Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2015
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2015-0238, written 19 May 2015. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 19 May 2015 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2015-0238 |
| Deceased | Sheila Johnson |
| Coroner | Robert Hunter |
| Coroner area | Derby and Derbyshire |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths |
| Organisation named | University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust · Tameside Hospital NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
OFFICE OF HER MAJESTY’S CORONER
DERBY& DERBYSHIRE CORONER’S AREA
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1)
REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1. Karen James Chief Executive, Tameside Hospital
1
CORONER
I am Robert W Hunter, senior coroner, for the coroner area of Derby and Derbyshire.
2
CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.
3
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 23rd May 2013 I commenced an investigation into the death of Sheila Johnson aged
74 years. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 11th March 2015. The
conclusion of the inquest was that the medical cause of death was:
1a. Haemorrhage from left femoral artery graft site (operated May 2013).
The circumstances were that on the 15th May 2013 Sheila Johnson died at 11 John
Street, Glossop from catastrophic haemorrhage from a femoral graft wound less than 24
hours after being discharged from Tameside Hospital with an open left groin wound
being treated with Total Negative Pressure Therapy.
My Conclusion was:
Sheila Johnson died as a result of wound dehiscence from a left femoral endarterectomy
and bovine graft, in part because signs of bleeding from the wound were recognised
before her discharge from the ward, however a number of failures prevented appropriate
measures being taken to address the issue and prevent further bleeding. On balance
these failures were gross failures and Sheila Johnson’s death was contributed to by
neglect.
4
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
The nurse in charge of Mrs Johnson’s care was informed by two doctors that Mrs
Johnson was not to be discharged until Mrs Johnson had been reviewed by the
consultant later that afternoon. Despite this she carried on and discharged Mrs Johnson
before that consultant review.
The consultant when he came to the ward to review Mrs Johnson he was made aware
that she had already been discharged. Despite appreciating that she was at risk of
catastrophic haemorrhage he made no effort to recall Mrs Johnson back to the ward that
afternoon as a matter of urgency.
5
CORONER’S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. –
(1) The court was provided with a copy of the Trust’s Internal Report of the
circumstances of Mrs Johnson’s death and heard evidence regarding the
findings from the author of the report.
(2) The court was of the opinion that any such investigation and report must be
sufficiently robust if it is to have any meaning and lessons learnt to prevent
future deaths.
(3) The court was of the opinion that on this occasion there was insufficiency of
inquiry and the investigation was perfunctory and slipshod.
(4) Statements of 6 members of staff were taken. Two of those members were
interviewed, the court was of the opinion that other key witnesses including the
nurse who discharged Mrs Johnson should have been interviewed.
(5) An audit of the nursing and medical documentation was undertaken, however
this confined itself to establishing that the entries were accurately dated and
timed with a legible signature. No consideration was given to the clinical content
of those entries and as to whether or not they were appropriate.
(6) The report contained serious factual inaccuracies and based on those errors of
fact erroneous findings and recommendations were made.
(7) The court believes that should future reports be conducted in this manner then
patient’s clinical conditions may be compromised and such errors could lead to
deaths in the future.
(8) The Trust appeared to have no system in place for the urgent recall of patients
who had been discharged with potentially life threatening conditions.
6
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and your
organisation has the power to take such action.
7
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report,
namely by 14th July 2015. I, the coroner, may extend the period.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.
8
COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested
Persons; the Family of Mrs Johnson.
I have also sent it to:
The Secretary of State for Health.
The Chief Executive of the Care Quality Commission.
who may find it useful or of interest.
I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful
or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your
response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.
9
19th May 2015 Robert W Hunter
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
ak» aS ‘ From the Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP Secretary of State for Health i | AE | Department i of H eal th Richmond House Your Ref: RWH/DS/906/13 79 Whitehall London SWIA 2NS PO00000936797 rs Dr Robert W Hunter Senior Coroner, Derby and Derbyshire Coroner’s Area Coroner’s Court 5-6 Royal Court Basil Close Chesterfield $41 7SL 17 JUN 2015 Dw a. Wk, Thank you for your letter of 19 May enclosing the Regulation 28 Report on the inquest into the death of Sheila Johnson. I share your concern following your comments on the lack of co-operation by the Tameside Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. Departmental officials have made enquiries with the Trust, and I have been assured that it will be responding appropriately to your Regulation 28 Report. Officials have shared your letter with the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The CQC advises that it will follow up any actions identified as a result of the Trust’s response as part of its ongoing engagement with the Trust. The CQC will also reinforce the duties of the Trust in relation to its duty of candour and being open, transparent and cooperative with key stakeholders and statutory bodies. You are right that improving transparency and reinforcing a culture of openness and honesty is a key focus for the NHS and it is crucial that NHS trusts meet expectations in this area. The fundamental standards require that providers assess, monitor and improve the quality and safety of services. The CQC’s guidance about complying with this regulation, to which all providers must have regard, states that providers should share relevant information. This would include sharing information about incidents with relevant bodies, including coroners. In addition, the CQC has a number of actions in hand that are intended to improve working between healthcare providers and coroners, including the establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding with the Coroners Society of England and Wales to achieve better working relationships and improve the sharing of information, as well as developing a single protocol for handling information from coroners, which includes storing and passing on information. You will also be aware that there is existing legislation in relation to how public bodies and professionals should behave with respect to coronial processes. Finally, you may be aware that one of the recommendations made by in his report into the deaths of mothers and babies at the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust was around the setting out of duties of all NHS trusts and their staff in relation to inquests. The Government hopes to respond formally and fully to the Morecambe Bay investigation recommendations shortly, which may be of interest to you. While I am not able at this point to give an indication of the Government’s response to the recommendations, I hope you will be assured that we are giving thought to whether further measures are required to guide appropriate behaviour in relation to coroner investigations and inquests. I have also copied your letter to Monitor, as the Foundation Trust sector regulator for health services in England, so it is aware of your concerns in relation to Tameside. I hope this reply is helpful. GA yinonhy JEREMY HUNT | | |
Tameside Hospital NHS Foundation Trust Tameside General Hospital ually one Department Fountain Street Tameside General Hospital Ashton-Under-Lyne Ashton-Under-Lyne Tameside OL6 SRW OL6 SRW [ee Telephione: 0161 922 6000 Fax: 9" June 2015 Dr Robert W Hunter HM Senior Coroner Coroner's Court 5 — 6 Royal Court Basil Close Chesterfield Derbyshire S41 7SL Dear Dr Hunter, Re: Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths following Inquest into the death of Mrs. Sheila Johnson | am in receipt of your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 19" May 2015. ! am very sorry that you have had cause to identify concerns regarding the quality of the Trust’s internal investigation process and in relation to the system for the urgent recall of patients discharged with potentially life threatening conditions. We accept in full your verdict and requirements. It was recognised by the Keogh Review Team who visited the Trust in May 2013 that at the time of Mrs. Johnson’s death the Trust fell below expected standards in relation to a number of areas associated with the governance of care and treatment. As a result, the Trust was placed in Special Measures. The Trust engaged a new Leadership team and accepted all the recommendations made by the Keogh Review and CQC which resulted in a Trust-wide review and improvement programme. The improvement plan has been extensively monitored by the CQC, Monitor, NHS England and Tameside and Glossop CCG with independent third part scrutiny Since Mrs. Johnson’s inpatient treatment, her tragic death and the 2013 investigation into the circumstances surrounding her death; considerable changes have been made both to improve the quality of the Trust's internal investigations and the process for discharging patients. As part of the improvement programme across the Trust, a review of senior nursing staff took place, and medical staffing underwent a review with the intention of improving Senior Doctor presence within the Trust and their availability out of hours to improve quality, safety and patient care. The Trust has implemented a programme of Leadership Development for Clinical Leaders and Ward and Senior managers to develop leadership capabilities, abilities and build a more collaborative organisational culture. In relation to your particular concerns regarding the quality of the internal investigation undertaken at this time, the Trust's processes have been revised significantly and beyond all recognition. The current policy for the management of serious incidents including their investigation has been rewritten and implemented. The policy provides clear guidance to Trust staff in relation to incident reporting and the investigation process, with the aim of improving the quality of the Trust's investigations. We have had this monitored by the CQC and CCG and reported to external oversight groups. All serious incidents are reviewed by Directors who assign a level of investigation and an investigation team to each serious incident, consisting either of appropriate individuals from the Trust or where relevant external independent persons. Professional advice relevant to the specialty is now obtained. We recognise that staff undertaking incident investigations need to be appropriately trained. Since the investigation into Mrs. Johnson's death the Trust has invested significantly in additional training provided by an external facilitator. This has delivered root cause analysis and investigation training across all divisions of the Trust, the most recent training taking place in March of this year. More than 75 senior officers have been trained in RCA. This has underpinned the revised policy to ensure investigations are more robust and recommendations are acted upon and patient care and safety is improved. A sample of serious incident investigations conducted since the training were audited during the period November 2014 and March 2015 by independent third party auditors (MIAA) and the audit demonstrated that the individuals involved in those investigations were appropriately trained. The auditors concluded in their report dated 10" March 2015 that the serious incident processes provided significant assurance to the Trust that systems and processes were in place. We have also introduced improvements to the process for internal review of serious incident reports. There is now an Executive led Serious Incident Review Panel which reviews all serious incident investigation reports and action plans and scrutinises and challenges them, providing feedback to the investigation teams when further clarity is required. The panel also require that responsible nursing and medical leads attend the meeting to feed back what changes have been made and what lessons have been learnt from investigations. As part of the investigation process appropriate recommendations and actions are identified either within the investigation report or in a separate action plan to address issues that have been highlighted. The Serious Incident Executive Review Panel discusses actions arising from serious incidents and how they will be addressed by the divisions of the Trust. The Trust has a number of improvement work streams into which the actions arising from serious incidents have been mapped, including patient safety programme work streams that are monitored and feed into the Trust's Governance arrangements which report to Trust Board. The Quality & Governance Unit has developed processes to work with the Trust’s Clinical Divisions and follow-up on the implementation of actions identified and further assurances are gained through the ward accreditation process, Board leadership walk-rounds to wards and departments, and patient experience feedback. The complaints processes, HM Coroner’s Inquest processes and mortality review processes are now coordinated into one process to oversee the Statutory Duty of Candour requirement. ! also note your concern that the audit of the nursing and medical documentation undertaken during the investigation into Mrs. Johnson’s care confined itself to establishing that the entries were accurately dated and timed with a legible signature. The revised investigation process and procedure includes the requirement that incident and complaint investigations consider relevant best practice and policies and that the investigation should include whether the recommended systems and processes were followed, as well as whether record keeping standards were adhered to. It signposts the user to the Incident Decision Tree which also includes the requirement to assess decisions made and actions taken against policies and procedures to identify whether there were failures in systems and processes or individual failures. The Trust acknowledges your concerns and accepis them in full. The fact that there was no formal system for the urgent recall of patients discharged with potentially life threatening conditions, has been addressed by the Patient Flow Manager. Staff will be directed to attempt to contact the patient or relatives in the first instance and contact the General Practitioner and Community staff should the patient or relatives not be contactable, if necessary staff will be directed to contact the Police and ask for a ‘safe and well’ check. The procedure will be defined in a simple flowchart which signpost will staff to the correct actions and responsibilities should any staff member identify that a patient has been discharged and needs to be recalled urgently. We are closely monitoring the quality of discharges with our CCG. The process will also be included as an appendix within the Admission and Discharge Policy. | am writing directly to the family of Mrs. Johnson extending my apologies and sincere condolences. ! hope that the above clarifies the improvements that we have made and addresses your concerns and findings in relation to Mrs. Johnsons Inquest. Piease do noi hesitate to contact me again if any more information is required. Yours sincerely Karen James Chief Executive cc. Monitor cQc Tameside and Glossop CCG
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