Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2025

Mark Vidler

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2026-0023, written 1 Dec 2025. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report1 Dec 2025
Reference2026-0023
DeceasedMark Vidler
CoronerIan Potter
Coroner areaKent and Medway
CategoryCommunity health care and emergency services related deaths · Mental Health related deaths · Suicide (from 2015)
Organisation namedKent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Kent and Medway Coroners' Service 
Oakwood House 
Oakwood Park 
Maidstone 
Kent 
ME16 8AE 
Telephone:  03000 410502 
Email: kentandmedwaycoroners@kent.gov.uk 

Date: 11 January 2026 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:  

•  Chief Executive, Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust, Farm Villa, 

Hermitage Lane, Maidstone, Kent, ME16 9QQ 

1. CORONER 

I am Mr. Ian Potter  for Kent and Medway  

2. CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and 
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made 

  
   
  
  
  
  
 3. INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 9 May 2025 an investigation was commenced into the death of Mark Stuart VIDLER. The 
investigation concluded at the end of the inquest heard by me on 2, 3, and 19 December 2025. 
The conclusion of the inquest was: 

Suicide, contributed to by a failure in care 

1a   Hanging 

1b    

1c    

1d     

 II     

4. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

Mark Vidler had severe depression, which presented atypically. He was under the care and 
treatment of Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust (the Trust) between July 2024 and 
his death on 8 May 2025. Mark had previously been detained under the Mental Health Act 
1983 (MHA) (August - September 2024, and November 2024) following serious and impulsive 
attempts to end his life. He was well known to 'mask' his symptoms and feelings. 

On 30 April 2025, Mark made a very serious attempt to end his life by hanging: the only 
reason the attempt was unsuccessful was due to the ligature snapping after Mark had fallen 
unconscious. Mark's treatment was escalated to the Home Treatment Team (HTT) due to his 
increased risks. Some days later, Mark requested to be discharged by the HTT. This request 
to be discharged was a significant risk factor that was not fully appreciated by clinicians in the 
HTT when they agreed to discharge Mark on 6 May 2025. Given the events of 30 April 2025 
and Mark's evolving risks, his discharge from the HTT was premature. 

On 7 May 2025, Mark made a further serious attempt to end his life by hanging, which 
included leaving a final note for his family. Mark was seen by a nurse from the Mental Health 
Together Plus (MHT+) that day, who immediately recognised that Mark was at a real and 
immediate risk of death by suicide. The nurse escalated her concerns to a psychiatrist who 
agreed with that view and planned for Mark to be assessed urgently with a view to detaining 
him under the MHA. Neither the psychiatrist nor the nurse considered Mark's home was a 
place of safety for him. The plan was for Mark to be referred to the Trust's Rapid Response 
Team, who could have seen him that night for safety and risk management input, pending the 
MHA assessment. The referral to the Rapid Response Team was declined by the clinician and 
there was no valid reason for that decision. This meant Mark was not seen or reviewed by an 
'out of hours' clinician on the night of 7 May 2025. This was a failure in care that more than 
minimally contributed to Mark's death. 

In the early afternoon of 8 May 2025, Mark's son entered Mark's home address due to 
concerns for his welfare. Sadly, he found Mark suspended by ligature and Mark's death was 
verified by a paramedic shortly thereafter. Mark had intended to end his life. 

  
  
 5. CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my 
opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances 
it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

Before setting out my concerns, it is only right that I acknowledge that I heard evidence about 
good aspects of care treatment provided to Mark. Further, the Trust has undertaken some 
work to address the risks and concerns it has identified by way of its own internal processes. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: 

(1) Some staff at the Trust were so focussed on 'process' that they lost sight of the need for 
patient centred care. This was accepted within the Trusts PSII report. I was insufficiently 
reassured that action has been taken to address this matter. 

(2) The process in place for triaging and considering referrals to the Rapid Response Team is 
reliant, for the most part, on call handlers working through a script and there is a total lack of 
clarity regarding clinical decision making in this regard. The Trust acknowledged in its PSII 
report that there was "no evidence of senior clinical oversight of the decision making or clarity 
as to where the final clinical decision sits regarding accepting or declining referrals". A senior 
manger from the Trust told me, in evidence, that there is still work to be done to address this 
concern. 

(3) Evidence I considered showed that some risk factors, such as the masking of symptoms, 
were well documented. However, the HTT clinician still appeared not to acknowledge the 
extent of such risks. This raises the risk of a repeat of this concern in the future. 

(4) I heard evidence that the decision to discharge Mark from the HTT was made at a multi-
disciplinary team (MDT) meeting prior to the HTT nurse visiting Mark on 6 May 2025. This 
raises the concern that the decision was pre-determined. I heard no evidence that this 
situation has changed. 

(5) Both the nurse from MHT+ and the consultant psychiatrist gave evidence that the MHT+ 
were not included, as the receiving team, in the MDT decision on 6 May 2025. They 
considered that this would have been useful and is something that can and has happened in 
the past. I was told that this left Mark 'in limbo' following the his discharge from HTT and I was 
told that this is something that has not changed since. 

(6) I heard evidence that the Trust does not have care co-ordinators and the clinician felt that 
this could lead to similar situations arising in the future. 

(7) The Collaborative Assessment and Management of Suicidality (CAMS) work undertaken by 
the Trust lacks "dedicated resource in place to manage or support implementation" (quote 
taken from Trust PSII report). I also heard that the CAMS programme cannot currently be 
integrated with the Trust's computerised records system, due to copyright issues. This matter 
was due to be resolved by June 2025; however, it remains unresolved with a current target 
date of June 2026. I was told that there is no system in place to safety net the use of both 
paper and computerised records in the meantime.  

(8) I heard evidence that as a result of the referral to the Rapid Response Team being 
declined, Mark's mental health care technically rested with the MHT+ team, which only works 
until 17:00. As a result, the Approved Mental Health Practitioner service (responsible for 
arranging MHA assessments) would have been unable to speak to the referrer. While this was 

  
 not an issue in the specific circumstances of this case, I consider that it raises risks for others 
in the future. 

6. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the 
power to take such action. 
7. YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely 
by 9 March 2026. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the 
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 
8. COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: 
Mark's family. I have also sent it to the Care Quality Commission who may find it useful or of 
interest. 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. 

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. She 
may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. 
You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the 

  
 release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

12 January 2026 

Signature

Ian Potter Area Coroner for Kent and Medway

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Kent and Medway NHS Mental Health Trust (PDF)
Mr. Ian Potter  

Kent and Medway Coroners' Service  

Oakwood House  

Oakwood Park  

Maidstone  

Kent 

ME16 8AE 

Chief Executives Office 

Priority House 

Hermitage Lane 

Maidstone 

Kent 

ME16 9PH 

6 March 2026 

Dear Mr Potter 

Inquest into the death of Mr Mark Stuart VIDLER  

Kent and Medway Mental Health Trust Response to the Regulation 28 Report to 

Prevent Future Death 

I  write  in  response  to  the  Regulation  28  Report  dated  11  January  2026,  sent  to  Kent  and 

Medway Mental Health NHS Trust (the Trust) following the conclusion of the inquest into the 

very sad death of Mr Mark Stuart VIDLER on 8 May 2025.  

In your report to the Trust, you raised the following matters of concern: 

1.  Some staff at the Trust were so focussed on 'process' that they lost sight of the 

need for patient centred care. This was accepted within the Trusts PSII report. I 

was insufficiently reassured that action has been taken to address this matter.  

2.  The  process  in  place  for  triaging  and  considering  referrals  to  the  Rapid 

Response Team is reliant, for the most part, on call handlers working through a 

script and there is a total lack of clarity regarding clinical decision making in this 

regard. The Trust acknowledged in its PSII report that there was "no evidence of 

senior clinical oversight of the decision making or clarity as to where the final 

clinical  decision  sits  regarding  accepting  or  declining  referrals".  A  senior 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 manager from the Trust told me, in evidence, that there is still work to be done 

to address this concern.  

The Trust wide Rapid Response Standard Operating Procedure is being revised and 

amended to ensure referrals received are accepted by call handlers. No referral will be 

declined until a senior clinician has had oversight, and alternative care agreed. As such 

each referral will be reviewed by a Rapid Response clinician in collaboration with the 

referring clinician, thereby ensuring decision making is person centred.  

The revision of the Trust wide Home Treatment Team and Rapid Response Standard 

Operating Procedure review which is currently underway,  is due for completion by 1 
April  2026.  In  addition;  to  the  revision  of  the  SOP’s  both  the  Home  Treatment  and 

Rapid Response Teams are booked to undertake CRAM training for both qualified and 

unqualified  staff.  This  will  be  completed  by  April  2026.  This  training  will  specifically 

address the need for clinicians to be curious and ask specific risk questions around 

safety  and protective factors  as  well  as  co-written  plans  of  care  in  conjunction  with 

carers and family where to do so. This will ensure person centred care is at the centre 

of all assessments.  

3.  Evidence I considered showed that some risk factors, such as the masking of 

symptoms, were well documented. However, the HTT clinician still appeared not 

to acknowledge the extent of such risks. This raises the risk of a repeat of this 

concern in the future. 

The Home Treatment and Rapid Response Teams have planned and dedicated 

Clinical Risk Assessment & Management (CRAM) training sessions where masking 

of symptoms will be covered as a learning outcome. CRAM is the clinical tool that 

teams use to assess and care plan for risks that are identified.  

The Trust has implemented quality audits to determine the quality of the Risk 

Assessment & Management plans across the Trust, and as such there is an ongoing 

Trust wide quality improvement drive to establish improvements particularly around 

risk recognition and safety planning. As part of this work, there is weekly tracking of 

our improvement trajectory targets for completion of the CRAM documents. 

This activity is currently part of the Trusts Quality Action Plan. 

 
 
 
 
 
 4.  I heard evidence that the decision to discharge Mark from the HTT was made at 

a multidisciplinary team (MDT) meeting prior to the HTT nurse visiting Mark on 

6  May  2025.  This  raises  the  concern  that  the  decision  was  pre-determined.  I 

heard no evidence that this situation has changed. 

The HTT have initiated a twice weekly MDT discussions with Community services 

which focuses discussion on aspects of individual patients care including those 

patients for whom discharge is planned from HTT. This allows for the wider support 

system to debate and consider the decision to discharge.  

In addition, as part of the Trusts ongoing development, of understanding and 

managing risk with our patients, a risk assessment is completed at discharge. If the 

clinician completing the risk assessment identifies a deterioration in mental state this 

can and should delay that decision- the team have a mechanism for discussion and 

decision making regarding clinical care, on a daily basis, and access to a Consultant 

Psychiatrist for advice and guidance in complex cases. 

5.  Both the nurse from MHT+ and the consultant psychiatrist gave evidence that 

the  MHT+  were  not  included, as  the  receiving  team,  in  the  MDT  decision  on  6 

May 2025. They considered that this would have been useful and is something 

that can and has happened in the past. I was told that this left  Mark 'in limbo' 

following his discharge from HTT and I was told that this is something that has 

not changed since.  

Following this Inquest outcome, the Home Treatment Team service have implemented 

a  twice  weekly  clinical  MDT  interface  meeting  with  local  MHT  and  MHT+  teams  to 

enable  and  ensure  timely  discussion  of  specific  cases.  Feedback  from  the  clinical 

teams  has been  positive as  these  forums are the opportunity  to discuss  patients  of 

concern where risk continues to be identified. 

The Rapid Response Team will have senior clinical input into these interface forums 

where  decisions  impacting  on  patient  care  can  be  discussed  and  decisions  made 

clinically  to  ensure  the  person  has  an  agreed  discharge  plan  that  promotes  clinical 

safety and is based on senior clinical consideration. The revised Standard Operating 

Procedure will detail that MHT+ colleagues including medics must be invited to these 

forums to assist with community treatment planning and will be audited 3 monthly to 

ensure  quality,  patient  safety  and  positive  patient  outcomes  agreed  across  the 

interface of services.  

 
  
 
 
 This practice improvement will be included in the revised Trust wide Home Treatment 

Team and Rapid Response Standard Operating Procedures review which are 

currently underway review, and due for completion by 1 April 2026.  

6.  I heard evidence that the Trust does not have care co-ordinators and the 

clinician felt that this could lead to similar situations arising in the future.  

The  Trust  has  and  is  undergoing  transformation  in  line  with  the  Community  Mental 

Health Framework (CMHF) which includes a national directive to move away from care 

co-ordination. As part of our continuous improvement  agenda and refinement of the 

community model of care the Trust has identified a number of service improvement 

which we will be making and which will include the introduction of a named worker.  

There have been a number of workshops held across the organisation, by Directorate 

and  work  is  underway  to  finalise  the  refinement  model,  and  implementation 

timeframes. 

7.  The  Collaborative  Assessment  and  Management  of  Suicidality  (CAMS)  work 

undertaken  by  the  Trust  lacks  "dedicated  resource  in  place  to  manage  or 

support implementation" (quote taken from Trust PSII report). I also heard that 

the  CAMS  programme  cannot  currently  be  integrated  with  the  Trust's 

computerised records system, due to copyright issues. This matter was due to 

be resolved by June 2025; however, it remains unresolved with a current target 

date of June 2026. I was told that there is no system in place to safety net the 

use of both paper and computerised records in the meantime.  

By  the  end  of  February  2026,  the  CAMS  clinical  documentation  forms  will  be 

accessible as stand-alone documents on Rio clinical record system. These can only 

be completed by those undertaking specialist CAMS training or those who have fully 

trained in use of the National CAMS model.  

The  Trust  are  currently  considering  options  in  relation  to  a  dedicated  workforce  of 

CAMS trained workers across our services. In addition, the continued roll out of this 

specialist  service  is  under  review  by  the  organisation.  This  will  inform  the  finalised 

CAMS Standard Operating Procedure. In the meantime, a 6-month secondment role 

has  been  agreed  to  support  the  CAMS  service  (band  7  clinician).  This  role  is  split 

equally between CAMS practice and training staff in CRAM. 

 
 
 
 
 8.  I  heard  evidence  that  as  a  result  of  the  referral  to  the  Rapid  Response  Team 

being declined, Mark's mental health care technically rested with the MHT+ team, 

which  only  works  until  17:00.  As  a  result,  the  Approved  Mental  Health 

Practitioner service (responsible for arranging MHA assessments) would have 

been unable to speak to the referrer. While this was not an issue in the specific 

circumstances of this case, I consider that it raises risks for others in the future. 

With clarity being established through the Home Treatment Team & Rapid Response 

Standard  Operating  Procedure,  we  expect  that  this  will  not  occur  in  the  future.    In 

addition to the robust adjustment to the Rapid Response referrals received process 

outlined above, the Trust continues to promote the use of the  Urgent Mental Health 

Helpline, by patients known or unknown, and their families 24/7. 

Thank you for bringing your concerns to my attention and I am sincerely sorry for the shortfalls 

in the care of Mr Vidler. 

I hope that the detailed information provided, including the attached timetable for action, offers 

you a level of assurance about both the seriousness with which  the Trust has received and 

responded to your concerns, and the significant improvements that have been made since the 

sad passing of Mr Vidler.  

Please do let me know if I can be of any further assistance. 

Yours sincerely 

Chief Executive

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