Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2026

Janet Tripp

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2026-0091, written 9 Feb 2026. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report9 Feb 2026
Reference2026-0091
DeceasedJanet Tripp
CoronerGuy Davies
Coroner areaCornwall & the Isles of Scilly
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Organisation namedRoyal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Information Classification: PUBLIC 

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS  

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUEST  

TOUCHING THE DEATH OF JANET MARY TRIPP 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

Chief Executive 
Royal Cornwall Hospital 

1 

CORONER 

I am Guy Davies, His Majesty’s Assistant Coroner for Cornwall & the Isles of Scilly. 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 
[HYPERLINKS] 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 15 January 2025 I commenced an investigation into the death of 85 year old Janet 
Mary Tripp.  

The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 18 December 2025.  

The medical cause of death was found to be as follows: 

1a Ischaemic right foot and Frailty of Old Age 
1b Peripheral Vascular Disease 
2 Non heeling pressure Ulcer on Right Heel, Cerebrovascular Disease, Iron 
deficiency anaemia 

The four statutory questions - who, when, where and how – were answered as follows: 

Janet Mary TRIPP died on 28 December 2024 at Apartment 10 Ocean 1 Pentire 
Avenue NEWQUAY CORNWALL from Frailty of Old Age and an Ischaemic right 
foot caused by Peripheral Vascular Disease.  The ischaemic right foot was 
contributed to by an avoidable pressure sore that developed on Janet’s right heel 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Information Classification: PUBLIC 

during a 7 hour stay in the Royal Cornwall Hospital discharge lounge.  In that time 
there was an absence of protective measures that could have prevented that 
pressure sore.  The right heel pressure sore more than minimally contributed to 
Janet’s death. 

The conclusion of the inquest was as follows 

Janet died from natural causes contributed to by an avoidable pressure sore. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

1.  The circumstances are sufficiently explained in the answers to the four statutory 

questions set out above. 

2.  The following findings of fact were made in relation to failings in the provision of 
care whilst Janet was in the Royal Cornwall Hospital discharge lounge awaiting 
transport to Helson hospital.  These failings likely caused the development of a 
pressure sore that contributed to Janet’s death. 

•  Lack of care rounds by staff. 
•  Lack of training regarding basic patient care for some staff working in the 

• 

discharge lounge. 
Janet was not re-positioned every 2 hours as is required to avoid pressure 
sores. 

•  No risk assessment was conducted in the duration of Janet’s stay in the 

discharge lounge or following the discovery of pressure sores when Janet was 
still in the discharge lounge.  

•  No documentation that dressings were required following the discovery of 

Janet’s pressure sores  

•  No handover notes to the ambulance service or Helston hospital warning of 

the development of pressure sores and the need for protective measures. 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

There was insufficient evidence before the court to indicate that the above failings found at 
Inquest had been addressed by the hospital. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you [AND/OR 
your organisation] have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 6 April 2026. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the 
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Information Classification: PUBLIC 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to Janet’s family. 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. 
He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of 
interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, 
about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

9 February 2026                                              HMC Guy Davies 

3

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Royal Cornwall Hospital (PDF)
Chief Medical officer’s office 
Royal Cornwall Hospital 

Truro  

Cornwall 
TR1 3LJ 

Date: 25 March 2026 

Private and Confidential  
Mr. Guy Davies 
H.M Assistant Coroner for Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly 
Pydar House 
Pydar Street 
Truro 
Cornwall 
TR1 1XU 

Dear Mr Davies  

Re: The Late Mrs Janet Tripp  – Regulation 28 PFD Report and Response 

I write in response to the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, dated 09 February 2026 
and received on the 12 February 2026 This was issued following the inquest into the death of Mrs 
Janet Tripp which was heard on 18 December 2026. I understand the Matron who provided a report 
was unavailable to attend the hearing on 18 December 2026 due to pre-planned annual leave. 

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincerest condolences to the family of Mrs Tripp 
for their tragic loss.  

During the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. Which are as follows: 

1.  There was in sufficient evidence before the Court to indicate that the following failings found 

at inquest had been addressed by the Hospital: 

o  Lack of care rounds by staff 
o  Lack of training regarding basic patient care for some staff working in the discharge 

lounge 

o  Janet was not re-positioned every 2 hours as is required to avoid pressure sores 
o  No risk assessment was conducted in the duration of Janet’s stay in the discharge 
lounge or following the discovery of the pressure sores when Janet was still in the 
discharge lounge 

o  No  documentation  that  dressings  were  required  following  the  discovery  of  Janet’s 

pressure sore 

o  No  handover  notes  to  the  ambulance  service  or  Helston  hospital  warning  of  the 

development of pressure sores and the need for protective measures. 

                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
 
 
 Please  find  below  the  response  from  the  Trust  and  details  of  the  actions  taken  in  relation  to  the 
above concerns. 

Response: 

I reiterate the contents of paragraph 8 – 11 of Matron Keogh’s statement dated 13 November 2025 

which confirmed the following:  

•  Nursing documentation indicated that care rounding had been carried out every two 

hours in line with RCHT policy whilst Mrs Tripp was on the Trauma Unit and this 

continued in the Discharge Lounge. 

•  Whilst on the Discharge Lounge, a healthcare professional identified a blister on 

Mrs Tripp’s right heel. The issue was raised, and appropriate pressure care was 

initiated by elevating the foot on a pillow. This had been documented in the notes on 

the 22.07.2024 @ 17:15 hours. 

• 

The  following  Learning  Point  has  been  taken  from  Mrs.  Tripp's  case.  While  skin 

bundles  were  completed  as  per  protocol,  there  is  an  important  learning  outcome 

regarding  the  need  to  ensure  documentation  and  reassessment  are  undertaken 

whenever new clinical findings arise, particularly prior to any patient transfer. Nursing 

documentation indicates that staff had elevated the patient's heels on a pillow in order 

to relieve additional pressure. However, there was no documentation to suggest that 

dressings were required. The identified learning points will focus on the importance 

of timely reassessment and identification of required needs, to include repositioning 

advice if required. All new findings, reflections and learning are discussed during our 

safety  briefing  and  subsequently  shared  with  nursing  staff  through  the  monthly 

newsletter 

• 

In addition to the information provided by Matron Keogh, to support good 

communication on the discharge lounge, a verbal ‘safety brief’ in held at each shift 

handover to ensure patients who are in the Discharge Lounge have their care 

rounds and other needs completed and ensure this is correctly documented.  

• 

Training concerns – All staff working within the Discharge Lounge are required to 

complete the organisation’s essential mandatory training programme, alongside any 

role-specific clinical skills competencies.  

Compliance with mandatory training is monitored by the Unit Leader, with additional 

oversight and support provided by the Clinical Practice Educator (CPE) team. Any 

gaps in compliance are actively followed up on to ensure that staff maintain the 

required level of knowledge and competence for safe patient care. 

Page 2 of 4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In addition, the Division has recently increased its focus on pressure ulcer 

prevention and on the fundamentals of patient assessment. Targeted education 

sessions have been delivered to reinforce the importance of timely and accurate 

assessments, clear documentation, and proactive risk identification. Staff are being 

supported in developing a stronger understanding of their responsibilities for 

escalating concerns and communicating identified risks effectively to all members of 

the multidisciplinary team. 

The Unit Leader, in collaboration with the CPE team, will continue to monitor 

training compliance and practice standards to ensure that all staff in the Discharge 

Lounge maintain the skills and confidence required to provide safe, high-quality 

basic care to all patients. As of 28th February 2026, the overall training compliance 

for the discharge lounge is 84.5%, including all non-registered staff who are 

compliant with the HCSW (Band 3) Clinical Skills Core Competencies. The updated 

training figures from March 2026 will be available from early April 2026 and can be 

provided if required. 

•  Handover concerns re SWAST/Community Hospital - We acknowledge the 

concerns raised regarding the absence of documented handover to both the 

ambulance crew and Helston Hospital, particularly regarding the development of 

pressure damage and the need for protective measures. We also recognise that the 

SBARD forms completed at the point of transfer were not signed by a registered 

nurse and did not include timings, which falls below expected standards of 

documentation and governance. 

Following internal review, it was identified that while Helston Hospital’s SBARD did 

include reference to a “blister to the right heel,” this information was not formally or 

consistently communicated as part of a structured handover from the Discharge 

Lounge. The lack of a clearly identifiable RN signature and the absence of time-

stamping on the SBARD documentation further hindered continuity of care and 

compromised clarity regarding the patient’s condition at the point of transfer. 

We also acknowledge the concern regarding the retrospective documentation 

recorded by the registered nurse at 17:15 hours, noting Mrs Tripp’s arrival in the 

Discharge Lounge that morning and her discharge at 18:43 after a total stay of over 

seven hours. While the medication handover was appropriately completed in line 

with EMPA requirements and TTOs were provided to the transport team, the delay 

and retrospective nature of the clinical record did not meet the required standards 

for real-time documentation and handover completeness. 

In summary, the Division has implemented the following actions: 

Page 3 of 4 

 
 
 
 •  Reinforcement of SBARD standards: All staff in the Discharge Lounge have 

received updated guidance and education on the requirement for SBARD forms 

to be fully completed, including mandatory timing and a registered nurse’s 

signature. Compliance will be reviewed through monthly documentation audits. 

•  Structured handover expectations: A standardised handover process has 

been introduced for all patient transfers from the Discharge Lounge, including 

mandatory communication of any identified risks—particularly pressure damage 

or vulnerability—and confirmation that this has been verbally acknowledged by 

the receiving team. 

•  Real-time documentation reminder process: Unit leadership has reinforced 

with all registered staff the requirement to document care contemporaneously. 

Spot checks of nursing notes are being undertaken to ensure improvements and 

identify any additional training needs. 

•  Focused education on pressure ulcer risks: In conjunction with the Clinical 

Practice Educator team, staff have been trained on the importance of 

recognising early skin changes, documenting these accurately, and escalating 

them promptly to the multidisciplinary team and receiving services. 

These measures aim to ensure that all future handovers from the Discharge Lounge are accurate, 

timely, and complete, thereby supporting continuity of care and reducing the risk of avoidable 

harm. 

I hope that this letter provides both you and  Mrs Tripp’s family with assurance that the Trust has 

taken seriously the concerns raised in your report and that the Trust has taken the appropriate action 

to prevent future deaths.  

Yours Sincerely 

Chief Medical Officer 
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust 

Page 4 of 4

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