Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0327, written 19 Jun 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 19 Jun 2024 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2024-0327 |
| Deceased | Thomas Gibson |
| Coroner | Chris Morris |
| Coroner area | Manchester South |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths |
| Organisation named | Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1)
University NHS Foundation Trust; and 2)
Health and Care Excellence
CORONER
, Group Chief Executive Officer, Manchester
, Chief Executive, National Institute for
I am Chris Morris, Area Coroner for Manchester South.
CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 1ST November 2023, Lauren Costello, Assistant Coroner for Manchester South, opened an inquest
into the death of Thomas Gibson who was found to have died at his home on 7th June 2023, aged 40
years. The investigation concluded with an inquest which I heard on 4th and 5th June 2024.
The inquest determined Mr Gibson died as a consequence of:
1) a) Sudden cardiac death;
1)b) Idiopathic myocardial fibrosis.
II) Acute on chronic colitis
At the end of the inquest, I recorded the following Narrative Conclusion:
Mr Gibson died at his home as a consequence of sudden cardiac death due to myocardial fibrosis.
Eleven days previously, Mr Gibson had been seen at his local hospital which provides specialist
cardiac services, where the clinical team assessing him did not appreciate that ECGs showed him to
be experiencing complete heart block. Had this been appreciated, Mr Gibson would have been
admitted under the care of the cardiologists and a series of investigations undertaken which would
probably have culminated in an implantable device such as a pacemaker being fitted. It is likely these
measures would have avoided his death.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
Mr Gibson was found dead at home on 7th June 2023. A post mortem examination determined the
primary cause of his death arose from idiopathic myocardial fibrosis which had not been diagnosed
during his lifetime. Mr Gibson was not known to have any chronic health problems.
During May 2023, Mr Gibson developed a gastrointestinal illness for which he initially sought
medical attention via his local GP Surgery. As his symptoms did not improve, a call was made to NHS
111 which resulted in Mr Gibson being advised to attend the Emergency Department at
Wythenshawe Hospital. There, a series of initial tests were undertaken, including an ECG. The ECG
machine self-generated a report indicating that the ECG was abnormal, showing features of Long QT
syndrome. Having reviewed this ECG, a junior doctor initiated treatment for Long QT syndrome, and
referred Mr Gibson to the medical team.
A junior doctor in medicine reviewed Mr Gibson later in the day, by which stage lab results from a
stool sample taken in the community had been reported as showing the presence of Campylobacter.
A repeat ECG was undertaken. This again came with a self-generated report indicating the ECG was
abnormal, but the junior doctor considered it to show a heart in normal sinus rhythm. The ECG was
discussed in isolation with the Medical Registrar who, whilst recognising the ECG was abnormal, did
not consider any immediate additional action was indicated.
Mr Gibson was discharged from hospital. The discharge letter which was sent to his GP makes no
mention of the ECGs undertaken, or the fact that Mr Gibson had received treatment in the
Emergency Department in response to an ECG abnormality.
CORONER’S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion
there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my
statutory duty to report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. –
To the Group Chief Executive Officer, Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
1. Whilst some important learning has been derived from the Trust’s review of the care
provided to Mr Gibson, I am concerned that a narrow focus on the error of three different
doctors to interpret two ECGs correctly (rather than any broader consideration of the
context in which such misinterpretations occurred) represents a missed opportunity to fully
understand the factors that led to Mr Gibson’s discharge from hospital, thus creating a risk
of future deaths.
2. Having carefully considered all of the evidence at inquest, I am concerned that there does
not appear to be clear guidance available to those working within the Trust as to what is
required when communicating (particularly as to test results and a patient’s presentation) as
between different specialisms and as between different roles within the team.
3. Connected with the above, I am concerned that the court heard evidence to the effect there
is no specific guidance as to expected minimum standards as to obtaining appropriate
context / information for clinicians (whether from the HIVE system or otherwise) when
asked to review a single test or investigation result in isolation.
4.
I am also concerned that there does not currently appear to be any particular requirement in
place for a senior review of the patient to take place in circumstances where diagnostic tests
undertaken yield results which appear incongruous / unexpected in the context of their
presentation.
5. Given the Trust’s own findings on investigation, I am concerned that no wider audit of ECGs
interpreted in the Emergency Department / Acute Medical Unit prior to discharge of
patients appears to have been undertaken; and
6.
It is a matter of concern that no audit as to the sufficiency of detail contained in discharge
summaries appears to have been undertaken to date in the light of the issues identified by
the Trust’s High Impact Learning Assessment.
To the Chief Executive, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
1. The court heard evidence that ECGs are used by different professional groups in a wide
range of clinical settings. A consultant cardiologist in this case gave evidence that complete
heart block was sometimes a wholly incidental finding on ECG, with the patient not
previously exhibiting any obvious signs or symptoms. In the present case, the court heard
evidence that the computer-generated interpretations of two EGCs were both incorrect, and
that three different (relatively experienced) doctors misinterpreted the ECGs. In those
circumstances, I am concerned there are currently no authoritative national guidelines (such
as those which exist for CTGs) in place as to the use and interpretation of ECGs in various
clinical settings.
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and your
organisation have the power to take such action.
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by
14th August 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.
COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and Mr Gibson’s partner. I have also sent a
copy to the General Practitioner.
I have also sent a copy to the Care Quality Commission and NHS Greater Manchester Integrated Care
Partnership who may find it useful or of interest.
I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may
send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may
make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the
publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.
Dated:
19th June 2024
Signature: Chris Morris HM Area Coroner, Manchester South.
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Inquest Index
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SECTION A – Responses
Document
Date
Author
Pages
Regulation 28 Response -
NICE
Regulation 28 Response -
MFT
08/08/2024
A1 – A2
14/08/2024
A3 – A7
~E
~E
~E
2nd Floor
2 Redman Place
London
E20 1JQ
United Kingdom
08 August 2024
Mr Chris Morris
HM Area Coroner
Coroner’s Court,
1 Mount Tabor Street,
Stockport
SK1 3AG.
Sent via email:
Our reference:
Dear Mr Morris
Re: Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths Report (Thomas Lee Gibson)
I write in response to your regulation 28 report dated 19 June 2024 regarding the very
sad death of Thomas Gibson. I would like to express my sincere condolences to
Thomas’s family.
The patient safety leads at NICE have discussed the report and understand that your
request is that we develop guidance on teaching clinicians to interpret ECG readings
correctly.
They have explained that teaching clinicians to take a history and interpret an ECG
are both very important, however we do not feel that it is possible to produce a
guideline that would achieve this aim, and therefore we do not believe that NICE is the
relevant body to take action on this point. We would suggest that the request is
directed to the relevant Royal Colleges/Specialist Societies and to the General Medical
Council (GMC), who are responsible for postgraduate and undergraduate training
respectively.
You may also find of interest the MEdTEch briefing from NICE on a related topic; The
technology | Remote ECG interpretation consultancy services for cardiovascular
disease | Advice | NICE
I am sorry that we could not be more helpful on this occasion, but hope that our
suggestions above will help to ultimately achieve the necessary improvements in care.
Yours sincerely,
Chief Executive
A1
Page | 2
A2
Joint Group Chief Medical Officers’ Office
Trust Headquarters
Room 218, Cobbett House
Oxford Road
M13 9WL
Tel:
Email:
14 August 2024
HM Area Coroner Mr Christopher Morris
Manchester South Area Coroner’s Court
1 Mount Tabor Street
Stockport
SK1 3AG
By Email
Dear HMC Mr Morris,
Re: Regulation 28 Report into the death of Thomas Gibson
Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 19th June 2024
addressed to Mr Mark Cubbon in his capacity as Group Chief Executive of Manchester
University NHS Foundation Trust (“MFT”, “the Trust”) following the inquest into the death of
Mr Thomas Gibson which you heard on the 4th and 5th June 2024.
I have now had the opportunity to acknowledge and consider the matters of concern that were
raised within your report and which emerged during the inquest of Mr Gibson.
On behalf of the Trust, I would like to extend my sincere condolences to the family of Mr
Gibson for their very great loss.
During the inquest you heard that Mr Gibson attended Wythenshawe Hospital Emergency
Department (ED) following a period of gastric illness whereupon an ECG was performed.
Following this, Mr Gibson was discharged. He sadly died eleven days later as a consequence
of sudden cardiac death due to idiopathic myocardial fibrosis. You received and heard
evidence on behalf of the Trust which accepts that the ECG was incorrectly interpreted and
there was a failure to diagnose complete heart block. Had this been recognised, Mr Gibson
would have been admitted under the care of the cardiologists for investigations and
interventions that would have followed, most likely avoiding his death. We are very sorry for
the failure to correctly interpret Mr Gibson’s ECG.
The Trust was able to provide some assurance of our learning and actions taken at the inquest.
However, you felt there were matters of concern which remained and that your statutory duty
under Regulation 28 of the Coroners (Inquest) Rules 2013 was engaged; and you
subsequently wrote a Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths to MFT to express your
concerns.
www.mft.nhs.uk
Incorporating:
Altrincham Hospital • Manchester Royal Eye Hospital • Manchester Royal Infirmary • North Manchester General Hospital •
Royal Manchester Children’s Hospital • Saint Mary’s Hospital • Trafford General Hospital • University Dental Hospital of Manchester •
Wythenshawe Hospital • Withington Community Hospital • Community Services
A3
You explained these were as follows:
1. Whilst some important learning has been derived from the Trust’s review of the
care provided to Mr Gibson, I am concerned that a narrow focus on the error of
three different doctors to interpret two ECGs correctly (rather than any broader
consideration of the context in which such misinterpretations occurred)
represents a missed opportunity to fully understand the factors that led to Mr
Gibson’s discharge from hospital, thus creating a risk of future deaths.
2. Having carefully considered all of the evidence at inquest, I am concerned that
there does not appear to be clear guidance available to those working within the
Trust as to what is required when communicating (particularly as to test results
and a patient’s presentation) as between different specialisms and as between
different roles within the team.
3. Connected with the above, I am concerned that the court heard evidence to the
effect there is no specific guidance as to expected minimum standards as to
obtaining appropriate context / information for clinicians (whether from the HIVE
system or otherwise) when asked to review a single test or investigation result
in isolation.
4. I am also concerned that there does not currently appear to be any particular
requirement in place for a senior review of the patient to take place in
circumstances where diagnostic tests undertaken yield results which appear
incongruous / unexpected in the context of their presentation.
5. Given the Trust’s own findings on investigation, I am concerned that no wider
audit of ECGs interpreted in the Emergency Department / Acute Medical Unit
prior to discharge of patients appears to have been undertaken; and
6. It is a matter of concern that no audit as to the sufficiency of detail contained in
discharge summaries appears to have been undertaken to date in the light of the
issues identified by the Trust’s High Impact Learning Assessment.
MFT is committed to learning from any incident, and we thank you for the opportunity to
address your concerns and thereby improve the care we provide. A multi-disciplinary
approach has been taken to address your concerns as follows:
1. The Trust has given careful consideration to this concern and apologises for giving the
impression of a narrow focus. The Trust is aware that there is a longstanding issue
with ECG interpretation both within the UK and internationally. Multiple studies have
confirmed that the accuracy of ECG interpretation varies from 42% for medical
students and 75% for cardiologists (who are the experts at interpreting ECGs).1 These
issues with ECG interpretation are present even after extensive training and other
interventions. For this reason, we have focused on the Human Factors of errors in
clinical medicine and have engaged with our Human Factors Academy (HFA). This will
support us to understand better the other factors at play which contribute to incorrect
ECG interpretation; and which can be mitigated in the future.
1 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7522782/
www.mft.nhs.uk
Incorporating:
Altrincham Hospital • Manchester Royal Eye Hospital • Manchester Royal Infirmary • North Manchester General Hospital •
Royal Manchester Children’s Hospital • Saint Mary’s Hospital • Trafford General Hospital • University Dental Hospital of Manchester •
Wythenshawe Hospital • Withington Community Hospital • Community Services
A4
Additionally, we have confirmed with our undergraduate educator colleagues that
training on ECG interpretation starts in the first year of medical school and is woven
through a number of modules across the five years.
2. Clarification of roles and responsibilities is a key aspect of our training and the
mechanism for securing a senior / speciality review is clearly defined. There is an
opportunity at least twice daily to discuss medical cases both on the ward and in ED.
It is part of standard medical training around how and when to escalate patients with
tools such as the SBAR (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation)
taught and reinforced in undergraduate and postgraduate training across the UK. The
SBAR tool is recommended by NHS England for use by all clinical staff; it is described
as ‘a structured way of communicating information that requires a response from the
receiver. As such, SBAR can be used very effectively to escalate a clinical problem
that requires immediate attention, or to facilitate efficient handover of patients between
clinicians or clinical teams’. Consultants from a range of specialties make themselves
available as much as possible, with named consultants present in ED and on the
admitting wards 7 days a week. A consultant attends medical handover twice a day
and each department at Wythenshawe, Trafford, Withington and Altrincham (“WTWA”)
(and indeed across MFT) discusses SBAR and escalation processes for senior review
at induction with the junior doctors. It is also written in the induction booklets handed
out at the start of each placement for the medical teams.
ECG training is delivered regularly as part the Wythenshawe medical teaching
programme. The training also encourages junior members of the team and other
Health Care Professionals (HCPs) to have a low threshold to seek a second opinion
either from a Consultant/Specialist Trainee (who are signed off as competent to
interpret ECGs independently) or cardiologist.
3. The reality of practice in a busy Emergency Department does mean that at times,
clinicians will be presented with a test result in relative isolation without a fully
comprehensive clinical picture, and asked to comment on this result in the context of
other potentially competing priorities. In any situations of competing priorities,
clinicians need to be able to weigh the relative risks and benefits of dealing with one
matter ahead of another. We recognise the challenge this real-world scenario
presents, and the need to support staff to recognise and mitigate the risk of those
“human factors” and situational challenges that can impact a correct diagnosis being
reached. The concept of “human factors” in healthcare is described as “enhancing
clinical performance through an understanding of the effects of teamwork, tasks,
equipment, workspace, culture and organisation on human behaviour and abilities and
application of that knowledge in clinical settings”.2 We are therefore expanding our
simulation and Human Factors training. This HF training will form part of regular
teaching programmes for medical and surgical junior doctors and the content and
syllabus will be discussed with the HFA. The aim is to have a rolling 12-month
programme established by 31 December 2024. This program will look at how to
provide training across MFT sites. It is anticipated that Human Factors training will
focus on increased vigilance in the interpretation of screening investigations such as a
chest radiograph or ECG when patients do not have typical presenting features, as in
the case of Mr Gibson. The Human Factors training will also reinforce the importance
of clinicians having a robust systematic process for interpreting ECGs. There are
2 Catchpole (2010), cited in department of Health Human Factors Reference Gorup Interim Report
March 2012, National quality Board, March 2012.
www.mft.nhs.uk
Incorporating:
Altrincham Hospital • Manchester Royal Eye Hospital • Manchester Royal Infirmary • North Manchester General Hospital •
Royal Manchester Children’s Hospital • Saint Mary’s Hospital • Trafford General Hospital • University Dental Hospital of Manchester •
Wythenshawe Hospital • Withington Community Hospital • Community Services
A5
ongoing discussions with Cardiology and the Human Factors Academy to ensure this
training achieves these objectives.
4. Whilst no Consultant reviewed the ECG prior to Mr Gibson being discharged, the
Registrars did review this. A Registrar is an appropriately senior clinician to discharge
a patient; it is not anticipated or reasonable for a Consultant to oversee all ECG
interpretation 24 hours a day, as the opportunity cost of this would adversely impact
other activity that necessitates Consultant input.
Acute Medicine and ED have weekly junior doctor teaching sessions. Once a month
these are based on ‘missed opportunities’ or ‘lessons learnt’ from the previous month.
This includes clinical cases or themes relating to errors to ensure learning is
disseminated across the teams. Relevant cases are also added to the monthly
governance meetings and mortality meetings which have a broader reach to include
Consultants and senior nursing staff.
5. As stated above, it is well documented that ECG interpretation accuracy varies
between 42% and 75% (expert cardiologists) and so it has been agreed by the Clinical
Head of Division and the WTWA Associate Medical Director for Quality and Patient
Safety that performing a random audit of selected ECGs would not provide assurance
of the quality of interpretation. The only way to seek assurance would be to audit all
ECGs and this would be extremely onerous on the ED department and distract from
delivery of patient care. An audit presented in August 2024 has shown that we perform
100-190 ECGs every day in ED which amounts to 41% of all attendees. Of these
ECGs, 35-56% of them have an abnormality detected.
However, it was agreed that there would be benefit in performing an audit to ensure
that the correct processes are being followed in ED with regard to the Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP). i.e. ECG reviewed by the appropriately qualified member
of staff with interpretation and action plan documented. This audit used data from
timepoints in December 2023 with 64% of ECGs having an interpretation documented
within the medical records. Of those not interpreted within the ED, some patients had
opted to leave the department, and some had been under the care of specialties so
not the direct responsibility of ED teams. Since that audit we have revised the SOP
around documentation standards and delivered education on which patients should
receive an ECG. The second phase of the audit will now take place to assess the
impact of that intervention. Our expected standard is that 100% of ECGs will have an
interpretation documented. Although this cannot guarantee accurate interpretation
each time, the standard will enforce that a period of time be given to the ECG
interpretation, ensuring due attention and thus removing some of the human factors
issues which can limit focus and assessment skills in the moment.
6. A Task and Finish Group involving colleagues in Primary Care and MFT clinicians was
set up in April 2024 to ensure that discharge summaries confirm to a basic standard
set by the Professional Records Standards Body. A new template has been produced
which includes all relevant descriptors. It is important that discharge summaries are
kept succinct to enable all relevant information to be easily accessed by the receiving
clinician. However it is also important that the relevant information is included to ensure
that the care provided and ongoing plan can be understood by Primary Care
colleagues. As part of the changes made, this new version will automatically provide
any medication updates and concerns and each section must be completed: see
example below. This template has been signed off by Primary Care; and colleagues in
www.mft.nhs.uk
Incorporating:
Altrincham Hospital • Manchester Royal Eye Hospital • Manchester Royal Infirmary • North Manchester General Hospital •
Royal Manchester Children’s Hospital • Saint Mary’s Hospital • Trafford General Hospital • University Dental Hospital of Manchester •
Wythenshawe Hospital • Withington Community Hospital • Community Services
A6
Primary Care have been encouraged to feed back any suboptimal discharge
summaries.
Recommended Actions for GP or Receiving Dept:
Please document any recommended actions for the GP or Receiving Dept if needed.
***
Problem List at Discharge:
Please ensure problem list is updated if it differs from below {(click here to update):1}
There are no hospital problems to display for this patient.
Clinical Summary:
Please document a clinical summary of this admission, including procedure or investigation
results information.
***
Hospital Plan:
Please note that results of any outpatient investigations will be sent to the Attending
Consultant at discharge. {(click here to update):1}
***
Rationale for Medication Changes:
Document rationale for medication changes. Please note medication information is already
included within the Discharge Summary Letter and does not need to be repeated.
***
We hope that this response provides you and Mr Gibson’s family with assurance in respect of
the matters of concern you have raised, and we thank you for your Report. The Trust is
committed to ensuring patient safety is our priority at all times. If you require any further
information, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Yours sincerely
Joint Group Chief Medical Officer / Responsible Officer
On behalf of
Chief Executive Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust
www.mft.nhs.uk
Incorporating:
Altrincham Hospital • Manchester Royal Eye Hospital • Manchester Royal Infirmary • North Manchester General Hospital •
Royal Manchester Children’s Hospital • Saint Mary’s Hospital • Trafford General Hospital • University Dental Hospital of Manchester •
Wythenshawe Hospital • Withington Community Hospital • Community Services
A7
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