Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2016

Ronnie Olliffe

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2016-0224, written 15 May 2016. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report15 May 2016
Reference2016-0224
DeceasedRonnie Olliffe
CoronerKate Thomas
Coroner areaMid Kent and Medway
CategoryState Custody related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1) 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

The Governor of HMP Rochester  

1  CORONER 

I am Kate Thomas, Assistant Coroner for the Coroner’s area of Mid Kent 
and Medway. 

2  CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners 
(Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On the 7th of October 2014 I commenced an investigation into the death 
of Ronnie Olliffe, aged 34 years. The investigation concluded at the end 
of the Inquest on the 9th of June 2016. The conclusion of the inquest was 
a unanimous narrative conclusion by a Jury. 

4  CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

At approximately 1.08 am on the 1st of October 2014 Ronnie Olliffe was 
found  collapsed  on  the  floor  of  his  cell  at  HMP  Rochester  gasping  for 
to  ventricular 
breath  with  a  probable  pulmonary  embolism  due 
tachycardia.   

The  Operational  Support  Grade  Worker  (OSG)  working  alone  on  the 
Wing that night called for immediate assistance over his radio but did not 
call  a  “Code  Blue’  which  would  have  prompted  the  Control  Room  to 
immediately summon an ambulance.  He did not open the cell but waited 
for assistance.  

In evidence the OSG explained that he believed that only health care or a 
more  senior  officer  could  make  the  decision  to  call  an  ambulance.  
Further,  whilst  he  was  aware  that  there  was  a  policy  which  required  a 
Code  Blue  to  be  called  where  someone  was  experiencing  breathing 
difficulties,  he  did  not  appreciate  that  it  would  result  in  an  ambulance 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 being called.   He did not recall why he hadn’t called a Code Blue in these 
circumstances.  

Assistance  arrived  at  approximately  1.15  am  which  included  the  Night 
Orderly Officer (Oscar 1) who had had first aid training including the use 
of a defibrillator. All the officers then tried to assist Mr Olliffe and ascertain 
what the problem was. Mr Olliffe did not respond to questions and fought 
efforts by officers to place him in the recovery position. No officer called a 
Code Blue at any stage. 

Oscar 1  then  took  the  decision  to  summon  an  ambulance,  which  he  did 
from the Wing Office, pausing to talk to a number of prisoners on the way 
to try and ascertain what the source of the problem may have been.  The 
call  to  the  Ambulance  Emergence  Call  Centre  was  made  at  1.31.50  am 
(although there may have been some disparity between the prison CCTV 
clock and the Ambulance Service of approximately 2 minutes). 

The Emergency Call Operator wrongly interpreted Mr Olliffe as conscious 
when  told  that  he  was  fighting  with  staff  and  terminated  the  call  in 
circumstances  where  she  should  have  remained  on  the  line  to  provide 
ongoing  advice  including  the  use  of  a  defibrillator  in  the  event  of  a 
collapse.  The  Operator  would  have  known  that  the  prison  had  a 
defibrillator as it was recorded on the ambulance system and would have 
been flagged up on her screen.   

Between  1.45  am  and  1.56  am  Mr  Olliffe  went  limp  and  ceased  to 
breathe.  Immediate  CPR  was  started  by  the  officers  present  (including 
Oscar  1)  although  no  officer  thought  to  retrieve  or  use  the  defibrillator 
which was located in the Wing Office.  

The Ambulance First Responder arrived on site at 1.44 am and was with 
Mr  Olliffe  between  1.58  am  and  2.01  am.  Mr  Olliffe  was  found  to  be 
asystole  and  despite  the  attempts  of  two  further  ambulance  crews, 
including a specialist critical care paramedic. Mr Olliffe never regained a 
shockable rhythm and was confirmed dead at the scene at 2.32 am. 

Mr  Olliffe  was  34  years  of  age  and  died  from  Anabolic  Steroid-related 
Cardiac Hypertrophy. His physical appearance and the weight of his heart 
were  such  that  he  had  been  abusing  anabolic  steroids  for  a  number  of 
months at the very least.  As a result, his heart was over 50% larger than 
that of a normal heart for a man of his size and the risk of sudden death 
was  20%  higher.  That  said,  Mr  Olliffe  was  a  young  man  without  any 
history of a heart complaint or any other significant physical illness which 
would have militated against his recovery from this acute cardiac event.   

At Inquest it was ascertained that although Mr Olliffe’s collapse was not a 
predictable event, had the ambulance been called when his collapse was 
first  discovered  then  he  probably  would  have  survived.    The  ambulance 
crew  would have treated the pulmonary embolism and probably avoided 
his heart going into ventricular fibrillation or cardiac arrest.  Further, even 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 if he had suffered a cardiac arrest in the presence of the ambulance crew, 
that too was an event that could have been treated with good prospects 
of survival. 

Finally,  provided  Mr Olliffe had  retained  a  shockable  rhythm at  the point 
where  he  had  stopped  breathing,  had  the  officers  used  the  defibrillator 
from  the  Wing  Office  then  again  Mr  Olliffe’s  probably  would  have 
survived. 

1. 

The medical cause of death after Post Mortem Examination was recorded 
as  

1a) Anabolic Steroid-related Cardiac Hypertrophy 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise 
to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur 
unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to 
report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

1)  there was a failure to issue a Code Blue pursuant to both a local 
and national policy in circumstances where it was appropriate to 
do so 

2)  there was a lack of understanding as to what consequences 

flowed from the issuing of a Code Blue, namely that an ambulance 
would be summoned immediately 

3)  there was a failure to consider or use a defibrillator when it was 

appropriate to do so and when one was available  

6  ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I 
believe your organisation has the power to take such action.  

7  YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date 
of this report, namely by the 12th June 2016, the Coroner, may extend the 
period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be 
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain 
why no action is proposed. 

8  COPIES and PUBLICATION 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following 
Interested Persons :  

– Next of Kin  

The Prison and Probation Ombudsman 

The Care and Quality Commission  

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your 
response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted 
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who 
he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make 
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about 
the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

Kate Thomas  
Assistant Coroner  

15th May 2016  

4

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Noms (PDF)
Pa at a

said Equality, Rights and Decency
National Offender Group
j National Offender Management Service
Management Service 4th Floor, Clive House,

70 Petty France,
London, SW1H 9HD

Kate Thomas
HM Assistant Coroner
HM Coroner's Court
Archbishops Palace
Mill Street
Maidstone
ME15 6YE
August 2016

Dear Ms Thomas

Regulation 28 report concerning the inquest into the death of Ronnie Olliffe on
1 October 2014 at HMP&YOI Rochester.

Thank you for your report addressed to the Governor of HMP&YOI Rochester
concerning the inquest into the death of Mr Olliffe. Your report has been passed to
Equality, Rights and Decency Group in NOMS, as we have responsibility for sharing
learning from deaths in custody. This reply has been formulated in consultation with
the Governor of HMP&YOI Rochester.

You have raised three matters of concern, and | will respond to them in the order in
which you have raised them.

There was a failure to issue a Code Blue pursuant to both a local and national
policy in circumstances where it was appropriate to do so

All night staff have been issued with a personal copy of Prison Service Instruction
(PSI) 03/2013 Medical Emergency Response Codes and have each signed to say
they understand the PSI and are fully aware of their responsibilities. A Notice to Staff
setting out the policy has been issued and the remaining staff have been briefed at
staff engagement sessions.

There was a lack of understanding as to what consequences flowed from the
issuing of a Code Blue, namely that an ambulance would be summoned
immediately

The Notice to Staff described above also explains that when a codes is used an
ambulance will be called, and emphasises the importance of using the codes
appropriately. Pocket-sized cards explaining the codes have been ordered and will
be distributed to all staff.

There was a failure to consider or use a defibrillator when it was appropriate to
do so and when one was available

The Notice to Staff described above also explains the process for the deployment of
defibrillators and their location within the prison. A demonstration of the use of a
defibrillator was provided during the July 2016 staff engagement session, and the
Safer Custody team will follow this up so that all staff know when and how to use
them.

You may also wish to be aware that relevant managers from HMP&YO! Rochester
will be meeting colleagues from the South East Coastal Ambulance Service on 18
August to formalise a joint protocol for the response to emergencies within the prison.

| hope this provides assurance that the matters of concern that you have raised have
been or are being addressed at HUP&YOI Rochester.

Yours sincerely

NOMS Equality, Rights and Decency Group

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