Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0215, written 28 Jun 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 28 Jun 2023 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2023-0215 |
| Deceased | Carol Hatch |
| Coroner | Kevin McLoughlin |
| Coroner area | West Yorkshire (Eastern) |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1)
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1. Spire Healthcare Limited. F.A.O.
, 3 Dorset Rise, London EC4Y BEN
1
CORONER
I am Kevin Mcloughlin, Senior Coroner, for the Coroner area of West Yorkshire (East)
2
CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.
3
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 20 October 2023 I commenced an investigation into the death of Carol Ann Hatch
aged 73. The investigation concluded at the end of the Inquest on 26 June 2023. The
conclusion of the Inquest was a Narrative which recorded the medical cause of death as
(1a) Sepsis, (1b) gastric perforation (1c) revision Nissen Fundoplication.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
4
Carol Ann Hatch aged 73 underwent a surgical procedure in 2015 known as a 360
degree Nissen Fundoplication to repair a hiatus hernia and reduce the risk of reflux. On
31 August 2022 she underwent an identical procedure as a further hiatus hernia had
developed, causing a recurrence of symptoms. The surgery was performed at the Spire
Private Hospital in Leeds.
Mrs Hatch became unwell during the night following the surgery. It was only the
following morning when the surgeon returned to the hospital that the extent of her
deterioration was appreciated. She was transferred to an NHS hospital in Leeds,
underwent emergency surgery within a few hours and was admitted to an intensive care
unit. Over the following six weeks she was treated on the intensive care unit for septic
shock and organ failure. She died on 18 October 2022 at St James University Hospital
in Leeds.
5
CORONER'S CONCERNS
During the course of the Inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. -
1. Mrs Hatch's condition deteriorated markedly during the night of 31 AugusU1
September 2022 (some hours after surgery). Neither the surgeon nor the
anaesthetist were alerted to this unexpected deterioration. The Surgeon only
became aware of the position when he contacted the hospital and came in
around 7 am.
2. Mrs Hatch was cared for durinQ the night by an agency nurse who had not
1
worked at the hospital previously. No records were produced to the Inquest to
demonstrate she was (a) competent (b) had an induction to the hospital or (c)
received a handover at the start of the shift.
3. The nurse took observations at times during the night but either omitted some
elements or misinterpreted the information with the result that the NEWS scores
were inaccurately portrayed. This resulted in missed opportunities to escalate
concerns to a doctor, more senior colleagues or the surgeon.
4. No observations whatsoever were taken in the period between 3 am and 6.25
am , despite the patient having been recorded as "crying in pain" around 10pm.
5: The records kept were inaccurate; for example, there was no record of oxygen·
being provided around 2 am.
6. The RMO was called to review Mrs Hatch twice during the night but failed to
appreciate that the deterioration in her condition necessitated an escalation to
the surgeon and/or anaesthetist.
7. When Mrs Hatch was observed to be in pain there was a delay in moving her to
an extended care unit ('ECU') bed or otherwise escalating the level of
monitoring. This did not take place until 9.50 am.
8. When the surgeon sought an x ray at 8.35 am there was a delay until this took
place at 10.09 am. There was a failure to appreciate the urgency of the
situation in a patient who was displaying symptoms of septic shock.
9.
It was not readily apparent to some of those involved at that time that an out of
hours radiographer could have been called in. This was a further missed
opportunity to investigate her condition before it deteriorated.
10. Blood samples taken at 8.02 am were not delivered to the laboratory until 9.06
am and then not reported on until 10.21 am as they had not been marked as
'urgent'. This also reflects a failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation.
11. The RMO was the senior doctor at the hospital overnight. The RMO recorded a
note at 8.45 am "feeling much better now". The Inquest noted a discrepancy
between this comment and the fact that Mrs Hatch was deemed too unwell to be
moved to the radiology department at 9.1 0am, some 25 minutes later.
12. Overall, the cluster of failings on 31 August/1 September brought into question
the competence of the staff looking after Mrs Hatch on duty at the Spire Hospital
that night. The Inquest was informed that such concerns had not been reported
to the regulatory bodies of those involved, The RMO continues to practice at the
Spire Hospital.
13. The Inquest was informed that Spire Healthcare Limited rely on agencies who
supply clinical staff to assess their competence (whilst retaining a power of veto
any individual put forward). Given the importance of having competent nurses
and doctors on duty overnight further consideration should be given to the
methods by which professional competence is assessed and staff from agencies
are engaged.
14. Evidence taken from a consultant surgeon at the Inquest indicated that the
failings at Spire Hospital contributed (more than minimally) to the death of Mrs
Hatch on 18 October. This view dovetails with the medical opinion obtained by
Spire Healthcare Limited themselves to the effect that this death was
"avoidable".
2
6
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe your
organisation have the power to take such action.
7
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report,
namely by 30 August (to make allowance for the holiday season). I, the Coroner, may
extend the period.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.
8
COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested
Persons
UK Ltd, 66 High Street Aylesbury WP20 1SE, Stonor Medical Ltd, 112 Green Street,
Northampton, NN1 1SY and Mr S .P. L Dexter C/O St James University Hospital Leeds
who may find it useful or of interest.
(husband). I have also sent it to RMO Agency, NES Healthcare
I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary
form . He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful
or of interest.
You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about
the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.
9
Dated
28 June 2023
Kevin McLouqhlin, Senior Coroner
3
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Dear Sir
Regulation 28 Report - Response
We write in response to your Regulation 28 Report dated 28 June 2023 issued following the inquest into the sad death of Mrs Carol Hatch. Please consider
this letter as Spire Healthcare Limited’s formal response to the concerns raised in the report.
We would like to take this opportunity to offer our sincerest condolences to Mrs Hatch’s family. Prior to the inquest, we conducted a thorough and candid
Root Cause Analysis (“RCA”) investigation into the circumstances surrounding Mrs Hatch’s death and had identified the majority of the issues which were
recorded in the Regulation 28 report. To that extent, we consider it important that it is acknowledged that that the concerns raised in the Regulation 28
report are comprised largely of concerns Spire had already highlighted and was taking steps to address prior to the inquest. Notwithstanding this, as an
organisation we have considered the concerns raised in the Regulation 28 report with the utmost seriousness and have undertaken further work to address
these concerns.
We have set out our response to the Regulation 28 concerns in the table below with reference to evidence in support of those actions both in the form of the
evidence which formed part of Spire’s RCA action plan as presented at the Inquest, as well as evidence of the further work undertaken since the hearing took
place.
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
Escalafion to consultant
1. Mrs Hatch's condifion deteriorated
markedly during the night of 31
August/1September 2022 (some hours
after surgery). Neither the surgeon nor
the anaesthefist were alerted to this
unexpected deteriorafion. The Surgeon
only became aware of the posifion
when he contacted the hospital and
came in around 7 am.
The RCA invesfigafion completed prior to the inquest
clearly idenfified that, wholly regreftably, on this occasion,
some of the staff involved in the pafients’ care made errors
in clinical judgement in failing to appreciate the signs of
the pafient’s deteriorafing condifion and sepsis was not
considered during the night and up unfil the pafient was
reviewed by the consultant surgeon. As soon as the
consultant contacted the hospital at 07:00 hours and
received an update on the status of the pafient he
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Integrated Quality Governance Team (”IQG”)
Review of Learnings from Serious Incidents in
2022 and Q1 2023
Leeds Incident Review of Escalafing to
Consultants
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
responded promptly and aftended the hospital. As a result
of this incident, Spire conducted a full and thorough RCA
idenfifying areas of concern pufting in place an acfion to
address those concerns. As stated above, the majority of
the issues idenfified in the Regulafion 28 report are
mafters which had already been idenfified and addressed.
Notwithstanding this, Spire is commifted to ongoing
learning from this event and improving its systems and
processes.
Nursing/RMO care
2. Mrs Hatch was cared for during the night
by an agency nurse who had not worked
at the hospital previously. No records
were produced to the
Inquest to
demonstrate she was (a) competent (b)
had an inducfion to the hospital or (c)
received a handover at the start of the
shift.
or misinterpreted
3. The nurse took observafions at fimes
during the night but either omifted some
elements
the
informafion with the result that the
inaccurately
NEWS
portrayed. This resulted
in missed
opportunifies to escalate concerns to a
doctor, more senior colleagues, or the
surgeon.
scores were
These points were addressed in the RCA with remedial
acfion listed in acfion points 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19
and 20 and evidence on these acfions was presented at the
inquest.
The agency staff hospital inducfion process includes a
documented local inducfion based on a standard format
for inducfion used across the group. The invesfigafion
idenfified that the agency nurse (who had worked at Spire
Leeds on a previous occasion) received a verbal inducfion
when she arrived on shift on 31.08.22. A documented
record of this inducfion could not be located but from the
evidence obtained during the invesfigafion and the events
that occurred, we are confident that the agency staff
member was orientated to the hospital as she completed
Spire’s care plans and pafient records during the shift,
accessed the handover, knew where to locate equipment,
RCA ACTIONS EVIDENCE
Acfion No. 9 Refresher Training for NEWS 2
Acfion No. 10 Heads Together Clinical Night Staff
Acfion No. 12 NEWS 2 Training for Nafional
Agency Supplier
Acfion No. 13 Online Training to Recognise a
Deteriorafing Pafient
Acfion No. 14 Spot Audit of NEWS 2 Scores
Acfion No. 17 Departmental On-Call Service
Acfion No. 18 Updated Inducfion Checklist –
Leeds
Acfion No. 19 Key Learning Points to Nursing
Agency
Acfion No. 20 Completed Agency Inducfion
AGENCY NURSE & RMO INFORMATION
Confirmafion from Nursing Agency of Acfion
Taken
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Ward Handover 31.08.22
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
4. No observafions whatsoever were taken
in the period between 3 am and 6.25am,
the pafient having been
despite
recorded as "crying in pain" around
10pm.
5. The records kept were inaccurate; for
example, there was no record of oxygen
being provided around 2 am.
and escalated her concerns to the Resident Medical Officer
(“RMO”) via a senior member of nursing staff for advice.
Agency Confirmafion Form 31.08.22
Spire has a series of checks to ensure that agency staff are
assessed as competent to care for pafients, as follows:
-
-
-
-
The nursing agency screens the candidates via
their CV and ensures that they meet Spire
Healthcare’s statutory and mandatory training
requirements of BLS, Anaphylaxis, Safeguarding
Adults and Children, Infecfion Prevenfion and
Control, Informafion Governance and Manual
Handling and provides a Proforma Confirmafion
Form to the hospital.
The hospital will then thoroughly review the
informafion provided to them in the Proforma
Confirmafion Form before they accept the nurse
for the shift.
In this case, it was documented that the nurse who
cared for the pafient overnight had “recent and
credible experience in surgical nursing, Immediate
Life Support (“ILS”)/Advanced Life Support (“ALS”)
and
training
requirements” and was suitable to care for
pafients at Level 1A+ per our policy for Safe
Staffing.
If suitable, the hospital agrees to the placement of
the candidate, but careful considerafion is given in
each case and it is not uncommon to reject a
candidate based on
insufficient skills and
experience to meet the hospital’s requirements.
the mandatory
had met
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
As part of the learning from this event, the team at Spire
Leeds have shared and discussed the findings in the RCA
with this nurse’s agency. The core supplier competency
checklist includes requires that agency staff are competent
in the management of the deteriorafing pafient. The new
checklist must be signed by the candidate as well as the
agency to ensure both are confirming the informafion is
correct.
In addifion to addressing NEWS training with agency staff,
the hospital have ensured that a NEWS update refresher
has been provided to all relevant colleagues and have
conducted regular audits to provide assurance in relafion
to compliance.
As heard in evidence during the inquest, this point was
idenfified in the RCA and was addressed in the acfion plan
at point 8 and 11. The RMOs for the majority of Spire
hospitals are provided by an external agency. The agency
provides training before RMOs start with us and provide
top-up training as required. The training provided includes
on-line elements and a residenfial course. The Group
Medical Director (GMD) has visited the training site to get
assurance of the extent of training. RMOs’ CVs are
provided to a site before they commence. When RMOs are
new to a site, they have a period of shadowing with a
previous RMO. In addifion, there is have a RMO handbook
with an inducfion checklist.
RCA ACTIONS EVIDENCE
Acfion No. 8 to share the RCA with RMO and
NES
Acfion No. 11 Recognising a gastric perforafion
complicafion
AGENCY NURSE & RMO INFORMATION
Confirmafion of RMO Appraisal
Clinical Policy 18 RMO Handbook
NES Resident Doctor Pre Checks
6. The RMO was called to review Mrs Hatch
twice during the night but failed to
appreciate that the deteriorafion in her
condifion necessitated an escalafion to
the surgeon and/or anaesthefist.
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
Spire Leeds has the appraisal for the RMO covering the
period when the incident occurred. The appraisal for that
year documented mandatory training including sepsis. We
have the doctor’s full CV which includes an NES Healthcare
inducfion which covers ECGs, BNF Medicafion, NEWS,
Medical Note Wrifing, Pharmacology, and clinical self-
declarafion of competencies dated 23rd January 2017. At
the fime of the incident the RMO was trained in Advanced
Life Support and EPALS. Compliance was assured in
accordance with the contractual Spire requirements.
This mafter was recognised in the RCA, has been discussed
with the RMO and there is a plan in place for training to be
delivered to RMOs on recognising signs of a deteriorafing
pafient and recognising signs of gastric perforafion. In
addifion, Spire has received confirmafion that the RMO
has undertaken a recent appraisal. We refer the Coroner
to evidence file relafing to the RMO which includes
evidence of acfion taken in relafion to this concern.
Care provided in ECU is governed by Clinical Policy 80 –
Elecfive Adult Surgical Admission – Level 1 Provision and
Clinical Policy 88 – Crifical Care Standards. Level 1 Care is
described as “Enhanced care provides care for pafients
requiring more detailed observafions than level 0 (ward
and HOC) or step down from Level 2-3 care”, examples of
requiring close physiological
which are, pafients
monitoring after major surgery – may have addifional
monitoring devices in situ e.g. arterial line, pafients
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Clinical policy 80 Enhanced Care Service
Provision
Clinical Policy 88 Crifical Care Standards
Enhanced monitoring/further invesfigafions
7. When Mrs Hatch was observed to be in
pain there was a delay in moving her to
an extended care unit ('ECU') bed or
otherwise escalafing the level of
monitoring. This did not take place unfil
9.50 am.
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
requiring a single vasopressor support (peripheral or
central) but otherwise stable and not deteriorafing. E.g.
post-op pafient with a “saggy” blood pressure secondary
to an epidural, pafients stepping down from level 2 crifical
care whose needs are greater than those that can be met
by ward
requiring ongoing
level care, pafients
intervenfions from crifical care outreach teams.
All colleagues across the group and at Spire Leeds undergo
competency assessment, with colleagues working in Level
1 ECUs also undergoing the Nafional Competency
Framework for Registered Nurses in Adult Crifical Care
Step 1. Of the nine colleagues who work within Spire
Leeds ECU two have addifionally completed a Crifical Care
Degree and another has completed a Crifical Care
Cerfificate.
links with Spire
In addifion, Spire Leeds has close
Manchester, who provide Level 3 (ICU) care and an
agreement with Leeds NHS Hospital where our colleagues
can aftend to maintain ongoing competence in specific
areas, for example, arterial lines, inotropes, non-invasive
venfilafion, transfer training.
8. When the surgeon sought an x ray at
8.35 am there was a delay unfil this took
place at 10.09 am. There was a failure to
appreciate the urgency of the situafion
in a pafient who was displaying
symptoms of sepfic shock.
As heard in evidence during the inquest, this mafter was
idenfified in the RCA and addressed in the acfion plan at
points 1, 2, 11, and 21. When Consultants commence their
pracfice at Spire Leeds, they undergo an inducfion process
which includes out of hours provision. The hospital has
improved on call service documentafion and has
RCA ACTIONS EVIDENCE
Acfion No. 1 RCA to Consultant
Acfion No. 2 RCA to Anaesthefist
Acfion No. 11 Consultant Training on Symptoms
and Signs of Gastric Perforafion
Acfion No.17 Departmental On-Call Service
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
communicated this to all consultants pracfising at the
hospital.
Acfion No. 21 Per-operafive Communicafion of
Difficult Surgeries
9.
It was not readily apparent to some of
those involved at that fime that an out
of hours radiographer could have been
called in. This was a further missed
opportunity to invesfigate her condifion
before it deteriorated.
This mafter was idenfified in the RCA and addressed in the
acfion plan at point 17. When Consultants commence their
pracfice at Spire Leeds, they undergo an inducfion process
which includes out of hours provision. The hospital has
improved on call service documentafion and has
communicated this to all consultants pracfising at the
hospital.
RCA ACTIONS EVIDENCE
Acfion No. 17 Departmental On-Call Service
10. Blood samples taken at 8.02am were
not delivered to the laboratory unfil
9.06 am and then not reported on unfil
10.21 am as they had not been marked
as ‘urgent’. This also reflects a failure to
appreciate the gravity of the situafion.
11. The RMO was the senior doctor at the
hospital overnight. The RMO recorded a
note at 8.45 am "feeling much befter
now". The Inquest noted a discrepancy
between this comment and the fact
that Mrs Hatch was deemed too unwell
to be moved to the radiology
department at 9.10am, some 25
minutes later.
12. Overall, the cluster of failings on 31
August/1 September brought
into
quesfion the competence of the staff
As heard in evidence during the inquest, this mafter was
idenfified in the RCA acfion plan at point 22.
RCA Acfions Evidence
Acfion No. 22 Labelling of Urgent Bloods
As stated in Spire’s RCA, learning has been developed
surrounding the appropriate labelling of bloods in relafion
to the urgency of a clinical situafion. This learning has been
shared with staff across the hospital
This incident was escalated to the RMO’s agency, NES
Healthcare, at the fime of the inifial event. The agency
reviewed the incident and considered it to be a learning
opportunity rather than requiring referral to the GMC. At
the fime of the incident, the RMO had an in-date Sepsis
training record (23/1/22) and he was asked to reflect on
the issue in his appraisal. In his appraisal, he presented a
case study about Upper GI surgery and its complicafions.
He completed the GMC Medical Pracfice in Acfion in
October 2022 to update himself on the GMC guidance for
doctors. He also completed the EPALS course in December
2022 where a lecture and a pracfical case included sepsis
training.
AGENCY NURSE & RMO INFORMATION
Confirmafion of RMO Appraisal
Clinical Policy 18 RMO Handbook
NES Resident Doctor Pre Checks
RCA ACTIONS EVIDENCE
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
Acfion No. 4 RCA to RMO’s
Acfion No. 7 RCA Sent to Nursing Agency
Acfion No. 8 RCA Sent to NES Healthcare
Acfion No. 11 Recognising a gastric perforafion
complicafion
looking after Mrs Hatch on duty at the
Spire Hospital that night. The Inquest
was informed that such concerns had
not been reported to the regulatory
bodies of those involved, The RMO
confinues to pracfice at the Spire
Hospital.
Evidence was heard at the inquest that considerafion was
given to referring the RMO to the GMC following this
incident. The RMO’s skill set, and competency were
discussed at a Scrufiny Panel on 17th February 2023
aftended by hospital and senior clinical and medical
management at Spire. It was concluded that the findings
of the RCA and the known pracfice of the RMO did not
meet the threshold for referral to the GMC. It was agreed
that the hospital team would share the RCA with the
RMO’s agency, which was completed on 16th March 2023.
It was agreed that the RMO’s agency were best placed to
assist us in understanding whether this was an isolated
episode or not, whether
there were any wider
performance concerns that needed to be addressed or
mafters requiring escalafion to the GMC.
We have a quarterly meefing with NES Healthcare and
have strengthened the process to include case by case
discussion if we have raised any concerns about an RMO,
and vice versa if the RMOs have raised any concerns about
our hospital. If we have significant or unresolved concerns,
the RMO is replaced by the agency. The RMOs undertake
annual appraisal with their employing agency, and our
hospital Directors of Clinical Services meet regularly with
them.
13. The Inquest was informed that Spire
Healthcare Limited rely on agencies
As stated above, the agency staff hospital inducfion
process includes a documented local inducfion based on a
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS EVIDENCE
Mandatory Training Planner
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
who supply clinical staff to assess their
competence (whilst retaining a power
of veto any individual put forward).
Given the importance of having
competent nurses and doctors on duty
overnight further considerafion should
be given to the methods by which
professional competence is assessed
and staff from agencies are engaged.
Oxylog Training
Resuscitafion Scenarios
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Spire Educafion TNA
standard format for inducfion used across the group. The
RCA idenfified that the agency nurse (who had worked at
Spire Leeds on a previous occasion) received a verbal
inducfion when she arrived on shift on 31.08.22. A
documented record of this inducfion could not be located,
but
from the evidence obtained during the RCA
invesfigafion and the events that occurred, we are
confident that the agency staff member was orientated
and completed Spire’s care plans and pafient records
during the shift, accessed the handover, and escalated her
concerns to the RMO for advice.
Current ILS compliance for registered colleagues at Spire
Leeds is 77%, against the target of 90%. Colleagues who
do not currently have ILS training are booked onto training
in the near future.
is part of ILS
competency. We have 100% compliance in performing
quarterly scenarios of which sepsis is included.
Sepsis training
In this case, the RMO had documented mandatory training
which included sepsis assessment and management.
Similarly, the agency nurse in this case was ILS/ALS trained,
which includes the assessment and management of sepsis.
Spire has a series of checks to ensure that agency staff are
assessed as competent to care for pafients.
The nursing agency screens the candidates via their CV and
ensures that they meet Spire Healthcare’s statutory and
mandatory training requirements of Basic Life Support,
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
Anaphylaxis, Safeguarding Adults and Children, Infecfion
Prevenfion and Control, Informafion Governance and
Manual Handling and provides a Proforma Confirmafion
Form to the hospital.
The hospital will then thoroughly review the informafion
provided to them in the Proforma Confirmafion Form
before they accepted the nurse for the shift. In the case, it
was documented that the nurse who cared for the pafient
overnight had “recent and credible experience in surgical
nursing, ILS/ALS and had met the mandatory training
requirements” and was suitable to care for pafients at
Level 1A+ per our policy for Safe Staffing.
As part of the learning from this event, the team at Leeds
have shared and discussed the findings in the RCA with this
nurse’s agency. The core supplier competency checklist
includes requires that agency staff are competent in the
management of the deteriorafing pafient. The new
checklist must be signed by the candidate as well as the
agency to ensure both are confirming the informafion is
correct.
This concern is a mafter of evidence before the coroner.
Based on the thorough and considered invesfigafions
undertaken by Spire (see file enfitled Incident
Management), the organisafion formed the view that Mrs
Hatch’s death was regreftably avoidable.
14. Evidence taken from a consultant
surgeon at the Inquest indicated that
the failings at Spire Hospital contributed
(more than minimally) to the death of
Mrs Hatch on 18 October. This view
dovetails with the medical opinion
obtained by Spire Healthcare Limited
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Dafix Report DW-336489 (Transfer Out)
01.09.22
PSIR DW-336489 01.09.22
CQC Nofificafion DW-336489 (DPL-1355306)
12.09.22
Dafix Report DW-343997 (Pafient Death)
19.10.22
Coroner’s Concern
Spire’s Response
Evidence
themselves to the effect that this death
was “avoidable”.
PSIR DW-343997 19.10.22
Medical Examiner Report (Commenced 26.10.22
- Returned 04.01.23)
Central Scrufiny Panel 17.02.23
RCA Report DW-343997 08.03.23
Mortality Review Annual Report 2022 28.03.23
Clinical Governance Leads Nafional Meefing
28.04.23
Structured Judgement Review 06.05.23
Group Mortality Review Commiftee 16.05.23
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS EVIDENCE
Deteriorafing Pafient Sfickers
Agreement in Principle with Leeds Teaching
ECU Equipment Stock Check
Hospitals
NEWS 2 Posters
Addifional CPAP Masks
Addifional Chest Drains
Venous Blood Gas Process for Deteriorafing
Pafients
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
MAC Q1 2023 Newslefter (legible
documentafion)
I hope this letter and evidence attached provides both you and Mrs Hatch’s family with assurance that Spire has taken seriously the matters of concern
raised in your report and has taken substantial effective steps to address those concerns.
Yours faithfully
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