Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2021
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2021-0344, written 14 Oct 2021. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 14 Oct 2021 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2021-0344 |
| Deceased | Alexandra Tolley |
| Coroner | Kevin McLoughlin |
| Coroner area | West Yorkshire (East) |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths · Suicide (from 2015) · Mental Health related deaths · Police related deaths |
| Organisation named | Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust 1 CORONER I am Kevin McLoughlin, Senior Coroner for the Coroner area of West Yorkshire (East) 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 29 October 2019 an investigation was commenced into the death of Alexandra Jane Tolley, aged 20. The investigation concluded at the end of the Inquest on 13 October 2021. The jury returned a narrative conclusion based upon their finding that Ms Tolley committed suicide. This reflected the cause of death: 1a Hypoxic brain injury 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Ms Tolley, aged 20, was compulsorily detained in a psychiatric hospital under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983, on 24 October 2019. She had a long history of self harming and was not allowed bathroom privacy. incidents. She was subject to continuous 1:1 observations within eyesight and On Sunday 27 October 2019, after a she was permitted to walk in the hospital grounds, accompanied by an escort. incident in the at lunchtime, At 13:50hr she absconded. This was reported to the police at 14:10hr and classified as a high risk missing person. At 14:46 hr she was found by police officers in cardiac arrest with a . . Despite emergency treatment Ms Tolley was declared dead on Monday 28 October 2019 at St James’ University Hospital, Leeds. 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the Inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. – Evidence taken at the Inquest indicated Ms Tolley had been admitted to the Becklin Centre late on the night of 18 October 2019 and was Sectioned on 24 October. She was categorised as at ‘high risk’ and deemed to require 1:1 continuous observations, within eyesight, without bathroom privacy. In the days preceding her death 7 occurred, culminating in one around 13.00 hours on Sunday 27 October. At approximately 13.50 hours the same afternoon she absconded whilst being permitted to walk in the hospital grounds with an escort. Approximately one hour later she was found with a that resulted in un-survivable injuries and died the following day. incidents 1 1. The Care Plan agreed between Ms Tolley and the team treating her, included a provision that in the event she absconded, she would neither be restrained, nor followed. Given her history and risk profile, it appeared this contingent instruction to staff regarding the risk of absconding, placed too much emphasis on her long term ability to manage her own turbulent emotions, at the expense of the imperative of keeping her safe. The priorities underlying such instructions merit further review. 2. The absconding instructions to staff (set out above) seems incompatible with the duty to detain in order to keep safe, inherent in an order under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 when viewed in the context of a patient deemed to require such intensive monitoring. 3. The decision to permit ground leave so shortly after a incident (and only three days after a previous absconding incident) was made on a relatively informal basis. There were no documented criteria to be considered before it was approved, nor was the grade of staff required to make the decision stipulated. 4. The instruction to staff stipulated ‘physical interventions’ will not be used to restrain Ms Tolley, yet this expression was not defined or particularised. Greater clarity might assist a staff escort (likely to be a relatively junior individual) to know whether it was permissible, for example, to put a gentle hand on Ms Tolley’s shoulder to steer her back towards the hospital. 5. The permission given to walk in the grounds of the hospital was not considered to amount to section 17 MHA 1983 leave. The informality involved in the decision missed an opportunity to consider issues such as: (a) Whether two escorts would be appropriate in view of Ms Tolley having absconded three days earlier. This would have facilitated one person following her to monitor and report on her whereabouts. In a time critical situation this could have altered the tragic outcome; (b) Providing the escort with a discretion in the manner of a dynamic risk assessment whether or not to follow Ms Tolley. (c) Reviewing the type of applied to her wounds, before she was permitted to leave the ward, in the light of her misuse of these . 6. The care plan containing the staff instruction not to restrain or follow was discussed and agreed with Ms Tolley. She was thus expressly aware that if she did decide to abscond, she knew she would be able to do so. Moreover, she was explicitly told that the staff member escorting her would return to the reception area and wait for a short period in the hope Ms Tolley would return voluntarily. The implication of this was that Ms Tolley knew she had a period of grace of around 10 minutes in which to get clear of the hospital, before the police would be asked to search for her. Whilst potentially beneficial from a therapeutic perspective, such knowledge may also inform a vulnerable patient on ways in which the protection afforded by a MHA Section could be undermined. The wisdom of explaining to a patient how the hospital staff would respond to them absconding should be reviewed. 7. Ms Tolley was found with a made from used some time earlier to dress a self-inflicted wound. She had twice before used such as : (1) earlier the same day and (2) three days previously- 24 October. Consideration should be given to the types of Becklin Centre, with a view to selecting a type which could not serve as a used at the . 8. The Inquest was informed that the general policy in relation to absconding patients has been under review since Ms Tolley’s death nearly two years ago but has (understandably) been delayed during the Covid pandemic. It was said a draft revised policy was sent to West Yorkshire Police on 14 June 2021 by way of consultation, but no response has been received. In the meantime, similar instructions are still being issued to staff not to restrain or follow in some other cases. There is thus an ongoing risk of further deaths should a comparable situation arise again. 2 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe your organisation has the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 10 December 2021. I, the Coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: I have also sent it to West Yorkshire Police (FAO Inspector or of interest. ) who may find it useful I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 SIGNED BY SENIOR CORONER, KEVIN MCLOUGHLIN 14 October 2021 3
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Date: 08th December 2021
Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation
Trust
2150 Century Way
Thorpe Park
Leeds
LS15 8ZB
Mr Kevin McLoughlin
Senior Coroner, Western Yorkshire (Eastern
District)
Coroner’s Office and Court
71 Northgate
Wakefield
WF1 3BS
Dear Mr McLoughlin,
RE: REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS: Alexandra Jane TOLLEY,
(deceased)
Thank you for the correspondence regarding the outcome of the inquest, which was concluded on
13 October 2021, touching upon the death of Ms Alexandra Jane Tolley. I would firstly like to take
this opportunity to express my sincere condolences to Alexandra’s family and friends at the tragic
death of Alexandra.
Following the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths issued on the 14 October 2021 to
Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (LYPFT), please find below the details of our
response to address the concerns raised.
The Matters of Concern within the report have been broken into the points below in bold text with
the Trust’s response following:
1. The Care Plan agreed between Ms Tolley and the team treating her, included a
provision that in the event she absconded, she would neither be restrained, nor
followed. Given her history and risk profile, it appeared this contingent instruction to
staff regarding the risk of absconding, placed too much emphasis on her long-term
ability to manage her own turbulent emotions, at the expense of the imperative of
keeping her safe. The priorities underlying such instructions merit further review.
One of the challenges of caring for patients with a diagnosis of Emotionally Unstable Personality
Disorder (EUPD) as Ms Tolley, is that there are often times that being able to articulate distress in
a verbal way is difficult, and therefore a way to describe this is often through self-harming
behaviour, which was the case for Ms Tolley.
Page 1 of 6
In the case of Ms Tolley staff were trying, by building a therapeutic relationship, to balance a
positive risk-taking approach by not being over restrictive but applying restriction at the right time in
the right way to support Ms Tolley.
A comprehensive care plan had been established that described the management of risks
associated with Ms Tolley’s self-harm behaviour at times of distress. Unfortunately, what is not
described is the staff’s ability to increase or decrease the least restrictive care in line with any
observed changes to Ms Tolley’s presentation.
In order to ensure the Trust has learnt lessons from Ms Tolley’s death, it is vital that team and clinical
services review interventions described within care plans and leave agreements and consider how
these interventions can be altered depending on an individual’s presentation at a moment in time or
following any change in the baseline mental state or any significant events. This will allow staff to
use a more collaborative approach of engagement to enable them to respond to risk and also
balance the risk associated with needing to potentially intervene when leave is in progress.
Where any leave is agreed, the balance of any associated risk should be weighed up prior to the
leave and documented, to enable it to commence or be suspended for a period. Within that any
consideration to leave boundaries should also be considered, for example, is it appropriate to place
hands on a patient if the need arises in order to maintain their safety.
To support this learning, the following work will be undertaken through the local clinical governance
forums and monitored through audit.
o Staff are to reflect upon this case and subsequent learning. Teams will also liaise with
colleagues in the EMERGE Leeds (previously known as the Personality Disorder Manged
Clinical Network) to consider what further support they can provide to our inpatient staff. This
will be seen as an outside voice that can provide a reflective space with expertise.
2. The absconding instructions to staff (set out above) seems incompatible with the
duty to detain in order to keep safe, inherent in an order under Section 2 of the
Mental Health Act 1983 when viewed in the context of a patient deemed to require
such intensive monitoring.
The Trust has reviewed its Prevention, Management of Violence and Aggression (PMVA) training
provision offered to staff regarding the role of escorting patients outside of the ward and is
developing training for all staff, including bank staff. This training will be included in the initial and
updated PMVA training provision. The training will be scenario and role play based and will
include discussions regarding decision making related to risk whilst escorting somebody outside of
the ward.
This face-to-face group scenario will allow for wider discussion on the legal and ethical principles
in relation to managing difficult decision making alone which may result in the use of force being
required to return someone from leave.
This training aims to equip all staff with the knowledge and confidence to be able to act quickly and
autonomously in challenging clinical situations. The PMVA team will be supported and supervised
by the Trusts subject matter experts to ensure this is implemented effectively.
Page 2 of 6
3. The decision to permit ground leave so shortly after a
incident (and only
three days after a previous absconding incident) was made on a relatively informal
basis. There were no documented criteria to be considered before it was approved,
nor was the grade of staff required to make the decision stipulated.
Consideration for leave from the hospital ward are discussed via the Multidisciplinary Team (MDT).
It is at this meeting that the type of leave is discussed and agreed upon and this decision is based
on risk, current presentation, and history in relation to what is appropriate and therapeutic for the
patient at that time.
Despite a patient being granted ground leave, a further assessment should be undertaken on the
day taking into consideration a number of factors including compliance with previous leave,
consideration of benefits of further leave, and flexibility versus senior guidance. Additionally, the
following points should be taken into consideration:
o Any periods of recent changes to mental state and presentation
o Review of risks associated with leave which may or may not impact on the current
requested leave
o Review success of previous leave
Following this review a decision will be made in conjunction with the registered/named nurse along
with the nurse in charge (if required) to consider the appropriateness of leave and if this should be
altered. Staff must ensure that the decisions as detailed above are documented within care
records including the rationale and wider discussion.
4. The instruction to staff stipulated ‘physical interventions’ will not be used to restrain
Ms Tolley, yet this expression was not defined or particularised. Greater clarity might
assist a staff escort (likely to be a relatively junior individual) to know whether it was
permissible, for example, to put a gentle hand on Ms Tolley’s shoulder to steer her
back towards the hospital.
The care plan developed by the team and Ms Tolley considered the intervention of placing any
form of touch to Ms Tolley. It was deemed this would increase the risk of further distress to Ms
Tolley and may further increase the risk of emotional deregulation in the event of an individual
placing a hand on her. However more consideration should have been given to the need to think
about alternative means to support Ms Tolley, enabling her to maintain her self-control at the point
of feeling distressed whilst out on leave. Alternative strategies that could have been considered at
the point Ms Tolley indicated either physically or verbally that she was becoming distressed or that
she was not coping with the period of escorted leave.
In keeping with the Trusts review of its Prevention, Management of Violence and Aggression
(PMVA) training provision, as referred to in the previous response, training will be offered to staff
regarding the role of escorting service users outside of the ward and is developing training for all
staff, including bank staff. This training will be included in the initial and updated PMVA training
provision. The training will be scenario and role play based and will include discussions regarding
decision making related to risk whilst escorting somebody outside of the ward.
Page 3 of 6
This face-to-face group scenario will allow for wider discussion on the legal and ethical principles
in relation to managing difficult decision making alone which may result in the use of force being
required to return someone from leave.
This training will equip all staff with the knowledge and confidence to be able to act quickly and
autonomously in challenging clinical situations. The PMVA team will be supported and supervised
by the Trusts subject matter experts to ensure this is implemented effectively.
5. The permission given to walk in the grounds of the hospital was not considered to
amount to section 17 MHA 1983 leave. The informality involved in the decision
missed an opportunity to consider issues such as: (a) Whether two escorts would be
appropriate in view of Ms Tolley having absconded three days earlier. This would
have facilitated one person following her to monitor and report on her whereabouts.
In a time, critical situation this could have altered the tragic outcome; (b) Providing
the escort with a discretion in the manner of a dynamic risk assessment whether or
not to follow Ms Tolley. (c) Reviewing the type of bandage applied to her wounds,
before she was permitted to leave the ward, in the light of her
Consideration for leave from the hospital ward is discussed via the MDT, it is at this meeting that
the type of leave is discussed and agreed upon. This decision is based on risk, current
presentation, and history in relation to what is appropriate and therapeutic for the patient at that
time. The same principles would occur when discussing whether section 17 leave is appropriate. It
was considered by the MDT that Ms Tolley was suitable for periods of leave within the hospital
grounds as a first step on her recovery. Although ground leave had been granted by the
Registered Clinician, there is an expectation that the nursing staff will dynamically review risk prior
to letting a patient off the Ward. It is at this point that a review can be made, and further
consideration should be given in relation to the care plan and any further interventions that may be
required whilst out on leave i.e., increase in escorts.
To reflect and understand this further the Trust is going to undertake a tabletop review, which will
look at a sample of patients who have been given time off the ward to ensure the discussions as
described above have taken place and appropriately documented within the patients care record.
We acknowledge that Ms Tolley had previously
considered this along with the risk that her wound would become infected. The team have
identified that they could have requested guidance and support from the Trusts Physical Health
Team to support them in considering the prevention of infection and the types of wound coverage
that could have been used as alternative.
. The ward team
6. The care plan containing the staff instruction not to restrain, or follow was discussed
and agreed with Ms Tolley. She was thus expressly aware that if she did decide to
abscond, she knew she would be able to do so. Moreover, she was explicitly told that
the staff member escorting her would return to the reception area and wait for a short
period in the hope Ms Tolley would return voluntarily. The implication of this was that
Ms Tolley knew she had a period of grace of around 10 minutes in which to get clear
of the hospital, before the police would be asked to search for her. Whilst potentially
beneficial from a therapeutic perspective, such knowledge may also inform a
Page 4 of 6
vulnerable patient on ways in which the protection afforded by an MHA Section could
be undermined. The wisdom of explaining to a patient how the hospital staff would
respond to them absconding should be reviewed.
The Trust identifies that it is good practice to work collaboratively with service users in all aspects
of their care. It is important to build a relationship with open and honest conversations with our
service users to ensure there is clarity and mutually agreed expectations about actions that will be
taken in response to incidents such as absconsions. There is a recognition that as Ms Tolley was
aware that a short period of time would be given for her to return to the site, and that rather than
this aid Ms Tolley’s positive decision making as intended and planned for, she utilised the time to
take herself away from the Ward before the Police were notified. We will ensure that the learning
from this case is communicated within our procedure – ensure that staff are provided with clear
guidance when escorting patients of the action to be taken should leave start to break down or the
patient leaves the member of staff.
7. Ms Tolley was found with a l
used some time earlier to
dress a self-inflicted wound. She had twice before used such
(1) earlier the same day and (2) three days previously- 24 October. Consideration
should be given to the types of wound
view to selecting a type which could not serve as a
used at the Becklin Centre, with a
.
:
We acknowledge that Ms Tolley had previously used her
considered this along with the risk that her wound would become infected. Further learning is that
the Ward Team could have requested guidance and support from the Trusts Physical Health Team
to support them in considering the prevention of infection and the types of bandages that could
have been used as alternative.
. The ward team
We acknowledge that the sourcing of equally effective bandage material is sensible, our Physical
Health Team have been requested to scope what other
options are available. As part of
this work, they will also contact other Mental Health Trusts to ensure that any good practice is
captured and/or shared.
Our
staff on
clinical teams through our governance structures.
Anchor Point Assessment Procedure highlights bandages within our guidance for
. We will reference this when we share the report for learning with our
8. The Inquest was informed that the general policy in relation to absconding patients
has been under review since Ms Tolley’s death nearly two years ago but has
(understandably) been delayed during the Covid pandemic. It was said a draft revised
policy was sent to West Yorkshire Police on 14 June 2021 by way of consultation, but
no response has been received. In the meantime, similar instructions are still being
issued to staff not to restrain or follow in some other cases. There is thus an ongoing
risk of further deaths should a comparable situation arise again.
The Missing Service User Procedure, although led by the Trust, is jointly agreed with West
Yorkshire Police. Feedback on the procedure was received from West Yorkshire Police on the 11
November 2021. Upon receipt of the regulation 28, both organisations have taken a further review
of the procedure to ensure it contains the learning from the death of Ms Tolley. We are currently
Page 5 of 6
reviewing this feedback to ensure that it also meets the Trust’s requirements for a procedure that
is accessible and easily understandable for our staff.
The draft procedure will be circulated to stakeholders for comment on the week commencing the
13 December 2021 and will then be ratified and circulated by January 2022. The updated
procedure will be disseminated to all staff via Trustwide email, and any required adjustments will
also be made to any associated training.
We recognise that the time taken to progress this procedure is not acceptable, to ensure this does
not occur in any future policies developed in collaboration with outside organisations we will
communicate the following information through our governance structures:
Where outside organisations’ input is sought for a procedure, the report author must ensure that
the outside organisations are given clear timescales to provide their input and in the absence of
any input the Trust will proceed to revise its procedure and progress with implementation.
I hope that this response provides assurance of improvement, consistent with the concerns
highlighted in the Regulation 28 and we thank you for the opportunity to further reflect on the
learning following the sad death of Ms Tolley.
To support the further learning that will take place, the Trust will be developing an action plan
which will include all the recommendations provided within this response, we will of course share
this with you. We would be pleased to provide any further information or clarification required. If
you feel that a meeting with staff to discuss any of the above would be helpful, please do contact
us.
Yours Sincerely
Chief Executive
Page 6 of 6
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