Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2026

Josh Tarrant (1)

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2026-0075, written 9 Feb 2026. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report9 Feb 2026
Reference2026-0075
DeceasedJosh Tarrant (1)
CoronerScott Matthewson
Coroner areaMid Kent & Medway
CategoryAlcohol, drug and medication related deaths · State Custody related deaths
Organisation namedOxleas NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published2

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Mid Kent and Medway Coroners Area
Oakwood House
Oakwood Park
Maidstone
Kent
ME16 8AE

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

Josh Yemi TARRANT (died 1 November 2023)

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:

National Medical Director (Primary Care)
NHS England
PO Box 16738
Redditch B97 9PT

1.

CORONER

I am Scott Matthewson, Assistant  Coroner for the coroner area of Mid Kent &
Medway.

2.

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, paragraph 7,
Schedule 5, and The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, regulations
28 and 29.

3.

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On 13 November 2023 the Area Coroner for Mid Kent & Medway commenced
an investigation into the death of Josh Yemi Tarrant who died, aged 34, on 1
November 2023 at HMP Elmley (“the Prison”) on the Isle of Sheppey  in Kent.

1

 The investigation concluded on 11 December 2025 at the end of an inquest
conducted by me (sitting with a jury). The jury concluded that:

“Josh Yemi Tarrant died as a result of Cocaine toxicity following a lengthy and
challenging restraint. Josh was experiencing an acute behavioural disturbance
which was not recognized by Healthcare staff. Healthcare’s failure to provide
sufficient  medical treatment at the earliest appropriate opportunity by calling
an Ambulance by 23:29 was probably a significant contributing factor in Josh’s
death.  Josh’s death was contributed to by neglect.”

The medical cause of death was:

Ia.  Cocaine intoxication
II. 

Cardiac Hypertrophy and Exertion during Restraint

4.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

Mr Tarrant was born on 1 March 1989. On Saturday 28 October 2023 he was
arrested and charged with robbery, actual bodily harm and criminal damage.
He  was  held  in  police  custody  until  Tuesday  31  October  2023  when  he
attended court and was remanded in custody until his next court hearing. He
was taken to the Prison in the early evening. Despite being searched by prison
staff  Mr  Tarrant  somehow  managed  to  smuggle  cocaine  into  the  prison,
 He was initially calm, pleasant, complaint and engaged
with staff. Mr Tarrant was taken to Houseblock 1 at around 7.30/8.00 pm and
placed in a locked cell.

The  Officer  Staff  Grade  (“OSG”)  supervising  Houseblock  1  during  the  night
spoke  to  Mr  Tarrant  at  about  10.30  pm  when  he  remained  calm  and  lucid.
About an hour later his demeanour had completely changed. Mr Tarrant asked
the OSG for help and said that he was hearing voices. He had taken his shirt
off and was bare chested. He had probably ingested cocaine in the preceding
hour.  The  OSG  called  for  assistance  and  the  Prison’s  ‘Oscar  1’  (the  most
senior member of staff on site) attended with other officers. They entered Mr
Tarrant’s cell to speak to him. He was standing up and looking out of the cell
window. He did not respond and was speaking incoherently and repetitively,
saying “help me, help me, help me” repeatedly. Mr Tarrant suddenly knocked
a TV in his cell to the floor and ran out of his cell. He was restrained on the
floor by a number of officers using Control and Restraint techniques. Mr Tarrant
displayed unusual strength during this struggle and at one point lifted several
officers off the ground as he got to his feet.

The  Oscar 1 called for the  attendance of ‘Hotel 1’ (the nurse  on duty  at the
Prison overnight) who attended after a short delay caused by the fact that she

2

 had  no  key  to  open  locked  gates.  On  arrival  the  Hotel  1  made  little  or  no
assessment  of  Mr  Tarrant  and,  despite  thinking  he  was  having  a  psychotic
episode,  she did not declare a medical emergency (code blue) which would
have triggered a 999 to the South East Coast Ambulance Service (“SECAmb”).

The Oscar 1 decided that Mr Tarrant should be taken to the Prison’s healthcare
unit  where he  could  be kept  under  observation.  The healthcare  unit was  aa
short distance from Houseblock 1 and the journey on foot would normally take
no  more  than  a  few  minutes.  However,  Mr  Tarrant  was  agitated  and  non-
compliant and so the transfer took place under restraint

During the next half an hour or so the officers were engaged in a extremely
physically challenging transfer. Mr Tarrant was struggling throughout, allowing
his body weight to drop and the officers had to stop form time to time to catch
their breath and rotate staff. Throughout this episode Mr Tarrant was shouting
incoherently and repetitively. He did not appear to know where he was (he kept
asking for his mother) and displayed signs of severe distress.

Officers  finally  managed  to  get  Mr  Tarrant  into  a  observation  cell  in  the
healthcare  unit.  Once  the  door  was  locked  he  continued  to  be  extremely
distressed. He was shouting repeatedly and incoherently. He became violent
and smashed the gate of his cell with his legs, arms and even his head. The
force  with  which  he  did  these  things  shocked  some  of  the  officers  who
witnessed it. Mr Tarrant also seemed to be oblivious to the pain that that he
must have been experiencing.

After about an hour, during which time Mr Tarrant did not seem to tire, he made
a ligature out of his clothing material and put it around his neck and suspended
himself. Officers entered the cell and removed the ligature. When closing the
cell door, Mr Tarrant’s thumb was accidentally trapped between the metal gate
and the door frame. Although this must have caused extreme pain, he did not
seem to notice it.

Mr  Tarrant  continued  to  be  violent  and  the  force  of  his  blows  eventually
smashed the Perspex door cover. There were sharp  pieces of broken Perspex
both  inside  and  outside  the  cell  which  officers  were  worried  that  Mr  Tarrant
might use to harm himself. They therefore relocated him into the next-door cell
under restraint. Once again, Mr Tarrant struggled and the relocation was very
physically  challenging  and  took about  7/8 minutes to  transport him  no  more
than a few metres away.

The officers exited the cell in a controlled way until there was one officer left.
Whan  the  last  officer  made  to  exit  the  cell  he  sensed  that  something  was
wrong.  He  immediately  re-entered  the  cell  and  saw  that  Mr  Tarrant  was

3

 unresponsive. He was not breathing and did not have a pulse. A Code Blue
was called and an ambulance summoned at around 1.27 am on 1 November
2023. CPR was started immediately. Healthcare staff made a number of basic
errors in providing CPR (failing to use the correct equipment, inserting an i-Gel
in  Mr  Tarrant’s  airway  the  wrong  way  around  which  blocked  his  airway).
Although none of these failings ultimately caused or contributed to Mr Tarrant’s
death  the  failures  were  shocking.  In  contrast,  the  Prison  officers  acquitted
themselves very well and performed CPR to a high standard which was later
complimented by paramedics.

Paramedics arrived at the scene at 1.44 am and took over the management of
Mr Tarrant’s airway form healthcare staff. They immediately noticed  that the i-
Gel  had  been  placed  incorrectly  and  rectified  it.  CPR  was  ultimately
unsuccessful and Mr Tarrant was pronounced dead at 2.13 am on 1 November
2023.

5.

CORONER’S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise to
concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action
is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:

From about 11.30 pm on 31 October 2023 until moments before his death Mr
Tarrant was displaying classic signs of Acute Behavioural Disturbance (“ABD”),
which was formerly referred to as ‘Excited Delirium’.

ABD is a well-known condition throughout the World. People suffering ABD can
display a number of symptoms including apparent psychosis, repetitive shouting,
random violence against people or objects, they tend to disrobe, be impervious
to pain, demonstrate abnormal strength. They engage in bizarre behaviour and
cannot be reasoned with.

Expert evidence was given by Dr 
, a Consultant in Emergency
Medicine  and  an  acknowledged  expert  on  restrain  and  ABD  (who  has been
engaged by both eh Scottish Prison Service and HMPPS to advise in relation to
these matters).

Dr 
 stated that Mr Tarrant’s presentation made it obvious that he was
suffering ABD and that anybody who had been trained to spot the signs of it would
have come to that conclusion within minutes of seeing him.

People  in  a  state  of  ABD  are  at  risk  of  physiological  collapse  and  death.  It  is
believed  that  they  become  exhausted,  acidotic,  hyperthermic,  hyperkaliaemic
and  hypoxic  to  the  point  at  which  they  are  unable  to  compensate by
hyperventilating.

4

 The risk of death is particularly acute where a person suffering ABD is subjected
to  prolonged  restraint  because it  increases  their  level  of  exertion  (thereby
exacerbating  acidosis  and  hypoxia)  and  restricts the  airway,  chest  and/or
diaphragmatic movement.

Dr 
expressed dismay that, in 2023, neither healthcare staff nor Prison
staff had any training in respect of ABD and, as a result, appeared to have no
idea that Mr Tarrant might be suffering from it.

This is despite the fact that Prison Service Order 1600 (2005), written nearly two
decades before, states in section 3 that:

3. MEDICAL PROCEDURES

All staff who may be involved in the use of force (or in supervising it) are aware of  the signs
that a prisoner may be experiencing medical difficulties.

3.1

3.2

It is extremely important that staff involved in applying restraints or using force of any
kind  are  aware  off  the  signs  and symptoms  that  may  indicate  that  a  prisoner  is  in
medical distress.  Such an  incident will need to be treated  as a medical emergency
rather than a control and restraint incident.

The  onset  of  serious  medical  condition  following  the  application  of  physical  or
mechanical restraints is extremely rare – however it has been known to occur, and
prisoners in both prison and police custody have died as a result of being restrained.

3.3  Further information can be found in Annex D about the following medical conditions

that are relevant to the use of force on a prisoner:
Positional Asphyxia,
Excited Delirium,
Sickle Cell Disease,
Psychosis.






…

ANNEX D

MEDICAL CONDITIONS

Excited Delirium

Excited delirium is both a mental state and physiological arousal.

Excited delirium can be caused by drug intoxication (including alcohol) or psychiatric illness
or a combination of both. Cocaine is a well-known cause of drug induced excited delirium.

Differentiating  someone  in  excited  delirium  from  someone  who  is  simply  violent  is  often
difficult. People suffering excited delirium may:









Have unexpected strength and endurance, apparently without fatigue
Show an abnormal tolerance of pain
Feel hot to touch
Be agitated
Sweat profusely
Be hostile
Exhibit bizarre behaviour and speech

5

 It may only become apparent that a prisoner is suffering from excited delirium when they
suddenly collapse: beware of sudden tranquillity after frenzied activity which may be caused
by severe exhaustion, asphyxia or drug related cardiopulmonary problems (problems with
the heart and lungs).

The operator of primary healthcare at the Prison, Oxleas MHS Foundation Trust,
acknowledged that their clinical staff received no training in relation to ABD prior
to Mr Tarrant’s death. That has now been rectified and the Trust is rolling out a
training programme at a local level.

Dr 
 explained that ABD is a well-recognised condition. Indeed, SECAmb
witnesses provided evidence in this inquest that, if their call handlers are told that
a person is displaying signs of ABD whilst under restraint, the response would be
upgraded to aa Category 1 response and the immediate despatch of a Critical
Care Paramedic (“CCP”).

Dr 

 also stated that:

(1) Mr  Tarrant was displaying ‘textbook’ signs of ABD which would have been

apparent to a properly trained person within a matter of minutes;

(2) It was clearly a medical emergency that required the attendance of a CCP

who would have provided sedation and other treatments;

(3) Had  treatment  been  initiated  at  any  time  before  1  am  Mr Tarrant  probably

would have survived.

I am concerned that:

(a) No  training  is  provided  to  prison  healthcare  staff  in  relation  to  ABD

(despite the clear advice of PSO 1600).

(b) If prison nurses remain unaware of ABD and the need to treat it as a

medical emergency, then further deaths are likely in future.

Accordingly,  this  situation  should  be  reviewed  and  consideration  given  as  to
whether any steps should be taken to reduce the risk of death by from ABD. In
particular, training of prison clinicians should be carefully reviewed at a national
level.

6.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

6

 In my opinion,  action should  be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe
that you and/or your organisation  have the power to take such action.

7.

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this
report, namely by 6 April 2026. I, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken,
setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action
is proposed.

8.

COPIES and PUBLICATION

I have sent a copy of my report to the following:

  Her Honour Judge Alexia Durran, the Chief Coroner of England &

Wales

  Mr Tarrant’s family
  HMP Elmley
  Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust
  South East Coast Ambulance Service
  Kent Police

I am under a duty to send the  Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  The
Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary
form. She may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes  may
find it useful or of interest.  You may make representations  to me, the coroner,
at  the  time  of  your  response,  about  the  release  or  the  publication  of  your
response  by the Chief Coroner.

9.  Signature:

Scott Matthewson, Assistant Coroner, Mid Kent & Medway
9 February 2026

7

Responses

2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Frimley Health NHS Foundation Trust
Frimley Park Hospital  
Portsmouth Road  
Frimley  
Camberley  
GU24 7UJ  

 23   May 2026  

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 

Mr R Simpson Assistant coroner 
Coroners’ office  
Reading Town hall 
Blagrave Street 
Reading RG1 1QH  

Dear Sir 

Trust Response to Regulation 28 Report for the Prevention of Future Deaths. 

 RE: Inquest touching the death of Mr John Tarrant. 

The coroner’s concerns are replicated in bold below: 

1. Falls risk assessments. 
Only 2 falls risk assessments were carried out after Mr Tarrant arrived at the 
hospital. Both falls risk assessments used the Hester Davis scoring system, but 
both had carried out based on incorrect data. The falls risk assessments both 
resulted in a low-risk outcome which was not correct. Mr Tarrant should have been 
graded as a moderate risk even prior to his fall. Some of the data entered into the 
risk assessment tool was objectively wrong. For example, in the risk assessment 
carried out hours after his fall it stated that he had not fallen before. 

I heard that the Trust did not have a way of assessing and auditing the accuracy of 
these risk assessments. Whilst I found that the errors in this inquest did not 
contribute to Mr Tarrant’s death incorrect risk assessments can lead to inadequate 
falls mitigation measures being put in place and incorrect information being 
provided to staff. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A falls risk assessment was performed on attendance in the Emergency Department 
and following Mr Tarrant’s inpatient fall. For Mr Tarrant’s admission, these 2 falls risk 
assessments were all that was required. (Patients should be risk assessed for falls on 
admission to clinical areas, after a fall, or when their clinical picture changes). 
However, the Hester Davis scoring system which was in use at the time was calculated 
inaccurately by staff. Prior to Mr Tarrant’s inquest, the Trust had already acknowledged 
that the Hester Davis falls risk assessment was not intuitive for staff to use and, scoring 
mistakes were noted. Therefore, the Trust re-designed a new falls risk assessment 
which was launched on the electronic patient record system. The new falls risk 
assessment was in progress at the time of Mr Tarrant’s fall, and the Trust had been 
working on this for >12 months.  

The revised falls risk assessment is based on national guidance and is much easier for 
staff to use. The new risk assessment now grades patients as either “at risk”, or “not at 
risk” of falls rather than using the previous grading score of ‘low’ ‘moderate’ or ‘high’ 
risk. This new assessment significantly reduces the likelihood of incorrectly scoring a 
patient at risk. The revised risk assessment has been in use for the entire Trust since 
September 2025.   We apologise if this initiative was not communicated to the coroner 
prior to or during the inquest hearing on 30 March 2026.  

For further context, whilst  in Mr Tarrant’s case the risk score was incorrectly deemed to 
be ‘low’ rather than ‘moderate’ in accordance with the scoring system at the time, even 
if the correct risk score of “moderate”  had been correctly identified, the falls mitigating 
measures in place would not have changed. For example. and a green wristband used 
as a quick visual prompt for being at risk of falls. At the time of the fall, Mr Tarrant was in 
the bathroom seated on the toilet. The HCA attended to check on Mr Tarrant. He 
reported he did not require any assistance. He had non-slip footwear in place; the floor 
was dry and there were no environmental hazards. The HCA advised she would wait 
outside the door in case he required assistance and to allow him privacy. Shortly after 
she heard a noise and found him on the floor. Unfortunately, Mr Tarrant tried to get up 
from the toilet alone and fell.  

The Trust has a Harm Free Care Audit Programme which aims to promote high 
standards of nursing care. The Harm Free Care Audit Programme was introduced in July 
2025 as a monthly audit, to be completed by senior ward leaders, and encompasses 
key aspects of nursing care including falls prevention. Twenty-five per cent of the 
patients in a clinical area are audited. This audit tool is one of several methods 
available to monitor compliance with nursing care standards, including spot checks on 
the ward and compliance monitoring by senior ward leaders. 

The target of compliance for this audit is 90%. Whilst the time limited initial assessment 
scores (to risk assess a patient within 6 hours of being admitted to a ward) do not 
reflect reaching the target, the reassessment compliance indicates that falls and 
bedrail assessments are being completed but may be documented more than 6 hours 
post arrival on the ward. The reassessment figures are consistently above target. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Trust has a dedicated quality improvement workstream to reducing the number of 
inpatient falls and this is led by one of our senior nurses. This workstream has been in 
place for the last 2 years. Nationally, the Royal College of Physicians state that 
approximately 20% of inpatient falls are preventable. Over the last financial year, the 
Trust has reduced the incidence of inpatient falls by 12% and the incidence of inpatient 
falls is currently at the lowest number the Trust has had for the last 5 years. It was 
unfortunate this was not communicated to the coroner as this would have provided a 
clearer view of initiatives undertaken in the Trust. 

As part of the quality improvement workstream, the Trust has a multidisciplinary Falls 
Steering Group to oversee delivery, ensuring the implementation of evidence-based 
prevention strategies and sustained organisational focus.  In the last financial year falls 
prevention information has been updated to better support patients and families in 
understanding risks and contributing to prevention, via a leaflet. These are available in 
clinical areas.  

Prior to the inquest, two safety campaigns had already been initiated, including the 
relaunch of ‘Stay in the Bay’ and ‘Call Don’t Fall’. Both have now been reinforced across 
all sites. ‘Call Don’t Fall’ posters have been displayed in clinical areas, including all 
patient bathrooms in the organisation. ‘Stay in the Bay’ lanyards have been provided to 
all clinical areas for staff to use, to empower staff to decline leaving the bay / specific 
patient if providing enhanced / 1:1 care.  

Targeted falls prevention training has been delivered across Heatherwood Hospital, 
Heathlands and Farnham Rehabilitation settings, alongside the introduction of a ‘Falls 
Champion’ programme to embed best practice at ward level. Training has been 
delivered to the fall's champions, and this will occur as a minimum of every 3 months.  

The Trust has trialled new hospital beds with integrated falls alarms and the Trust has 
invested in some of these beds. Falls data analysis has been used to identify high-risk 
clinical areas that would benefit most from these beds and other interventions. 

Orthostatic blood pressure guidance has been standardised and embedded within 
ward observation processes to improve identification and management of falls risk 
factors. Easy to follow laminated guides on the correct assessment of lying and 
standing blood pressures have been attached to all observation machines in clinical 
areas. 

A simplified multidisciplinary team review form has been developed to support frontline 
teams in undertaking timely, structured post-falls reviews and identifying learning. This 
is also available on our incident reporting system, ‘In-Phase’. The Trust monitors the 
number of inpatient falls and in which clinical areas these occur and the data is shared 
with the senior leaders of the clinical areas every month. 

The Trust is also in the process of implementing a national campaign for falls 
prevention, the ‘Think Yellow’ campaign. This is planned to strengthen staff and 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 patient/visitor awareness and promote consistent falls prevention behaviours across 
all sites. Currently this has been piloted in both Emergency Departments. The initiative 
uses a ‘think yellow’ pack which consists of a yellow patient blanket, wristband and 
non-slip socks to quickly help staff identify the patients who are at risk of falls. The plan 
is that this will be rolled out to the rest of the organisation by the end of July 2026. 

The Trust has also identified advanced falls monitoring solutions are available. A trial of 
new falls prevention equipment (sensors for beds, chairs and toilets) is currently 
planned for a Care of the Elderly ward at Frimley Park Hospital, with a planned trial to 
also include Farnham Community Hospital – rehabilitation ward with single en-suite 
rooms. If the trial is successful, a phased rollout of the equipment will occur across the 
Trust. 

2. Anti coagulation risk awareness. 
The doctor who reviewed the CT results and neurosurgery advice after Mr Tarrant 
fell did not appreciate the urgency of the situation. I found in this inquest that due 
to timing issues this was not likely to have affected the outcome for Mr Tarrant. 

I heard from the consultant witness that the risks of anticoagulation are poorly 
understood. The post falls proforma was reviewed in court and, whilst it asked 
whether the patient was on anticoagulation medication, it did not provide a prompt 
about this during the post fall medical planning section. This led to a concern that 
the importance of considering administering an anticoagulation reversal 
medication and the urgency of such a need may be underappreciated. 

Mr Tarrant was correctly anticoagulated with warfarin (INR target 3-4) for a prosthetic 
aortic valve. 

On admission, his Warfarin was correctly held when he presented unwell as his INR 
over 6 and therefore outside the therapeutic range. INR frequently becomes unstable 
when patients are unwell. A single dose of clarithromycin (antibiotic) was administered, 
which can interact with warfarin and may have contributed to the subsequent high 
INRs. However, this potential interaction was recognised during the post-take ward 
round, and the antibiotic was changed to doxycycline. Despite the high INR level, there 
was no evidence of active bleeding and standard practice would be to allow the INR to 
reduce naturally given the critical indication for anticoagulation in Mr Tarrant’s case. 

When Mr Tarrant fell and the CT scan showed a small subdural bleed, as is standard 
practise, our tertiary neuro-surgical centre was contacted. In addition to advice on 
neurosurgical management their advice with regard to the anticoagulation was to 
contact Frimley haematology for consideration regarding reversal of anticoagulation. 
Unfortunately, haematology was not contacted.  Vitamin K was administered to Mr 
Tarrant , however had the on-call haematology consultant been called, they would have 
advised correction with Beriplex (PCC concentrate) and Vitamin K.as Beriplex has a 
faster action than Vitamin K. Whilst the risk of stroke or valve obstruction would have 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 been temporarily increased by reversal, extension of the subdural bleed was  at the 
time the greater risk. 

Our consultant haematologist on-call service is available 24/7, 365 days of the year, 
and it is very common for the consultant haematologist on-call to be contacted for 
advice in just this scenario. The Trust does not accept that the risks of anticoagulation 
are ‘poorly understood’, which was evidence provided to the coroner during the 
hearing. One of the Trust’s Consultant Haematologists confirms that in her experience 
clinicians are very aware of the risks of anticoagulation together with the risks of 
inappropriately stopping these agents.  In other words, it was probable that the 
evidence regarding a ‘poor understanding’ was related to the risk benefit balance which 
is what can make such decisions difficult. There is good understanding of the risks in 
the case of a bleeding anticoagulated patient and clear understanding of where to 
obtain expert advice.  

The availability of expert Consultant Haematologist advice 24/7, 365 days of the year is 
also strongly reiterated at the resident doctor’s induction training to the Trust, and the 
clear evidence is this is regularly accessed.  

In addition, the Trust has long-standing published guidance on reversal of all 
anticoagulant agents, and these are available on the Trust intranet, and this is easily 
accessible on individual’s mobile devices. The guideline has been in place since 2021. 
At the time of Mr Tarrant’s incident, the Trust guidance was in place and available for all 
to access.  The chief medical officer has monthly safety briefings in person to all 
resident doctors. Going forward, this briefing will be aiming to increase awareness to all 
the importance in escalating to senior level in such circumstances where there is a risk 
of continuing anticoagulation and/or where reversal is a consideration. 

Trust guideline - Emergency Reversal of Oral Anticoagulants v2 

Yours sincerely 

Chief Executive Officer 

In partnership with the Ministry of Defence  
Frimley Health incorporates Frimley Park Hospital, Heatherwood Hospital and Wexham Park
Response from NHS England (PDF)
Mr Scott Matthewson 
Assistant Coroner for Mid Kent and Medway 
Kent and Medway Coroners Service  
Oakwood House 
Oakwood Park 
Maidstone  
Kent  
ME16 8AE 

Medical Director for Mental Health 
and Neurodiversity  
NHS England  
Wellington House 
133-155 Waterloo Road  
London 
SE1 8UG 

20th April 2026 

Dear Coroner, 

Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Josh Yemi Tarrant who 
died on 1 November 2023.  

Thank  you  for  your  Report  to  Prevent  Future  Deaths  (hereafter  “Report”)  dated  9 
February 2026 concerning the death of John Yemi Tarrant on 1 November 2023. In 
advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to 
express my deep condolences to Mr Tarrant’s family and loved ones. NHS England is 
keen  to  assure  the  family  and  yourself  that  the  concerns  raised  about  Mr  Tarrant’s 
care have been listened to and reflected upon.   

I am grateful for the further time granted to respond to your Report, and I apologise for 
any anguish this delay may have caused to Mr Tarrant’s family and friends. I realise 
that responses to Coroners’ Reports can form part of the important process of family 
and  friends  coming  to  terms  with  what  has  happened  to  their  loved  ones,  and  I 
appreciate this will have been an incredibly difficult time for them. 

Your report raised concerns around the lack of training provided to prison healthcare 
staff in relation to Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD) (despite the clear advice of 
Prison Service Order 1600 (2005)) and if prison nurses remain unaware of ABD and 
the need to treat it as a medical emergency, then further deaths are likely in future.  

Background on Acute Behavioural Disturbance 

The term ‘Acute Behavioural Disturbance' (ABD) is not a formal diagnosis within the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11), which is the global diagnostic tool 
used in the NHS. ABD is generally used to describe behaviours linked with extreme 
agitation or distress, which may indicate a potentially life-threatening physical health 
emergency.  NHS  England  recognises  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  individuals 
presenting in extreme distress receive timely, safe and effective care. ABD is not a 
specific  condition  with  a  set  of  defined  symptoms.  It  is  not  common  and  it  is  very 
difficult  to  identify  the  difference  between  agitation,  antisocial  behaviour,  deliberate 
violent behaviour and ABD. There is no reliable way to determine mild or severe ABD 
in  the  pre-hospital  setting  nor  over  the  phone  during  a  triage  process.  ABD  is  a 

                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 complex but known clinical presentation, and the Royal College of Psychiatrists has 
published guidelines on managing ABD. 

We have considered your concerns to inform our learning and we have consulted with 
,  Consultant  Forensic  Psychiatrist  and  member  of  NHS  England 

Health and Justice Clinical Reference Group.  

Given the rarity and complexity of ABD and the operational realities of prisons, it is not 
reasonable  to  expect  prison  healthcare  staff  to  diagnose  ABD  reliably.  The  critical 
safety issue is recognition of severe agitation accompanied by physiological red flags 
and escalation as a medical emergency.  

In 2025 NHS England developed a framework for healthcare roles and responsibilities 
for  planned  and  unplanned  use  of  force  in  adult  prisons  and  immigration  removal 
centres  which  was  communicated  to  all  healthcare  providers  in  August  2025.  This 
framework  supports  HMPPS  and  Home  Office  policy  documents  and  makes  clear 
healthcare requirement to attend all planned, and where possible, unplanned use of 
force incidents.  

This framework strengthens the expectations of healthcare staff and provides explicit 
guidance  around  warning  signs  of  ABD.  This  revised  framework  offers  clearer 
boundaries and ensures that all staff involved in use of force events share a consistent 
approach to managing risk, including the risk of ABD. Use of force is the terminology 
used by HMPPS and Home Office and includes the use of physical, mechanical and 
chemical restraint.  

We will be sharing the details of this report with all prison and Immigration Removal 
Centre healthcare providers with an action to ensure all establishments have a clear 
red flag criteria and emergency escalation pathway within existing healthcare training 
structures and operation briefings. This should include a focus on early recognition of 
deterioration,  prompt  ambulance  activation  where  indicated,  minimising  restraint 
duration  and  maintaining  continuous  observation  until  handover,  with  routine 
governance review of such incidents.  

In addition, the findings, information and any learning from this case will be tabled at 
a  future  NHS  England  Health  and  Justice  Delivery  Oversight  Group  (HJDOG).  The 
HJDOG is the senior leadership forum, which holds responsibility for the oversight of 
delivery and continuous improvement in Health and Justice commissioned services, 
through  both  national  and  regional  teams.  All  health  and  justice  related  Reports  to 
Prevent Future Deaths are shared and discussed at the HJDOG, and assurance is 
sought from regions where learning and action is identified.  

Regional Response  

South  East  Regional  Colleagues  have  shared  reports  around  the  Trust’s  PSII  and 
PPOs independent review. South East Regional Colleagues have advised that both 
sets of reports identify that clinical staff should receive training in managing violence, 
aggression and mental health crises, as well as the fact some actions taken by staff , 
particularly around restraint, were not with current guidance and policy. Neither report 
shared mentions ABD or ‘Excited Delirium’, suggesting that Mr Tarrant’s presentation 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 was directly related to cocaine use and exacerbated by a heart condition, which the 
prison staff had no knowledge of at the time, as it was only detected postmortem.  

I  would  also  like  to  provide  further  assurances  on  the  national  NHS  England  work 
taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are 
discussed  by  the  Regulation  28  Working  Group,  comprising  Regional  Medical 
Directors,  and  other  clinical  and  quality  colleagues  from  across  the  regions.  This 
ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of Mr 
Tarrant, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us 
to  pay  close  attention  to  any  emerging  trends  that  may  require  further  review  and 
action.   

Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please 
do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.  

Yours sincerely,  

Medical Director for Mental Health and Neurodiversity  

NHS England

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