Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2026
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2026-0326, written 11 May 2026. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 11 May 2026 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2026-0326 |
| Deceased | Oliver Shelley |
| Coroner | Karen Henderson |
| Coroner area | Surrey |
| Source | judiciary.uk record |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
__________________________________________________________ The Inquest Touching the Death of Oliver Charles Major Shelley A Regulation 28 Report – Action to Prevent Future Deaths __________________________________________________________ THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: • NHS England • NHS Pathways CORONER Dr Karen Henderson, HM Assistant Coroner for Surrey CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 5 to The Coroners and Justice Act 2009. INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 16th February 2026 a jury inquest was resumed into the death of Oliver Charles Major Shelley. On 17th February 2026 the inquest was concluded. At the time of his death Oliver was 17 years of age. The medical cause of death given was: 1a. Multi-Organ Failure 1b. Meningococcal Septicaemia The jury found: Oliver was generally fit and well with no underlying medical problems. Oliver became noticeably unwell in the early afternoon of the 22nd July 2024. Oliver’s parents phoned emergency services at 14.51 hours on the 22nd July 2024. The parents reported Oliver as showing symptoms of meningitis including a non-blanching rash at the time of the 999 call. In the absence of an ambulance being dispatched, the parents took the decision to take Oliver to East Surrey Hospital, arriving at or around 15.55. On admission, Oliver was recognised to be unwell, with a widespread rash and evidence of septic shock and organ dysfunction from a presumptive diagnosis of Meningococcal Septicaemia. Oliver was treated for Meningococcal Septicaemia according to the sepsis protocol, which included IV antibiotics, IV fluids and other medications, shortly after admission. Oliver briefly showed signs of responding to treatment. Following maximal available supportive treatment, including intubation and ventilation Oliver continued to clinically deteriorate. Oliver was recognised to have died at East Surrey Hospital, Redhill at 23.30 hours on the 22nd July 2024 around 7.5 hours after admission. Narrative conclusion: Died as a result of complications of overwhelming meningococcal septicaemia CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Please see the findings of the jury above CORONER’S CONCERNS 1. The lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway to assist the emergency medical advisor (EMA) during 111/999 calls At 14:51 hours on 22nd July 2024, Oliver’s parents called 999 indicating their concern that Oliver was suffering from meningitis as he was suffering from a non-blanching rash, vomiting and reduced level of consciousness. The EMA began a triage using NHS Pathways algorithm but as they were unable to prioritise any of the listed symptoms, they requested operational support at 14:57 hours, to ask if there was a meningitis pathway within the system. This call was concluded at 15:51 with the EMA indicating to Oliver’s parents that a call back was scheduled within 20 minutes. A call back was not undertaken until 1 hr and 41minutes later and in the absence of a response a further unsuccessful call was made 2 hrs and 18 minutes later before Secamb closed the referral. In the meantime, Oliver’s parents made the decision to convey Oliver to hospital arriving there at or around 15:55 hours. On attendance it was recognised that Oliver was gravely unwell and despite maximal supportive management sadly died from overwhelming meningococcal septicaemia 7.5 hours after his arrival. In their investigation, Secamb acknowledged that the EMA’s management of the 999 call was not compliant and have taken the opportunity to offer ongoing training. However, it was also recognised EMA’s found it challenging to triage individuals when multiple signs and symptoms were present in relation to a possible sepsis diagnosis and that having a dedicated sepsis algorithm would assist them in being able to provide an appropriate response to callers and to ensure appropriate management. This has important implications for prioritising ambulance disposition, which may also include the ability of a paramedic to attend at the earliest opportunity to give antibiotics. 2. Emergency Medical Advisors Other than some in-house training, Emergency Medical Advisors (EMA’s), generally have no qualifications in medicine or nursing. As such, the use of this title to describe their role raises a real concern they are misleading the public who use the 111/999 service. Oliver’s parents gave an extreme clear assessment of Oliver’s condition and also informed the EMA that they were concerned it was meningitis. However, this was not recognised by the EMA reaffirming their limited abilities. This reinforces the need to provide further assistance to all EMA’s who use NHS pathways by providing an appropriate ‘sepsis’ algorithm to assist in their role. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe that the people listed in paragraph one have the power to take such action. YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of its date; I may extend that period on request. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for such action. Otherwise, you must explain why no action is proposed. COPIES I have sent a copy of this report to the following: 1. 2. SECAMB 3. CDOP In addition to this report, I am under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who, he believes, may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. Signed: Karen Henderson DATED this 11th Day of May 2026
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Dr Karen Henderson
HM Assistant Coroner for Surrey
HM Coroner’s Court
Station Approach
Woking
GU22 7AP
National Medical Director
NHS England
Wellington House
133-155 Waterloo Road
London
SE1 8UG
1st July 2026
Dear Dr Henderson,
Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Oliver Charles Major
Shelley who died on 22nd July 2024.
Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 11th
May 2026 concerning the death of Oliver Charles Major Shelley on 22nd July 2024. In
advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to
express my deep condolences to Oliver’s family and loved ones. NHS England is keen
to assure the family and yourself that the concerns raised about Oliver’s care have
been listened to and reflected upon.
Your Report raised the following concerns:
1. There is a lack of a sepsis algorithm pathway to assist the emergency medical
advisor (EMA) during 111/999 calls
2. That Emergency Medical Advisors (EMA’s), generally have no qualifications in
medicine or nursing and the use of this title to describe their role raises a
concern they are misleading the public.
Background of NHS Pathways Clinical Decision Support System
The NHS Pathways Clinical Decision Support System (CDSS) is a triage product
that is used to support Urgent and Emergency Care (UEC) in England. The product
is owned by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and is manufactured
and managed by the Transformation Directorate of NHS England. It is embedded
within host systems in NHS 111 and 999 ambulance providers where it interacts with
other technology products to support the assessment, sorting and onward
management of calls received by those services. The NHS 111 and 999 providers
are required to enter into a licence governing their use of NHS Pathways and the
training materials. The tool also supports online triage, in-person and enhanced
clinical assessments via modules such as the NHS Pathways Clinical Consultation
Support (PaCCS) system.
The safety of NHS Pathways triage outcomes - known as "dispositions" - is overseen
by the National Clinical Assurance Group (NCAG), an independent intercollegiate
body hosted by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges. Alongside this external
scrutiny, NHS Pathways aligns its content with up-to-date national clinical guidance,
including NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence), UK Resuscitation
Council and UK Sepsis Trust.
The system supports over 2.5 million triage assessments each month across
telephone, digital, and face-to-face settings.
NHS Pathways follows a structured clinical hierarchy. Serious and potentially life-
threatening symptoms are assessed first to ensure rapid escalation - such as
dispatching an ambulance or involving a clinician. The assessment then progresses
to less urgent symptoms, identifying the most appropriate level of care. The tool is
not diagnostic. Instead, it works by systematically ruling out more serious causes of
symptoms to ensure safe, efficient triage. Relevant history is gathered where
clinically necessary to minimise triage time while maintaining safety.
In telephone settings, assessments are conducted by trained non-clinical health
advisors. The term “Health Advisor” is set by the NHS 111 service specification. 999
services can determine this per service. Though non-clinical, these advisors complete
a rigorous structured training programme, which includes classroom learning,
assessments and preceptorship, to ensure they can use the NHS Pathways algorithm
safely and effectively. Once working independently, health advisors must be
supervised by clinical staff, to whom they must always have access to for guidance
and support. It is therefore a condition of the NHS Pathways licence that clinical
supervision and escalation support must be available 24/7.
Health advisors using the NHS Pathways system are trained to use probing questions
to better understand caller responses. A fundamental component of training is learning
how to manage complex calls. The "complex call process" provides a clear protocol
for health advisors to seek assistance or transfer a complex call to a clinician. This
process should be followed in situations involving declared medications, medical
procedures, terminology that complicates triage or any other situation when the
advisor feels they have reached the limits of their knowledge or understanding.
Additionally, it should be used if the call includes three “not sure” answers, or
information is incomplete, ambiguous, or difficult to interpret. In such circumstances
health advisors are expected to seek immediate clinical input from an experienced
NHS Pathways trained clinician. This approach is reinforced by the principle:
“If in doubt, shout.”
NHS Pathways recognise there may be operational delays which must be managed
locally. NHS Pathways is not able to take account of these as they and the local
management of them can vary, and thus NHS Pathway’s expectations are based on
what should happen in absence of such delays.
Following initial core role training, both health advisors and clinicians are required to
undertake mandatory training aligned to each new release of the NHS Pathways
system, which typically occurs every 12 weeks. This ensures that staff remain up to
date with any changes to clinical content, pathways, and system functionality. In
addition, they have access to a comprehensive suite of ongoing learning resources,
including ‘Hot Topics’ (a “Hot Topic” is a short, focused NHS Pathways training
resource used to reinforce key areas of triage practice across Providers), case studies
and e-learning packages, which support continuous professional development and
dissemination of learning.
Sepsis and meningitis are specifically addressed within core training, including pre-
module learning, scenario training, and ongoing learning resources such as a sepsis
training toolkit and ‘Hot Topics’, ensuring that users are familiar with the recognition
and escalation of these time-critical conditions. Alongside this, providers are required
to undertake regular quality assurance processes, including monthly audit of calls.
These audits assess a range of core competencies, including the effective use of
probing. Audit findings are intended to be used to provide structured feedback,
targeted coaching, and, where required, retraining to ensure ongoing competence and
safe application of the system.
Within NHS Pathways, health advisors are trained and expected to actively probe to
clarify and refine the information provided by the caller. This is a fundamental
component of the NHS Pathways model and forms an important part of its safety
design.
Sepsis algorithm pathway
Upon review of the calls, it is apparent that Oliver was seriously unwell and there were
concerns expressed regarding Oliver's level of consciousness. Unconscious callers
are triaged to a level no lower than a category 2 emergency ambulance. NHS
Pathways acknowledges that, although multiple symptoms were present concurrently,
had the health advisor selected any of the declared symptoms as the main problem,
including ‘Behaviour Change’, ‘Rash’, ‘Vomiting’ or ‘Headache’ pathway, the triage
system would have presented a question to assess whether the patient was able to
carry out normal everyday activities (functional impairment assessment).
In this case it appeared that Oliver was functionally impaired, which in all of these
Pathways would have led to a further question about a non-blanching rash, resulting
in the dispatch of a Category 2 ambulance. The assessment of a 'non blanching' rash
accompanied by being unable to carry out normal activities appears in over 100
different clinical triage pathways as NHS Pathways acknowledges the multiple
different ways that symptoms of Meningococcal Septicaemia may present.
It is noted that the health advisor sought advice from a Senior Non-Clinician as they
wanted to know if there was a specific Pathway for meningitis before then passing the
case to the clinical queue for inability to prioritise a main symptom. It is important to
highlight that as NHS Pathways is a non-diagnostic clinical assessment tool
'Meningitis' (or any other condition) would not present as a pathway option, however,
questions regarding septicaemia and meningitis are covered in a variety of symptom-
based pathways and when answered positively result in an ambulance dispatch. In
essence, rather than one ‘sepsis algorithm’ pathway, NHS Pathways has embedded
a ‘sepsis’ algorithm into a wide range of symptom-based pathways where sepsis could
present. In this way, even if the caller does not recognise potential symptoms of sepsis,
the NHS Pathways algorithm would screen for potential sepsis in a wide range of
symptom pathways.
NHS Pathways training explicitly recognises that presentations involving multiple
symptoms increase the complexity of triage and are associated with higher clinical
risk. To mitigate this risk, NHS Pathways includes a structured and safety-focused
approach to assessing patients with multiple symptoms. This is embedded within both
system design and user training.
Health advisors are trained to:
• Prioritise the rapid exclusion of immediately life-threatening conditions
through structured questioning in the first section of NHS Pathways (known
as Module 0). This includes an assessment of consciousness.
• Progress systematically into the next section of questions (known as Module
1) to identify the most clinically significant presenting problem, supported by
Key Points within the system. Key points assist the health advisor to select
the most appropriate pathway by providing details on when to use each
pathway.
• Recognise that where symptoms suggest potential compromise to airway,
breathing, circulation or a reduced level of consciousness, these must take
priority regardless of how they are described by the caller.
• Use targeted probing to clarify symptoms and reduce ambiguity.
Importantly, training emphasises that where a caller is unable to identify a main
symptom, or where the presentation remains unclear or complex, this should be
treated as an indicator of increased risk.
In these situations, call handlers are instructed to:
• Seek immediate clinical support, or
• Undertake an Early Exit and transfer the call to a clinician
This reflects a deliberate safety principle within NHS Pathways: that it is appropriate
and expected for non-clinical users to escalate to a clinician when the limits of system-
supported decision-making are reached.
This structured approach is reinforced through initial training, ongoing learning, and
monthly audit.
This approach is designed to ensure that complex or unclear presentations, such as
those involving multiple symptoms potentially consistent with serious infection, are
identified early and managed with appropriate clinical input.
The sequence described in the inquest, including the duration of the call and the
timing of subsequent contact, reflects a situation that would have been deeply
worrying for any family in those circumstances.
While NHS Pathways does not oversee local service delivery or response times, this
case emphasises the importance of early clinical input when presentations are
complex, where severity is unclear, or where it has not been possible to prioritise a
primary symptom of concern.
It is NHS Pathway's view that given the family clearly expressed concern that Oliver
may have been suffering from meningitis, and recognising that Health Advisors
receive training in the identification and escalation of serious infection including
sepsis and meningitis, this further reinforces the importance of early clinical
involvement if there is uncertainty about which route to take through the system.
Emergency Medical Advisors
The terminology used to describe call-takers using the NHS Pathways system is
described in the background and training section above. For clarity, the term Health
Advisor is set by the NHS 111 service specification. 999 services can determine this
per service.
In ambulance service settings, local services may choose to adopt alternative role
titles, such as “Emergency Medical Advisor (EMA)”. The selection and use of these
titles is determined locally by provider organisations.
Regardless of job title, when undertaking the Health Advisor role using NHS
Pathways, individuals are operating within a structured clinical decision support
system, supported by training, defined principles and access to clinical supervision.
It is a requirement of the NHS Pathways licence that appropriately trained clinicians
are available at all times to provide immediate advice and to take over calls where
needed.
NHS Pathways training and system design emphasise the importance of recognising
the limits of non-clinical roles and escalating to clinical support where there is
uncertainty or complexity.
Regional Response
NHS England's South East Regional Team have liaised with South East Coast
Ambulance Service regarding this PFD. Following a full investigation into Oliver's
death, SECAmb identified learning relating to the way the service responded
when patients presented with multiple or unclear symptoms. In these situations, it
can be harder to recognise the seriousness of a patient's condition and delays
can occur in escalation to clinical review. The Trust has acknowledged the impact
this had on Oliver and his family and has implemented a number of
improvements in response to the learning identified. These include:
• Clearer rules for escalation: Staff are now clearly instructed that when a
patient has multiple or unclear symptoms, they must involve a clinician earlier
rather than trying to manage the call alone.
• Faster access to clinicians: The Trust has removed any ambiguity around
seeking clinical support and staff are actively encouraged to obtain clinical
advice promptly.
• New technology to prioritise risk: The Intelligent Clinical Queue has been
•
implemented to help identify higher-risk patients and prioritise them for clinical
review.
Improved staff training and culture: Training and support have been
strengthened to help staff recognise when concerns should be escalated and
to foster a culture where raising concerns is encouraged.
The Trust continues to review its systems, listen to staff and families, and
implement further improvements to reduce the risk of similar incidents occurring
in the future.
I would also like to provide further assurances on the national NHS England work
taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are
discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical
Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This
ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of Oliver,
are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us to pay
close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.
Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please
do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Yours sincerely,
National Medical Director
NHS England
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