Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2026
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2026-0075, written 9 Feb 2026. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 9 Feb 2026 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2026-0075 |
| Deceased | Josh Tarrant (1) |
| Coroner | Scott Matthewson |
| Coroner area | Mid Kent & Medway |
| Category | Alcohol, drug and medication related deaths · State Custody related deaths |
| Organisation named | Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Mid Kent and Medway Coroners Area Oakwood House Oakwood Park Maidstone Kent ME16 8AE REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS Josh Yemi TARRANT (died 1 November 2023) THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: National Medical Director (Primary Care) NHS England PO Box 16738 Redditch B97 9PT 1. CORONER I am Scott Matthewson, Assistant Coroner for the coroner area of Mid Kent & Medway. 2. CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, regulations 28 and 29. 3. INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 13 November 2023 the Area Coroner for Mid Kent & Medway commenced an investigation into the death of Josh Yemi Tarrant who died, aged 34, on 1 November 2023 at HMP Elmley (“the Prison”) on the Isle of Sheppey in Kent. 1 The investigation concluded on 11 December 2025 at the end of an inquest conducted by me (sitting with a jury). The jury concluded that: “Josh Yemi Tarrant died as a result of Cocaine toxicity following a lengthy and challenging restraint. Josh was experiencing an acute behavioural disturbance which was not recognized by Healthcare staff. Healthcare’s failure to provide sufficient medical treatment at the earliest appropriate opportunity by calling an Ambulance by 23:29 was probably a significant contributing factor in Josh’s death. Josh’s death was contributed to by neglect.” The medical cause of death was: Ia. Cocaine intoxication II. Cardiac Hypertrophy and Exertion during Restraint 4. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Mr Tarrant was born on 1 March 1989. On Saturday 28 October 2023 he was arrested and charged with robbery, actual bodily harm and criminal damage. He was held in police custody until Tuesday 31 October 2023 when he attended court and was remanded in custody until his next court hearing. He was taken to the Prison in the early evening. Despite being searched by prison staff Mr Tarrant somehow managed to smuggle cocaine into the prison, He was initially calm, pleasant, complaint and engaged with staff. Mr Tarrant was taken to Houseblock 1 at around 7.30/8.00 pm and placed in a locked cell. The Officer Staff Grade (“OSG”) supervising Houseblock 1 during the night spoke to Mr Tarrant at about 10.30 pm when he remained calm and lucid. About an hour later his demeanour had completely changed. Mr Tarrant asked the OSG for help and said that he was hearing voices. He had taken his shirt off and was bare chested. He had probably ingested cocaine in the preceding hour. The OSG called for assistance and the Prison’s ‘Oscar 1’ (the most senior member of staff on site) attended with other officers. They entered Mr Tarrant’s cell to speak to him. He was standing up and looking out of the cell window. He did not respond and was speaking incoherently and repetitively, saying “help me, help me, help me” repeatedly. Mr Tarrant suddenly knocked a TV in his cell to the floor and ran out of his cell. He was restrained on the floor by a number of officers using Control and Restraint techniques. Mr Tarrant displayed unusual strength during this struggle and at one point lifted several officers off the ground as he got to his feet. The Oscar 1 called for the attendance of ‘Hotel 1’ (the nurse on duty at the Prison overnight) who attended after a short delay caused by the fact that she 2 had no key to open locked gates. On arrival the Hotel 1 made little or no assessment of Mr Tarrant and, despite thinking he was having a psychotic episode, she did not declare a medical emergency (code blue) which would have triggered a 999 to the South East Coast Ambulance Service (“SECAmb”). The Oscar 1 decided that Mr Tarrant should be taken to the Prison’s healthcare unit where he could be kept under observation. The healthcare unit was aa short distance from Houseblock 1 and the journey on foot would normally take no more than a few minutes. However, Mr Tarrant was agitated and non- compliant and so the transfer took place under restraint During the next half an hour or so the officers were engaged in a extremely physically challenging transfer. Mr Tarrant was struggling throughout, allowing his body weight to drop and the officers had to stop form time to time to catch their breath and rotate staff. Throughout this episode Mr Tarrant was shouting incoherently and repetitively. He did not appear to know where he was (he kept asking for his mother) and displayed signs of severe distress. Officers finally managed to get Mr Tarrant into a observation cell in the healthcare unit. Once the door was locked he continued to be extremely distressed. He was shouting repeatedly and incoherently. He became violent and smashed the gate of his cell with his legs, arms and even his head. The force with which he did these things shocked some of the officers who witnessed it. Mr Tarrant also seemed to be oblivious to the pain that that he must have been experiencing. After about an hour, during which time Mr Tarrant did not seem to tire, he made a ligature out of his clothing material and put it around his neck and suspended himself. Officers entered the cell and removed the ligature. When closing the cell door, Mr Tarrant’s thumb was accidentally trapped between the metal gate and the door frame. Although this must have caused extreme pain, he did not seem to notice it. Mr Tarrant continued to be violent and the force of his blows eventually smashed the Perspex door cover. There were sharp pieces of broken Perspex both inside and outside the cell which officers were worried that Mr Tarrant might use to harm himself. They therefore relocated him into the next-door cell under restraint. Once again, Mr Tarrant struggled and the relocation was very physically challenging and took about 7/8 minutes to transport him no more than a few metres away. The officers exited the cell in a controlled way until there was one officer left. Whan the last officer made to exit the cell he sensed that something was wrong. He immediately re-entered the cell and saw that Mr Tarrant was 3 unresponsive. He was not breathing and did not have a pulse. A Code Blue was called and an ambulance summoned at around 1.27 am on 1 November 2023. CPR was started immediately. Healthcare staff made a number of basic errors in providing CPR (failing to use the correct equipment, inserting an i-Gel in Mr Tarrant’s airway the wrong way around which blocked his airway). Although none of these failings ultimately caused or contributed to Mr Tarrant’s death the failures were shocking. In contrast, the Prison officers acquitted themselves very well and performed CPR to a high standard which was later complimented by paramedics. Paramedics arrived at the scene at 1.44 am and took over the management of Mr Tarrant’s airway form healthcare staff. They immediately noticed that the i- Gel had been placed incorrectly and rectified it. CPR was ultimately unsuccessful and Mr Tarrant was pronounced dead at 2.13 am on 1 November 2023. 5. CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: From about 11.30 pm on 31 October 2023 until moments before his death Mr Tarrant was displaying classic signs of Acute Behavioural Disturbance (“ABD”), which was formerly referred to as ‘Excited Delirium’. ABD is a well-known condition throughout the World. People suffering ABD can display a number of symptoms including apparent psychosis, repetitive shouting, random violence against people or objects, they tend to disrobe, be impervious to pain, demonstrate abnormal strength. They engage in bizarre behaviour and cannot be reasoned with. Expert evidence was given by Dr , a Consultant in Emergency Medicine and an acknowledged expert on restrain and ABD (who has been engaged by both eh Scottish Prison Service and HMPPS to advise in relation to these matters). Dr stated that Mr Tarrant’s presentation made it obvious that he was suffering ABD and that anybody who had been trained to spot the signs of it would have come to that conclusion within minutes of seeing him. People in a state of ABD are at risk of physiological collapse and death. It is believed that they become exhausted, acidotic, hyperthermic, hyperkaliaemic and hypoxic to the point at which they are unable to compensate by hyperventilating. 4 The risk of death is particularly acute where a person suffering ABD is subjected to prolonged restraint because it increases their level of exertion (thereby exacerbating acidosis and hypoxia) and restricts the airway, chest and/or diaphragmatic movement. Dr expressed dismay that, in 2023, neither healthcare staff nor Prison staff had any training in respect of ABD and, as a result, appeared to have no idea that Mr Tarrant might be suffering from it. This is despite the fact that Prison Service Order 1600 (2005), written nearly two decades before, states in section 3 that: 3. MEDICAL PROCEDURES All staff who may be involved in the use of force (or in supervising it) are aware of the signs that a prisoner may be experiencing medical difficulties. 3.1 3.2 It is extremely important that staff involved in applying restraints or using force of any kind are aware off the signs and symptoms that may indicate that a prisoner is in medical distress. Such an incident will need to be treated as a medical emergency rather than a control and restraint incident. The onset of serious medical condition following the application of physical or mechanical restraints is extremely rare – however it has been known to occur, and prisoners in both prison and police custody have died as a result of being restrained. 3.3 Further information can be found in Annex D about the following medical conditions that are relevant to the use of force on a prisoner: Positional Asphyxia, Excited Delirium, Sickle Cell Disease, Psychosis. … ANNEX D MEDICAL CONDITIONS Excited Delirium Excited delirium is both a mental state and physiological arousal. Excited delirium can be caused by drug intoxication (including alcohol) or psychiatric illness or a combination of both. Cocaine is a well-known cause of drug induced excited delirium. Differentiating someone in excited delirium from someone who is simply violent is often difficult. People suffering excited delirium may: Have unexpected strength and endurance, apparently without fatigue Show an abnormal tolerance of pain Feel hot to touch Be agitated Sweat profusely Be hostile Exhibit bizarre behaviour and speech 5 It may only become apparent that a prisoner is suffering from excited delirium when they suddenly collapse: beware of sudden tranquillity after frenzied activity which may be caused by severe exhaustion, asphyxia or drug related cardiopulmonary problems (problems with the heart and lungs). The operator of primary healthcare at the Prison, Oxleas MHS Foundation Trust, acknowledged that their clinical staff received no training in relation to ABD prior to Mr Tarrant’s death. That has now been rectified and the Trust is rolling out a training programme at a local level. Dr explained that ABD is a well-recognised condition. Indeed, SECAmb witnesses provided evidence in this inquest that, if their call handlers are told that a person is displaying signs of ABD whilst under restraint, the response would be upgraded to aa Category 1 response and the immediate despatch of a Critical Care Paramedic (“CCP”). Dr also stated that: (1) Mr Tarrant was displaying ‘textbook’ signs of ABD which would have been apparent to a properly trained person within a matter of minutes; (2) It was clearly a medical emergency that required the attendance of a CCP who would have provided sedation and other treatments; (3) Had treatment been initiated at any time before 1 am Mr Tarrant probably would have survived. I am concerned that: (a) No training is provided to prison healthcare staff in relation to ABD (despite the clear advice of PSO 1600). (b) If prison nurses remain unaware of ABD and the need to treat it as a medical emergency, then further deaths are likely in future. Accordingly, this situation should be reviewed and consideration given as to whether any steps should be taken to reduce the risk of death by from ABD. In particular, training of prison clinicians should be carefully reviewed at a national level. 6. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 6 In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe that you and/or your organisation have the power to take such action. 7. YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 6 April 2026. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 8. COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the following: Her Honour Judge Alexia Durran, the Chief Coroner of England & Wales Mr Tarrant’s family HMP Elmley Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust South East Coast Ambulance Service Kent Police I am under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. She may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9. Signature: Scott Matthewson, Assistant Coroner, Mid Kent & Medway 9 February 2026 7
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Frimley Park Hospital Portsmouth Road Frimley Camberley GU24 7UJ 23 May 2026 PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL Mr R Simpson Assistant coroner Coroners’ office Reading Town hall Blagrave Street Reading RG1 1QH Dear Sir Trust Response to Regulation 28 Report for the Prevention of Future Deaths. RE: Inquest touching the death of Mr John Tarrant. The coroner’s concerns are replicated in bold below: 1. Falls risk assessments. Only 2 falls risk assessments were carried out after Mr Tarrant arrived at the hospital. Both falls risk assessments used the Hester Davis scoring system, but both had carried out based on incorrect data. The falls risk assessments both resulted in a low-risk outcome which was not correct. Mr Tarrant should have been graded as a moderate risk even prior to his fall. Some of the data entered into the risk assessment tool was objectively wrong. For example, in the risk assessment carried out hours after his fall it stated that he had not fallen before. I heard that the Trust did not have a way of assessing and auditing the accuracy of these risk assessments. Whilst I found that the errors in this inquest did not contribute to Mr Tarrant’s death incorrect risk assessments can lead to inadequate falls mitigation measures being put in place and incorrect information being provided to staff. A falls risk assessment was performed on attendance in the Emergency Department and following Mr Tarrant’s inpatient fall. For Mr Tarrant’s admission, these 2 falls risk assessments were all that was required. (Patients should be risk assessed for falls on admission to clinical areas, after a fall, or when their clinical picture changes). However, the Hester Davis scoring system which was in use at the time was calculated inaccurately by staff. Prior to Mr Tarrant’s inquest, the Trust had already acknowledged that the Hester Davis falls risk assessment was not intuitive for staff to use and, scoring mistakes were noted. Therefore, the Trust re-designed a new falls risk assessment which was launched on the electronic patient record system. The new falls risk assessment was in progress at the time of Mr Tarrant’s fall, and the Trust had been working on this for >12 months. The revised falls risk assessment is based on national guidance and is much easier for staff to use. The new risk assessment now grades patients as either “at risk”, or “not at risk” of falls rather than using the previous grading score of ‘low’ ‘moderate’ or ‘high’ risk. This new assessment significantly reduces the likelihood of incorrectly scoring a patient at risk. The revised risk assessment has been in use for the entire Trust since September 2025. We apologise if this initiative was not communicated to the coroner prior to or during the inquest hearing on 30 March 2026. For further context, whilst in Mr Tarrant’s case the risk score was incorrectly deemed to be ‘low’ rather than ‘moderate’ in accordance with the scoring system at the time, even if the correct risk score of “moderate” had been correctly identified, the falls mitigating measures in place would not have changed. For example. and a green wristband used as a quick visual prompt for being at risk of falls. At the time of the fall, Mr Tarrant was in the bathroom seated on the toilet. The HCA attended to check on Mr Tarrant. He reported he did not require any assistance. He had non-slip footwear in place; the floor was dry and there were no environmental hazards. The HCA advised she would wait outside the door in case he required assistance and to allow him privacy. Shortly after she heard a noise and found him on the floor. Unfortunately, Mr Tarrant tried to get up from the toilet alone and fell. The Trust has a Harm Free Care Audit Programme which aims to promote high standards of nursing care. The Harm Free Care Audit Programme was introduced in July 2025 as a monthly audit, to be completed by senior ward leaders, and encompasses key aspects of nursing care including falls prevention. Twenty-five per cent of the patients in a clinical area are audited. This audit tool is one of several methods available to monitor compliance with nursing care standards, including spot checks on the ward and compliance monitoring by senior ward leaders. The target of compliance for this audit is 90%. Whilst the time limited initial assessment scores (to risk assess a patient within 6 hours of being admitted to a ward) do not reflect reaching the target, the reassessment compliance indicates that falls and bedrail assessments are being completed but may be documented more than 6 hours post arrival on the ward. The reassessment figures are consistently above target. The Trust has a dedicated quality improvement workstream to reducing the number of inpatient falls and this is led by one of our senior nurses. This workstream has been in place for the last 2 years. Nationally, the Royal College of Physicians state that approximately 20% of inpatient falls are preventable. Over the last financial year, the Trust has reduced the incidence of inpatient falls by 12% and the incidence of inpatient falls is currently at the lowest number the Trust has had for the last 5 years. It was unfortunate this was not communicated to the coroner as this would have provided a clearer view of initiatives undertaken in the Trust. As part of the quality improvement workstream, the Trust has a multidisciplinary Falls Steering Group to oversee delivery, ensuring the implementation of evidence-based prevention strategies and sustained organisational focus. In the last financial year falls prevention information has been updated to better support patients and families in understanding risks and contributing to prevention, via a leaflet. These are available in clinical areas. Prior to the inquest, two safety campaigns had already been initiated, including the relaunch of ‘Stay in the Bay’ and ‘Call Don’t Fall’. Both have now been reinforced across all sites. ‘Call Don’t Fall’ posters have been displayed in clinical areas, including all patient bathrooms in the organisation. ‘Stay in the Bay’ lanyards have been provided to all clinical areas for staff to use, to empower staff to decline leaving the bay / specific patient if providing enhanced / 1:1 care. Targeted falls prevention training has been delivered across Heatherwood Hospital, Heathlands and Farnham Rehabilitation settings, alongside the introduction of a ‘Falls Champion’ programme to embed best practice at ward level. Training has been delivered to the fall's champions, and this will occur as a minimum of every 3 months. The Trust has trialled new hospital beds with integrated falls alarms and the Trust has invested in some of these beds. Falls data analysis has been used to identify high-risk clinical areas that would benefit most from these beds and other interventions. Orthostatic blood pressure guidance has been standardised and embedded within ward observation processes to improve identification and management of falls risk factors. Easy to follow laminated guides on the correct assessment of lying and standing blood pressures have been attached to all observation machines in clinical areas. A simplified multidisciplinary team review form has been developed to support frontline teams in undertaking timely, structured post-falls reviews and identifying learning. This is also available on our incident reporting system, ‘In-Phase’. The Trust monitors the number of inpatient falls and in which clinical areas these occur and the data is shared with the senior leaders of the clinical areas every month. The Trust is also in the process of implementing a national campaign for falls prevention, the ‘Think Yellow’ campaign. This is planned to strengthen staff and patient/visitor awareness and promote consistent falls prevention behaviours across all sites. Currently this has been piloted in both Emergency Departments. The initiative uses a ‘think yellow’ pack which consists of a yellow patient blanket, wristband and non-slip socks to quickly help staff identify the patients who are at risk of falls. The plan is that this will be rolled out to the rest of the organisation by the end of July 2026. The Trust has also identified advanced falls monitoring solutions are available. A trial of new falls prevention equipment (sensors for beds, chairs and toilets) is currently planned for a Care of the Elderly ward at Frimley Park Hospital, with a planned trial to also include Farnham Community Hospital – rehabilitation ward with single en-suite rooms. If the trial is successful, a phased rollout of the equipment will occur across the Trust. 2. Anti coagulation risk awareness. The doctor who reviewed the CT results and neurosurgery advice after Mr Tarrant fell did not appreciate the urgency of the situation. I found in this inquest that due to timing issues this was not likely to have affected the outcome for Mr Tarrant. I heard from the consultant witness that the risks of anticoagulation are poorly understood. The post falls proforma was reviewed in court and, whilst it asked whether the patient was on anticoagulation medication, it did not provide a prompt about this during the post fall medical planning section. This led to a concern that the importance of considering administering an anticoagulation reversal medication and the urgency of such a need may be underappreciated. Mr Tarrant was correctly anticoagulated with warfarin (INR target 3-4) for a prosthetic aortic valve. On admission, his Warfarin was correctly held when he presented unwell as his INR over 6 and therefore outside the therapeutic range. INR frequently becomes unstable when patients are unwell. A single dose of clarithromycin (antibiotic) was administered, which can interact with warfarin and may have contributed to the subsequent high INRs. However, this potential interaction was recognised during the post-take ward round, and the antibiotic was changed to doxycycline. Despite the high INR level, there was no evidence of active bleeding and standard practice would be to allow the INR to reduce naturally given the critical indication for anticoagulation in Mr Tarrant’s case. When Mr Tarrant fell and the CT scan showed a small subdural bleed, as is standard practise, our tertiary neuro-surgical centre was contacted. In addition to advice on neurosurgical management their advice with regard to the anticoagulation was to contact Frimley haematology for consideration regarding reversal of anticoagulation. Unfortunately, haematology was not contacted. Vitamin K was administered to Mr Tarrant , however had the on-call haematology consultant been called, they would have advised correction with Beriplex (PCC concentrate) and Vitamin K.as Beriplex has a faster action than Vitamin K. Whilst the risk of stroke or valve obstruction would have been temporarily increased by reversal, extension of the subdural bleed was at the time the greater risk. Our consultant haematologist on-call service is available 24/7, 365 days of the year, and it is very common for the consultant haematologist on-call to be contacted for advice in just this scenario. The Trust does not accept that the risks of anticoagulation are ‘poorly understood’, which was evidence provided to the coroner during the hearing. One of the Trust’s Consultant Haematologists confirms that in her experience clinicians are very aware of the risks of anticoagulation together with the risks of inappropriately stopping these agents. In other words, it was probable that the evidence regarding a ‘poor understanding’ was related to the risk benefit balance which is what can make such decisions difficult. There is good understanding of the risks in the case of a bleeding anticoagulated patient and clear understanding of where to obtain expert advice. The availability of expert Consultant Haematologist advice 24/7, 365 days of the year is also strongly reiterated at the resident doctor’s induction training to the Trust, and the clear evidence is this is regularly accessed. In addition, the Trust has long-standing published guidance on reversal of all anticoagulant agents, and these are available on the Trust intranet, and this is easily accessible on individual’s mobile devices. The guideline has been in place since 2021. At the time of Mr Tarrant’s incident, the Trust guidance was in place and available for all to access. The chief medical officer has monthly safety briefings in person to all resident doctors. Going forward, this briefing will be aiming to increase awareness to all the importance in escalating to senior level in such circumstances where there is a risk of continuing anticoagulation and/or where reversal is a consideration. Trust guideline - Emergency Reversal of Oral Anticoagulants v2 Yours sincerely Chief Executive Officer In partnership with the Ministry of Defence Frimley Health incorporates Frimley Park Hospital, Heatherwood Hospital and Wexham Park
Mr Scott Matthewson
Assistant Coroner for Mid Kent and Medway
Kent and Medway Coroners Service
Oakwood House
Oakwood Park
Maidstone
Kent
ME16 8AE
Medical Director for Mental Health
and Neurodiversity
NHS England
Wellington House
133-155 Waterloo Road
London
SE1 8UG
20th April 2026
Dear Coroner,
Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Josh Yemi Tarrant who
died on 1 November 2023.
Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 9
February 2026 concerning the death of John Yemi Tarrant on 1 November 2023. In
advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to
express my deep condolences to Mr Tarrant’s family and loved ones. NHS England is
keen to assure the family and yourself that the concerns raised about Mr Tarrant’s
care have been listened to and reflected upon.
I am grateful for the further time granted to respond to your Report, and I apologise for
any anguish this delay may have caused to Mr Tarrant’s family and friends. I realise
that responses to Coroners’ Reports can form part of the important process of family
and friends coming to terms with what has happened to their loved ones, and I
appreciate this will have been an incredibly difficult time for them.
Your report raised concerns around the lack of training provided to prison healthcare
staff in relation to Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD) (despite the clear advice of
Prison Service Order 1600 (2005)) and if prison nurses remain unaware of ABD and
the need to treat it as a medical emergency, then further deaths are likely in future.
Background on Acute Behavioural Disturbance
The term ‘Acute Behavioural Disturbance' (ABD) is not a formal diagnosis within the
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11), which is the global diagnostic tool
used in the NHS. ABD is generally used to describe behaviours linked with extreme
agitation or distress, which may indicate a potentially life-threatening physical health
emergency. NHS England recognises the importance of ensuring that individuals
presenting in extreme distress receive timely, safe and effective care. ABD is not a
specific condition with a set of defined symptoms. It is not common and it is very
difficult to identify the difference between agitation, antisocial behaviour, deliberate
violent behaviour and ABD. There is no reliable way to determine mild or severe ABD
in the pre-hospital setting nor over the phone during a triage process. ABD is a
complex but known clinical presentation, and the Royal College of Psychiatrists has
published guidelines on managing ABD.
We have considered your concerns to inform our learning and we have consulted with
, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and member of NHS England
Health and Justice Clinical Reference Group.
Given the rarity and complexity of ABD and the operational realities of prisons, it is not
reasonable to expect prison healthcare staff to diagnose ABD reliably. The critical
safety issue is recognition of severe agitation accompanied by physiological red flags
and escalation as a medical emergency.
In 2025 NHS England developed a framework for healthcare roles and responsibilities
for planned and unplanned use of force in adult prisons and immigration removal
centres which was communicated to all healthcare providers in August 2025. This
framework supports HMPPS and Home Office policy documents and makes clear
healthcare requirement to attend all planned, and where possible, unplanned use of
force incidents.
This framework strengthens the expectations of healthcare staff and provides explicit
guidance around warning signs of ABD. This revised framework offers clearer
boundaries and ensures that all staff involved in use of force events share a consistent
approach to managing risk, including the risk of ABD. Use of force is the terminology
used by HMPPS and Home Office and includes the use of physical, mechanical and
chemical restraint.
We will be sharing the details of this report with all prison and Immigration Removal
Centre healthcare providers with an action to ensure all establishments have a clear
red flag criteria and emergency escalation pathway within existing healthcare training
structures and operation briefings. This should include a focus on early recognition of
deterioration, prompt ambulance activation where indicated, minimising restraint
duration and maintaining continuous observation until handover, with routine
governance review of such incidents.
In addition, the findings, information and any learning from this case will be tabled at
a future NHS England Health and Justice Delivery Oversight Group (HJDOG). The
HJDOG is the senior leadership forum, which holds responsibility for the oversight of
delivery and continuous improvement in Health and Justice commissioned services,
through both national and regional teams. All health and justice related Reports to
Prevent Future Deaths are shared and discussed at the HJDOG, and assurance is
sought from regions where learning and action is identified.
Regional Response
South East Regional Colleagues have shared reports around the Trust’s PSII and
PPOs independent review. South East Regional Colleagues have advised that both
sets of reports identify that clinical staff should receive training in managing violence,
aggression and mental health crises, as well as the fact some actions taken by staff ,
particularly around restraint, were not with current guidance and policy. Neither report
shared mentions ABD or ‘Excited Delirium’, suggesting that Mr Tarrant’s presentation
was directly related to cocaine use and exacerbated by a heart condition, which the
prison staff had no knowledge of at the time, as it was only detected postmortem.
I would also like to provide further assurances on the national NHS England work
taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are
discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical
Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This
ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of Mr
Tarrant, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us
to pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and
action.
Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please
do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Yours sincerely,
Medical Director for Mental Health and Neurodiversity
NHS England
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