Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0118, written 29 Dec 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 29 Dec 2023 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2024-0118 |
| Deceased | Meghan Chrismas |
| Coroner | Darren Stewart |
| Coroner area | Surrey |
| Category | Suicide (from 2015) |
| Organisation named | Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1. Chief Executive Officer, NHS England 2. Chief Constable Hampshire and Isle of Wight Constabulary 1 CORONER I am Darren Stewart OBE, Assistant Coroner, for the Coroner Area of Surrey 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 26th October 2021 I commenced an investigation into the death of Meghan Irene CHRISMAS. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 24th April 2023. The inquest was heard with a Jury. Mrs. CHRISMAS died of: 1a: Hypoxic Brain Injury 1b: Cardiac Arrest (Resuscitated) 1c: Hanging The jury returned the following narrative conclusion: Narrative conclusion On 18th February 2021, Mrs. CHRISMAS had a face-to-face appointment with her GP, after which 50mg of the anti-depressant Sertraline was prescribed. Mrs. CHRISMAS suffered a panic attack on 4th July 2021 whilst out with friends for which an ambulance was called. On 7th July 2021, Mrs. CHRISMAS was referred to a private psychiatrist who admitted her voluntarily to the Priory, Roehampton after a new patient assessment. Mrs. CHRISMAS had two consultations with the private psychiatrist before electing to discharge herself from the Priory on 16th July 2021. Following this discharge, Mrs. CHRISMAS continued to meet with the private psychiatrist and received prescriptions from both the private psychiatrist and her GP, meaning that Mrs. CHRISMAS had access to double prescriptions. Mrs. CHRISMAS also commenced Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) Therapy on 9th August 2021 with a separate private mental health practitioner. On 1st October 2021, Mrs. CHRISMAS impulsively attempted suicide by overdose and was admitted to Royal Surrey Hospital on the following day. Mrs. CHRISMAS was offered further psychiatric treatment through the NHS at this time, which she declined in favour of continuing with her private treatments. On 4th October 2021, Mrs. CHRISMAS's GP received a letter from Surrey and Borders Partnership's psychiatric liaison service concerning her attendance the previous day. This letter was passed on to neither the private psychiatrist nor the EMDR therapist who were treating Mrs. CHRISMAS. Healthcare professionals treating Mrs. CHRISMAS Meghan Irene CHRISMAS (02840-2021) placed significant reliance on the perception that she would be open and honest in her communication with them. Following concerns expressed to Mrs. CHRISMAS's GP by her husband, on 12th October 2021, the GP made an urgent referral to NHS Mental Health Services, which was ultimately rejected on the basis that Mrs. CHRISMAS had capacity and had not provided consent to be referred. On 18th October 2021, Mrs. CHRISMAS had an outpatient appointment with her private psychiatrist who reported that Mrs. CHRISMAS was progressing well. After checking into the Premier Inn, Guildford, Mrs. CHRISMAS expressed in a WhatsApp message to her husband that she planned to hang herself. Shortly thereafter, her husband called 999 to report his concerns. At 16:54, Mrs. CHRISMAS contacted Surrey Police to explain that she was fine and in Guildford, although she gave no further details with respect to her location. The incident regarding Mrs. CHRISMAS was initially logged as a Grade 1 Missing Person; however, according to the Hampshire Police control room logs there appears to have been some confusion with respect to risk status. Police officers acted under the impression that the incident was indeed high-risk, but the log describes the risk status as low. On the basis of this information, the handler in the control room decided to communicate with Surrey Police via email rather than by telephone at 17:18, which was inappropriate in light of the reality of the incident. It could not be concluded that this shortcoming significantly shortened the life of Mrs. CHRISMAS. By 18:15, there had been no response from Surrey Police, at which point the handler communicated via telephone. Police officers arrived at Guildford at 18:37 and sought access to the room in which Mrs. CHRISMAS was staying; however they found the room to be barricaded. Upon gaining access to the room, officers found Mrs. CHRISMAS suspended , . Attempts were made to resuscitate Mrs. CHRISMAS, resulting in the restarting of her heartbeat. After resuscitation, Mrs. CHRISMAS was transported to Royal Surrey County Hospital where she died two days later on 20th October 2021 from a Hypoxic Brain Injury. Meghan Irene CHRISMAS took her own life whilst suffering from the diagnosed illnesses of Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Depression, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH The circumstances of the death are recorded in the Jury’s Narrative Conclusion. Meghan Irene CHRISMAS (02840-2021) 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. The concerns raised were as follows: a. Passage of information between NHS and private healthcare providers. At a time where pressures on the NHS exist, particularly for mental health services, it is of concern that measures which could alleviate this pressure (where someone sources private care) do not exist. There is little or no policy, guidance or other effective arrangements to share important clinical information about patients between private and public healthcare sectors. b. The handling of the incident involving Mrs. CHRISMAS in Hampshire Constabulary’s Force Control Room which resulted in a hour delay in determining that an important communication (being a request for assistance) had not been received by a neighbouring force. This raises concerns as to the effectiveness in the supervision of operators handling the calls and the presence of redundancies or safeguards to detect such circumstances sooner to avoid repetition. I received further evidence orally and in writing from the Interested Persons’ subsequent to the completion of the Inquest in relation to these concerns. This evidence included responses from Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (SABP), The Priory Hospital, concerning the measures which have been put in place to address the concerns identified during the course of the Inquest with respect to sub-paragraph a. (above). I was satisfied that these measures addressed the concerns in relation to each of those Interested Persons. In addition, I received evidence from Hampshire Constabulary concerning the measures which have been put in place to address the concerns identified during the course of the Inquest as outlined at sub-paragraph b. (above). These measures included: a. Revision of training provided and the introduction of additional training for supervisors and control room staff. b. Implementation of National Policy concerning Missing Persons, including documentation to assist in control room responses to similar circumstances. c. Revision of the recording of risk assessment measurements on the computer aided dispatch record (CAD) system. It was further explained to the court that the measures should be seen in the context of wider cultural change management in the supervision and leadership being undertaken by Hampshire Constabulary in the operation of the Control Room. I have taken account of the measures, many of which are of a policy nature, as outlined by Hampshire Constabulary. However, I remain concerned in relation to the matters identified at sub-paragraph b. (above). In addition, I am concerned that, although welcoming the local changes implemented by the Grayshott Surgery Practice, The Priory Roehampton Meghan Irene CHRISMAS (02840-2021) and SABP, there is an absence of a wider national structure within the NHS that facilitates the effective passage of patient information between the private and public healthcare sectors. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. 1. The effectiveness in the supervision of operators handling calls in the Hampshire Police Force Control Room to detect circumstances such as those which involved Mrs. CHRISMAS sooner and to avoid repetition. Evidence of the change required in this respect, was not provided to the court beyond limited training measures; either in the form of a plan to bring such change about, or evidence that such change has otherwise occurred. 2. The passage of information between NHS and private healthcare providers is hindered due to the absence of an adequate structure to share important clinical information about patients in a timely and effective manner. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and/or your organisation have the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 23rd February 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting outthe timetable for action. Otherwise, you must explain why no action is proposed. 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons namely: Family of Meghan Irene CHRISMAS Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust The Priory Hospital, Roehampton , Consultant Psychiatrist, The Priory Hospital , Grayshott Surgery, Hindhead, Surrey Hampshire and Isle of Wight Constabulary Surrey Police I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I believe may find it useful or of interest. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it usefulor of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response. Meghan Irene CHRISMAS (02840-2021) 9 29th December 2023 Darren Stewart OBE Meghan Irene CHRISMAS (02840-2021)
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Hampshire & Isle of Wight Constabulary
and Thames Valley Police
Strategic Police & Fire Headquarters
Leigh Road
Eastleigh
SO50 9SJ
RE; Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths- Meghan Irene Christmas
who died on 20th October 2021
Thank you for your report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter the report dated 29th
December 2023 concerning the death of Meghan Irene Christmas on 20th October
2021. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your report I would
like to express my deep condolences to Megan’s Family and loved ones.
The Coroner has previously been provided with statements and live evidence from a
Superintendent. This dealt with topics including the national position on transfer or
enquiries/incidents, the National Police Directory, learning within the Constabulary and
control room supervision. This evidence included the updated manner in which risk
assessments are conducted following a system upgrade and the focus that on
supervisory review of high risk incidents awaiting deployment, as well as being their
availability to advise staff. Those matters are not set out again in this document. The
following information is provided in order to update the Coroner with further detail and
recent developments in relation to training and organisational updates.
Training
Staff in the police control room receive five dedicated CPD training days each year.
The CPD training which was provided in 2023 to both supervisors and operators
included THRIVE Risk Assessment and Re-assessment of Risk training as a training
topic. Further details of these assessments are provided below.
In addition, control room supervisors attend two additional CPD briefing days each
year, the most recent training day in November 2023. The Coroner has previously
received evidence in relation to the Professional Development Portfolio (PDP) which
is completed by newly appointed supervisors. This is a comprehensive portfolio
team
dealing with
incident management,
handovers,
briefings,
and
welfare/supervision. All supervisors are expected to complete the portfolio prior to
being ‘independent.’ There is a distinct section on incident management, and it
requires competence to be shown in an operational environment. This includes
competency of incidents of the following type: “High Risk Missing Person – Early
identification of a High Risk missing person incident and ensuring appropriate initial
lines of enquiry. Assisting FIM with initial command and handing over to duty R&P
inspector when appropriate.” It also includes a unit on supervisor handovers and
requires competency in relation to the handovers which includes, quick response to
new incidents, handovers of incidents of note, and reviewing current, outstanding, and
deployed incidents to get an overview and understanding of current work, with specific
reference to priority incidents for deployment and offering guidance and support to
controllers. It also requires competency in checking Control Room dispatch
group (CWUN) for outstanding No apparent Risk grading (NAR) and other incidents
of note, monitoring the OOC (Out of County)box, ensuring reviews of NAR missing
persons are completed and onward tasked if required. The competency requires that
all tasks are acknowledged and completed in a timely manner.
In December 2023, the PCR Operations Manager
set out clear guidance
in terms of the expectations on supervisors, specifically in terms of their responsibilities
to regularly review and reassess risk. Adherence and compliance against this is
tracked by our Quality Assurance and Development Team which is referred to in
further detail below.
The December 2023 guidance document was circulated to provide guidance to PCR
supervisors in terms of Contact Management’s expectation of supervisory reviews, for
incidents being managed through the PCR in CMP, and what should be included within
them, and to provide supervisors with a framework to help in the timely completion of
their reviews.
The document set out that performance Management is a key accountability of PCR
supervisors clearly outlined within their Role Profile. Relevant considerations from the
Performance Management section of the role include but are not limited to the
following: -
• Monitor and review incidents to ensure an effective and efficient response
in accordance with performance guidelines utilising THRIVE principals and
the NDM.
• Monitor demand from all routes into the Control Room and where necessary
take proactive action to manage any apparent shortfalls in resourcing.
• Liaise with staff across the organisation but in particular with DPT Sergeants
and Inspectors to optimise service delivery.
• Monitor and respond to service delivery demands using appropriate IT
systems, primarily CMP.
• Support the management of major, critical or significant incidents including
conducting dynamic risk assessments to ensure the safety of relevant
persons.
• Complete Quality Assurance processes.
• Room Management – including set up of staff, staff roles and incident
response.
• Ensure that Force Policies and working practices are adhered to, providing
advice when necessary.
The December 2023 guidance also set out that although every incident is different and
therefore supervisory input will vary significantly between incidents, the following
points are required for consideration and inclusion on CMP as part of a supervisory
review, unless there is good reason for any of the points not to be covered.
•
•
•
•
Is the incident type correct.
Is the grading appropriate.
Is the incident appropriate for deployment through the PCR, would it be better
suited for allocation via the Triage Hub or other specialist team.
Is
considerations been missed.
the THRIVE assessment appropriate, have any relevant points
/
• Has any re-THRIVE been completed, is one required.
•
If relevant, have action plans been identified and followed.
• Have appropriate attempts to resource the incident been made.
• Are likely breaches of SLA identified in good time to allow for remedial action
to prevent any breach.
• Has the escalation process been followed.
•
If deployed, are the actions of attending officers appropriate (in line with the
recently shared terms of reference).
A template was provided to assist supervisors completing each of these reviews and
provided guidance on each of the steps above to ensure that each of the steps are
properly considered.
Introduction of THRIVE Risk Assessments
In order to improve the quality of initial risk assessments as well as reassessment of
risk in PCR, Contact Management adopted the THRIVE risk assessment model
(October 2023). HMICFRS define THRIVE as ‘a model used to assess the right initial
police response to a call for service. It allows a judgement to be made of the relative
risk posed by the call and places the individual needs of the victim at the centre of that
decision’. THRIVE refers to Threat, Harm, Risk, Investigation, Vulnerability and
Engagement. THRIVE is used both as an initial risk assessment tool but also by staff
and supervisors in the PCR to reassess risk.
All staff were trained in THRIVE between October and December 2023.
Quality Assurance and Development Team (QuAD)
In 2021 Contact Management set up the QuAD team to provide continual audit and
inspection of our call handling. This is a team of four staff, seconded from the
department who are trained to conduct the audits. Results from the audits drive both
individual, department and organisational learning.
In December 2023 the remit of the QuAD team was expanded so that we could audit
incidents managed in the PCR as well as call handling. Importantly we now audit the
quality of supervisory reviews and re-assessment of risk, providing immediate
feedback to individuals. Audit results are also subject to scrutiny during a monthly
Senior Leadership Team Performance Meeting.
‘Your Call’ Learning Publication
In January 2024, Contact Management launched its first ‘Your Call’ publication. ‘Your
Call’ features a series of anonymised case studies where there has been learning for
our staff. This provides another opportunity to upskill our staff, learn from mistakes
and improve our service to the public.
Yours sincerely
Assistant Chief Constable
Joint Operations and Contact Management
Hampshire Constabulary & Isle of Wight Constabulary and Thames Valley Police
Darren Stewart OBE
Surrey HM Coroner’s Court
Station Approach
Woking
GU22 7AS
Dear Coroner,
National Medical Director
NHS England
Wellington House
133-155 Waterloo Road
London
SE1 8UG
21st January 2024
Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Meghan Irene Chrismas
who died on 20 October 2021.
Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 29
December 2023 concerning the death of Meghan Irene Christmas on 20 October
2021. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would
like to express my deep condolences to Meghan’s family and loved ones. NHS
England are keen to assure the family and the coroner that the concerns raised about
Meghan’s care have been listened to and reflected upon.
This response focusses on the NHS England national and regional policy,
programmes, and commitments relevant to the matters of concern identified in your
Report, namely your concern that the passage of information between NHS and
private healthcare providers is hindered due to the absence of an adequate structure
to share important clinical information about patients in a timely and effective manner.
Meghan’s case highlights the importance of effective information sharing to support
providing the best care possible where individuals are transferred between different
care settings.
When sharing information between clinicians looking after patients, the concept of
‘Direct Care’ is relied on as the legal basis of the sharing and explicit consent for this
sharing is not required from the patient. However, the patient can object to information
being shared, at which point a clinical decision will need to be made as to whether the
patient is at risk and the information needs to be shared despite their objections.
NHS England is currently working to enhance the sharing of patient information to and
from Voluntary, Charity and Social Enterprise (VCSE) and other independent/private
sector providers who are commissioned by NHS organisations.
The Summary Care Record (SCR) was originally designed and communicated as a
means to support patients when they receive emergency care. Over time, the
significant value of access to SCR to wider healthcare services has been recognised
and, as a result, the SCR Team have worked with the Expert Advisory Committee to
extend its use into multiple other care settings through a governance framework into
which patients and professionals contribute.
The SCR Team at NHS England have done significant work with a number of private
sector organisations, including a range of private hospitals and privately funded
healthcare services as part of Proof of Concepts (PoCs), into settings where SCRs
have previously been unavailable. e.g. private GP Services. This work will continue
throughout 2024. Clearly, it is difficult to define precisely what is included within
“private hospitals and privately funded healthcare services”. However, all “private
hospitals and independent healthcare services” that have approached NHS England
to date seeking access to SCR have either been onboarded into the existing proof of
concepts or there have been discussions with the requesters regarding initial setup
and their use for access to SCR. Learnings from these PoCs will be reported back to
the Expert Advisory Committee to better understand any benefits realised but also any
potential unintended consequences. The SCR Team will work with the Expert Advisory
Committee to seek full rollout approval in this sector and consider the scope of this
approval and any specific exclusions, constraints, or caveats.
It is worth mentioning that, in the past, the Summary Care Record application (SCRa)
was the main method to access SCRs for the existing NHS user base and the private
sector PoCs. However, NHS England have been involved in a programme of work to
transfer SCR users from the legacy SCRa service to the new National Care Records
Service (NCRS) service. This work has accelerated during 2023 and is projected to
conclude during Q2 2024.
NCRS is the successor to SCRa and by design removes a large amount of the
reported barriers to adoption within many care settings including the private sector.
The National Care Records Service (NCRS) provides a quick, secure way to access
national patient information to improve clinical decision making and healthcare
outcomes, it is free to use and includes additional features and services beyond the
legacy SCRa product. Further
found here:
https://digital.nhs.uk/services/national-care-records-service.
information on NCRS can be
The NCRS complements Shared Care Records, which is a way of bringing separate
records from different health and care organisations together digitally in one place and
joining up information based on an individual rather than one organisation. Shared
Care Records will include prescribed medications and will typically hold more
information about an individual than a Summary Care Record.
Responsibility for delivering shared care records sits with local Integrated Care Boards
(ICB). Each ICB’s shared care records are developed in response to the health and
care needs of the local area, existing systems, and future planning. This means some
of their shared care records are available to neighbouring ICBs, while others are only
supported within their own ICB. Future plans include making shared care records link
together regardless of where you live or receive care in England.
Regarding the duplicate prescriptions administered to Meghan, the General Medical
Council (GMC) have produced clear professional standards guidance for doctors on
the prescribing and managing of medicines and addressed where a prescribing
clinician may not be the patient’s regular prescriber. Sections to note are referenced
below:
• Section 20: You should only prescribe medicines if you have adequate knowledge
of the patient’s health and you are satisfied that the medicines serve the patient’s
needs. You must consider … whether you have sufficient information to prescribe
safely, for example if you have access to the patient’s medical records and can
verify relevant information.
• Section 27:
a. It’s not safe to prescribe if you don’t have sufficient information about the
patient’s health or if the mode of consultation is unsuitable to meet their needs.
b. It may be unsafe if relevant information is not shared with other healthcare
providers involved in the patient’s care – for example because the patient
refuses consent.
• Section 28: Before prescribing, you must consider whether the information you
have is sufficient and reliable enough to enable you to prescribe safely. For
example, whether … you have access to the patient’s medical records or other
reliable information about their health and other treatments they are receiving.
• Section 29: If you are not the patient’s regular prescriber, you should ask for the
patient’s consent to:
a. contact their GP or other treating doctors if you need more information or
confirmation of the information you have before prescribing,
b. share information with their GP when the episode of care is completed.
• Section 30: If the patient objects to information being shared with you, or does not
have a regular prescriber, you must be able to justify a decision to prescribe
without that information.
• Section 31: If the patient refuses to consent to you sharing information with their
GP, or does not have a GP, you should explain to the patient the risks of not
sharing this information. This should be documented in their medical records.
• Section 32: If failing to share information could pose a risk to patient safety, you
should explain to the patient that you cannot prescribe. You should outline their
options and signpost them to appropriate alternative services. You should clearly
document your reasons for any decisions made.
I would also like to provide further assurances on national NHS England work taking
place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed
by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors, and
other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key
learnings and insights around preventable deaths are shared across the NHS at both
a national and regional level and helps us pay close attention to any emerging trends
that may require further review and action.
Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please
do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Yours sincerely,
National Medical Director
See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, and how often a new one appears.
What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text
Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.
These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.