Matthew Brierley

Dr Nicholas Shaw 
HM Assistant Coroner for Cumbria  
Fairfield 
Station Road 
Cockermouth 
Cumbria  
CA13 9PT 

17 March 2025 

Dear Dr Shaw, 

Re: 

 Death of Matthew Brierley (Ref: 11873028) 

Thank you for your report dated 8 January 2025 in relation to the death of Mr Matthew Brierley. 
As I understand from the detail of your report, on 16 March 2024, Mr Brierley was arrested in 
connection with indecent images of children and subsequently placed on police bail. He died in 
the car park of Buttermere Hotel, Cumbria, on 24 April 2024 having taken his own life by 

. I note within the body of your report, that three areas are of concern, and 

that you have asked for a response (as per your statutory duty).  

The areas of concern are;  

1. That men in Matthew’s circumstances are at a markedly elevated risk of suicide 

2. The examination process for devices (connected with such investigations) & application of 
bail conditions (whether standard or otherwise). 

3. The risk assessment process following release from custody & proactive contact  

As you may be aware, the College of Policing is the professional body for everyone working 
across policing. It is an operationally independent non-departmental public body. In this context, 
I have provided a reply under each heading to both assist you and respond as thoroughly as 
possible. 

1.  That men in Matthew’s circumstances are at a markedly elevated risk of suicide 

The College of Policing recognises that suspects of child sexual exploitation, 
possession/distribution of indecent images of children and other sexual offending are at 

 
 
 increased risk of suicide (such as those matching Mr Brierley’s demographics). We have 
produced comprehensive practitioner advice for officers and staff that outlines a series of 
measures to mitigate against this risk and have also added the latest guidance document from 
the Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine on how to care for suspects of sexual assault in 
police custody.  (Please find further details here).  

2.  The examination process for devices (connected with such investigations) & 

application of bail conditions (whether standard or otherwise). 

As operationally independent organisations, each police force will have provisions for the 
forensic examination of mobile phones and other digital devices. The context of each 
investigation will also shape the extent of both lines of enquiry and the depth or otherwise, of 
those examination processes, which will invariably have an impact on the time taken to 
complete those examinations. Similarly, the context of each case and presentation of risks 
would also help inform decision makers. Given the case specifics here, I would expect that 
officers appropriately recognise their responsibilities to safeguard children under Working 
Together 2023 and the Children Act 1989 and that this had a strong bearing on the bail 
conditions imposed. I would also expect the application of those bail conditions to have had a 
duration and scrutiny in compliance with the law (please see here for further information).  I 
shall outline wider risk-assessment provisions when addressing point 3, below.  

3.  The risk assessment process following release from custody & proactive contact 

The Detention and Custody Authorised Professional Practice (APP) has a detailed chapter 
under  ‘Detention and Custody Risk Assessment’ where it provides clear guidance to 
Custody Officers that the National Decision Model should be used to assess the threat(s) and 
risk(s) throughout the period of detention.  It also makes clear that the risks can escalate 
towards the point of release and that custody officers should engage with detainees and offer 
the relevant support where applicable. Outside of the College, there is the National Custody 
Strategy (2022), produced by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) which is also 
referenced in the custody APP.  It contains six strategic principles and makes explicit reference 
to working in partnership with key stakeholders (such as Liaison and Diversion).  I note that Mr 
Brierley was offered and declined the support of Liaison and Diversion (which is in line with 
APP) and that you have understandably queried whether proactive support was offered post 
release. Without further case information I am unaware as to what extent the investigating 
officer(s) made further contact/offers of support but would expect there to have been an 
appropriate investigation plan and bail management position while Mr Brierley remained a 
suspect. As you will appreciate, each police force also has a separate local partnership support 
arrangement which may or may not have been applicable here.  

 
 
 
 I trust that the above assists in answering your queries and that you are reassured by the 
provisions and guidance that are in place. Please do not hesitate to contact me or my lead for 
Crime and Criminal Justice, Chief Superintendent 

 if you need any further information or assistance. 

Yours sincerely 

Chief Executive Officer 
College of Policing 
E:

From: 
To: 
Sent: Mon Apr 14 2025 10:33:43 BST 
Subject: RE: Death of Matthew Brierley 

Good morning, 

From reading the attached Report this indicates that Matthew Brierley had been arrested and 
was bailed whilst police investigations continued during which time he sadly took his own life.   

There is no suggestion in the attached Report that he had been sentenced by a Court, so will not 
have had any involvement with the Probation Service.  Similarly, there is no mention of a period 
on remand, or in custody following sentence, so no involvement with the Prison Service.   

Can I therefore check please if the Report should have been directed to the Home Secretary 
rather than the Secretary of State for Justice?  It was also sent to the National Police Chief’s 
Council and the College of Policing, and the matters of concern seem to relate to police 
investigative procedures and bail conditions, which are usually requested by the police/CPS.   

There is mention of the deceased having been suspended by his Employer, Border Force, but 
this also sits within the Home Office.   

Kind regards, 
Simran 

Ministerial Account Manager to The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice 
102 Petty France | London | SW1H 9AJ  

_________________________
From: Cumbria coroner service
Sent: 8 January 2025 12:31 
To: MAHMOOD, Shabana 
Subject: Death of Matthew Brierley 

Dear 

,  

Please can you see the attached Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths and 
associated letter.    

The report was issued by Assistant Coroner, Dr Nicholas Shaw following the Inquest 
of the late Mr. Matthew Brierley.  

Kind Regards,  

Coroners Officer 
Tel: 0300 303 3180 
Mob: 
Email: 
Contact us about this case 

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Staff Officer to CC 
NPCC lead for Custody and Movement of Prisoners
Wootton Hall
Wootton Hall Park
Northampton
Northamptonshire
NN4 0JQ

Direct Line: 

4th March 2025

Dear Dr Nicolas Shaw

Thank you for including the NPCC Custody por(cid:414)olio within your preven(cid:415)on of future deaths report 
concerning Mr Ma(cid:425)hew Brierley.

and I, took over the Custody por(cid:414)olio in October 2024 and the overarching priority 

behind all of our strategic objec(cid:415)ves, is to make custody as safe as possible for detainees and those 
working within the custody environment.  To that end, we are heavily involved with the healthcare 
providers and what is o(cid:332)en referred to as, Liaison and Diversion services within custody.  We recently 
re-established the healthcare providers working group and meet regularly with the IOPC, and also 
a(cid:425)end the Ministerial Board on Deaths in Custody, working to prevent both deaths in custody and post 
custody suicides.  Today, I have also a(cid:425)ended a na(cid:415)onal mee(cid:415)ng of police, healthcare providers and 
stakeholders including the Independent Office of Police Conduct, Independent Custody Visi(cid:415)ng 
Associa(cid:415)on, Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody, College of Policing and others, where I 
raised the death of Ma(cid:425)hew as a primary example of what it is we are working to improve.

I detail the aforemen(cid:415)oned with the inten(cid:415)on of making you aware of the importance this por(cid:414)olio 
places upon all deaths in or following custody.

The death of Ma(cid:425)hew is an extremely tragic example of where improvements are required.  I will 
address each of your ma(cid:425)ers of concern in turn.

1 and 3 – A lot of research has been undertaken already, to try and iden(cid:415)fy any commonali(cid:415)es between 
instances of post custody suicide.  The objec(cid:415)ve is to establish a post release risk assessment process 
that will iden(cid:415)fy those most at risk, and ini(cid:415)ate a process to mi(cid:415)gate that risk, with further support 
such as a mandatory referral to support agencies.  The current research has iden(cid:415)fied from a review of 
five years of data from the IOPC:

439 deaths
288 occurred within 48 hours of release
151 occurred outside 48 hours of release

 The next phase of the research discussed today, will be for each force from which one of those deaths 
occurred, to answer further qualita(cid:415)ve ques(cid:415)ons to iden(cid:415)fy commonali(cid:415)es.  At present, we do not ask 
the key ques(cid:415)ons that iden(cid:415)fy the impact upon somebody’s life, following their arrest.  Ques(cid:415)ons 
proposed include subjects such as:

Did they have to change their place of residence as a result of bail condi(cid:415)ons?
Was their access to children restricted?
Was their employer no(cid:415)fied?

These were all applicable to Ma(cid:425)hew.

Answers to these and other ques(cid:415)ons, will be analysed to draw any sta(cid:415)s(cid:415)cal conclusions available, 
that can then be used to iden(cid:415)fy those most at risk in the future.  The (cid:415)metable for this next stage of 
research, is to submit the request to all forces by the end of April and allow 4 months for the return of 
the requested informa(cid:415)on.  Once received, the analy(cid:415)cal work will be undertaken, with a (cid:415)me es(cid:415)mate 
of 6 months.  Whilst this work will take (cid:415)me to complete, communica(cid:415)on with strategic custody leads is 
conducted via a quarterly strategic board mee(cid:415)ng and the regular sharing of informa(cid:415)on and guidance 
such as the findings within this report and others, so as not to delay any learning.

I note in Ma(cid:425)hew’s case, he was offered support, which he declined, but as aforemen(cid:415)oned, we are 
seeking to introduce an evidence led process to iden(cid:415)fy individuals where a mandatory referral to 
partner agencies for support following a release from custody is made, so the onus is not on the 
individual to accept the support offered during their deten(cid:415)on, as it is recognised many individuals will 
decline this for different reasons as you have outlined.  

2 – In rela(cid:415)on to the examina(cid:415)on of digital devices, (cid:415)mescales vary between forces, but it is not 
uncommon for those considered to be linked to lower risk inves(cid:415)ga(cid:415)ons, not to be processed for many 
months.  It will be for the officer in charge (OIC) of the inves(cid:415)ga(cid:415)on to iden(cid:415)fy all risks within their 
submission to their Digital Forensics Unit (or equivalent), which is then used to priori(cid:415)se the 
examina(cid:415)on of those devices.  The factors in this inves(cid:415)ga(cid:415)on should have resulted in a much quicker 
interroga(cid:415)on of the device than the 18 months es(cid:415)mated.  The fact that Ma(cid:425)hew was on bail, should 
have seen the inves(cid:415)ga(cid:415)on progressed within the requisite bail periods, but I cannot comment upon 
any individual backlogs or otherwise that the force concerned may have been managing.  It appears 
however, that the risk of suicide was not weighted heavily enough in any triage of the mobile device 
that took place.  

Assessments of risk should always be individualised.  Whilst there will be a ques(cid:415)on set used to 
conduct a pre-release risk assessment, the responses should be applied to the individual circumstances 
of the inves(cid:415)ga(cid:415)on, by the OIC and ra(cid:415)fied by their supervisor when making a disposal decision.  Bail 
condi(cid:415)ons should only be applied where it is necessary and propor(cid:415)onate to do so.  There is a 

 presump(cid:415)on for uncondi(cid:415)onal bail, unless condi(cid:415)ons are required to manage the risk of further 
offences, interference with witnesses or ensure the suspect a(cid:425)ends future proceedings.  

I have shared a copy of this preven(cid:415)on of future deaths report with all custody leads within the UK, 
with a recommenda(cid:415)on to ensure that the risk of suicide within cohorts such as Ma(cid:425)hew’s, are 
included within the inves(cid:415)ga(cid:415)ve strategies and par(cid:415)cularly the triage of digital devices, and that risk 
assessments are tailored to the individual circumstances of the inves(cid:415)ga(cid:415)on.

I hope the contents of this le(cid:425)er have been useful and offer some reassurance of the ongoing work and 
seriousness 
 and I place on all instances of post custody suicide.  Please do contact me if I 
can be of any further assistance.

Yours faithfully,

Minister of State 

2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 
www.gov.uk/home-office 

His Majesty’s Assistant Coroner, Dr Nicholas Shaw,  
Fairfield, Station Road  
Cockermouth 
Cumbria 
CA13 9PT 

Regulation 28 report: Matthew Brierley 

Dear Dr Shaw, 

14 October 2025 

Thank you for your email of 28 April to the Home Secretary regarding the Prevention of 
Future Deaths report relating to the death of Matthew Brierley, a Border Force employee, 
in April 2024. I am replying as Minister of State at the Home Office, and I apologise for the 
delay in responding to your letter. 

At the outset, I wish to express my most sincere condolences to Matthew’s loved ones for 
the distress they will have experienced following Matthew’s death. 

The Detention and Custody Authorised Professional Practice (APP) produced by the 
College of Policing (henceforth ‘the College’) sets the standards for police engagement 
with detainees after their arrest, including any offers of support. This includes operational 
advice on managing the risk of suicide for persons under investigation, such as Matthew. 
The College is independent of government; its role is to set high professional standards for 
policing; sharing what works best; acting as the national voice of policing; and ensuring 
police training and ethics is of the highest possible quality.   

How the APP is followed is an operational decision for individual police forces. The Home 
Office has no authority to intervene in operational policing matters. I cannot comment on 
the action and decisions taken by police officers in the course of their duties because 
operational matters are the responsibility of the Chief Officer of the force concerned.   

I have had sight of the responses by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and 
College of Policing to your report. These set out the relevant guidance that police officers 
should follow in order to support detainees after their arrest and prevent custody and post-
custody suicides. I am satisfied that there is current police guidance on this matter which is 
readily available to forces and clearly sets out the actions for police officers.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I am also reassured by the commitment of the NPCC to ensure that detainees are offered 
support, post-arrest, in order to decrease the likelihood of suicide post-custody, including 
consideration of mandatory referrals to partner agencies when an offer of support is 
declined. 

I would like to take the opportunity to set out the support Matthew was offered by the 
Home Office as a Border Force employee.  

Hampshire Police informed Border Force officials of Matthew’s arrest on the weekend of 
16 March 2024. Matthew was contacted by a Border Force Deputy Director and support 
was offered. Subsequently a welfare point of contact was identified. A decision was made 
to suspend Matthew on full pay, in line with HR guidance. This decision was explained to 
Matthew, whilst emphasising the importance of his welfare. Matthew was given 
assurances that the situation would be managed discretely and confidentially.  

The ‘keeping in touch’ process was explained, and all relevant welfare support contact 
numbers were shared with Matthew. A week later, following a conversation with Matthew, 
his Border Force IT equipment was collected during an offsite meeting with a Border Force 
official, a standard formality in these circumstances. The offer of employee support was 
reiterated during this meeting. The following day, Border Force officials were informed of 
Matthew’s death. 

Following this tragic news, Border Force officials maintained contact with Matthew’s wife 
and have written to Matthew’s father on two occasions to assure him that HR guidance 
was followed appropriately. 

The Home Office Independent Professional Standards Unit conducted a formal review of 
the management and support for Matthew during and after his arrest. The report 
concluded that “following Matt’s arrest, the steps taken under the relevant policies were 
appropriate” and that “Matt was provided with appropriate support and treated with due 
sensitivity”. The report also found that aside from one occasion, keep-in-touch discussions 
occurred regularly and well within the agreed ten-day period. 

I hope this letter assures you, and Matthew’s family, that proper processes were followed, 
and that appropriate guidance is in place to support Home Office employees in these 
circumstances. My thoughts remain with Matthew’s family. 

Yours sincerely,