Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2013

Matthew Dunham

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2013-0229, written 12 Sep 2013. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report12 Sep 2013
Reference2013-0229
DeceasedMatthew Dunham
CoronerWilliam Armstrong
Coroner areaNorfolk
CategoryMental Health related deaths
Organisation namedNorfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses publishednone published

The report

Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Norfolk and Suffolk [Vi

NHS Foundation Trust
Trust Management

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Drayton High Road

Mt WA: Hellesd
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WY KA

6 November 2013

Private and Confidential
Ms Jacqueline Lake

HM Coroner

Norfolk Coroner's Service
69-75 Thorpe Road
Norwich

Norfolk

NR1 1UA

Dear Ms Lake
Re: Inquest into the death of Matthew Dunham concluded on 4 September 2013

| write in response to the report dated 12 September 2013 from Mr Armstrong. Following the
conclusion of the inquest into the death of Matthew Dunham the Trust was asked to consider a
number of aspects of service delivery under Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (investigations) Regulations 2013.

| respond to the areas you highlighted:

A) An emergency referral by the general practitioner to the assessment team on the 4" of April 2013
was not followed up within the normal time scale of four hours and it was two days before a
telephone triage session took place and four days before an assessment was undertaken by a
mental health nurse. This raises the need to ensure that emergency referrals are dealt with within
the appropriate time scales and that policies and procedures are in force to make sure that this
happens.

The Trust’s internal investigation (Root Cause Analysis) identified this gap in responding to the
requested assessment. Since this period the service has made a number of resource changes to be in
a position to respond to referrals within the specified time period, according to the assessed urgency.

The Trust has implemented monitoring mechanisms for the four hour ‘urgent referral’ standard which
is reported daily to commissioners and is monitored by senior managers and clinicians.

Additionally, the Clinical Team Leader for the Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment (CRHT) team
reviews all assessment requests each day to confirm that contact was made within the 4 hour
timeframe and that where possible this is a face to face contact. If this is not possible, then a minimum
standard of telephone contact has been agreed and put in place. This includes an assessment of risk,
support mechanisms available and ensuring the service user has contact details in case the situation

deteriorates.
Ra
KY, x,
DIVERSITY CHAMPION

“y $. ae

Ms Lake -2-

B) There appears not to have been a clear shared understanding between professionals as to which
team it was appropriate to refer Mr Dunham to. There was some lack of understanding revealed as
to whether a referral to the assessment team or the crisis resolution and home treatment team was
appropriate. This highlights the need for there to be a clear understanding about the roles of each
team and the interface between them.

The Trust's internal investigation recognised that with the symptoms presented to the practitioner on
the 8 April 2013, it would have been proportionate to have requested the support of the Crisis
Resolution and Home Treatment (CRHT) team.

To enhance the interface between the two clinical teams, Access and Assessment Team (AAT) and
CRHT, a member of the CRHT is now based within the AAT. This enables joint working without any
delay, supporting transition of care between the two teams. The Trust is monitoring its effectiveness in
identifying people in need of this crisis support.

C) On the 8 April 2013, despite the fact that Mr Dunham was presenting as feeling suicidal and
specifically that he had set up a noose in his flat the previous night, it was not thought appropriate
to refer him to the Crisis team for appropriately robust intervention. This raises the issue of the
basis upon which the risk of suicide or serious self harm is recognised and acted upon particularly
where the person concerned has gone beyond vague suicidal ideation and moved towards
contemplating some specific ways of ending his life.

The Trust accepts that on the 8 April Mr Dunham presented with a number of factors associated with
people having suicidal thoughts. As noted above it is recognised that it would have been proportionate
to refer Mr Dunham to the Trust's CRHT at that time. This would have enabled the opportunity for an
assertive intervention aimed at identifying and supporting his needs.

The Trust's internal investigation recognised that the AAT is a new service (commenced in February
2013). The investigation recommended that an audit be completed to seek assurance on the
robustness of the assessment structure, both from the perspective of the framework and clinician’s
individual judgements within it. This will provide the evidence to support further developments in the
assessment of suicide risk alongside the Trust's current mandatory training programme. This audit is
currently in progress and | would be happy to share a copy of its report upon conclusion.

D) A letter sent to Mr Dunham's general practitioner from the advice and assessment team was not
draft appropriately. This raises the issue if the need for specific guidance to be given about how
such letters should be drafted within a template structure.

The Trust's internal investigation identified that whilst all of the information was within the letter to the
GP it was presented in a way that key aspects were not readily visible. To address this, the AAT have
been working with general practitioners to develop a template that provides information in a manner to
meet their needs. The agreed template is due to be implemented from the 18" November 2013

E) Most disturbingly the evidence at the hearing displayed a lack of coordination between mental
health professionals involved in Mr Dunham’s care. Specifically when a mental health nurse saw
Mr Dunham on the 8 April he had no knowledge whatsoever that Mr Dunham was already being
seen by a psychological wellbeing practitioner. This clearly demonstrates the need for effective
information sharing between professionals involved in managing the care of a mentally ill person
and the need for each and every professional to have access to all the records relating to the
patient and details of interventions and actions by other practitioners. It is recognised that the Trust
is working towards the implementation of a single electronic health record in 2014.

© ABOz,

~ >
s &
aWWe EMPLOYER Stonewall

1s DIVERSITY CHAMPION

Ms Lake -3-

The Trust's internal investigation confirmed that the computer system employed by AAT at the time
was able to scan all the Trust electronic health record systems with the exception of the electronic
health record system named PC Mis. This meant that it was not readily identified if a patient was
attending the Trust's Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) service. The Trust has now
implemented an updated system (Apervita) which is able to include the system PC Mis and therefore
identify any current or historical care episodes an individual has with the IAPT service.

As you recognise, the Trust is in the process of working towards a single electronic health record
across all of its services. This will bring together a number of different electronic and paper based
record systems bringing a number of benefits to increase patient safety.

Thank you for bringing these matters to the Trust's attention which assists to provide focus in
improving patient safety for service users. The Trust is committed to applying as much learning as
possible from this tragedy.

Yours sincerely

Acting Chief Executive

sronewall

DIVERSITY CHAMPION

S\ ‘S.

~ &

3 YY Ss MINDFUL
* o EMPLOYER
Also filed under 2013-0229: Dunham2013-0229.pdf
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1)

NOTE: This form is to be used after an inquest.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
The Chief Executive

PS

Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust
Trust Headquarters

Hellesdon Hospital

Drayton High Road

Norwich

NR6 5BE

4 | CORONER \

| am William James Armstrong, Senior Coroner; for the area of Norfolk.

2 | CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

3 | INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On the 15" of May 2013 | commenced an investigation into the death of Matthew
Christopher Dunham, who was 25 years old at the time of his death on the 9" of May
2013. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on the 4" of September
2013. It was found that the cause of death was multiple injuries as a result of a fall and
the conclusion of the inquest was “Suicide whilst suffering from mental disorder and
whilst in receipt of mental health services.

4 | CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

Matthew Christopher Dunham, who was suffering from mental disorder and receiving
professional mental health services at the time, leapt from the fifth floor of a shopping
mall known as Castle Mall in Norwich. He fell to the ground. Assistance was provided
straight away and medical attention given expeditiously. Sadly he could not be saved
and was pronounced dead at the scene.

Mr Dunham had been seen by various mental health professionals since February 2013
and had recently been expressing suicidal ideation.

ss)

CORONER'S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern
and, in my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. |
fully accept that since this tragedy the Trust has instigated an internal review and is
committed to taking a number of measures as a result of lessons learned from this
tragedy.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. —

‘a) An emergency referral by the general practitioner to the assessment team on the 4"

of April 2013 was not followed up within the normal time scale of four hours and it was
two days before a telephone triage session took place and four days before an
assessment was undertaken by a mental health nurse. This raises the need to ensure
that emergency referrals are dealt with within the appropriate time scale and that policies
and procedures are in force to make sure that this happens.

b) There appears not to have been a clear shared understanding between professionals
as to which team it was appropriate to refer Mr Dunham too. There was some lack of
understanding revealed as to whether a referral to the assessment team or the crisis
resolution and home treatment team was appropriate. This highlights the need for there
to'be a clear understanding about the roles of each team and the interface between
them. .

c) On the 8" of April 2013, despite the fact that Mr Dunham was presenting as feeling
suicidal and specifically that he had set up a noose in his flat the previous night, it was
not thought appropriate to refer. him to the crisis team for appropriately robust
intervention. This raises the issue of the basis upon which the risk of suicide or serious
self harm is recognised and acted upon particularly where the person concerned has
gone beyond vague suicidal ideation and moved towards contemplating some specific
way of ending his life.

d) A letter sent to Mr Dunham's general practitioner from the advice and assessment
team was not drafted appropriately. This raises the issue of the need for specific
guidance to be given about how such letters should be drafted within a template
structure. .

e) Most disturbingly the evidence at the hearing displayed a lack of coordination
between mental health professionals involved in Mr Dunham's care. Specifically when a

| mental health nurse saw Mr Dunham on the 8" of April he had no knowledge

whatsoever that Mr Dunham was already being seen by a psychological wellbeing
practitioner. This clearly demonstrates the need for effective information sharing
between professionals involved in managing the care of a mentally ill person and the
need for each and every professional to have access to all the records relating to the
patient and details of interventions and actions by other practitioners. It is recognised
that the Trust is working towards the implementation of a single electronic health record
in 2014. :

N.B. It is fully recognised that the Trust has commendably committed itself to learning
lessons as a result of this tragedy. However, the inadequacies revealed in what |
described at the inquest as the “fragmented and uncoordinated” approach to Mr
Dunham's care clearly demonstrate the need for these issues to be addressed speedily
and comprehensively in the interests of seeking to reduce the possibility of further
fatalities.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In-my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and | believe your
organisation has the power to take such action.

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 60 days of the date of this report,
namely by 11 November 2013. |, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.

COPIES and PUBLICATION

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested
Persons: : A

(mother)

Spixworth
Norwich

NR10

(father)

Stanfield
Wymondham
NR18

= ity = Patient Safety Manager,

NHS Anglia Commissioning Support Unit
Lakeside 400

Old Chapel Way

Broadland Business Park

Norwich

NR7 OWG

Healthwatch Norfolk
The Business Base Ltd
Rowan House

28 Queens Road
Hethersett

Norwich

NR9 3DB

Derek Winter (Archivist)

HM Coroner for the City of Sunderland
Civic Centre

Burdon Road

Sunderland SR2 7DN

Lam also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful
or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your
response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.

12 September 2013 | le __ fee

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