Wiktoria Was

AS TOTAL POLICING

DIRECTORATE OF PROFESSIONALISM

Fiona Taylor
Assistant Coroner Tony Badenoch QC, Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Inner London South,
Southwark Coroners Court, Room 918
1 Tennis Street New Scotland Yard

London SE1 1

Y' Broadway
Coroners’ Cr London
tel: 0207-525-0: SW1H OBG

Date: 7th September 2015

Dear Mr Badenoch,

| write on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service in response to your Regulation 28
report to prevent future deaths, dated 13" July 2015, following the inquest concluded
before you and a jury on 8" May 2015 at Southwark Coroners Court into the
circumstances of the death on 6th January 2013 of Wiktoria WAS, at the junction of
IIderton Road and Canal Road, London SE16. You will recall that the conclusion of the
jury at the inquest was that her death was as a result of a road traffic collision, when a

car being followed by a police vehicle struck the car Ms WAS was a passenger in.
You raised three matters of concern:

1) "At the point of impact and for an unsatisfactory period of time thereafter, there
was insufficient regard to Wiktoria Was and her family. There were a number of
officers immediately at the scene, and all focus appears to have been on the
wanted suspect to the exclusion of injured third parties. A call for an ambulance
without further initial enquiry to third parties, whilst the pursuit continued for the
wanted suspect was inadequate."

2) "Evidence was placed before me from other unrelated deaths in police pursuits.
There was an insufficiency of material to satisfactorily conclude that lessons had

been learnt about police pursuits."

3 “Police Officers were not required to attend for sufficient ‘refresher’ training
either at all, at satisfactory intervals, or of a sufficiently rigorous nature. This
revealed a gap in continued learning and skills updates. In this regard | would be
concerned to learn if lessons to be learnt from this investigation about the
potential impact of police pursuits on third parties were not disseminated to

officers as soon as reasonably possible."
MPS Response - Preface

In drafting a response to these points subject area experts have been consulted,
principally EE Strategic Manager Safety and Health Risk Management; Chief
Inspector [J Operational Lead, Hendon Driving School, Officer Safety Training,
Taser and First Aid At Work; Acting Inspector Tristian Knight, Roads Policing and Police
Driving Standards Unit; and Sergeant Jim Widdicks, Hendon Driving School. Dates,
relevant parties, and communications have where possible been confirmed by reference
to emails, meeting minutes, published policies, intranet communications or other
documents. The following is based on a review of such documents, and the review in
turn of this response in draft by the above parties. | have not had sight of transcripts of
any oral evidence from the inquest itself, so in the event of any variance between these
reported facts and evidence you know to have been presented during the inquest itself, |
of course defer to your greater knowledge.

Response Concern #1: Police focus following the coltision

Society requires that on occasion police officers, in furtherance of their primary mission
to protect and serve the public, take grave decisions in circumstances of imperfect
knowledge, or where no good outcomes can be guaranteed. We ask, in other words, that
officers make choices, and take risks. Training, policies, procedures, equipment, and
tactics may all play a part in mitigating these risks, and ensuring that they are not, or
should not, be taken recklessly; but all risk-taking irreducibly involves judgement and
balance. Accordingly, the prospect for harm, by commission or omission, can never be

totally prevented; and any risk decision, properly considered, should be judged by the

quality of the decision making involved, not by its’ outcome. With this in mind, | note your
concern that:

“...the Standard Operating Procedure [on pursuits, exhibit 2] “...does recognise
the interests of third parties, but is silent on the issue of how an officer should
approach the competing interests of a third party in the event of injury and the
need to pursue a suspect. “ [your report, para 32]

A simple mnemonic - ‘COW’ - Casualties, Obstructions, Witnesses - has long been a
cornerstone of officer training in the handling of road traffic incidents, reminding first
responders of their priorities as they arrive on scene. However, since the tragic death of
Ms WAS, further steps have been taken by the MPS to better equip our officers, firstly
with the cognitive tools to structure their choices in such difficult circumstances, and
subsequently to better evidence these choices in a way which can make their rationale
more readily apparent to others. For example, the Metropolitan Police now subscribes to
the National Decision Model (NDM), developed by the College Of Policing.

First published by the College in its current form in December 2014, and now an
element in all MPS new recruit training, in-service refresher programmes, Standard
Operating Procedures and on-line reference ‘toolkits’, this model offers a structure for al/
police decision-making and subsequent recording: before pre-planned events, during
fast-moving spontaneous incidents, or subsequently, when participants have time to
reflect on and document the actions and choices they have made in the moment, often
on the basis of incomplete information, or under the physiological and psychological

stress of intense situations.

In short, decision makers can if they wish now use the NDM in their statements and
records of an event to structure a rationale of what they did during it and why; whilst
managers and others can use the model to objectively review these decisions and

actions.

The model encourages the officer to consider six elements of every situation: five of
these suggest possible actions the officer should actively consider:

e Information — Gather information and intelligence

e Assessment — Assess threat and risk and develop a working strategy

e Powers and policy — Consider powers and policy

e Options — Identify options and contingencies

e Action and review — Take action and review what happened
The sixth, central element is the new Police Code of Ethics, and its associated
Standards of Professional Behaviour, given legislative force by the Police (Conduct)
Regulations 2012. This requires the officer to consider the above actions in the light of
the following ethical principles:

e Accountability - You are answerable for your decisions, actions and omissions

e Fairness — You treat people fairly

e Honesty — You are truthful and trustworthy

e Integrity — You always do the right thing

e Leadership — You lead by good example

¢ Objectivity - You make choices on evidence and your best professional
judgement

e Openness — You are open and transparent in your actions and decisions
e Respect — You treat everyone with respect
e Selflessness — You act in the public interest

College of Policing (2014) National Decision Model [Internet].

https.//www.app.college. police. uk/app-content/national-decision-model/the-national-

decision-model/ [Accessed 25 August 2015]

Crucially, the National Decision Model states:

“...Even where the outcome was not as planned, if the decision was reasonable
and proportionate in the circumstances, and made in accordance with the Code of
Ethics, the decision maker deserves the support of their supervisor and that of the

organisation.”

This places a premium on fully understanding those circumstances. The NDM offers a
mechanism for structuring the necessary evidence to enlist that support, now, which was
not available at the time to the officers involved in this incident. This absence, together
with your observation that “...all focus appears to have been on the wanted suspect to
the exclusion of injured third parties” therefore necessarily refocuses attention on any
explanation for the ‘dynamic risk assessment’ choices made by the officers involved in
this fast developing incident, which, as the timed CAD entries and radio traffic indicate,

was concluded 105 seconds after it began.

The context in which risk is undertaken is that of the officers’ duty to the public. The
National College of Policing reminds us that the ‘core operational duties’ of an officer

are:

e protecting life and property
e preserving order
e preventing the commission of offences

e bringing offenders to justice.

College of Policing (2013) : Core planning principles [Internet].
https://www. app. college. police.uk/app-content/operations/operational-planning/core-
principles/ [Accessed 24 August 2015]

Failing to knowingly act in defence of any of these principles when an opportunity to do
so was available would therefore require, firstly, establishing that such an opportunity did
in fact exist; secondly, that an officer knowingly chose nof to take it, without good reason.
Where both of these conditions are satisfied, such a failure, in the absence of any
mitigating factor or other sufficiently compelling claim on their duty may constitute

grounds for possible disciplinary, or even a criminal finding of neglect of duty.

It follows that there may be a conflict of principles - for example, between the duty to
protect life and the duty to bring offenders to justice. In such a case, the culpability or

otherwise of an officer making what may be considered in hindsight a ‘wrong’ choice -
perhaps through opting to pursue offenders at the expense of protecting life, as is the
suggestion here - therefore requires close examination of what that officer knew, and
intended by their actions at the relevant time, in the context of the situation as they
understood it to be, so that a proper view of the quality of their decision making can be

arrived at.

An important element to consider in taking that view is the recognition that human
decision making under conditions of threat, risk, or stress, where the body's ‘fight or
flight’ mechanisms have been engaged, is not purely an intellectual exercise. ‘Red Mist’
is the colloquial term to describe the sudden onset of a state of mind which can lead to
loss of proper judgement during these high-risk incidents. The MPS works to the

following definition of it:

‘The narrowing of attention through heightened psychological and physiological
arousal in the pursuit of a goal ..’

From ‘Making sense of invulnerability at work — a qualitative study of police
drivers’ by f Behavioural Psychologist, Cranfield University

Recognised ‘symptoms’ include a tendency to ‘fix’ mentally and visually on a target or
threat, to the exclusion of other elements in a scene, and to the detriment of subsequent
recollection of background detail in that scene. Suitable training can attempt to mitigate,
but not entirely eliminate the effects of this basic element of human nature. For example,
a simple recognition of the symptoms of the physiological fact, and the way it manifests
in auditory exclusion (loss of hearing), tunnel vision (loss of peripheral vision),
accelerated heart beat and so on is addressed in all police driving courses, as a step
towards mitigating its’ effects. Since 2006 this awareness has also been a feature of
every new MPS recruits’ Foundation Training. Here, it forms a component within the four
hour course module “The Worst Enemy: Dynamic Risk Assessment’, [Course reference
GN164]. course motto: ‘Stop and Think’.

| understand that the facts of officer actions and decisions in the immediate aftermath of
the collision between the vehicle driven by the fleeing suspect and that occupied by the
deceased, including EEE request for an ambulance, and the immediate foot pursuit
of the suspect by the officers on scene, were explored both by the IPCC independent

investigators, and in some depth at inquest, and | do not propose to rehearse this detail

again here. | note however your particular concern that:

“,.A call for an ambulance, without further initial enquiry to third parties whilst the

pursuit continued for the wanted suspect was inadequate.”

The IPCC, as the independent body charged by statute to consider potential
wrongdoing by the police also had consideration of this within scope as part of the terms

of reference of their own initial investigation:

“1. To investigate the authorisation, supervision, and level of risk assessment
carried out by the MPS Control Room staff and police vehicle crews who
responded to this incident. Including all relevant factors such as: road conditions,
other road users, and the general locality through which the pursuit passed.” (my

emphasis)
[Wictoria Was (deceased) Investigation into a fatal collision following police
pursuit., IPCC ref 2013/000345, p3 para 4.1 ]

Whilst highlighting some momentary breakdown in the communication between the
police control room and the vehicle engaged in the pursuit, however, the IPCC report

nevertheless concluded:

“...this was a fast moving, dynamic incident which was over in under two
minutes...From the evidence available, ou svit of Devon Newell
was justified and proportionate. The investigation finds that no police officer or
police staff committed criminal or disciplinary offences during the pursuit.”

[IPCC report p13-14, para 101-103]

| understand that the IPCC have been provided with a copy of your report, and have it
within their power to reinstitute an investigation of the behaviour of the officers involved
should they choose to do so, in the light of the evidence presented at inquest and your
subsequent comments. At time of writing | have received no indication that they are

minded to do this.

However, given the seriousness of the criticism raised, the matter was voluntarily re-
referred by our Directorate of Professional Standards to its Specialist Investigations Unit,

to conduct an internal ‘Severity Assessment’, that is, to review the available materials,
including those adduced at inquest, to determine whether, in the light of your comments,
the actions of officers at the scene should now, the IPCC judgement notwithstanding,

warrant further disciplinary consideration.

It is not in dispute that the attending officers failed to immediately check on the welfare of
the occupants of Ms Was’ car. Nor that they instead pursued and caught the fleeing
suspect. Nor, sadly, that the severity of the collision caused by the suspect’s car was
such that Ms Was died on impact and any failing ‘...could not on any view be said to be
causative or contributory.’ [Your report, para 32.] The point at issue therefore:

What evidence is there in the available materials to suggest why attending officers
pursued the suspect instead of attempting to render first aid? A wilful choice to put the
capture of the suspect ahead of the duty to preserve life could still potentially amount to
a serious neglect of duty. Please note: | am not privy to the detail of the oral evidence
given at inquest, and therefore any construction placed on the following account may in
your view be overthrown by evidence heard there.

Detective Sergeant |G Specialist Investigations considered the question of
whether discipline for any officer would be appropriate in view of your comments. In his
subsequent ‘Severity Report’ of 17" August 2015 EBpotes that he reviewed the
written statements of the attending officers, the tape transcripts of their interviews,
viewed the CCTV footage of the collision scene which determined the final position of
the VW Polo in which Ms Was died, and reviewed what was said by the officers when

they gave evidence during the inquest.

BB notes of a. officer who called for an ambulance) that “.../t was

only after he returned to the scene of the crash that he became aware of the VW Polo.”;
similarly, “.. tates he was aware the Peugeot had hit something but he
wasn’t sure what.”. Of EEE account of his arrival at the scene,
records that the officer stated he “...can see debris and a black car that was facing
towards him [the suspect's vehicle] but could not see any other vehicles that had been
involved in the crash.”; whilst PC Humble is reported as saying it was only «after

2: detained and...wher|ii returned to the crash site did he notice the

damaged VW Polo.”

In short, in the immediate aftermath of the collision EE finds no evidence in any of
the officers’ accounts that they were aware of the location or condition of any other
vehicles involved. All officers’ accounts do however note the sudden appearance of the
suspect from his own crashed vehicle, and his attempted escape, and it is this factor
which becomes the focus of their attention in the moments after the crash.

It is at least possible therefore that in those moments the physiological effects of
‘perceptual narrowing’ described above, and which our training regimes strive to
mitigate, may have played a part in these officers’ apparent ‘blindness’ to other parties at
the scene. One element of this, as we have noted, is a tendency to fix on the ‘target’ - in
this case, a suspect for a serious assault, possibly armed and therefore a continuing
threat to colleagues and public alike, exiting a crashed vehicle directly in front of the
police car, and beginning to run - to the exclusion of other elements in the scene at the
periphery of the officers’ vision, which, in this case, unfortunately also included the VW
Polo containing Ms Was. This could possibly be considered a subjective, albeit
physiologically and psychologically comprehensible failure by the attending officers to

maintain situational awareness.

However, a report also notes, there may instead be an objective reason why
there is nothing apparent in the written, tape or oral accounts of the attending officers to
indicate that in the immediate aftermath of the collision they were actually aware of the
severity of the damage to the car in which Ms Was died. For, as the CCTV of the scene
verifies, he notes that Ms Was’ vehicle had spun around 180 degrees, and rolled away
from the point of initial impact, such that the worst of the damage — which might have
offered an immediate visual indication of the involvement of the vehicle in the incident
and of the potential seriousness of it for the vehicles’ occupants — was facing away from

the viewpoint of the officers first on scene. As he puts it:

“...Officers at the scene would have had sight of the front of the VW Polo which
did not look fike it had suffered impact. This may well explain why the officers are
not aware of the other vehicle involved in the crash.”

| additionally note that the documented evidence is not conclusive in determining what
was in | mind when he called for an ambulance. The available material is at
least as strongly indicative of the possibility he was calling for an ambulance for the only
person whom he reasonably believed at that point might require one - the occupant of
the suspect vehicle, which he knew to have crashed - as it is of the counter-suggestion

that he was instead attempting to consciously derogate from his primary responsibility to
the occupants of the VW Polo by calling the LAS, in order that he could continue the
pursuit of the suspect.

In the relevant exchange during his taped interview, acknowledges that the
suspect must have collided with another vehicle, but “before [the suspect] vehicle has
come to rest because I’ve seen it go up in the air from a distance and then travelled to it;
in that space | have said over the radio this vehicle has crashed...! requested LAS to our
location....But | could not see the other vehicle.” (pp. 72- 73 of interview of 14/01/13,
exhibit BPL1).

In short: he was aware that there had been a crash; there was a crashed vehicle (the
suspects) before him; he called for an ambulance. Respectfully, unless further detail was
offered in oral evidence, that would appear to be all that the available account can
sustain. A comment from the MPS Lead for Health and Safety matters
may be instructive here:

“Dynamic risk assessment is a process of common sense decision making to
enable officers and staff to manage the inherent day to day risks in policing; at
high-risk fast time incidents, individual officers and operational staff will carry out a
dynamic risk assessment of hazards and take appropriate and immediate actions
to manage the hazards and control the risk. All officers and operational police
staff receive dynamic assessments training on entry to the service. In relation to
this case, it is worthy of note that in the HSE document "Striking the balance
between operational and health and safety duties in the Police Service".
[http://www.hse.gov.uk/services/police/assets/docs/duties.pdf] Paragraph 9
states that ‘HSE inspectors, when inspecting or investigating an individual Police
Force using HSE’s own procedures, including the Work Related Death Protocols,
will consider:

- the actual information about the incident that was available to
officers and staff when they had to make operational decisions in
what we recognise are sometimes dangerous, fast-moving and
emotionally-charged environments, but not revisiting decisions
made during operations with the benefit of information that could not

reasonably have been known at the time.

ons

[My emphasis]

BE arcs a similar point in the concluding remarks of his Severity Report:

“This is not a situation where disciplinary proceedings would be suitable. In
summary, it would appear that none of the officers saw the VW Polo on their
immediate arrival at the scene. a cic’ immediately request an
ambulance with regards to the crash. On the arrival at the crash by , |

Ene 1) necdiately started to make off from the
scene an@§iichose to give chase. | | had information that the
driver of the Peugeot was wanted for a serious assault and may be armed. |

Hose to also chase i. assist a... based on the
increased risk that came with this information. The officers had not seen the VW
Polo and their decision making is in line with the National Decision Model.

a... | sda attended the scene of the crash and again did

not see the VW Polo but did witness the foot chase and again took immediate
action to assist TE Again this decision was taken in
line with the National Decision Model and the fact they were presented with a
situation where they needed to take action immediately and had information that
meant there was an increased risk to their colleagues...The officers have not
neglected to give care to the occupants of the VW Polo and chosen to pursue i
BB stead, they are only aware of the VW Polo following the point where Hi

BB was detained.”

Response Concern #2: Lessons Learnt from Vehicle Pursuits

| note that you are concerned that the Metropolitan Police have failed to provide a

‘sufficiency of evidence’ regarding the learning we take from vehicle pursuits. Some
context may be appropriate to provide here.

In 2013-14, the last full year for which we have currently have audited data, the total
MPS vehicle fleet drove in excess of 68 million miles, or an average of 186,301 miles
each day, a proportion of which of course was conducted under emergency response
conditions, where our suitably-trained drivers, tested against national standards, are
permitted to treat mandatory speed limits and other traffic signals as ‘advisory’. All ‘police
involved collisions’ - ‘polcols’ - ranging from ‘vicinity only’ incidents involving third parties,
or minor ‘clipped wing mirror’ contacts, through to fatal collisions must be reported; and

all are subject to internal review, supervision, and if necessary, internal training,
discipline or external prosecution.

Based on the current ‘polcol’ data, this translates into one collision every 15,657 policing
miles travelled. However only 48% of these are adjudged to be ‘blameworthy’ (that is,
the collision is held to be the responsibility of the police driver), meaning that in this
period our officers were held responsible for one collision every 31,940 miles travelled.
[source: Sergeant FY Police Driving Standards Unit] We are not complacent
regarding any collision directly or indirectly involving a police vehicle, but these figures
do offer some perspective on how much police vehicle travel is safely conducted without

incident.

All Death or Serious Injury (DSI) incidents involving police vehicles are subject of
mandatory referral to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and subsequent
investigation, either directly by the IPCC themselves, or by the Directorate of
Professional Standards and the Police Driving Standards Unit. All deaths of this kind of
course are further subject to review through the coronial process; and all parties to these
levels of scrutiny: the IPCC, coroners, and our own investigators - can make learning

recommendations arising from the particular case.

| am informed that you have already seen a 2011 response to coroner in the 2009 death
of Liam Albert as background to our organisational learning processes, and so have
already had an account of how recommendations are logged, analyzed, referred to
subject area experts to inform and improve their practice, and their confirmation of steps
undertaken in response to the recommendations captured as ‘corporate memory’ around

the issue, in a process of which this letter is itself an example.

You will also therefore be aware that in 2009 an upswing in reported DSI incidents to an
all time high of 8 in a single year, of which the Albert case was one, prompted ‘Safer
Driving 3’, a large scale programme of change looking at all aspects of MPS driving
practice, from equipment and vehicle specifications, through driver selection and
training, to improved tactical options for the resolution of pursuits, and better
management of ongoing pursuits themselves.

This was an ambitious and complex piece of work, conceived in a different economic
climate from that which now confronts public services in the UK, initially covering over
100 different strands of activity across multiple business and policy areas, aspects of

which are still being progressed today. Progress on some of these strands has been
slowed, or on occasion cancelled in the light of the new financial and operational
environment in which we now function. | will not revisit in detail here all the operational
changes which have directly resulted from ‘Safer Driving 3’, and its’ 2015 successor, the
Pursuits Working Group, but | will note that despite budgetary constraints a great many
improvements have been successfully carried through to implementation as a direct
result of Safer Driving 3. The following are some of the fruits of that programme:

e Adoption of the ‘A Pursuit’ mnemonic by both police drivers and control room
staff, closing a much-criticised ‘decision gap’ in pursuit governance, and
permitting tighter contro! room grip of the risk of vehicle pursuits, as it obliged both
‘ends’ of the communication to progress in lock-step through an identical script
covering the 13 points agreed nationally as being essential information for a
pursuit controller to accurately assess the risk of any pursuit, and to authorize it to
continue.

e Improvements to Standard Operating Procedures to clarify phases of a pursuit,
roles, and responsibilities.

e Clear corporate guidance on driving standards and discipline options.

e Funding for increased availability of ‘Hostyds’ tyre deflation devices

e Training of suitably qualified officers in the ‘TPAC’ rolling roadblock tactic

e Development and delivery of a Pursuit Narration training package for in car radio
operators for all new recruits.

e Agreement in principal to funding for a career-length driver record database
(ongoing)

e Evolution of the safest tactical response to growing criminal use of motorcycles
(ongoing)

| will return to the subject of training in more detail in the final point below, but in closing
on this topic will note that in at least one sense an ‘insufficiency’ of evidence is perhaps
fortunate, in that absolute numbers in any year sampled to date remain very small. Of
course on such low numbers, a single tragic incident can have a disproportionately
calamitous effect on any ‘percentage improvement’ shown; whilst for those affected, a
single death is one too many. With these thoughts in mind then:

Safer Driving 3 was introduced in 2009 in part as a response to that year being our
worst-ever ‘high’ of 8 Home Office ‘Category One’ road traffic fatalities, defined as
‘...deaths of motorists, cyclists or pedestrians arising from police pursuits, police vehicles

responding to emergency calls and other police traffic related activity’. [source

https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/research_stats/Deaths Report 14
15.pdf accessed 27/08/15]

However, according 7 0Utt~C@Y Crime Intelligence Analyst with the

Directorate of Professional Standards Specialist Investigations Unit, the quantitative
evidence that is available, albeit on a very small numerical base, does indeed show a

welcome downward trend:

Period Cat 1 Deaths
April 2009 - March 8

2010

April 2010 -March 3

2011

April 2011 -March 2

2012

April 2012 -March 4

2013

April 2013 -March 2

2014

April 2014 - March =
2015

It can be seen that in the five years since the introduction of Safer Driving 3, we have
consistently halved or more than halved the number of police involved fatal road traffic

incidents in comparison with our worst recent year.

There is also qualitative evidence to suggest that the lessons of Safer Driving 3 have
been taken on board. For example, in one of a number of similar cases, in the IPCC
report on the March 2013 Category 1 pursuit deaths of two passengers in a car driven by
a dangerous driver, our learning case reference IX-256-13, the independent IPCC
investigators in that case directly comment on the police use of the ‘A Pursuit’ mnemonic
to structure and evidence their dynamic risk assessment of the unfolding pursuit.
Together with the other evidence considered in that case, the officers’ explicit reliance on
this product of Safer Driving 3, evidenced in the transcripts of their radio communications
with the control room, assisted the IPCC investigators in concluding that the risk of the

pursuit was under active consideration throughout, and not implicated in the dangerous
driving by the suspect which culminated in the deaths of two of his own passengers.

In sum, between the quantitative evidence of declining Category 1 deaths year on year,
and the well-evidenced qualitative accounts of professionally managed pursuits captured
in independent investigations, of which the above is an example, directly attributable to
the use of tools developed during the Safer Driving 3 project, | respectfully submit that
there is in fact solid evidence of progress in our management of these high risk, fast
moving situations, albeit on a small evidence base - which is itself a testament to how
many vehicle pursuits conclude safely and without incident.

However, we are not complacent, and continue to adapt our policies and procedures in
the face of new and difficult threats, such as the current, growing exploitation of our
safety protocols by motorcycle-using criminals. Most recently, for example, Police
Notices #33 of 2015, published on 13th August, effective on Monday 17th August, takes
its’ lead from the latest changes to the College of Policing Authorised Professional
Practice (APP) on the Management of Police Pursuits, and covered the following topics:

e Pursuit Authorisations

e Authorisation for Tactical Phase

e Authorisations for Motorcycle/quad bike Pursuits

e Armed Pursuits

e Pre-planned operations

e Introduction of Dynamic Risk Assessment aid
Re your observation that: “...it is recognized by me that police pursuits are inherently
dangerous and carry risk. It is not my function to offer opinions about the
appropriateness of this particular form of policing.” [your report para. 29] , please note
that there has been in our most recent procedural updates a considerable emphasis on

further clarification of authorizations and roles, and ‘failsafes’ introduced to radio
procedures to ensure that ‘message sent’ equaled ‘message received’ , all with the aim

of reducing risk through eliminating possible dangerous ambiguity wherever possible -

for example:

“All drivers must now ensure following providing the APURSUIT information they
specifically ask for "authority to continue a pursuit", drivers must not assume a pursuit
is authorised unless they are told it has been terminated. Control Room staff - Must
ensure once the pursuit is authorised that the driver is aware and this is confirmed
and recorded...TPAC drivers must ensure the pursuit is authorised and they identify
via their shoulder number who will perform the role of pursuit commander. Control
Room staff - Tactical Phase will only be declared when a TPAC trained driver is
aware the pursuit has been authorised and the Pursuit Commander has been
identified.”

The Notice also demonstrates a practical application of the National Decision Model, in
its application to the risk assessment process for the authorization of motorcycle
pursuits; and provides additional support for this difficult decision in the form of a flow
chart listing factors which might affect that decision.

| hope that the above affords some context for you on the evidence for our commitment
to continuous improvement, the most recent fruits of which | now turn in consideration of

your final point.

Response Concern #3: Refresher Training

As this months’ new Notice demonstrates, National guidance on all aspects of the safe
conduct of pursuits has continued to evolve in recent years, punctuated by a history of
updates and revisions in our internal communications and training inputs to our drivers to
keep pace with these developments. This has included responses to coronial, HMIC,
IPCC and internal recommendations on such matters as: appropriate vehicles to engage
in the initial and tactical phases of a pursuit; risk assessment regarding police pursuit of
motorcycles; the safe operation of unmarked police vehicles; the appropriate use of
hazard warning equipment; the introduction of TPAC as a tactic; and so on.

We also monitor the legislative landscape. Our current model of regular re-assessment
for our qualified police drivers is based upon the recommendations of the 2002 IPCC
report ‘Police Road Traffic Incidents: A Study Of Cases Involving Serious and Fatal

Injuries’

[https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/rti_report_11_9 _07_new.pdf,
accessed 27/08/15], which in turn drew on the 1998 Lind Report /Lind, R. "Report of the
Working Group of the Association of Chief Police Officers (Personal and Training)
Committee into Pursuit Driver Training." Working Group of the Chief Police Officers
Committee, London (1998). ] which recommended that:

“Periodic formal assessment of driving skills should take place between each 3-5
years. A return to driving duties, after 12 months or more absence from a
particular standard should be accompanied by an appropriate assessment and
refresher training provided as necessary.” [ibid, para 4.3]

The MPS undertakes initial driver training at the MPS Driving School, Hendon where
students receive training from highly skilled, experienced and independent instructors
under the governance of Met Training OCU. All training undertaken within the MPS
Driving School is compliant with the national College Of Policing learning outcomes.

Once a student has successfully completed initial driver training, they are able to use this

skill, in line with service policy, in an operational capacity.

In order to maintain their driving qualification, police drivers in the MPS are currently
required to undertake an “Assessment Drive” conducted at a local level, by Advanced
Drivers who have themselves been trained to carry out these assessments. Our Driving
assessors are highly qualified ‘advanced drivers’ (formerly Level 1), who have attended
the MPS Driving School for a 3 day course and are taught how to give feedback on an
officers driving. Our current assessments are carried out at Response Car Level, and
consist of a ‘normal’ drive which does not make use of any legal exemptions, together
with a simulated emergency response drive using appropriate warning equipment and
making use of legal exemptions. This is sufficient to comply with the current regulatory
regime and, at a practical level, to check that drivers tested at Response Car level are
safe and capable. It is also worth noting that a smaller cohort of officers trained in the
‘TPAC’ tactic face further, more rigorous testing, and are assessed every 2 years at the
Driving School in order to maintain their TPAC classification.

We note however your concerns regarding the ‘...gap in continued learning and skills
updates’. We are also mindful of proposed changes to the regulatory framework. Section
19 of the Road Safety Act 2006 seeks to amend Section 87 of the Road Traffic
Regulation Act 1984 to regularise the current use by police, fire and ambulance services

of speed exemptions, in part by introducing a regulatory scheme for training courses for
high speed emergency service operations. The timescale for implementation of Section
19, the detail of the regulatory framework it will introduce, and the frequency of the
reassessment it will require are all unknown at present, but there are indications that it
may be introduced in 2016.

The new Regulations, once enacted, are likely to require a ‘requalification’ check test for
drivers who have not used the skill to the relevant standard in the workplace for a period
of 12 months or more; that actual refresher training is to be delivered only by suitably
qualified specialist instructors; and should incorporate any changes in best practice since
the last reassessment. !n short, if implemented, such a scheme would address exactly
those issues that you have identified.

In anticipation of this, the MPS has begun a scoping exercise under the direction of Chief
Inspector Dale of the Driving School to determine what resources will be required to
deploy a suitable training regime and manage the significant training abstractions
compliance would require, on the assumption that this will mean at least a full days’
training per driving officer, at least once every three to five years, for the duration of their
police career. The proposed course would take into account specialist roles such as
Covert Advanced and Advanced driving, and latest best practice for IPP and Blue Light
driving. To comply fully with the proposed regulatory change, it would also include a
formal assessment carried out by a qualified driving instructor.

This proposal also gives additional impetus to another long standing strand of the
original Safer Driving 3 project, namely the introduction of a full-spectrum database for
all drivers, to include not only their current driving skills and review date status, but also
to electronically capture and store centrally all the ancillary information and
documentation which at present is held off line locally as paper records, for example

driving licence and endorsement checks, eyesight checks, and so on.

| am advised that project delivery for this database is now dependant on the roll out of a
new Human Resources function for the entire organisation, as part of an outsourcing
agreement for the whole of our Business Support Services to a commercial provider.
This is a major computer infrastructure project for the MPS, elements of which are due to
go live on a new technology platform in October 2016. Chief Inspector Dale is the Driving
School link person on this work, but no firm deadline for the introduction of the driving-
specific functions within the new platform can be given as yet. As an interim measure an

existing, more limited driving database already in operation at the Driving School will be
used to capture attendance at the new Section 19 refresher attendances required once
the new regulatory framework is implemented.

In the meantime, in July this year the business case for funding the additional database
functionality was submitted as a ‘gateway case’ to the relevant forum, and is currently
supported to progress to the next stage of our budgeting process, though a commitment
for the release of the relevant funds at time of writing is still pending.

| am however optimistic that the operational need, the imminent changes to the
legislative landscape, and, not least, the highlighting of driver training governance
directly as an issue in your report should all greatly contribute to a successful bid.

Finally, in the ‘Written Reasons’ section of your report, though not listed as one of the
three ‘Matters Of Concern’ you comment in passing on the matter of radio
communications. It may reassure you to know that another product of the Safer Driving 3
project was the publication in June 2011 of a full, DVD-supported, instructor led ‘RT
Operators Course’ , designed ‘...to introduce the students to the correct action and
Radio

Telephony (RT) procedure in the event of a pursuit.’ [from the course Trainers Notes]

The course incorporates risk assessment, managing the stress response, the ‘A Pursuit’
mnemonic, and includes an interactive section where the students first witness an
‘expert’ vehicle pursuit narration on DVD, then are assessed on their own narration of

the same pursuit to the ‘A Pursuit’ model.

Since its introduction this package has been rolled out to selected elements of the
Territorial Policing (uniformed) workforce; and since July 2014 aif new recruits to the
service have had this input. Steps are in hand to ensure that the officers serving prior to
the course introduction, and who have yet to receive the benefit of it, may have an
opportunity to take the course in the near future, most likely re-worked as a computer-

delivered package.

In conclusion

The MPS aspires always to be a learning organisation, and to respond promptly and

effectively to well founded criticism of our actions. | trust that the above gives you some

reassurance that we have considered all the points you have raised fully, and moved
promptly to make improvements in our practice where the evidence shows we should.

Yours sincerely,

Fiona Taylor
Deputy Assistant Commissioner