Taiyah-Grace Peebles

06 NOV 2018 —) NetworkRail

“4

Private and Confidential Network Rail Infrastructure Limited
lan Frank Goldup James Forbes House
Assistant Coroner, North East Kent 27 Great Suffolk Street
Coroners Service, Cantium House, London

2nd Floor, SE1 ONS

Sandling Road,

Maidstone,

Kent,

ME14 1XD

5 October 2018

Dear Sir

Regulation 28 Report — Taiyah-Grace Sharon Peebles

| refer to your report dated 24 July 2017 made under paragraph 7, Schedule 5 of the
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations)
Regulations 2013 in relation to the inquest into the very sad death of Taiyah-Grace Sharon
Peebles, who died on 25 July 2017 at Herne Bay railway station.

Background

As noted in your report, the conclusion of the inquest was that Taiyah-Grace Sharon
Peebles died on the evening of 25 July 2017 when, having dismounted from a train at the
station in an intoxicated state, she turned in the wrong direction, became disorientated and
made contact with the live rail carrying the electric current.

Response to Points of Concern

In your report, you state that “The absence of an end of platform barrier and the existence of
a live rail at ground level that might [be] accessible to members of the public may in my
opinion create a risk that future deaths wills occur unless action is taken.... The Assistant
Coroner understands that a barrier has since been constructed at Herne Bay Station to help
prevent deaths in similar circumstances but that other platforms in the area have no such
barrier. His further understanding is that in other parts of the country, trains are powered by
eleciric current supplied by way of overhead cables rather than live rails at ground level,
thereby making contact with the power supply less likely. In my opinion, action should be
taken to prevent future deaths and | believe your organisation has the power to take such
action.”

Ground level power supply

| can confirm that the majority of the South East route rail network is powered by a ground
level 750V d.c. conductor rail system. The UK rail network comprises of two main forms of

electric traction systems, 750V d.c. ground level conductor rail systems and 25kV a.c.
overhead contact line systems. Both types of traction systems come with different risks
which are key drivers of Network Rail’s asset polices and standards.

The ground level conductor rail system on the South East route was installed in the 1950s
and, although Network Rail has no future plans to install new conductor rail systems, it is not
reasonably practicable to convert the system to an overhead contact line due to the
complexity and cost to the railway industry. Whilst the ground level conductor rail cannot be
replaced, Network Rail is committed to continue to develop reasonably practical solutions to
improve the safety of the system wherever possibie.

Platform-end fencing

With regards to platform-end fencing, historically the fencing has not been installed as
standard practice. The risks involved in intentlonal and unintentional accessing of the rail
network were controlled via warning notices at the platform-end. The platform-end fencing
and anti-frespass panels that have been installed at Herne Bay are part of a wider program
of mitigations that are being applied to locations across the South East route to address the
tisks associated with members of the public either intentionally or unintentionally accessing
the rail network. There are currently two programmes of activity which will see platform-end
gates installed at over 50 stations on the South East route. We have already completed
works on 30 locations over the Kent and Sussex areas. We expect the majority of works to
be completed by the end of 2018 with some being finished in early 2019. There are also
programmes to improve our fencing at areas we consider to be at higher risk of intentional or
unintentional public access and this includes £800,000 of work which is due to be completed
by April 2019.

Network Rail, Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and the British Transport Police continue
to work together to manage this type of incident on the rail network. Our approach is a risk-
based one using data (including data shared by the BTP) to identify areas where the public
may access the line. Every week, joint BTP and Network Rail data is used to identify trends.
This information is used to inform our patrolling plans which set out where the BTP, TOC or
Network Rail should position their security resources throughout the week to best protect
both members of the public and our infrastructure and stations from intentional or
unintentional access. Monthly meetings are held with the BTP and TOCs (Southeastern and
Govia Thameslink Railway (GTR)) to discuss our priorities around areas we consider to be
at a higher risk of the public gaining access to the infrastructure.

| hope this response provides you with assurance that addresses your concerns. If|can be
of further assistance, or if you would like further clarification, please do not hesitate to
contact me.

Finally, on behalf of all at Network Rail, | would like to take this opportunity to express my
sincere condolences to the family of Miss Peebles.

Yours faithfull

oute Managing Director