Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024

Sebastian ‘Benji’ Oliver

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0589, written 30 Oct 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report30 Oct 2024
Reference2024-0589
DeceasedSebastian ‘Benji’ Oliver
CoronerAdam Hodson
Coroner areaBirmingham and Solihull
CategoryAlcohol, drug and medication related deaths · Police related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:  West Midlands Police 

CORONER 

 I am Adam Hodson, Assistant Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

 I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and 
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

 On 19 August 2024 I commenced an investigation into the death of Sebastion Benjamin OLIVER. 
The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest. The conclusion of the inquest was: "Died 
after suffering an accidental injury to his hand from climbing a fence whilst under the influence of 
drugs". 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH  

  At 06:21 on 29/11/23, Benji was found unresponsive by a member of the public outside 

, Sutton Coldfield, and was suffering significant blood loss from an incised 
wound to his left hand, together with hypothermia. Paramedics duly attended and conveyed 
him to Good Hope Hospital where sadly he could not be resuscitated, and he was 
pronounced deceased at 07:56. The evidence indicates that there was no third party 
involvement, and instead Benji had impaled his left hand after trying to climb a spiked metal 
fence, for reasons unknown, on Harrison Road off Erdington High Street at about 22:00 on 
28/11/23 whilst under the influence of drugs. He was attended to and treated by paramedics 
twice during the evening of 28/11/23 but refused treatment in hospital and subsequently 
absconded. It is not possible to say whether he would have been found following 
absconding from hospital. There were missed opportunities for emergency services to 
provide instructions on bystander life support and provide defibrillation in a timelier 
fashion, but on the balance of probabilities these delays did not minimally, trivially or 
negligibly contribute to his death. 

 Following a post mortem the medical cause of death was determined to be: 

 1a   Incised wounds to the left hand with hypothermia 

1 

2 

3 

4 

 1b    

 1c    

 1d  

 II    Mixed drugs intoxication (

) 

  
  
  
  
  
 5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

 During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my 
opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is 
my statutory duty to report to you. 

 The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  – 

1.   The evidence heard at inquest indicates that following an emergency call at 22:18 on 

28/11/23, paramedics from West Midlands Ambulance Service ("WMAS") assessed Mr 
Oliver as requiring hospital treatment to his hand but he refused. Although he was 
intoxicated, he was deemed to have capacity and let about his way. 

2.  At 23:10 on the same night, paramedics attended upon him a second time and deemed him 
to lack capacity due to intoxication. He agreed to be conveyed and treated in hospital but 
when paramedics went to handover to the hospital staff, he absconded at 00:41 on 
29/11/23.  

3.  WMAS notified West Midlands Police ("WMP") and requested a "safe and well check". After 
determining he was not at the last known location, the decision was made by officers of 
WMP to close the log because WMAS had earlier deemed him to have capacity (following 
the 22:18 call). 

4.  However, the decision to close the log was an error - as a person's capacity can 
fluctuate, it was inappropriate for WMP to rely upon a past capacity assessment 
taken hours earlier in the evening, particularly when a more recent capacity 
assessment indicated that he lacked capacity and where WMAS were concerned 
enough to request a "safe and well check". 

5.  I stress that the evidence was clear at inquest that even if WMP had not closed the 
log, they may not have been able to find Mr Oliver as it was not known where he 
went in the two hours or so after he left hospital. before being recorded on CCTV at 
, and being subsequently found unresponsive at 06:21. 
02:55 at 
On the balance of probabilities therefore, it cannot be said that Mr Oliver would 
have been found had the log not been closed. 

6.  However, I am concerned that the decision to not seek clarification from WMAS as 

to Mr Oliver's capacity represents shortcomings in training and/or a failure to ensure 
that WMP properly and effectively communicate with medical colleagues in WMAS 
when dealing with incidents where patients have fluctuating or lack capacity and 
abscond from treatment centres. It is not clear whether this was a "one-off" issue 
localised to a specific officer, or whether it represents a larger or institutional issue.  

7.  It is easy to anticipate a similar situation occurring in the future which leads to a 

death that is preventable, particularly those involving vulnerable persons and those 
lacking capacity. 

8.  As Coroner, I cannot compel your organisation to take a particular course of action, 
but I can request that you give consideration to this issue with a view to preventing 
future deaths. I therefore await your response. 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

6 

 In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the power to 
take such action. 

 
  
 YOUR RESPONSE 

 You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 
25th December 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

7 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the 
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.  

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

 I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: 

Next of kin 

8 

 I have also sent it to West Midlands Ambulance Service and the Medical Examiner who may find it 
useful or of interest. 

 I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. 

 The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may 
send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may 
make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the 
publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

 30 October 2024  

9 

Signature:  

Assistant Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from West Midlands Police (PDF)
Keeping our Communities  
Safe and Reassured 

Working in partnership, making 
communities safer 

STAFFORDSHIRE AND WEST MIDLANDS POLICE 
JOINT LEGAL SERVICES 

Director of Legal Services 

Your Ref: 

Our Ref: 

Email:

Date: 16 December, 2024 

Dear Sir, 

Prevention of Future Deaths report dated 30 October 2024, Sebastian Benjamin Oliver 

I write in response to the Prevention of Future Deaths report dated the 30 October 2024 which followed on 
from the inquest touching upon the death of Mr Sebastian Benjamin Oliver. This letter is the response on 
behalf  of  the  Chief  Constable  of  West  Midlands  Police  (WMP).  I  am  Lyndsey  Bailey-Smith,  Strategic 
Business Lead on the Command Team and West Midlands’ Police Force Contact. I hold responsibility for 
the Force Contact unit and the response to calls for service. 

Powers and WMP policies at the time of Mr Oliver’s death 

Paragraph 4 of the Prevention of Future Deaths Report identifies that the decision to close the log was an 
error. This was because the decision was based on an earlier assessment of Mr Oliver’s capacity, following 
the call at 2218 on 28 November 2023.  

In November 2023, when a call was received into the Force Contact Centre, such as the one in relation to 
Mr Oliver, it would have been answered by Contact Handling with an initial THRIVE (Threat, Harm, Risk, 
Investigation and Engagement) risk assessment completed by the call handler answering that call. The 
assessment would then indicate the appropriate grade for a response.  

THRIVE is a recognised tool used by many forces nationally and is the primary lens through which we 
assess operational risk. THRIVE sits in the Threat Assessment section of the National Decision Model 
(NDM). Contact Officers are taught the NDM alongside THRIVE as the NDM is a nationally recognised 
model with the Code of Ethics at its core. There are five stages to the NDM which include assessing 
information and intelligence, assessing risk, considering powers and policy, identifying options and 
contingencies, and taking and reviewing action. The NDM is a tool that a Contact officer would be cognisant 
of when making their assessments within the THRIVE model.  

Contact officers gather as much information as they can during a call and consider each element of 
THRIVE when assessing the inherent risk. This assessment would then indicate the appropriate grade for a 
response. THRIVE also requires a consideration of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the balance between an individual’s right to a private life and the interests of public safety, prevention of 
disorder or crime, national security, the protection of health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.   

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 WMP now use four response grades (Emergency, Priority, Scheduled Appointment and Non-Emergency). 
Emergency and Priority would be passed to dispatch who would then seek to deploy any available resource. 
At the time of the calls in relation to Mr Oliver, WMP were still using nine response grades. P1 and P2 
would be the equivalent of Emergency and Priority now. Once assessed a P1 or P2 would have been 
passed to dispatch to allocate resource. The first call in relation to Mr Oliver was graded as P2, the second 
call was also graded as a priority, P2. Priority grades should be attended within 1 hour. The average 
(median) response time in November 2024 for Emergency was 10 minutes and 24 seconds and for Priority 
was 40 minutes and 56 seconds. 

In the event of a question about resourcing a log could be escalated to supervision to allocate resource and 
dispatch. This happened in Mr Oliver’s case following the second call from WMAS requesting a “safe and 
well”. A decision was then made by a supervisor not to attend. After the supervisory review it was 
transferred out of dispatch into the ‘FCTRF’ which is a queue for cases to be reviewed and closed. WMAS 
were advised WMP would not attend. The decision to close a log would be an individual decision also 
applying the ‘THRIVE’/ RE-THRIVE risk assessment principles and a consideration of any change in 
circumstances which may affect a risk profile. Where a grading is changed the reviewer, in this case the 
supervisor, should completed a ‘Re-THRIVE’. They should detail their rational for a change in the THRIVE 
assessment on the log and, preferably, also in a new THRIVE form.  

THRIVE compliance and quality are audited via dip sample and reported on at the Force Contact service 
improvement meeting, governance boards and at the quarterly performance review. Re-THRIVES are 
currently audited daily with each supervisor on duty expected to audit two incidents per day and to report 
back. Quality and compliance have increased significantly over the last six months with daily audits 
completed and driving improvement to approximately 85% of last week’s audits being graded as adequate 
or higher.  

The individual making the decision about the closure of the log would also have been aware and relied upon 
the following documents, available at the time: 

•  The College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice: Missing Persons 

•  The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and WMP’s supporting Tactical Advice Manual 

•  NPCC Principles of Risk: (Risk | College of Policing), Principle 4: Harm can never be totally 

prevented. Risk decisions should, therefore, be judged by the quality of the decision making, not by 
the outcome. 

The WMP Tactical Advice Manual, at section 3, page 5 (attached), states: You must presume capacity 
unless, a two-stage test suggests otherwise: 

1.  Can you “ID a CURE”? –· Impairment or Disturbance – of the mind or brain.  

2. 

Is this person ill, injured or temporarily affected by drugs and / or alcohol to cause a cognitive 
impairment or disturbance? 

CURE is a pneumonic which stands for: Communicate; Understand; Retain; or Evaluate and asks: can the 
person communicate their decision; understand its implications; can they retain or evaluate information 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 relevant to taking it. Whilst capacity can be assessed by a Police officer on scene utilising the ID a CURE 
model the most qualified person must complete the test. For example, once paramedics arrive they are 
most qualified. Should a doctor then arrive on scene or re-test capacity on arrival at hospital then their 
assessment is to be taken. In Mr Oliver’s case WMAS completed their assessment and it was recorded on 
the WMP log at 23:30 on 28 November 2023 that WMAS deemed him to have capacity. WMP then 
received a further call from WMAS recorded at 00:46 on 29 November 2023. WMAS recorded Mr Oliver 
had left hospital prior to being admitted and lacked capacity due to intoxication from opiates. They noted he 
had a stab wound to his hand.  

The Contact officer in Force Contact reviewed the previous log and noted the discrepancy between WMAS’ 
initial capacity assessment and the further call. They noted, “ambo stated at 23:30 male had capacity and 
they let him go on his way and yet here they are stating he does not have capacity”. The log was reviewed 
by a Force Contact Dispatch Supervisor at 01:12. The supervisor made the decision to close the log and 
not to deploy WMP resource. As identified at paragraph 4 of the Prevention of Future Deaths report, they 
used the original capacity assessment as part of their rationale to close the log. This was an individual 
decision taken applying the APP missing person guidelines and balancing Article 8 to formulate a 
THRIVE supported decision. The rationale for this decision should have been documented. This would 
usually be in the form of a THRIVE form within the WMP ControlWorks log. In relation to Mr Oliver’s log, 
the supervisor did not complete a THRIVE form or detail, fully, their THRIVE rationale. The individual will 
be given feedback and learning to ensure their future decision making is appropriately recorded in line 
with force policy. 

Whilst there appears to have been an individual error in this case, through the use of an outdated 
capacity assessment, since Mr Oliver’s death there have been a number of changes within Force 
Contact and national policy. These will impact upon the WMP overall response to the situation, if it arose 
today. Secondly, the improvements will ensure individual decision makers are aware of issues arising 
from an assessment of capacity and strengthen the quality of their decision making. 

Force Contact and National Policy: Right Care, Right Person (RCRP) 

RCRP was published on 26 July 2023 and has been signed by: The Minister of State for Crime, Policing 
and Fire; The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Mental Health and Women’s Health Strategy; The 
Mental Health Lead of the National Police Chiefs’ Council; The National Mental Health Director at NHS 
England; The Mental Health Lead of the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners; and The CEO of 
the College of Policing. 

RCRP is an operational model which was initially developed by Humberside Police in relation to how 
emergency services respond to calls involving concerns about mental health. It is focused on the interface 
between policing and mental health services, although there is an acceptance that the principles can be 
applied more broadly. RCRP is in the process of being rolled out across the UK as part of ongoing work 
between police forces (including WMP), health providers and the Government.  

RCRP is designed to ensure that people of all ages, who have health and/or social care needs, are 
attended to by the right person, with the right skills, training, and experience to best meet their needs. 
RCRP seeks to alleviate the police being the default first responder as has been the case in most areas. 
RCRP has been shown to improve outcomes, reduce demand on all services, and make sure the right care 
is being delivered by the right person.  

The RCRP model has four phases. i) Phase 1 relates to ‘concern for welfare’ calls; ii) Phase 2 focusses on 
‘AWOL’ and ‘walk out of health care facilities’; iii) Phases 3 deals with transportation of patients; and iv) 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Phase 4 concerns the use of powers under sections.136 & 135 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA 1983) 
and voluntary mental health patients. The first two phases were implemented on 5th February 2024 for all 
partners collaborating within the West Midlands Region, including: WMP, Mental Health Trusts, Acute 
Trusts, Local Authorities, Integrated Care Boards, West Midlands Ambulance Service (WMAS) and West 
Midlands Fire Service.  

Phases 3 and 4 were implemented on 18th November 2024. RCRP has been identified as the best practice, 
leading to national agreement and work to implement the policy. It was recognised that the lines had 
become blurred between partner agencies over many years resulting in untrained, and therefore 
inappropriate, resources attending incidents. Specifically, in relation to policing, this has led to adverse 
decisions in many cases. The aspiration of the partners collaborating to deliver RCRP in the West Midlands 
is to ensure that public service is delivered in the way that the agreement intended, such that members of 
the public get the support they need from appropriately trained individuals. 

Additional training has been provided to WMP Force Contact Call Handlers to ensure that the right 
deployment decisions are made when calls are received from members of the public or partners. This was 
in the form of a ‘Blackboard’ hybrid learning package containing informative videos, theory and knowledge 
checks in addition to a ‘flowchart’ decision tree to support Force Contact’s decision making; this is easily 
accessible to all both via a link within the ControlWorks (WMP’s command and control system) and within 
the WMP Intranet page.  This includes consideration as to whether the call relates to an Article 2 
(immediate risk to life) or Article 3 (immediate threat of serious harm) issue, and where these are present to 
deploy a police resource only where there is a clear policing role. 

In addition, a national training package developed by the College of Policing covering RCRP has been 
made mandatory for front line officers who are likely to be dispatched to these types of calls to ensure that 
they also understand the decision-making process. This package was deemed mandatory in the spring of 
2024 and the current completion rate of those colleagues required to do so sits at 98% completion. In 
relation to phases 3 and 4, a mandatory force led training package has been disseminated to front line 
officers which is part of WMP’s continued approach to enforcing the message of RCRP. 

A Vulnerability Desk was also created within Force Contact in December 2023 which operates in line with 
the RCRP policy allowing call handlers and operational colleagues the ability to escalate complex concerns 
to this team of subject matter experts consisting of Mental Health Tactical Advisors, Missing person experts 
and Supervisors. The Vulnerability Desk supervisors are also responsible for conducting ‘dip samples’ to 
quality assure the organisation’s response to RCRP related incidents ensuring the correct decisions are 
drawn upon in line with legal framework, policy and in the best interests of the public. The latest month’s dip 
samples for the month of October 2024 depict that WMP made the correct decision regarding deployment 
or non-deployment in 90% of cases.  

Following the implementation of RCRP, if faced with identical circumstances to Mr Oliver’s once he had 
absconded from the care of WMAS, WMP would not routinely respond. Following the RCRP flowchart 
(see page 7, below), whilst there could be a consideration to treat a patient as a missing person in line 
with APP guidelines, if Article 2 or 3 concerns were not present then WMAS/the hospital would be 
advised to take reasonable steps to locate their patient as per their statutory obligation. For example, 
through repeated attempts to contact the patient, their next of kin and through dispatching an ambulance 
to the reasonably suspected location of the patient such as a home address 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Force Contact training and decision making  

The following measures will also be introduced within the Force Contact environment as part of the 
continuous improvement of the Force Contact function service within WMP. These will focus on supporting 
individual decision makers who are required to make decisions in cases such as Mr Oliver’s where there is 
a question of capacity.  

These improvements include:  

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

(iv) 

(v) 

(vi) 

(vii) 

(viii) 

(ix) 

Capacity: Vulnerability Desk to support in implementing training within Force Contact that 
creates a question set for Contact Handling in relation hospital absconders to assist in 
gaining all the appropriate information to aid decision making. The term ‘capacity’ should 
NOT bear relevance to WMP’s decision making on an individual as we are not medically 
trained to determine the potential outcome for an individual who does or does not have 
capacity. We cannot definitively state that we would deploy in all instances where an 
individual lacks capacity or not deploy if they do. Therefore, it is more appropriate to move 
away from this terminology so that it is not an unnecessary focal point of decision making. 

Use of safe and well terminology: WMP cannot define an individual as ‘safe and well’. This 
is medical terminology and we are not qualified to do so, we can provide proof of life. WMP 
to adopt the use of phrase “welfare check” and “proof of life” in support of the Concern for 
Welfare Memorandum of Understanding (attached). 

Collaboration with partners: Officers will be reminded that they must consider risk from the 
stakeholder/partner perspective and obtain the rationale of the treating clinician where 
there is a difference. This should then be recorded utilising WMP systems and fed back to 
WMP supervisors and shared with the reporting partner agency. Whilst WMP can 
professionally challenge partners it is more appropriate to follow the process in the best 
interest of the public and inaccuracies be fed back within working groups such as Joint 
Strategic Operation Groups (JSOG) to aid future learning. 

Re-THRIVE: Part of ongoing quality assurance conducted within Force Contact. This was 
implemented in March 2023 and continues to improve, currently depicts 74.7 % re-THRIVE 
compliance. Communications to continue surrounding the importance of rationalising 
decision making within THRIVE form and in the ‘remarks’ area of ControlWorks. Significant 
focus on dispatch. 

Updates within WMP systems: Reminder to all those who utilise ControlWorks to provide 
meaningful and diligent updates when departing a location. This will aid decision making 
should any future logs arise and allows efficient access to provide the outcome of previous 
attendance in the event originally attending officers are now off duty or non-contactable.  

To refresh communications across WMP:  via corporate communications, relating to 
medical assessment capacity on logs to use only the latest assessment in decision making. 

Training lesson plans and inputs to ensure: that the Mental Capacity Act, capacity 
assessments and partner agency assessments are inputted to all staff. 

Training to re enforce to staff to re-THRIVE: and a complete a full rationale if 
recommending non-Police attendance. 

Review of Force Contact Departmental Improvement Plan to incorporate the above 
changes and initiatives  

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If WMP can be of further assistance in relation to this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. 

Yours sincerely 

Strategic Business Lead, Force Contact 
West Midlands Police 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 7

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