Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2020

William Israel

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2020-0271, written 3 Dec 2020. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report3 Dec 2020
Reference2020-0271
DeceasedWilliam Israel
CoronerSonia Hayes
Coroner areaNorth East Kent
CategoryRailway related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published2

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

ANNEX A 

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1) 

NOTE: This form is to be used after an inquest. 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

1.  Chief Executive Officer 

London & South Eastern Railway 
3rd Floor, 41-51 Grey Street 
Newcastle-Upon -Tyne NE1 6EE 

1 

CORONER 

I am SONIA MARIE HAYES assistant coroner, for the coroner area of North East Kent 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 
[HYPERLINKS] 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 2nd April 2020 an investigation was commenced into the death of WILLIAM STEVEN 
ISRAEL, 23. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 24th November 
2020. The conclusion of the inquest was ACCIDENT the medical cause of death 
electrocution.  

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

William Israel had visited a friend who lived near Canterbury East Railway Station. They 
had a drink before they travelled to a nightclub crossing from one platform to the other at 
Canterbury East Railway Station using an underpass at around midnight. The station 
was closed but the palisade gates at Platforms 1 & 2 were open routinely out of ours. 
William left the nightclub at around 03:30 hours alone with the keys to go back to his 
friend’s flat. Toxicology evidence establishes he was intoxicated. He was seen on CCTV 
walking normally and entering the station through palisade gates. He then hopped down 
on the track and caught the toe of his shoe and tripped landing on the live rail at 
approximately 03:45 hours. He was found by a member of the public and the cause of 
death was given as electrocution.  

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

(1)  Evidence heard from an experienced South Eastern Railway witness was that a 
national survey has found that there is a widespread assumption by members of 
the public that: 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 a.  Power to the rail tracks is switched off at night 
b.  Power to the rail tracks is only switched on when trains are due 

             This supports that the risk of electrocution from train tracks is not well  
             understood by the public. The risk of electrocution is from the live rail in such   
             cases and the signage at Canterbury East Station relating to this is at each end  
             of the platform. This signs in this vicinity contain the word ‘Caution’; the  
             font used warning of the risk of death was not highlighted and significantly  
             smaller than the rest of the sign.  

(2)  There is insufficient signage warning of the risk of electrocution to the public 
from the live rail and none present at the palisade gates. The evidence at the 
inquest established that there has been recent national guidance indicating 
changes to warning signs at railway stations. Signage has not been updated at 
this station following this death in accordance with that guidance.  

(3)  The British Transport Police Designing Out of Crime Unit (BTP DOCU) 

investigated this incident and has made a recommendation to consider the 
placement of strategic under-platform warning signage that would be visible 
where a member of the public jumping or stepping down onto the tracks. This 
recommendation has not been implemented.  

(4)  The main entrance to the station is open between the hours of 06:00 -22:00 
hours Monday to Saturday and 07:00 – 22:00 hours on Sunday during such 
hours the station is staffed. First and last trains run outside of the staffed hours. 
There is signage by the main entrance directing the public to an underpass 
allowing pedestrians to safely cross between Platforms 1 & 2. The station has 
steel fencing around part of the perimeter that is approximately 2 metres high 
with spikes at the top and there is a potential alternative egress and ingress 
comprising palisade gates set withing that fencing. When the station is open and 
staffed, the palisade gates are locked. When the station is unstaffed the 
palisade gates are open and there is no signage in that vicinity directing 
pedestrians to the underpass. 

(5)  It appears inconsistent that the palisade gates that deter public entering are 

closed when the station is open and staffed, then open when the station is 
unstaffed and after trains have stopped running.  

(6)  Whilst it is not disputed that William had used the underpass with friends to get 
to a nightclub that night. He had already been drinking prior to this journey, was 
not local to the area and was alone when he accessed the station through the 
palisade gates a few hours later. William was intoxicated at the time he 
attempted to cross the train tracks at Canterbury East Station, however there 
have been a number of incidents of individuals on the tracks over the last three 
years and the station is just meters from a nightclub. There is a significant risk 
that members of the public using the station as a cut through will be intoxicated.  

(7)  Evidence at the inquest from the BPT DOCU report was that London & South 

Eastern Railway staff had informed the investigator that:  

a.  staffing at the station during the entirety of operational hours was not 

b. 

possible due to the timings of the first and last trains, and  
if the palisade gates were locked overnight and a member of staff did not 
then attend for work then the public would not be able to enter the station 
and catch a train 

c.  changes to the opening hours of the station would be complex and require 

d. 

lengthy consultation with staff 
locking the palisade gates when the station was unstaffed would require 
some members of the public who lived in housing on the opposite sides of 
the track to the main town to take a detour at night 

2 

 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (8)  There appears to be an absence of a sufficient risk assessment of the risks to 
the public from electrocution from the live rail particularly when the palisade 
gates are open and, if the palisade gates should remain open, of any potential 
risk mitigation that might be implemented to ensure safe use of the underpass. 

(9)  I understand that the configuration of a live rail is widespread in the South of 
England and also other areas of the country and many of those stations are 
unstaffed and accessible by the public out of hours, therefore this is a matter 
that is of relevance nationally and not just at Canterbury East Railway Station.  

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and your 
organisation have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 27th January 2021. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons 
(London & South Eastern Railway), 

 (sister of William Israel). I have also sent it to 

 (British Transport Police) and 

 (Network Rail) who may find it useful or of interest. 

I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all 
interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.   

I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I believe may find it 
useful or of interest.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary 
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful 
or of interest.  

You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about 
the release or the publication of your response. 

9 

3rd December 2020                                              

Sonia Marie Hayes  
Assistant Coroner North East Kent  

3

Responses

2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Southeastern (PDF)
Ms S M Hayes 
Assistant Coroner North East Kent 
North East Kent Coroners 
Cantium House County Hall 
Sandling Road 
Maidstone 
Kent 
ME14 1XD 

30th September 

Dear Ms Hayes 

Regulation 28 Report: William Steven Israel 

1 

I wrote to you on 6 January in response to your Regulation 28 report regarding the tragic death of 

William Steven Israel at Canterbury East railway station on 15 March 2020. 

2 

In that letter I committed Southeastern to taking to following actions: 

(a)

Replacing  the  three  warning  signs  provided  at  the  main  entrance  and  palisade  gates  at

platforms 1 and 2 at Canterbury East station with a new design.

(b)

Engaging with the operators of the Chemistry nightclub to seek ways to inform and educate

their clientele in relation to the risks associated with people going on to railway tracks.

(c)

Reviewing the risk assessments applicable to Canterbury East as part of our routine review

processes and updating them as appropriate.

(d)

Sharing the findings of the Inquest, the Regulation 28 report and details of our actions with

the wider railway community via the industry Passenger Operators’ Safety Group (POSG)

and Passengers on Trains and Stations Risk Group (PTSRG).

3 

 I now write to update you on progress with the implementation of those actions. 

a) Warning signs at station entrances

4 

We have replaced the three warning signs at the various entrances to the station with a new design 

as promised and photographs of these signs are attached as Annex A. 

 
 5 

In addition to this we have also engaged with the wider rail industry with a view to establishing a 

project to review and replace existing station warning signs with more informative alternatives that 

highlight the “Danger of Death” message. 

b)  Chemistry Night Club 

6 

We  have  engaged  with  the  operators  of  the  Chemistry  Night  Club  and  developed  a  constructive 

working  relationship  with  them.  As  part  of  this  we  have  agreed  to  provide  the  night  club,  free  of 

charge,  with  a  supply  of  A4  posters  and  several  thousand  drinks  mats  which  highlight  three  key 

railway safety messages in a “fun facts” format intended to engage and inform.  These are drawn 

from our Travel Smart Travel Safe campaign and highlight: 

(a) 

The fact that the conductor rail is never switched off 

(b) 

The extended stopping distance for trains (equivalent to 20 Premier League football pitches 

or 2 km) 

(c) 

The weight of trains (equivalent to 80 elephants or 400 tonnes) 

c)  Review of Risk Assessments 

7 

We have completed our review of the risk assessments at Canterbury East station and have updated 

them in the light of this accident and physical changes to the station, including the recent completion 

of an “Access for All” footbridge with lifts. 

d)  Sharing findings 

8 

We have shared all our learning from this tragic accident with the wider industry via the POSG and 

PTSRG and this has prompted both discussions and actions, including work on signage reference 

in paragraph 5 above. 

Yours sincerely 

Managing Director  
Southeastern 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annex A – New warning signs at station entrances
Response from Southeastern (PDF)
Ms S M Hayes 
Assistant Coroner North East Kent 
North East Kent Coroners  
Cantium House County Hall  
Sandling Road  
Maidstone  
Kent ME14 1XD 

6th January 2021 

Dear Ms Hayes 

Regulation 28 Report: William Steven Israel (ref: 

) 

1 

I write in response to your Regulation 28 report dated 3 December 2020 regarding the death 

of William Steven Israel on railway tracks at Canterbury East railway station on 15 March 

2020. 

2 

I would like to begin by expressing my condolences to Mr Israel’s family and my sorrow for 

their loss. I can assure you and them that we will learn lessons from this tragedy to prevent 

recurrence of similar events.  

3 

I, my colleagues at Southeastern and indeed the whole railway community are very aware 

of the risks associated with unauthorised access to railway tracks – particularly where it is 

electrified  using  the  DC  conductor  rail  system  –  and  we  take  this  issue  very  seriously. 

Regrettably, it is a matter of record that the vast majority of deaths on Britain’s railways arise 

from unauthorised access onto the tracks. For that reason, we implement a wide range of 

strategies and initiatives with the aim of reducing and preventing unauthorised access. 

4 

The strategies and initiatives Southeastern take range from physical deterrents and barriers 

to community engagement (to educate and raise awareness). For example, Southeastern 

(sometimes  in  conjunction  with  British  Transport  Police  and/or  Network  Rail)  take  part  in 

regular school visits, media campaigns such as “Respect the Edge”, “Next Day Regrets” and 

“You vs Train” as well as installing enhanced fencing (where appropriate) and gating platform 

ends. We also take part in localised activities around level crossings and other “hot spots” 

for trespass and have recently worked with Network Rail to develop a “Life Centre” for youth 

 education  at Margate  station,  which  includes  a  full-size  mock-up  of  a  platform  with  track, 

conductor rail and train. 

5 

In addition to our initiatives to reduce and prevent unauthorised access to railway tracks, we 

fund  a  number  of  Welfare  Officers  dedicated  to  identifying  and  engaging  with  vulnerable 

persons  at  stations,  and  significant  numbers  of  our  station  staff  have  been  trained  by 

Samaritans to be aware of people who may be vulnerable and, where appropriate, how to 

intervene and support them. 

6 

At Canterbury East Station, there were already a range of measures to prevent unauthorised 

access prior to Mr Israel’s death, including: (i) red anti-trespass signage at the booking hall 

entrance and at the side gate providing access and egress to platform 2 from Station Road; 

and (ii) barriers, anti-trespass matting, trespass warning and danger of live rail signage at 

the  platform  ends.  Following  Mr  Israel’s  death,  we  considered  whether  there  were  any 

additional measures which could be put in place at Canterbury East Station. As a result, we 

have already installed new signage at each of the three station entrances (the main entrance 

and the palisade gates on platforms 1 and 2) to emphasise the danger of crossing the tracks. 

Photographs  of  these  signs  were  provided  to  the  Inquest  as  exhibits  CC  15,  16  and  17 

appended to our witness statement.  

7 

Turning to the specifics of the report, I shall respond to the detailed points which you raised 

in section 5. 

Response to Paragraph (1)  

8 

It is correct that – except for when engineering work takes place – the live DC conductor rails 

are energised at all times. It is also the case that surveys show that many members of the 

public are not aware of this fact and assume either that the power is routinely turned off at 

night or that it is only switched on when a train is approaching. Existing industry educational 

and campaign material – for both conductor rail and overhead line electrification systems – 

addresses this point directly and emphasises that the power is always on.  

9 

We wish to clarify the signage which was present prior to the accident, and the signage that 

has been installed post-accident. Prior to this accident there were four signs at Canterbury 

East station which warned of the danger of the live DC conductor rails. These were the four 

platform end signs, photographs of which were provided to the Inquest as exhibits CC 3, 4, 

5 and 6. These signs carry the wording “Danger. Do not touch the live rail” and the word 

“Danger” is the largest on the sign.  

10 

After the accident, we took the initiative to design and install a further three signs at or close 

to the palisade side entrance gates to platforms 1 and 2 and at the main station entrance. 

Photographs  of  this  signage  were  provided  to  the  Inquest  as  exhibits  CC  15,  16  and  17. 

These signs carry the wording “Caution – Do not cross the tracks – Danger of Death – High 

voltage power rails live at all times”. The intention of these new signs was to highlight more 

 
 prominently  the risks of the live  DC conductor rails. We  believe that it  is  these additional 

signs to which you refer in paragraph (1). We note your concerns regarding the use of the 

word “Caution” and the size of the text relating to the risk of death and have addressed these 

through a revised design (see Annex A). 

11 

Action (a): we will replace the three additional signs at Canterbury East station with a new 

design based on that shown at Annex A. 

Response to Paragraph (2) 

12 

We wish to correct the statement in your paragraph (2) that there is no signage present at 

the palisade gates. As explained at paragraph 10 above, we installed three additional signs 

at or close to the palisade gates as well as at the main station entrance following the accident 

(see our witness statement at paragraph 19.3).  

13 

We note that you refer to “national guidance” on the changes to warning signs at railway 

stations.  We  apologise  if  our  evidence  was  unclear  on  this  point.  The  Effective  Signage 

Project (led by the University of Birmingham’s Centre for Railway Research and Education) 

is an academic study not national guidance.  The study was commissioned by Network Rail’s 

Trespass Improvement Group and led to a recent report1. The aim of the study and report is 

to assist Network Rail in the design of future signage to deter unauthorised access to the 

railway.  

14 

Southeastern provided input into this research via Network Rail, and a copy of the report 

was provided to us on 16 November 2020. Section 4.1.1.1 of this report states that “Signal 

words ‘Danger’ and ‘Warning’ are more likely to attract attention than ‘Caution’ or ‘Notice’ 

and have stronger connotations of risk.”  

15 

We are considering the findings of the research report and how the recommendations could 

improve our signage. This includes the redesign of the station entrance signs described at 

paragraph 10 above. 

Response to Paragraph (3) 

16 

The provision of under-platform signage is a matter for Network Rail as the platform faces 

concerned are their asset. Southeastern has made representations to Network Rail for such 

signage to be installed but this has been refused due to concerns that under-platform signs 

are difficult to maintain, and there is a risk they may obscure developing structural defects 

in the platform itself. In view of this, Southeastern are unable to take any further action in 

relation to under-platform signage at Canterbury East or elsewhere. 

1 “Effective signage to prevent trespass” - 
Birmingham, 7 September 2020 

., University of 

 
 
 
 Response to Paragraph (4) 

17 

Before the accident, directional signage to the station subway was provided in the form of a 

double-sided sign affixed perpendicular to the wall of the station building adjacent to the top 

of the subway stairs.  

18 

Following  the  Inquest,  we  have  installed  an  additional  directional  sign  adjacent  to  the 

entrance when entering platform 2 from the palisade gate which indicates the presence of 

the subway. I append a photograph of this sign in situ as Annex B. 

19 

Action (b) completed: A new directional sign has been installed adjacent to the side gate to 

platform 2. 

Response to Paragraph (5)  

20 

The purpose of the palisade gates is to permit access and egress to and from the station 

during the hours that the booking hall is closed and the station is unstaffed, and not to act 

as  a  deterrent  to  such  access.  They  are  not  required  to  be  open  during  the  day  as  it  is 

possible to enter the station via the booking hall and, as there are Automatic Ticket Gates 

provided to protect revenue, they are closed whilst the booking hall is open and the ticket 

gates in operation.  

21 

The booking hall is closed at 20:00 each evening and it is at this point that the palisade gates 

on platforms 1 and 2 are opened. They are closed again when the booking hall opens in the 

morning at 06:00 (Monday – Saturday) or 07:00 (Sunday). There are several reasons why 

the palisade gates need to be opened during these hours including passengers needing to 

access  and  egress  the  station  for  train  services  scheduled  after  20:00  and  before 

06:00/07:00.  

Response to Paragraph (6)  

22 

We note the comments in paragraph (6) in relation to previous incidents of individuals on the 

track although we note that none of these incidents involved a person leaving the Chemistry 

nightclub.    We  also  note  that  some  members  of  the  public  using  the  subway  may  be 

intoxicated  but  given  the  large  numbers  of  passengers  that  use  the  station  each  day  we 

would not describe this as a significant number or a “significant risk”.  

23 

Notwithstanding  this,  in  light  of  the  accident  we  consider  that  the  provision  of  relevant 

information to nightclub attendees may reduce the likelihood of other individuals making an 

attempt  to  cross  over  the  tracks.  This  could  potentially  be  achieved  by  using  leaflets, 

messages on menus  or drinks mats, posters in lavatories  or use of the industry  “You vs. 

Train” video materials.  

24 

Action  (c):  we  will  engage  with  the  operators  of  the  Chemistry  nightclub  with  a  view  to 

highlighting the dangers of the rail tracks to their clientele.  

 
 Response to Paragraph (7)  

25 

We note the contents of the BTP DOCU report, and the comments provided by our staff.  

26 

We do not propose to alter staff shift patterns or station opening hours. We believe that there 

are more effective methods of preventing unauthorised track access which we have set out 

in this letter together with the detail provided in our witness statement (see paragraphs 23 – 

26). 

Response to Paragraph (8) 

27 

We do not agree with the comment regarding risk assessment in paragraph 8. We have set 

out at paragraph 9 above the details of the four signs which were in place prior to the accident 

which warned of the danger of the live rail. Following the accident, we installed additional 

signage at all station entrances to highlight this risk and, as set out in paragraphs 10 and 13 

above, we have redesigned this signage to take into account your comments and the findings 

of the University of Birmingham research (see Annex A). In addition, the risk assessments 

applicable  to  Canterbury  East  will  be  reviewed  as  part  of  our  routine  review  processes 

following an incident and will be updated if appropriate. 

28 

Action (d): we will review the risk assessments applicable to Canterbury East as part of our 

routine review processes and will update if appropriate.  

Response to Paragraph (9) 

29 

Action (e): we will share details of this Inquest and Regulation 28 report with the wider railway 

community via the industry Passenger Operators’ Safety Group and Passengers on Trains 

and Stations Risk Group. We provided an initial briefing to the Passenger Operators’ Safety 

Group on 9 December. 

Summary  

30 

In summary, the actions that we propose to take in light of this report are as follows: 

(a) 

We will replace the three warning signs provided at the main entrance and palisade 

gates at platforms 1 and 2 at Canterbury East station with a new design as shown 

at  Annex  A.  These  signs  reflect  the  concerns  raised  in  you  report  and  take  into 

consideration the University of Birmingham’s findings and include replacing the word 

“Caution”  with  the  word  “Warning”  and  giving  greater  prominence  to  the  risk  of 

electrocution. 

(b) 

We have already provided signage at the side entrance to Platform 2 at Canterbury 

East station which directs users to the subway at the middle of the platforms. 

 
 (c) 

We will engage with the operators of the Chemistry nightclub to seek ways to inform 

and educate their clientele in relation to the risks associated with people going on to 

railway tracks. 

(d) 

 We will review the risk assessments applicable to Canterbury East as part of our 

routine review processes and will update if appropriate. 

(e) 

We will share the findings of the Inquest, the Regulation 28 report and details of our 

actions  with  the  wider  railway  community  via  the  industry  Passenger  Operators’ 

Safety Group and Passengers on Trains and Stations Risk Group. 

31 

Our current intention is to complete actions (a), (d) and (e) by 31 March 2021, action (b) is 

already complete, and to complete action (c) by 30 June 2021. These timescales may need 

to be altered dependent upon the impact of the Covid-19 lockdown/Tier restrictions. We do 

not intend to progress any other actions at this stage for the reasons indicated above. 

Yours Sincerely 

Managing Director  
Southeastern 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annex A – Initial design for new warning signs to be placed at all entrances to Canterbury East 
station (final design may be in landscape format). 

 Annex B - Photograph of new sign at the side entrance to platform 2

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