Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2015

Bryan Catanach

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, written 1 Dec 2015. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report1 Dec 2015
DeceasedBryan Catanach
CoronerAndrew Cox
Coroner areaWorcestershire
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses publishednone published

The report

Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

ANNEX A

REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1)
NOTE: This form is to be used after an inquest.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:

1. Royal Orthopaedic Hospital
CORONER

am Andrew Cox, Assistant Coroner, for the coroner area of Worcestershire

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

| make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On 17" February 2015 | commenced an investigation into the death of Bryan Amold
CATANACH then aged 84.

The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 26 November 2015.

The narrative conclusion of the inquest was that Mr Catanach died as the result of an
| accident. It is possible that a subsequent fall out of bed while attempting to go to the

| toilet may have contributed. It is also possible a failed attempt at traction may have

| contributed to the death.

The medical cause of death was 1(a) respiratory failure, 1(b) cervical spinal cord injury,
1(c) Fractured odontoid peg sustained in a fall, _|

4 | CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

At approximately 11,00am on 3rd February 2015 Mr Catanach fell after attending his
local gym. He suffered a serious neck injury, sustaining a fracture dislocation of the
odontoid peg with tearing of the posterior atlanto occipital ligament. He wes taken to
Worcestershire Royal Hospital. An x-ray confirmed the injury and he was referred to the
Royal Orthopaedic Hospital at approximately 20.00hrs, In the evening of 4th December
2015, Mr Catanach was seen by a consultant from Royal Orthopaedic Hospital who
deemed him fit for operative treatment and transfer. Instructions were left for the transfer
to be effected by 08.00am on 5th February 2015. This did not happen Mr Catanach
being transferred by about 11.30am. Shortly after admission into Royal Orthopaedic
Hospital Mr Catanach, having been told to stay immobile on bed rest, attempted to get up |
probably to use the toilet. He fell, Instructions were left for senior review to take place
that aftemoon. That did not happen until after 20.00hrs, Mr Catanach's condition was
found to have deteriorated at review and he was fitted with a halo crown later that night
with traction applied. The appropriate traction equipment could not be found and an
inferior alternative was used. On 6th February 2015 a pulley wheel was found to be
jammed rendering the traction ineffective, The halo crown had to be replaced. On 7th
February 2015 the correct traction equipment was found, assembled and applied. On
8th February 2015 Mr Catanach’s condition deteriorated and he died in the hospital
shortly after 14.00hrs.

5

_
CORONER'S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concer, In
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you,

The MATTERS OF CONCERN ere as follows. —

(1) There were a number of difficulties with communication between the various clinicians
and hospital Trusts. This led to a delay in the initial transfer of the patient, a delay in his
subsequent review by a senior clinician and confusion on the part of nursing staff as to
whether Mr Catanach was to be kept nil by mouth and/or given his prescribed
medication. While it is a matter for you it may be that the Trust will want to reflect on
whether there is a need to standardize its inter-hospital transfer process so that nursing
as well as medical staff are fully engaged with the process

(2) Additional concerns over communication were identified with clear instructions from
Consultants not being carried out. In particular, an instruction to have the deceased
transferred to the Royal Orthopaedic Hospital before 08:00 hours on 5" February 2015
was cancelled (on the wrong basis that no spare bed was available) and the cancellation
of the transfer was not communicated back to the consultant. Additionally, an instruction
by the consultant to a junior doctor directing his Registrar to review Mr Catanach was
only partly acted upon. This led to a delay in the senior review of Mr Catanach which,
when it took place 9 hours after admission, recognised a deterioration in his condition.

It is a matter for the Trust to reflect on how best to ensure that Consultants’ instructions
are fully acted upon and where, for whatever reason, that proves impossible, the
situation is communicated back to the Consultant concerned.

(3) Almost immediately after his admission into the Royal Orthopaedic Hospital with e
fractured dislocation of this neck Mr Catanach fell out of this hospital bed. This was

| probably due to him attempting to get up to use the toilet, Mr Catanach’s fall took place
| even though two members of the nursing staff had expressly told Mr Catanach not to

move and provided him with @ buzzer through which to seek nursing assistance if
required

Mr Newton-Ede, having reflected upon the matter, felt that similar patients in the future
may be better protected by a transfer into the HDU rather than a standard ward.

The Trust may wish to reflect on whether this is a realistic alternative. If implemented
this change will need to be audited to see whether there are sufficient resources
available within HDU. If not, an altemative course of action considered at inquest was
that for the small number of patients admitted with an unstable neck fracture it may be
appropriate immediately to arrange one to one nursing care pending operative fixation of
the fracture.

(4) Traction equipment - Mr Catanach had a halo crown fitted in an attempt to reduce the
fracture he had suffered. At the time this was undertaken Mr Newton-Ede did not have
available to him the required Balkan beam traction equipment and a Swan neck device
was used instead, This was plainly inferior and indeed a pulley wheel was found to have
jammed the following morning rendering the traction ineffective and causing the fracture
to slip back.

It took 48 hours for the correct traction equipment to be found. It was likely that the
equipment was available the whole time but that either staff did not know where it was
kept, or those sent to find it did not know for what they were looking,

It is a matter for the Trust to reflect on how to remedy this situation, It would seem that
training of relevant staff would be a sensible first step.

(5) | heard evidence at the inquest that there was no safe and effective way of a patient
in traction to have a CT scan without the traction weights being released. While | was told
that only a small number of patients will require both traction and a CT scan it maybe that
the Trust considers that this is something that should be considered further.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and | believe you have the
power to take such action.

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report,
namely by 25" January 2016 |, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.

COPIES and PUBLICATION

| have sent @ copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested
Persons being Mrs Catanach and Mr Newton Ede.

lam also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful
or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your
response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner

wo day of December 2015

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