Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2022
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2022-0306, written 30 Sep 2022. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 30 Sep 2022 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2022-0306 |
| Deceased | Shahan Aman |
| Coroner | Graeme Irvine |
| Coroner area | East London |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
MR G IRVINE SENIOR CORONER EAST LONDON Walthamstow Coroner's Court, Queens Road Walthamstow, E17 8QP REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1) Ref: 16304181 REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: • Whitechapel Road, Whitechapel , London, E1 1 BB Chief Executive, Barts Health , Royal London Hospital, • The Rt Hon Therese Coffey MP, The Secretary of State for Health & Social Care 39 Victoria St, Westminster, London SW1 H 0EU 1 CORONER I am Graeme Irvine, senior coroner, for the coroner area of East London 2 CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 . httQ:LLwww.legislation.gov.ukLukQgaL2009L25LscheduleL5LQaragraQhL7 httQ:LLwww.legislation.gov.ukLuksiL2013L1629LQartL7 Lmade 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 8th December 2021, this court commenced an investigation into the death of Shahan Abu Aman , The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest held 0111 31 st August 2022. I made a determination of a narrative conclusion incorporating a finding of neglect; "Shahan Abu Aman died in hospital on the morning of 8th December 2021 . Aman had attended the same hospital on the previous eveninq, 7 December 2021 . 1 A lack of communication between the nursing and medical team led to an inappropriate discharge from hospital, had Aman remained in hospital that evening, it is likely, on the balance of probability, that a different outcome would have followed. Neglect contributed to Aman's death." Aman 's medical cause of death was determined as; 1a Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome (SIRS) 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Shahan Abu Aman was a three year old boy born who was presented to his local ED on the evening of 7th December 2021 with symptoms of vomiting and diarrhoea. After assessment, observation and a fluid challenge he was discharged home. The following morning Aman was found unresponsive by his mother, despite the best efforts of his family and emergency services he was declared deceased later that morning in hospital. 5 CORONER'S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken . In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you . The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows . - 1. A series of miscommunications between ; nursing staff, junior and consultant paediatric medical staff resulted in concerns regarding Aman not being properly considered prior to discharge. Staff relied on assumptions that others understood the factors affecting Aman and had a plan to resolve them, this was not the case. Had effective communication occurred it was unlikely that Aman would have been discharged. 2. The doctor who authorised discharge did not satisfy himself of the most recent set of clinical observations and associated Paediatric Early Warning Sign (PEWS) score prior to discharge. 3. The Paediatric Emergency Department was particularly busy that evening , with a combination of high patient numbers and severe acuity of symptoms . The accounts provided by Trust witnesses was that resulted in a pressurised environment and that this was a situation that occurred with an increasing level of frequency over the last two years. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you [AND/OR your organisation] have the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 25th November 2022 . I, the coroner, may extend the period . Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken , settinq out 2 the timetable for action . Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed . 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons the family of Aman, the Care Quality Commission , the General Medical Councill COOP . I have also sent it to the local Director of Public Health who may find it useful or of interest. I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it. I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I believe may find it useful or of interest. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form . He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response , about the release or the publication o your response . 9 [DA TE] 30 September 2022 / ~NED BY CORONER] C. I 3
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Trust Executive Office
Ground Floor
Pathology and Pharmacy Building
The Royal London Hospital
80 Newark Street
London E1 2ES
Telephone: 020 32460641
www.bartshealth.nhs.uk
Date: November 11, 2022
Private & Confidential
Mr Graeme Irvine
Senior Coroner
Walthamstow Coroners Court
The Adult College of Barking &
Dagenham
127 Ripple Rd
Barking
IG11 7PB
Dear Mr Irvine
RE: Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths Report
I write in response to your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, dated 30th September 2022
touching on the death of Shahan Abu Aman.
I can assure you that, prior to the receipt of your report, the Trust recognised the severity of the concerns
raised by this sad case and has undertaken a large amount of work to ensure that the chance of recurrence
is reduced to a minimum. We believe that our response will hopefully provide a level of reassurance to
address the matters of concern outlined in your report.
While acknowledging the seriousness of the highlighted concerns, it is important to note that this incident
occurred on the background of a department that saw 150,487 patients; of which 37,146 were children in
the year 2021. We do not believe that there is an inherent systemic process failure; however, we have
introduced controls as outlined below which are designed to minimise the risk of recurrence of this tragic
outcome.
This Paediatric Emergency Department provides 24 hour per day cover and serves a diverse community.
It is staffed by medical and nursing staff of various grades, and it has systems in place that ensure safe
triage and disposition. To support the final disposition of patients we have an in-patient ward, a paediatric
assessment unit, our co located GP run urgent treatment centre, as well as a resuscitation room.
Matters of Concern.
A series of miscommunications between, nursing staff, junior and consultant paediatric medical
staff resulted in concerns regarding Aman not being properly considered prior to discharge.
Staff relied on assumptions that others understood the factors affecting Aman and had a plan to
resolve them, this was not the case. Had effective communication occurred it was unlikely than
Aman would have been discharged.
In this particular case, which we believe to be an isolated incident, there was a communication failure as
identified as a matter of concern . It is extremely difficult with any communication failures to pinpoint an
exact cause. However, despite this being said, the department did recognise the failure of this important
element that did translate into the erroneous discharge decision.
With any tool that is used to quantify risk, such as an early warning score, there is always the possibility
that it will never be 100% sensitive. The department has recognised that in patients presenting with
gastroenteritis, despite them being critically unwell, the early warning score system may not recognise this
and lends itself to aligning itself with a false sense of reassurance. In this case the individuals concerned
recognised the patient was unwell but there was a communication failure where the weight of their concern
was not able to be translated and transmitted for everyone to be aware.
The Paediatric Emergency Department has now implemented and is using a detailed 2 hourly SITREP
(Situational Report). The SITREP aims to capture this exact concern from members of staff who are
worried about a patient who, despite the psychological parameters being abnormal, the early warning
score does not identify this concern.
The Paediatric SITREP report addresses this element of concern as evidenced below.
The above tool is an objective measure that provides a trigger for staff to identify, document and escalate
the concern. The tool is run on a 2 hourly basis every day.
The severity of this case was also personally discussed and fed back by the Clinical Director of the
Emergency Department and by the Consultant in Paediatric Emergency Department at various forums.
Within these forums the importance of communication was strenuously emphasised.
The theme of communication failures was furthermore specifically discussed with all the senior paediatric
nursing staff by the Clinical Director on 15th July 2022 with an attendance register which has already been
evidenced. We would like to emphasise that the nursing staff who were involved in this case, were also
present and shared their involvement and learning with this case.
Over and above what has been mentioned, the theme of communication failure was not just aimed at the
Paediatric Nursing team but is one that the Clinical Director himself personally emphasises; and has done
so for at least 7 years at the Junior doctor’s induction programme. The department feels confident that its
messaging regarding the risks of communication failure are constantly reinforced.
Communication failures alone were recognised as not being the sole contributor as clinical knowledge
regarding diarrhoea and vomiting in children and the risks of its dangers being under-appreciated were
MRNCurrent PEWSWhat is the concern?Escalated to senior?0MRN for patients with PEWS ≤6 AND nursing or medical concernsPlan?Patients triggering PEWS ≤6 BUT nursing/medical concerns should be recorded here and escalation plan noted.
also acknowledged. With this in mind, the evidence bundle which has already been provided,
demonstrates all the teaching and educational efforts that we have put in place and continue to provide;
highlighting the importance of this case. Within these teaching modalities, although not explicitly
mentioned, the emphasis on communicating concerns remains a rolling theme.
This case and its investigation have also fed into the Trust’s robust clinical governance process that
emphasises learning from incidents and a just culture. This as well as all serious incident investigations
conclude with actions to ensure final reports are shared with relevant clinical staff for their reflective
learning. Learning summaries are also completed for all investigations and this is shared across all
hospitals within the Trust for learning. These steps have all taken place with respect to this case.
Serious incidents relating to specific themes are also discussed for learning as appropriate through
relevant governance arrangements. For example, incidents of failure to rescue are considered at the
hospital deteriorating patient improvement group, as well as other groups such as pressure ulcer incidents
reviewed at the hospital pressure ulcer improvement steering group and falls related incidents at the
hospital falls improvement group.
Specific sharing of lessons learned from incidents, as was in this case, also occur through speciality
governance meetings, through to divisional governance meetings and the hospital quality and safety
board.
Furthermore, the implementation of actions resulting from “recommendations for action” following serious
incident investigations have oversight through the divisional governance boards, and the hospital quality
performance reviews. In this particular case, the actions have been completed and evidenced.
The doctor who authorised discharge did not satisfy himself of the most recent set of clinical
observations and associated Paediatric Early Warning Sign (PEWS) score prior to discharge.
This is a theme that was recognised before the inquest. In response, processes were put in place whereby
the last set of observations and blood results over which a clinician makes an entry into the records, are
auto-populated so that the clinician can be sighted on these. In this particular case the early warning score
identified only 1 abnormal parameter which, according to National Guidance, does not merit repeated
frequent observations. However, as mentioned above the department fully recognises that no system can
be 100% sensitive and has put in a large amount of effort to ensure that the messaging/learning is shared
that children presenting with gastroenteritis, despite low early warning scores, can be critically unwell. This
educational programme has already been demonstrated in the evidence provided to the court.
The clinician in this particular case recognised that he did not satisfy himself with the most recent set of
clinical observations that were undertaken but not translated to him. The clinician has undertaken a large
amount of self-reflection where he has demonstrated insightfulness with respect to his involvement in the
case and demonstrated how he has educated himself; thus, minimising the likelihood of a reoccurrence
again.
The Paediatric Emergency Department was particularly busy that evening, with a combination of
high patient numbers and severe acuity of symptoms. The accounts provided by Trust witnesses
was that resulted in a pressurised environment and that this was a situation that occurred with an
increasing level of frequency over the last two years.
The Paediatric Emergency Department on a 24 hour basis is supported by consultants and registrars who
are at the level of ST4 and above. In this particular case the Emergency Department doctor was one who
had already taken a period of training in paediatrics and was one who was working at the level of ST4 i.e.
that of a senior decision maker. This case unfortunately highlights the reality that clinical judgements can
be difficult even in relatively experienced and expert hands.
On this particular day the department was extremely busy and it is not always possible, as is the case in
all Emergency Department, that every shift would be 100% fully staffed with no need for locums or the
movement of staff from one area to another.
The organisation has recognised a number of areas of pressure in the emergency departments and is in
the process of working through process pathway redesign so that we can potentially reduce the
pressurised working environment and reduce levels of risk.
Outside the Emergency Department the Trust has plans to work alongside North East London to support
paediatric flow, from the Emergency Department. This includes, but is not limited to, exploring ambulatory
step down from the paediatric ward, increased use of paediatric clinical decision unit to work into the
community to support early discharge. In addition to working alongside the complex discharge team, we
are exploring additional roles to support children on the ward who find themselves stranded to an array of
complex conditions. This is all monitored through the divisions, support and assurance meetings up to and
including the Executive boards.
Thank you for bringing your concerns to my attention. I am very happy to discuss or clarify any of the above
points.
Yours sincerely
Chief Medical Officer
• Department of Health & Social Care Mr Graeme Irvine HM Senior Coroner Walthamstow Coroner's Court Queen's Road Walthamstow E17 8QP Dear Mr Irvine, From Will Quince Minister for Health and Secondary Care 39 Victoria Street London SW1H0EU 16th June 2023 Thank you for your letter of 30 September 2022, to the then Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, Therese Coffey, about the death of Shahan Aman . I am replying as Minister with responsibility for Health and Secondary Care. Firstly, I would like to s-ay how deeply saddened I was to read of the circumstances of Shahan's death. I can appreciate how distressing his death must be for his parents and those who knew and loved Shahan and I offer my heartfelt condolences. It is vital that we take the learnings from what happened to him in order to prevent future deaths. In preparing this response, Departmental officials have made enquiries with NHS England and the Care Quality Commission (CQC) . I have been informed by my officials that several actions have been taken by Barts Health Trust following Shahan's death, including updated guidance on managing gastroenteritis in children as part of an awareness campaign for Emergency Department staff and revising the Emergency Department's policy on observations prior to discharge. Emergency Department clinicians are also being prompted to consider adding the assessment of urine output as an option to the online patient documentation system for Emergency Department clerking . Outcomes of this investigation will be shared with the patient's next of kin and staff involved . directly in the patient's care for their reflective learning. More broadly, learning summaries from the serious incident will be shared for trust-wide learning. The Government recognises the pressures the service is facing - and it is taking a whole- system approach to ensure people get the emergency care they need when they need it. Our Delivery Plan for Recovering Urgent and Emergency Care Services aims to deliver one of the fastest and longest sustained improvements in emergency waiting times in the NHS's history, including bringing down A&E wait times significantly over the next year, and down towards pre-pandemic levels within two years. To increase capacity and reduce waits, the plan will deliver 5,000 more staffed, permanent beds this year compared to 2022/23 plans, alongside 800 new ambulances including specialty mental health vehicles. This is backed by £1 billion of dedicated funding. We will also make greater use of 'virtual wards', with an extra 3,000 virtual ward beds to provide over 10,000 in total by this autumn, allowing patients to be safely monitored and supported towards recovery from the comfort of their own home. Longer term, we will build capacity to allow staff to care for up to 50,000 patients a month this way. Same Day Emergency Care services will also be in place across every hospital with a major emergency department, helping avoid unnecessary overnight stays in hospital. We are expanding and better joining up health and care outside hospital helping to reduce admissions to A&E, including scaling urgent community response, frailty and falls services across the whole country. The plan will also grow the NHS111 clinical workforce, make urgent mental health support universally available in 111 services, and expand and promote NHS111 online to ensure patients can access the right care first time, and only visit A&E when necessary. We are also investing £1.6 billion over the next 2 years to reduce the numbers of beds occupied by patients ready to be discharged. This includes establishing 'Care transfer hubs' in every hospital ahead of next winter, alongside new approaches to step-down care. I hope this response is helpful and thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention. Yours sincerely, WILL QUINCE MP MINISTER OF STATE FOR HEALTH
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