Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2021
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2021-0288, written 27 Aug 2021. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 27 Aug 2021 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2021-0288 |
| Deceased | Ann Geraghty |
| Coroner | Adam Hodson |
| Coroner area | Birmingham and Solihull |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths · Product related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
via UK Head Office - Philips Electronics UK Limited Ascent, 1 Aerospace Blvd,
Farnborough GU14 6XW
CORONER
I am Mr Adam Hodson, Assistant Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull
CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 1 April 2021 I commenced an investigation into the death of Ann GERAGHTY. The
investigation concluded at the end of the inquest . The conclusion of the inquest was: Death was
a consequence of natural causes.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
The deceased was admitted to Good Hope Hospital on 26 February 2021 where she was treated
for heart failure. She was commenced on continual cardiac monitoring from 6th to 8th March,
where two periods of ventricular standstill were recorded but were missed due to a combination of
policy, staffing, workplace and equipment issues. She suffered a cardiac arrest on 8 March 2021
and was treated on ICU for 22 days in total. Despite treatment, she deteriorated rapidly on her final
day, and she died at 13:40, 30 March 2021. Had the periods of ventricular standstill been
detected, she would have been admitted to CCU for monitoring, but her subsequent cardiac
arrests could not have been prevented.
Based on information from the deceased's treating clinicians the medical cause of death was
determined to be:
1
2
3
4
1a Multiorgan failure
1b Congestive cardiac failure
1c Dilated cardiomyopathy
II
CORONER'S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my
opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is
my statutory duty to report to you.
5
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. -
1. At inquest, the evidence was that all five hospitals within the University Hospitals
Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust ("the Trust") utilise a Phillips central monitoring
station (model number M3151), and there use is widespread throughout the
hospitals.
2. The deceased was commenced on continual cardiac telemetry monitoring on this
machine from the period 6th to 8th March. Following the deceased's cardiac arrest
on 8 March 2021, a retrospective review of the telemetry monitoring was carried out
and two periods of ventricular standstill were noted - one at 12:43, 6 March 2021
where the telemetry recorded a period of 4 seconds ventricular standstill; and one
at 13:09 on 8 March 2021 where the telemetry recorded a period of 10 seconds
ventricular standstill.
3. Medical engineers were asked to analyse the telemetry and noted that on 8 March
the monitor's alarm had triggered and that it was a self-terminating alarm as the
heart rhythm had corrected itself. There was no evidence that staff muted the alarm
or that there was any fault with the equipment. Thus, this self-correcting function is
an intended function of the monitor.
4. Following the Trust's internal investigations, it was recommended that discussion
with the manufacturers of the cardiac monitoring equipment take place to establish
whether the alarms can be configured in such a way that the alarm does not self-
terminate when certain abnormal heart rhythms correct themselves. The evidence
was that this discussion took place on 31 July 2021, but that there has been no
progress since that time, with the responsibility now lying with the manufacturer (i.e.
yourselves) to develop a software update or alternative system to ensure that the
issue of self-terminating alarms is remedied.
5. At inquest, it could not be determined whether Phillips central monitoring stations
(model number M3151) are utilised by other Trusts nationally, but given that Philips
is one of the largest providers of cardiac monitoring equipment to the NHS, it is
presumed that this monitoring station is deployed in other Trusts nationally.
6. I therefore have concerns that, unless immediate consideration is given to this
issue by the manufacture (i.e. yourselves), there is a risk of future deaths occurring
- both within the Trust and nationally within other Trusts - and will continue to exist
in the future until such time as this is addressed.
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the power to
take such action.
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by
22 October 2021. I, the coroner, may extend the period.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.
COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons
i)
(family)
ii) University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
I have also sent it to NHS England who may find it useful or of interest.
I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.
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7
8
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He
may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You
may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or
the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.
27 August 2021
9
Signature:
Adam Hodson
Assistant Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Philips Healthcare Mr. Adam Hodson Coroner’s Court Birmingham & Solihull Districts 50 Newton Street Birmingham 4B 6NE Great Britain October 8, 2021 Product = 866389 Patient Information Center iX (PIC iX) / MX40 Telemetry Serial Number = 7COD-02P6-V / U5096A7490 Dear Mr. Hodson, Thank you for bringing to our attention the incident involving the above cited product. The complaint details, subsequent investigation and resultant findings are described below. Incident as reported to Philips Healthcare: On August 27, 2021, Philips received the Coroner’s report titled ‘Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths ’ issued by you, Adam Hodson, HM Assistant Coroner. The following was reported: “On 1 April 2021 I commenced an investigation into the death of [redacted]. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest. The conclusion of the inquest was: Death was a consequence of natural causes. The deceased was admitted to Good Hope Hospital on 26 February 2021 where [redacted] was treated for heart failure. [Redacted] was commenced on continual cardiac monitoring from 6th to 8th March, where two periods of ventricular standstill were recorded but were missed due to a combination of policy, staffing, workplace and equipment issues. [Redacted] suffered a cardiac arrest on 8 March 2021 and was treated on ICU for 22 days in total. Despite treatment, [redacted] deteriorated rapidly on [redacted] final day, and [redacted] died at 13:40, 30 March 2021. Had the periods of ventricular standstill been detected, [redacted] would have been admitted to CCU for monitoring, but [redacted] subsequent cardiac arrests could not have been prevented.” The report summarized concerns of a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. Specifically, the report discussed a retrospective review of the telemetry monitoring carried out on this patient during the period of March 6-8, 2021. Two periods of ventricular standstill were noted: one at 12:43 on March 6, 2021 where the telemetry recorded a period of 4 seconds of ventricular standstill; and one at 13:09 on March 8, 2021 where the telemetry recorded a period of 10 seconds of ventricular standstill. The report further indicated that Medical Engineers were asked to analyse the telemetry and noted that on March 8, 2021 the monitor's alarm had triggered and that it was a self-terminating alarm as the heart rhythm had corrected itself. Medical Engineers and staff indicated there was no evidence that staff muted the alarm or that there was any fault with the equipment. Thus, it was concluded per the report that this self-correcting function is an intended function of the monitor. Philips Healthcare Investigation: Strip Review As the Device Manufacturer, Philips’ first contact from the Hospital in regard to this incident was on June 29, 2021. This was an informal request to investigate to a Philips Clinical Application Specialist (CAS) whilst visiting Heartlands Hospital on another matter. The question from the Matron was whether a Ventricular Standstill would cause an alarm and, if so, how long it would last for. A general ECG waveform strip and an Asystole Alarm strip, printed out around the time of the incident, was emailed to the CAS on July 18, 2021. The Asystole Alarm strip showed this alarm generated at the time of the Ventricular Standstill, but without the Clinical Audit Logs, the duration of this alarm and any other actions taken around the time of this alarm are unknown. The configuration of the PIC iX was reviewed by the CAS at the time of this first site visit and found the systems functioning as designed. Red alarms were enabled and cannot be terminated without end user intervention. Further review of the available information found that there was not a strip for the incident on March 6, 2021 to review. A strip was provided for March 8, 2021 13:09:13 that revealed an ECG waveform with beat labels. A (artifact), M (missed), ? (questionable), and one beat labeled N (normal) along with a period of ventricular standstill. The strips do not include the response taken by the user nor the length of time the alarm sounded. Philips was not notified of the March 2021 incidents until greater than three months following the events. As a result, Clinical Audit Logs required for a complete investigation were no longer available. Self-Terminating Alarms Per the report, hospital Medical Engineers were asked to review the Telemetry and the hospital Medical Engineers noted that on March 8, 2021, the monitors alarm had triggered and that it was a self-terminating alarm. Philips is interpreting this description as the alarm stopped on its own accord without user interaction. Any ventricular standstill of 4-10 seconds of duration would meet the definition of Asystole which is a red arrhythmia alarm. There is not a configuration to change Asystole or any other red arrhythmia alarm to self-terminate for a Telemetry / Central Station setup. In summary, the product is not designed to self-terminate red alarms nor is Philips able to reproduce the described behavior. Good Hope Hospital Site Visit Philips support personnel performed a site visit to Good Hope Hospital on September 24, 2021. An ECG simulator was utilized to test the customer’s system using the same equipment that was used on the patient in March. An Asystole alarm was generated, and the simulator was reset to normal sinus rhythm and the alarm continued even though the asystole condition had ended. Testing revealed no self-terminating of alarms. The devices were found to perform as expected. The configuration was further reviewed by the Business Unit Clinical Specialist from the data collected during this site visit and the initial assessment of red alarms cannot be terminated without intervention was verified. While the original description of the issue was reported as the Information Center iX; this issue is with alarm detection and communication from the Telemetry to the PIC iX. When Telemetry is used with PIC iX, the alarm settings are sent from the PIC. Red alarms cannot be set to self terminate in the PIC configuration. Philips Healthcare Complaint Review Complaints were analyzed for the last 3 years world-wide and found one other similar complaint. This complaint was a non-adverse event, it was found that the alarm had been silenced by an end user initially and was giving an alarm reminder with brief audible alerts since alarm reminders were enabled. The equipment was operating as designed. Conclusion: Philips Healthcare investigated the reported incident and concluded that the device operates per specification. • A full investigation into the alleged self-terminating alarm incident was not possible as the required logs were not obtained when the incident occurred. • There is not a configuration available to enable asystole or any other red arrhythmia alarm to self- terminate for Telemetry / Central Station monitoring. • Termination of asystole or other red arrythmia alarm with the current configuration requires end user intervention, as shown with the simulation test with NHS personnel present. • Based on the current configurations of the system, if a red alarm is silenced by the user but persists, the expected behavior is for the audible alarm to end, the visual alarm to remain and a brief series of audible tones to be provided every 3 minutes, which stop after several seconds on their own as long as the condition remains. • An on-site visit found the equipment to be operating as designed. A full explanation of the configuration options is available in the Configuration Guide. Philips’ clinical support continues to be available to assist with any changes to desired workflow. Please be assured that Philips Healthcare is committed to providing quality products and solutions. If you have any questions on the investigation of this incident, please contact us. Sincerely, Philips Healthcare Complaint Investigator Quality and Regulatory One Deerfield Centre 13560 Morris Road Alpharetta, GA 30004 Cc: Good Hope Hospital Quality Manager Philips Electronics UK Limited Philips Centre, Ascent 1 Aerospace Blvd Farnborough, GU14 6XW
For the attention of Mr Adam Hodson Assistant Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull 50 Newton Street Birmingham 18 October 2021 Dear Mr Hodson Inquest touching the death of Anne Geraghty Inquest – 25 August 2021 I write further to the Inquest touching the death of Anne Geraghty in which you issued a Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths to Philips in relation to their central monitoring stations. Following receipt of the Report, a meeting took place with our clinical leads and representatives from Philips to discuss the equipment and the issues that had arisen in this case. Philips have also subsequently attended and undertaken an inspection of the specific machine used in monitoring Ms Geraghty. During the Inquest, the evidence presented to you in both our internal investigation and through witness evidence, was that the alarms on the monitoring equipment had self-terminated. This was based on evidence obtained from nursing staff and our medical engineering team that the alarm had not been silenced and therefore it was assumed that it had self-terminated on Ms Geraghty’s heart rhythm returning to normal. During our discussions with Philips subsequent to the Inquest Hearing we have become aware that the machines are not configured in a way that allows alarms to self-terminate upon the heart rhythm returning to normal. The alarm must therefore have been silenced and we believe this is likely to have been a user error based on the fact the trace would have shown a normal rhythm within seconds of the alarm sounding. In light of this information, we would like to apologise for our honest and mistaken belief that the alarms on the equipment self-terminated. From our subsequent enquiries it appears that the confusion as to the functionality of the equipment is likely to have arisen during conversations with our ward staff and medical engineers, and subsequently with Philips’s support personnel. There is no evidence of any deliberate provision of incorrect information. As stated above, it is considered most likely that a member of staff must have silenced the alarm, noted that the heart was in normal rhythm and took no further action. Once an alarm has been silenced, the configuration of the equipment does not automatically highlight the abnormal section of the ECG and therefore no further action was taken at that point. It was only on a later examination of the log that the episode became apparent. Our clinical evidence remains that this episode, and the failure to identify the same at the time, would not have affected the outcome as regards Ms Geraghty’s unfortunate death. Action Plan As soon as we became aware of the machine configuration, following the inspection undertaken by Philips, we took a number of immediate steps to raise awareness of the alarm system in place which included an email to all cardiology staff on each of our sites detailing how the alarm system functions. This information was also discussed in ward safety huddles. In addition to the above, we have also put in place a number of other actions as set out below. Education and training In addition to internal education, the Trust is working with Philips to provide additional refresher training and education to our staff around the monitoring equipment and relevant human factors in the management of the same, including efforts to avoid/minimise any risk of ‘alarm fatigue’. This will include an Alarm Management Programme across our cardiology service at all our sites. Both our divisional and medical device team educators will be involved with the refresher training, and we are currently in discussion with Philips to agree dates. Our aim is to have completed the education and training within the next 3 months. Machine configuration As set out above, once an alarm is silenced, there is no facility which allows for the immediate review of the abnormal ECG if no longer on view. In partnership with Philips, we will be exploring whether it is possible to alter the configuration of the software and to explore with them the possibility of putting in place a facility which allows for review of the abnormal section of the ECG at the point it is silenced. Retention of traces Currently trace logs are only retained for a period of 50 days before they are removed from the system. In this case, the traces had already been removed at the point where Philips were asked to review them and so this could not assist the authors of the SI report relied upon at the Inquest Hearing. In recognition of this issue the Trust is exploring the retention of trace logs locally for an extended period which would allow for retrospective review. I would like to assure you that we have reflected on this case and have taken immediate steps to ensure our teams are fully aware of how the alarm systems function on the monitoring equipment. We will continue to work with Philips and implement the actions set above which we hope provides you with assurance that steps are being taken to prevent any similar occurrences in the future. Once again, we apologise to both the Court and the parties for the inadvertent incorrect evidence provided. This has been reflected on within both the Service and the Trust’s legal department and we can assure you that reflection on this incident will ensure increased scrutiny of evidence before it is provided to your office. Yours sincerely, Chief Medical Officer University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
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