Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2020
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2020-0264, written 1 Dec 2020. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 1 Dec 2020 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2020-0264 |
| Deceased | Anthony Slack |
| Coroner | Alison Mutch |
| Coroner area | Greater Manchester South |
| Category | Care Home Health related deaths · Community health care and emergency services related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 5 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: cac, The Vicarage Residential Care Home, PH England, NHS England, Greater Manchester Health and social care partnership 1 CORONER I am Alison Mutch , Senior Coroner, for the Coroner Area of Greater Manchester South 2 CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 14th April 2020, I commenced an investigation into the death of Anthony Slack .The investigation concluded on the 9th October 2020 and the conclusion was one of Narrative: Died from recognised complications of Covid 19 exacerbated by an industrial disease . The medical cause of death was 1 a) Community Acquired Pneumonia 1b) COVID-19 II) Dementia, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, Asbestos Related Pulmonary Fibrosis, Pleural Plaques, Type 2 Diabetes 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH I Anthony Slack had underlying health issues, including asbestos related pulmonary fibrosis. He had an unwitnessed fall at the care home. The precise circumstances were unclear and not documented. He lay on the floor pending an ambulance attending. An ambulance attended after over 4 hours - as a category 3 call the target time is 2 hours. He flagged as sepsis. The view was he was likely to have Covid 19, as there were other cases in the home and his symptoms were consistent with that as well. He remained at the home where he appeared to improve until 11th April 2020. On 11th April 2020, he became unresponsive and deteriorated rapidly and was transferred to Tameside General Hospital and was placed in the Stamford Unit. He was very unwell and was moved to a palliative care pathway. He died at the Stamford Unit on 13th April 2020. 5 CORONER'S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. - 1. The documentation available at the inquest from the home was limited in detail. As a result, it was difficult to understand what observations had been undertaken by care home staff who were monitoring him. 2. The evidence given at the inquest was that the observations were of limited quality notwithstanding the diagnosis of Covid 19 and his vulnerability. 3. The inquest heard that after the home went into lockdown Covid 19 was found in residents within the home. At the inquest the home were unclear if staff had brought it into the home or if the admission of residents from the community who were not tested for Covid 19 before admission were the cause of it entering the home. There was no risk assessment in place relating to admission of new residents. 4. Staff were unclear as to the PPE requirements as a result of changes to the guidance that were occurring on a regular basis and it was unclear how changes were being shared with staff and implemented. 5. The inquest heard that the ambulance was delayed due to shortages of available ambulances. The inquest was told this was driven by a number of factors. This included staff absences due to the need to self-isolate awaiting testing and the increased cleaning needs in relation to ambulances required by Covid 19. The inquest was told that at some points in the day and in some acute trusts, ambulance crews were being supported by on-site cleaning crews. This meant quicker turnaround times and increased capacity. This was not consistent and not on a 24/7 basis. As a result, ambulances were struggling to reach vulnerable and unwell members of the public and transport them to an acute setting. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 261h January 2021. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a coov of my reoort to the Chief Coroner, who mav find it useful or of 2 I I I interest. I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 Alison Mutch HM Senior Coroner 01/12/2020 3
5 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
HSCA Further Information Citygate Gallowgate Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4PA Telephone: Fax: 03000 616171 Alison Mutch HM Senior Coroner 1 Mount Tabor Street Stockport SK1 3AG Via email: 04 February 2021 Our Reference: Dear HM Senior Coroner Alison Mutch OBE, Prevention of future death report following inquest into the death of Anthony Slack. Thank you for sending the Care Quality Commission (‘CQC’) a copy of the prevention of future death report dated 01 December 2020 following the sad death of Anthony Slack. We note the legal requirement upon the CQC was to respond to your report within 56 days, by the 26 January 2021 but you kindly agreed to extend this deadline to the 5 February 2021. The registered provider of The Vicarage Residential Care Home at the time of Mr Slack’s death was Clarkson House Residential Care Home Ltd (the ‘Provider’). The Provider location (The Vicarage Residential Care Home) registered with CQC is located at 109 Audenshaw Road, Audenshaw, Manchester, M34 5NL. The Provider is registered for the regulated activity: Accommodation for persons who require nursing or personal care. There is a condition on the registration for this location, namely that the Provider must not provide nursing care under accommodation for persons who require nursing or personal care at The Vicarage Residential Care Home. The role of the CQC & Inspection methodology The role of the CQC as an independent regulator is to register health and adult social care service providers in England and to inspect whether or not the fundamental standards are being met. 1 Our current regulatory approach involves inspectors considering five key questions. They ask if services are Safe; Effective; Caring; Responsive; and Well Led. Inspectors use a series of key lines of enquiry (KLOEs) and prompts to seek and corroborate evidence and reassurance of how providers perform against characteristics of ratings and how risks to people are identified, assessed and mitigated. Sources of evidence for the KLOEs can be found on our website along with our KLOEs and characteristics of ratings. https://www.cqc.org.uk/guidance-providers/adult-social-care/key-lines-enquiry-adult- social-care-services . The regulatory framework requires registered persons to meet fundamental standards of care, standards below which care must never fall. We provide guidance to providers on how they can meet these standards (Regulations 4 to 20A of the Health and Social Care Act ‘Regulations’). https://www.cqc.org.uk/guidance-providers/regulations-enforcement/regulations-service- providers-managers . (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014) 2008 (the Regulatory History Clarkson House Residential Care Home Ltd were registered to carry on a regulated activity at The Vicarage Residential Care Home in January 2011. Our last comprehensive inspection was October 2019. The service was rated as Requires Improvement. There was one breach of Regulation 9 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, Person-centred Care. The Provider had not ensured care was designed to meet service users' needs when providing social activities. We found an infection prevention and control audit had been completed by infection prevention and control at Tameside in March 2019 and the home was found to be compliant in all areas and received an overall score of 94%. Staff had completed training in infection prevention and control and wore personal protective equipment (PPE), such as disposable aprons and gloves, when supporting people with personal care. A new assessment had been developed to be used when admitting new residents. This included information about the support people needed and how those needs were to be met. It included people’s personal, social and medical histories. This would help to ensure people were appropriately placed and the home could provide people with the support they needed. There was a system for monitoring falls. Records showed that appropriate treatment and support were sought in a timely manner. Care records were reviewed regularly and updated when people’s needs changed. This rating meant that under the inspection methodology we were using at the time, the service would be inspected by October 2021, but earlier if concerns were raised about the safety and welfare of people receiving the service. 2 Statutory Notification in relation to the Death of Mr. Slack CQC received a statutory notification ‘Death of a person using the service’ from the Provider on 18 April 2020. This identified the cause of Mr Slack’s death as due to suspected Covid 19 and that he had passed away in hospital. There were no details about the specific circumstances of Mr. Slack’s death, therefore CQC had further discussions with the Provider who confirmed that Mr Slack had a fall and that following attendance by the ambulance service had been diagnosed with suspected Covid 19. The Provider had followed the advice of the ambulance service, and government advice at the time, and isolated Mr Slack in his bedroom. Mr Slack had been admitted to hospital on 11 April 2020 when his condition deteriorated. The Provider confirmed to CQC during this discussion that they had sufficient supplies of PPE and had access to and were following government guidance in relation to Covid 19. In July 2020 as a result of information CQC received, unrelated to Mr Slacks death, we undertook a focussed inspection. This was a targeted inspection. The inspection was focused in one key question; Is the service safe? Within the safe domain our inspection focused on the specific areas of concern; about infection control, staff training and supervision, manual handling, building maintenance and management and reporting of safeguarding incidents. During this inspection we found no breaches of Regulation. Risks to people who used the service and staff, relating to infection prevention and control and specifically Covid 19, had been assessed and appropriate action taken. The Provider was promoting good infection control and hygiene practices. PPE was used appropriately, and staff had received additional training, including handwashing and use of PPE. Staff confirmed they knew what PPE they should wear and that they could access stocks of PPE. During this inspection, we found the Provider demonstrated they were aware of government guidance in relation to Covid 19 and had systems in place to ensure it was implemented in the home. The Provider’s infection prevention and control policy and admissions policy were up to date. The service did not receive a rating for this inspection as we did not look at all KLOE within the safe domain. Prevention of Future Deaths Report Following receipt of the concerns raised by the Coroner at the conclusion of the inquest into the death of Mr. Slack which resulted in the prevention of future deaths report. CQC undertook an unannounced, focused inspection of The Vicarage Residential Care Home. This was undertaken to ensure that the circumstances of Mr. Slack’s death did not raise concerns about any ongoing risk to current service users 3 The inspection commenced on the 18 January 2021. The inspection team consisted of one Inspector. The inspection was focused in one key question; Is the service safe? Within the safe domain, our inspection focused on the specific areas of concern raised in the report. We looked at infection prevention and control (IPC). in accordance with the IPC thematic inspection methodology CQC developed as part of its response to the Covid 19 pandemic. This provides a framework to assess the systems and processes providers have in place to respond to the Covid 19 pandemic. It includes reviewing infection control policies and procedures, staff and Provider knowledge and implementation of government guidance, access to and use of personal protective equipment (PPE), staff and resident testing and safe admissions to care homes. We also looked at risk management, falls management including post falls observations and protocols, accident and incident records, records of care provided and accessing and recording appropriate health support. The specific matters of concerns raised by the Coroner, in the report are addressed below: Matters of concern 1. The documentation available at inquest from the home was limited in detail. As a result, it was difficult to understand what observations had been undertaken by the care home staff who were monitoring him. 2. The evidence given at the inquest was that the observations were of limited quality notwithstanding the diagnosis of Covid 19 and his vulnerability. At our inspections in October 2019 and July 2020 we found care records, including risk assessments and care plans were person centred and sufficiently detailed to guide staff in the support and care people needed. We also found that records of care and support provided were completed by staff. CQC expects all services to have robust systems to ensure the quality of service and monitors that policies and procedures are being followed. We found there were a variety of checks and audits carried out in the home to ensure it was safe for the people living there. These included reviews of action taken following accidents and incidents, care record entries and observation records. These were overseen by the Provider to ensure any actions were completed. At our inspection in January 2021, we found that improvements had been made to the systems and processes for post falls management. This included contacting Digital Health Team at set intervals post fall. This enabled Digital Health to support staff with observations; these were then recorded on the person’s medical notes. 4 Digital Health have supplied monitoring equipment including blood pressure and pulse rate monitors to providers to enable this. A detailed protocol had been introduced that included guidance to staff on specific observations that should be taken and when they should be taken. We saw that there was also an updated monitoring record for staff to complete when undertaking regular routine well-being checks. These required staff to indicate where the person was and what they were doing. Staff we spoke with during the inspection were able to detail all aspects of the new system and what observations they were expected to complete if someone was ill or if they were undertaking routine well-being checks. The Provider had arranged training with Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council (TMBC) to improve daily record keeping. 3. The inquest heard that after the home went into lockdown Covid 19 was found in residents within the home. At the inquest the home were unclear if staff had brought it into the home or if the admission of residents from the community who were not tested for Covid 19 before admission were the cause of it entering the home. There was no risk assessment in place relating to admission of new residents. Throughout the Covid 19 pandemic government guidance has been issued to providers on admissions to care homes and testing of staff. This did not at the time of Mr Slacks death include the requirement to test staff or residents before admission. We have confirmed, through engagement conversations with the Provider in March, April and May 2020, and at our inspections in July 2020 and January 2021 that the Provider was aware of and was adhering to government guidance on the safe admission of people to care homes. This included isolation of new or Covid positive residents. The Provider has also confirmed they are now undertaking the required regular resident and staff Covid 19 tests. 4. Staff were unclear as to the PPE requirements as a result of the changes to the guidance that were occurring on a regular basis and it was unclear how changes were being shared with staff and implemented. We have confirmed, through engagement conversations with the Provider in March, April and May 2020, and at our inspections in July 2020 and January 2021 that the Provider was accessing the government guidance current at that time on use of PPE. On all of these occasions the Provider demonstrated that they were aware of current guidance and were ensuring staff were made aware of any changes via a staff Whats App group, emails and staff handovers. The Provider confirmed they were receiving updates from TMBC which included links to any changes in guidance to PPE use. 5 They confirmed they were also accessing COVID-19 related guidance for ASC providers on the CQC website. During our inspections of July 2020 and January 2021, we observed staff wearing appropriate PPE. Staff had received additional training, including handwashing and use of PPE. Staff confirmed to CQC during both inspections, that they received updates from the Provider to inform them of any changes in guidance and knew what PPE they should wear and that they could access stocks of PPE. testing and 5. The inquest heard that the ambulance was delayed due to shortages of available ambulances. The inquest was told this was driven by a number of factors. This included staff absences due to the need to self-isolate awaiting to ambulances required by Covid 19. The inquest was told that at some points in the day and in some acute trusts, ambulance crews were being supported by on site cleaning crews. This meant quicker turnaround times and increased capacity. This was not consistent and not on a 24/7 basis. As a result, ambulances were struggling to reach vulnerable and unwell members of the public and transport them to an acute setting. increased cleaning needs in relation As stated in the Regulation 28 Report, there are several contributing factors resulting in North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) delayed response times. NWAS have been transparent and open with the CQC to ensure we are aware of their performance and the factors that impact it. We are continually monitoring the regional ambulance picture, through ongoing engagement, performance reports and internal meetings. NWAS share with us their weekly HAS Report, Delayed admissions report and Weekly Snapshot (total turnaround for each Acute). We have monthly engagement meetings and attend national meetings. NWAS have informed us they have adopted the AACE guidance to ensure appropriate changes have been made to ensure safety of staff and patients. For example, designated cleaning teams with appropriate training have been assigned to stations and hospital premises to support ambulance crews decontaminate vehicles. NWAS have placed decontamination areas outside hospitals, so that ambulances who have conveyed Covid 19 patients can be deep cleaned at the hospital site rather than go back to the stations. Vehicle cleaning is in line with PHE guidance, cleaning all contact areas after each patient is essential to ensuring both staff and patients are safe. Cleaning sites have been set up on hospital sites to make the deep clean process faster. This is so that ambulances can get back on the road quicker. This has reduced the risk of transmitting the virus but does impact on time. 6 In addition, we have been made aware of the impact on response times due to the delays caused by hand over at hospitals. With regards to The Vicarage Residential Care Home, CQC expects registered persons to keep up to date with, take on board and implement government guidance. We have during the Covid 19 pandemic remained in regular contact with the Provider. This included engagement calls in March, April and May 2020. These were supportive calls to ensure that the Provider was aware of any updates to guidance and to signpost appropriate support if needed. CQC also published COVID-19 related guidance for ASC providers on the CQC website. From mid-March 2020 the Provider also received daily updates from TMBC which included updates on guidance, resources and support. CQC is satisfied that appropriate steps have been taken to ensure that staff recognise risks from falls and illness and are aware what action they need to take, including ensuring appropriate medical support, what observations are expected, and how to document them appropriately. This is based on our previous knowledge of this location and how they have responded following the circumstances around Mr Slacks death. CQC is of the opinion that the new processes that the service have adopted have addressed the known risks in this care home. CQC believe the actions taken by the Provider are what could reasonably be expected of them. In order to ensure that this risk is minimised to the lowest possible level and to ensure service users are not placed at risk at The Vicarage Residential Care Home, we are continually monitoring the service and liaising with the Local Authority to review any ongoing risks and feedback. In summary, CQC have reviewed systems in place at The Vicarage Residential Care Home and we are assured that the Provider has taken action to improve and further reduce risks within this care home. This will be reviewed at our next inspection of the service. Should you require any further information then please do not hesitate to get in touch. Yours sincerely, Interim Head of Inspection North West – Adult Social Care 7
Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership 4th Floor 3 Piccadilly Place London Road Manchester M1 3BN T: E: Date: 19 February 2021 Ms A Mutch OBE HM Senior Coroner Coroner’s Court 1 Mount Tabor Street Stockport SK1 3AG Dear Ms Mutch Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Anthony Slack 13.04.2020 Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report dated 1 December 2020 concerning the death of Anthony Slack on 13 April 2020. Firstly, I would like to express my deep condolences to Anthony Slack’s family. The inquest concluded that Anthony Salck’s death was a result of 1a) Community acquired pneumonia; 1b) COVID 19; 2) Dementia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asbestos related pulmonary fibrosis, pleural plaques, type 2 diabetes. Following the inquest you raised concerns in your Regulation 28 Report to Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership regarding the quality of observations and availability of documentation from the care home, the lack of risk assessments for new admissions to the care home, a lack of clarity around PPE guidance for care home staff at the time and the availability of ambulances in the area. I have noted that your Regulation 28 letter has also been sent to The Vicarage Residential Care Home, Public Health England and NHS England. Whilst I may summarise some of the actions taken by these organisations, I will leave it to the named respondents to address the specific concerns relevant to them which you have expressed. My letter therefore addresses the issues that fall within the remit of GMHSCP. Summary of actions taken or being taken by the organisation involved. The Care Home confirmed that; 1. The Provider/Registered Manager is speaking to staff individually to reiterate the need for thorough record keeping in relation to falls but also generally. A documentation awareness training offer has been made to the Provider/Registered Manager by Tameside and Glossop CCG Quality Improvement Team. This has been accepted and sessions will take place in February via Microsoft Teams. The Local Authority require all providers to comply with good record keeping standards as required by their CQC registration. 2. There is a Digital Health service for care homes in the borough and the CCG Contacts Performance and Quality Improvement teams have spoken to the provider and re-emphasised the need to seek advice from the Digital Health team, both following a fall but also in the event that there is some visible deterioration in a resident. 3. At the time of Mr Slack’s death there was no way of ascertaining how Covid- 19 entered the home. Whilst the home had been ‘locked down’ they were still accepting patients from the acute trust who had to create beds for the increasing numbers of covid-19 in-patients they had. Furthermore at that time there was no routine testing of care home staff or residents. Staff are now PCR tested weekly and have twice weekly lateral flow tests and residents are PCR tested monthly and any symptomatic resident has access to lateral flow testing also. The majority of residents and several staff have now had the first vaccine. The Provider/Registered Manager confirmed that the visitor’s policy has been updated for professionals and relatives (ensuring testing). They have also updated the admission procedure with regards to covid-19 and risk assessment (require negative test on admission) 4. Local Population Health colleagues provide written guidance on infection prevention and PPE every time there is a policy change. The CCG and ICFT now provide infection prevention webinars to support the care home sector and The Vicarage have positively engaged with these webinars, enabling several of their staff to access them. The local authority ensure no providers have been without PPE. The Provider/Registered Manager assured the CCG that there is clear guidance up in the home around PPE . Regular IPC audits are in place by IPC teams. 5. Throughout March 2020, operational teams at NWAS liaised with local Emergency Departments to establish cleaning teams to assist ambulance crews with the additional cleaning required following each handover. This partnered service meant that once a patient had left the ambulance, a cleaner would enter the saloon of the vehicle and clean the ambulance on the crews’ behalf whilst they completed handover, in order to improve ‘handover to clear’ time. The roll-out of this initiative was initially challenging due to the differing structural setups of local Emergency Departments, however as part of an initial roll out, the first Emergency Department went live 6 April 2020 with a two shift system operating from 06:00-14:00 and 14:00-22:00 with two person per shift. The initiative was rolled out to seven other Emergency Departments in the North West. Following the initial roll out, a feasibility review was undertaken which highlighted periods of inactivity between 06:00-08:00 and 19:00-22:00. As suce, the cleaning service has been revised and is now offered between 08:00-19:00 at each location. In response to the increasing pressure on the NWAS service, the cleaning service was extended further and NWAS crews are now supported by on-site cleaning crews at sixteen Emergency Departments across the North West. The cleaning service was not in place at Tameside Hospital at the time of Mr Slack’s attendance, though it has been confirmed that such a service is now provided there. Should an NWAS crew attend an Emergency Department at a time or location where the on-site cleaning crew is not in operation, ambulance crews are advised to complete onboard cleaning themselves, in the usual way. Actions taken or being taken to prevent reoccurrence across Greater Manchester. 1. Learning to be presented/shared with the Greater Manchester Quality Board. This meeting is attended by commissioners, including commissioners of specialist services, regulators, Healthwatch and NICE. 2. A Greater Manchester Infection Prevention and Control Care Home Cell has been established to interpret guidance and ensure a clear and consistent message to the care homes across Greater Manchester. 3. A monthly webinar has been organised, attended by over 100 care homes, to explain the science that supports the guidance, the interpretation of the guidance and to share best practice. The 5th Webinar is to be broadcast on 23rd February. This webinar and all the previous webinars are available to view on YouTube. 4. Tameside Local Authority, CCG and the care home have been invited to share the learning from this event at a quality improvement meeting on the 15th March 2021. The Quality Improvement Group meet monthly to share best practice and lessons learned. This group is attended by all 10 CCGs and LAs from across GM along with care home providers and key stakeholders The Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership (GMHSCP) is committed to improving outcomes for the population of Greater Manchester. In conclusion key learning points and recommendations will be monitored to ensure they are embedded within practice. I hope this response provides the relevant assurances you require. Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information. Yours sincerely Chair of GM Medical Executive, GMHSCP
National Medical Director NHS England & NHS Improvement Skipton House 80 London Road London SE1 6LH 2nd March 2021 Ms Alison Mutch Senior Coroner Greater Manchester South Stockport Coroners Court 1 Mount Tabor Street Stockport SK1 3AG By email: Dear Ms Mutch, Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Anthony Slack (DOD: 13.04.2020) Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report dated 1 December 2020 concerning the death of Mr Anthony Slack on 13 April 2020. Firstly, I would like to express my deep condolences to Mr Slack’s family. The Regulation 28 report concluded that Mr Slack’s death was a result of recognised complications of COVID-19 exacerbated by an industrial disease. I note the medical cause of Mr Slack’s death was as follows: 1a) Community Acquired Pneumonia 1b) COVID-19 2) Dementia, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, Asbestos Related Pulmonary Fibrosis, Pleural Plaques, Type 2 Diabetes At the conclusion of the inquest you raised concerns in your Regulation 28 Report addressed to NHS England regarding the delayed ambulance attendance due to shortages of available ambulances. I understand that the inquest heard evidence that this was as a consequence of COVID related absences amongst ambulance staff and further, the additional cleaning requirements. The inquest was told that at some points in the day and in some acute trusts, ambulance crews were being supported by on- site cleaning crews, which resulted in quicker turnaround times and thus increased ambulance capacity. However, the witness indicated that such support was inconsistent and not offered on a 24/7 basis. I have liaised directly with the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) in respect of your concerns. NHS England and NHS Improvement The graph below shows the average ‘handover to clear’ times from April 2018 to March 2020 i.e. the elapsed time between the point at which a patient is handed over into the care of the Emergency Department and when an ambulance crew are able to clear from an incident to make themselves available for further emergencies. The graph demonstrates that hand over to clear times had consistently remained within the 15-minute national target but did increase in March 2020, which has been attributed to the additional cleaning required as a consequence of COVID – 19 pandemic. Throughout March 2020, operational teams at NWAS liaised with local Emergency Departments to establish cleaning teams to assist ambulance crews with the additional cleaning required following each handover. This partnered service meant that once a patient had left the ambulance, a cleaner would enter the saloon of the vehicle and clean the ambulance on the crews’ behalf whilst they completed handover, in order to improve ‘handover to clear’ time. The roll-out of this initiative was initially challenging due to the differing structural setups of local Emergency Departments, however as part of an initial roll out, the first Emergency Department went live 6 April 2020 with a two shift system operating from 06:00–14:00 and 14:00–22:00 with two persons per shift. The initiative was rolled out to seven other Emergency Departments in the North West. Following the initial roll out, a feasibility review was undertaken which highlighted periods of inactivity between 06:00-08:00 and 19:00 to 22:00. As such, the cleaning service has been revised and is now offered between 08:00–19:00 at each location. In response to the increasing pressure on the NWAS service, the cleaning service was extended further and NWAS crews are now supported by on-site cleaning crews at sixteen Emergency Departments across the North West. I understand that the cleaning service was not in place at Tameside Hospital at the time of Mr Slack’s attendance, though I can confirm that such a service is now provided there. Should an NWAS crew attend an Emergency Department at a time or location where the on-site cleaning crew is not in operation, ambulance crews are advised to complete on-board cleaning themselves, in the usual way. It should be noted that even at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the handover to clear times have consistently remained well within the 15-minute national target. Thank you for bringing this important issue to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information. Yours sincerely, National Medical Director
By email Alison Mutch, Senior Coroner c/o Our ref: Dear Alison Mutch, Public Accountability Unit Wellington House 133-155 Waterloo Road London SE1 8UG T www.gov.uk/phe 26 January 2021 Re: Inquest into the death of Anthony Slack Thank you for sending the attached report for Public Health England’s (PHE) consideration. Under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, please find below PHE’s response in relation to the investigation of the death of Anthony Slack. Care homes have been particularly vulnerable to severe outbreaks of COVID-19 during the pandemic, both in the UK and internationally. This reflects the fact that the virus spreads more readily in large residential settings than between households, and COVID-19 causes particularly severe disease with increasing age and in the presence of underlying conditions. Tragically, there have been very large numbers of deaths in care homes during the pandemic. PHE has been working very closely with key stakeholders throughout the pandemic to address a wide range of issues to help reduce the risk of COVID-19 entering care homes, to reduce the risk of transmission when there is an incursion of infection and to improve the health outcomes of those who become infected. PHE has established a national team to lead the organisational response to COVID- 19 in adult social care settings. This team is involved in a number of activities, including: • Coordination of the PHE response to COVID-19 in adult social care settings, including holding a weekly meeting with Health Protection Teams (HPTs) and key partners from the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to review intelligence, share learning and support policy and public health practice in relation to outbreaks and incidents in care homes • National surveillance of COVID-19 incidents and outbreaks in care homes • Regular liaison with DHSC, including a weekly meeting with the Minister for Social Care to take a deep dive into issues relating to care home outbreaks to inform policy making • Membership of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) Social Care Working Group to review emerging scientific evidence and inform policy development • Membership of the Social Care Sector COVID-19 Support Taskforce to learn from the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic and inform advice and recommendations to government and the social care sector. The recommendations from this taskforce informed the development of the government’s Adult Social Care Winter Plan 2020-2021 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/adult-social-care-coronavirus- covid-19-winter-plan-2020-to-2021/adult-social-care-our-covid-19-winter-plan- 2020-to-2021 • Supporting DHSC in the delivery of the Adult Social Care Action Plan and Adult Social Care Winter Plan Throughout the pandemic, PHE HPTs have been working with local partners, including directors of public health, local authorities and clinical commissioning groups to support individual care homes during the pandemic. This has included providing advice on infection prevention and control measures to prevent incursion of infection into care homes, and supporting care homes in response to outbreaks. Outbreak response has included conducting risk assessments, arranging outbreak testing and advising on additional infection prevention and control measures. PHE has supported DHSC and NHS England in the development of a number of guidance documents to support the adult social care sector in responding to the pandemic, including guidance on admission and care of residents, discharge of residents from hospital, infection prevention and control, personal protective equipment and visiting. PHE research teams have conducted a number of research projects, including epidemiological and genomic research, to help understand key issues in relation to the entry and spread of COVID-19 in care homes to inform the public health response. PHE collates a weekly digest of research evidence in relation to the prevention and control of COVID-19 in home care/care home settings to inform the public health response. PHE has been heavily involved in the development of the COVID-19 vaccination programme and the prioritisation of vaccination for care home residents and staff. In respect of personal protective equipment (PPE) where the Regulation 28 Report states: "Staff were unclear as to the PPE requirements as a result of changes to the guidance that were occurring on a regular basis and it was unclear how changes were being shared with staff and implemented" In this matter, the national guidance on use of PPE developed rapidly during March and April, as the pandemic was declared and actions taken to respond to it. In those first few weeks, knowledge and understanding across the Health and Care System changed very quickly. In addition, availability of PPE was limited. Changes to guidance on use of PPE reflected the entire system adapting and responding to this complex situation. 2 Communication of changes to all national guidance, including the use of PPE, was (and continues to be) delivered under the established PHE incident response governance structures, which were activated in March at the outset of the pandemic . Regarding PPE guidance during March and April, partners in Health and Social care across the North West of England received written communication in a timely and proportionate manner via the PHE NW Incident Control Centre (ICC) email cascade on all updates and changes to guidance. This included all NW Directors of Public Health, Directors of Adult Social Care, with an onward cascade via Local Authority routes to Care Homes for which they had responsibility. In addition, PHE NW's ICC communicated directly with local Infection Prevention and Control Teams and North West Association of Directors of Social care (ADASS) to minimise the risk that guidance was missed. Guidance on the use of PPE has continued to develop in line with increasing scientific knowledge. PHE has worked with stakeholders in the adult social care sector to ensure that developing guidance meets the needs of the sector. As an example, PHE has developed video tutorials on the donning and doffing of PPE, and an illustrated guide to PPE for community and social care settings. Remaining concerns It is not appropriate that this response provides detail regarding points in the Regulation 28 Report on the limited details in documentation available at the inquest from the home, the quality of observations and assessment of vulnerability of Mr Slack, the route of transmission of COVID-19 into the home and the delay of the ambulance, as these are outside the remit, control and responsibility of PHE. PHE understands that the Regulation 28 Report has been sent to the Care Quality Commission, The Vicarage Residential Care Home, NHS England, Greater Manchester Health and social care partnership who will be able to comment on the remaining concerns. Additionally, PHE has shared this report with the DHSC who will provide further comment. Please do not hesitate to contact PHE should we be of any further assistance in this matter. Yours sincerely, FOI Team 3
Clarkson House Care Home Ltd / The Vicarage Care Home
Action Plan
Provider:
Clarkson House Care Home Ltd/ The Vicarage Care Home
This is following a Reg 28 issued by the coroners following an inquest
Care Home Manager
Date plan started;
Completed by:
18/10/2020 Based on information gathered at the inquest and updated after information as per Reg 28
letter received in December 2020.
RED
AMBER
GREEN
Still outstanding
Some work completed but not fully
complete
Work completed
Task not identified
Matters of Concern
Plan of Action
Review Review Review
Comments/Timeline
The documentation available at the inquest
from the home was limited in detail. As a
result, it was difficult to understand what
observations had been undertaken by care
home staff who were monitoring him.
Documentation training in house has
been completed. This has been carried
out by senior staff on a 1:1 basis with all
staff.
The quality
started
documentation for all staff.
Improvement Team has
on
training
Teams
The documentation and recording policy
has been updated and reissued to all
staff both hard copy and via group
email.
have
reissued
We
relevant
documentation pro formas and sourced
out
relevant and more uptodate
document proformas from The Quality
Improvement Team to be completed by
staff following a fall, resident being
unwell, loss of appetite , loss of weight
and ensured staff are conversant with
them and how to complete them through
1:1 where relevant and small group
sessions at handovers.
We have included documentation as
above as a high priority in our induction
document for new staff.
The evidence given at the inquest was that
the observations were of limited quality
notwithstanding the diagnosis of Covid-19
and his vulnerability.
In April 2020 the situations that we were
presented with were new and
unexpected:
Since then we have learnt a lot about
Covid-19. Drawing from regular
guidance provided by the local authority,
public health England, CQC we keep
our staff updated with new and updated
changing advice through memos,
18/10/20
27/12/20
22/01/21 All staff completed
-
Further training completed today
22/01/21 and other sessions booked
for 29/01/21 and 05/02/21
Continue to monitor
Monitoring continues
No Further Action Required at the moment
/continue to monitor
Continue to monitor
18/10/20
27/12/20
22/01/21
Continue to monitor
Awaiting to complete registration
To monitor
emails, whatsapp messages and group
discussions at handovers. Our senior
staff also carry out observations of our
staff practice and adherence to
instructions as per updated guidance.
All our staff on site except for a few new
starters have undertaken a specific
Covid-19 course provided online by
social care T.V and have all undergone
infection control training provided by the
Local Authority on a weekly basis.
(previously twice weekly) . We ensure
that staff have
refreshers as new information and
guidance are regularly added onto the
course.
We have sourced out a new course
specific to infection control and
management leading to a level 2
qualification. This is due to start by the
15/2/2021 and the objective is for all
staff to complete by the end of March
2021.
Details-Unit 1: principles of the causes
and spread of infection in health care
settings
Unit 2: Principles of the importance of
personal hygiene and health in the
prevention and control of infection in
health care settings
Unit 3: Principles of decontamination,
cleaning and waste management in
health care settings.
Unit 4: Principles of infection prevention
and control in a health care setting.
found
the home or
lockdown Covid 19 was
The inquest heard that after the home went
into
in
residents within the home. At the inquest
the home were unclear if staff had brought it
the admission of
if
into
residents from the community who were not
tested for Covid 19 before admission were
the cause of it entering the home. There
was no risk assessment in place relating to
admission of new residents.
We have increased cleaning staff duty
hours over the past 6 months to cater for
more regular cleaning and disinfection in
addition to new products being used for
desanitisation.
We have reviewed our admission policy
and we are keeping it under regular
review adding to it based on new
guidance being provided by the local
authority, PHE and our local infection
prevention team based at Tameside
General hospital
Included in the above is PCR testing
and lateral flow testing as guided by the
Local Authority and government
guidance.
We undertake regular testing of
residents and staff and keep the safe
steps Covid app updated and this is
monitored by the NHS regularly.
We as Managers follow and attend
meetings organized by the Local
Authority (manager’s forums) and
Greater Manchester infection control
meetings and cascade down any new
information we come across.
We have undergone vaccinations (1st
Dose) of most of our residents and staff
in December 2020 and now await the
second dose and a few requiring the 1st
dose.
Infection control audit to be planned as
the next due audit was the end of 2020
but due to the demands on the infection
prevention team who normally carry out
18/10/20
27/12/20
22/01/21 Continue to monitor
Continue to monitor
Continue to monitor
Continue to attend
Continue to monitor
Date of audit to be confirmed by the
quality improvement team by the end of
January 2021
to
the PPE
Staff were unclear as
requirements as a result of changes to the
guidance that were occurring on a regular
basis and it was unclear how changes were
being shared with staff and implemented
Continue to monitor
18/10/20
27/12/20
22/01/21
Continue to monitor
the audit this was not done. We have
now arranged for the Quality
improvement team to undertake and
support us with an infection control and
management audit in the coming weeks.
In March/April 20 the guidance of the
requirement and use of PPE was
limited. We are implementing the use of
correct PPE as guided by the local
authority and infection control team. Any
changes or new advice provided by the
local authority and other relevant
authorities are specifically cascaded
down to the staff electronically and
through memos and handovers. We can
confirm we have stock of PPE’s that
could last us for 4-6 weeks at the very
least.
We acknowledge that at the beginning
of the pandemic of March/April 2020
there was a lack of clarity as to PPE
requirements and there were regular
changes in the guidance on a regular
basis. Initially the changes were
communicated to staff at handovers but
soon after all updates on changes in
PPE requirements have
been shared at handovers and group
email and whatsapp group and this
remains relevant to date. Please note
that the use of appropriate PPE's and
other precautions required forms a large
part of the infection control and
management training offered by the
local authority.
The inquest heard that the ambulance was
delayed due
to shortages of available
ambulances. The inquest was told this was
driven by a number of factors. This included
staff absences due to the need of self-
isolate awaiting testing and the increased
cleaning needs in relation to ambulances
required by Covid 19. The inquest was told
that at some points in the day and in some
acute trusts, ambulance crews were being
supported by on-site cleaning crews. This
meant quicker
times and
increased capacity. This was not consistent
and not on a 24/7 basis. As a result,
reach
ambulances were struggling
vulnerable and unwell members of the
public and transport them to an acute
setting.
turnaround
to
Continue to monitor
18/10/20
27/12/20
22/01/21
Continue to monitor
We acknowledge that the delays from
the emergency services in periods of
high need could impact on vulnerable
and unwell residents. We have updated
our protocol as regards waiting times
whereby in the event of an emergency
e.g. fall or a resident becoming very
unwell, then staff to be proactive and
keep updating 111 or 999 on at least an
hourly basis.
In addition we have reviewed our
dispositions in terms of wifi capacity to
enable us to seek advice and support
digitally via skype or business whatsapp
accessible from every corner of the
building and every room of the building.
The system is tested daily via an app by
the manager.
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