Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2022

Andrew Kitson

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2022-0066, written 3 Mar 2022. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report3 Mar 2022
Reference2022-0066
DeceasedAndrew Kitson
CoronerKevin McLoughlin
Coroner areaWest Yorkshire (East)
CategoryPolice related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published2

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS  BEING SENT TO: 

1.  The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police, 
2.  Regional Major for West Yorkshire, 

1 

CORONER 

I am  Kevin Mcloughlin, Senior Coroner, for the Coroner area of West Yorkshire (East). 

2 

CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7,  Schedule 5,  of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and  regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On  11 th  June 2020 I commenced an  investigation into the death of Andrew David Kitson, 
aged 44.  The investigation concluded at the end of the  Inquest on  Thursday 3rd  March 
2022. The jury returned a narrative conclusion  including a finding that he was unlawfully 
killed  on  9th  June 2020 after he sustained multiple injuries when struck by a motorcar 
being driven at high speed as  it sought to flee from the police . 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

Around 5:20pm on Tuesday 9th  June 2020,  Mr Kitson was walking on the pavement of 
the A61  Leeds Road  in the directions of Wakefield. 

A Peugeot motorcar failed to stop when signalled to do so by police officers at 
approximately 5: 17pm in respect of a mobile phone offence they had observed. 

The police officer was authorised to pursue the Peugeot for a period of 2 minutes 42 
seconds over a distance of some 2½ miles, during which time the Peugeot was driven 
dangerously and  at high speed. 

The Peugeot lost control,  mounted the pavement and struck Mr Kitson, who sustained 
multiple injuries and was pronounced dead at the scene at 5:50pm that day. 

5 

CORONER'S CONCERNS 

During the course of the  Inquest the evidence revealed  matters giving rise to  concern.  In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken.  In the 
circumstances it is  my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  -

(1 )  The evidence taken at the inquest revealed insufficient statistical evidence was 

available to guide an  evaluation of the proportion of spontaneous police pursuits 
which 

(a)  involve driving at high speeds through residential areas; 
(b)  result in the apprehension of an offender; 
(c)  result in personal  injury to other road users or property damage; 
(d)  are aborted without the alleged offender being caught; 

without such analytical feedback (ideally prepared on a national basis) the risks 
inherent in such  pursuits, balanced against their effectiveness, cannot adequately 
be reviewed. 

(2)  The rules governing spontaneous police pursuits in  residential  areas place an 

onerous burden uoon  police drivers to review continuously the safety of oroceedinq 

1 

 
 
 whilst at the same time driving at high speed. The pursuit manager who authorises 
the continuance of a pursuit is dependant upon fragments of verbal  messages 
relayed over the radio,  due to the perceived  need to leave airtime for other TPAC 
units to input information. The Inquest heard evidence to the effect that real time 
camera pictures from the police vehicle are not always available due to  IT issues. 
This means the pursuit manager must largely trust the judgement of the police 
driver. 

In order to lessen the burden upon the police driver in  having to weigh  numerous 
factors in  a continuing,  complex judgement, consideration should  be given to a 
refinement of the parameters in which pursuits in residential areas are permitted. 
Such guidance to  pursuit managers (informed by data regarding the effectiveness 
and  risks arising in  previous pursuits) would  help to promote consistency and lessen 
the dependence upon a case-by-case judgement made in  a pressured timescale. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In  my opinion action should  be taken to prevent future deaths and  I believe your 
organisation has the  power to take such action. 

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You  are under a duty to respond to this report within 56  days of the date of this report, 
namely by Monday 9th  May 2022.  I,  the Coroner,  may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken,  setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise, you  must explain why no action is  proposed. 

8 

COPIES and  PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following  Interested 
Persons: 

(1)  The family of Andrew David Kitson 
(2)  The Independent Office for Police Conduct 

I have also sent it to the following who may find  it useful or of interest: 

(1) 
(2) 

 Yorkshire Live 
, Yorkshire Post 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. 

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in  a complete or redacted or summary 
form.  He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find  it useful 
or of interest. 

You  may make representations to  me,  the coroner, at the time of your response,  about 
the release or the  publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

~~~-t~~ 

cLOUGHLIN 

Ke 
Senior Coroner 
West Yorkshire (E) 

Dated:  3rd  March 2022 

2

Responses

2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Mayor of West Yorkshire (PDF)
Mayor Tracy Brabin 
West Yorkshire Combined Authority 
40-50 Wellington Street 
Leeds 
LS1 2DE  

Kevin McLoughlin 
Senior Coroner 
West Yorkshire (E) 

6 May 2022 

Dear Mr McLoughlin  

INQUEST TOUCHING THE DEATH OF ANDREW DAVID KITSON 
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

I acknowledge receipt of your Regulation 28 report dated 3rd May 2022 and provide this 
response pursuant to Regulation 29 of the Coroners (Investigation) Regulations 2013. 

Firstly, I would like to offer my sincerest condolences to the family of Andrew for their 
loss in circumstances that I appreciate must be extremely distressing.  

Your report has raised two matters of concern namely that:  

(1) The evidence taken at the inquest revealed insufficient statistical evidence was 

available to guide an evaluation of the proportion of spontaneous police pursuits 
which 

a.  involve driving at high speeds through residential areas; 
b.  result in apprehension of an offender; 
c.  result in personal injury to other road users or property damage; 
d.  are aborted without the alleged offender being caught; 

without such analytical feedback (ideally prepared on a national basis) the risks 
inherent in such pursuits, balanced against their effectiveness, cannot 
adequately be reviewed. 

(2) The rules governing spontaneous police pursuits in residential areas place an 

onerous burden upon police drivers to review continuously the safety of 
proceeding whilst at the same time driving at high speed. The pursuit manager 
who authorises the continuance of a pursuit is dependent upon fragments of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 verbal messages relayed over the radio, due to the perceived need to leave 
airtime for other TPAC units to input information. The inquest heard evidence to 
the effect that real time camera pictures from the police vehicle are not always 
available due to IT issues. This means that the pursuit manager must largely 
trust the judgement of the police driver. 

In order to lessen the burden upon the police driver in having to weigh numerous 
factors in a continuing, complex judgement, consideration should be given to a 
refinement of the parameters in which pursuits in residential areas are permitted. 
Such guidance to pursuit managers (informed by data regarding the 
effectiveness and risks arising in previous pursuits) would help to promote 
consistency and lessen the dependence on a case-by-case judgement made in a 
pressured timescale. 

The use of spontaneous police pursuits is a matter of operational policing 
concerning the deployment of police officers which falls under the direction and 
control of the Chief Constable. As the Mayor of West Yorkshire with Police and 
Crime Commissioner responsibilities, my statutory role is to hold the Chief Constable 
of West Yorkshire to account for the performance of his functions without 
compromising or fettering his operational independence (s.1 Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act 2011 and Policing Protocol Order 2011). 

I have governance structures in place to facilitate and support my statutory 
functions, including regular executive accountability meetings held with the Chief 
Constable and Chief officer Team at West Yorkshire Police, and a Joint Independent 
Ethics Committee that independently scrutinises the ethics of policing in West 
Yorkshire. This independent committee receives an annual report on the ethical 
considerations around police pursuits which covers decision making, threat and risk 
considerations, all related injuries and fatalities subject to a Post Incident Manager 
or IOPC referral and any ongoing work and developments. 

I have had sight of the Chief Constable’s response to your report which I trust 
addresses the operational concerns you have raised. In my role as the Mayor, I will 
continue to hold the Chief Constable to account in the performance of his statutory 
functions including the use of spontaneous police pursuits. 

Yours sincerely, 

Tracy Brabin 
Mayor of West Yorkshire
Response from West Yorkshire Police (PDF)
Headquarters 
PO Box 9 
Laburnum Road 
Wakefield 
West Yorkshire 
WF1 3QP 

Office of the Chief Constable 

Friday 6th May 2022 

Kevin McLoughlin 
Senior Coroner 
Coroners Office and Court 
71 Northgate 
Wakefield 
WF1 3BS 

Dear Mr McLoughlin 

Inquest touching the death of Andrew KITSON 1st – 3rd March 2022 
Response to announcement pursuant to Regulation 28 of the Coroners (Investigations) Rules 
2013. 

I am writing in response to the matters you raise in Annex A paragraph 5B of the Regulation 28 report 
directed towards West Yorkshire Police. 

First of all, I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere condolences to the family of Andrew. 
I can appreciate how  distressing the loss of a family member  would be, particularly  in these tragic 
circumstances. I would from the outset seek to reassure that any and all police incidents or activity 
that are either directly, indirectly or otherwise linked to the serious injury or death of any individual 
are, as a matter of course, inspected and investigated with due diligence.  

Following receipt of the Regulation 28 report, we undertook to re-evaluate our local arrangements at 
West Yorkshire Police and also to liaise with the NPCC National leads for Pursuit and Driving Standards 
to assess our compliance with National Standards. 

In your report to prevent future deaths Annex A paragraph 5B you identified  2 matters of concern 
which I shall reply to in turn. 

1.

The evidence taken at inquest revealed insufficient statistical evidence was available to guide
an evaluation of the proportion of spontaneous police pursuits which:
(a) Involve driving at high speeds through residential areas;
(b) Result in the apprehension of an offender;
(c) Result in personal injury to other road users or property damage;
(d) Are aborted without the alleged offender being caught;

 
 Without  such analytical feedback (ideally prepared on a national basis) the risks inherent in 
such pursuits, balanced against their effectiveness, cannot adequately be reviewed. 

West  Yorkshire  Police  has  recorded  data  relating  to  pursuits  since  2017.   From  April  2019,  the 
mechanisms for recording data changed and as such for the period between April 2019 and July 2020, 
the data remains available but only manually retrievable from RT18 forms. This particular format is 
not easily useable or searchable.  However, since July 2020 all pursuits are recorded on a Force system 
called Chronicle (an electronic database) and this data is passed through to the National Pursuits Group 
(NPROII) on a quarterly basis. The data includes whether the pursuit was spontaneous, the reason for 
the pursuit, time/date, whether the pursuit was discontinued, the reason for discontinuance and the 
location. 

While the data does include a location, this is a point in time and does not readily identify all streets 
the  pursuit  may  drive  along.   West  Yorkshire obviously  combines  urban  and  rural  locations  and  an 
extensive strategic road (motorway) network. It is commonplace for many pursuits to take place on a 
variety of road types therefore identifying all pursuits that occur in urban areas/ residential streets/ 
motorways would entail reviewing each minute of every pursuit.  Whether a pursuit should continue 
on  a  residential  road  is  based  on  the  risk  assessment  (environmental  factors,  suspect  behaviour, 
offence gravity) at the time the pursuit is occurring.  

The Chronicle system does not record speeds of the police vehicle; however, speed is recorded on the 
vehicle’s internal system (Airmax) data as well as the vehicle’s internal camera (Watchguard: fitted to 
all advanced vehicles).  Both the data and in-car footage are retrievable, however this would require 
manual  review  and  cross-referencing.  During  the  incident  subject  of  the  inquest,  the  speed of  the 
police  vehicle  on  a  residential  road  reached  90mph  for  a  very  short  period  of  time  and  then 
reduced. While there is no definition per se of what speed constitutes “high speed”, this would be a 
subjective  assessment  dependent  on  the  overall  risk  assessment  and  prevailing  circumstances 
surrounding the pursuit. Due to the dynamic nature of pursuits, the reality and perceptions of high 
speed have the potential to vary rapidly as the prevailing circumstances change. 

The statistical data that is obtained through Chronicle advises whether there was any injury to any 
persons  involved  in  the  pursuit.   The  data  also  includes  the  level  of  damage  caused  to  the  police 
vehicles, subject vehicles, street furniture and any other property. A sample of the data from Chronicle 
between 1 April 2021 and 31 march 2022 show that, of the 825 spontaneous pursuits, 16% resulted in 
some form of damage to property and only 2.6% resulted in some form of injury. 

There is currently no system-retrievable data which directly correlates whether a suspect is detained 
as a result of a pursuit. Additional de-briefing reports (the command and control system incident log, 
supervisor shift reports) do routinely explain pursuit activity and arrests made. Chronicle can only be 
configured on a national level to include whether an arrest(s) is made or not. Discussions are to be 
undertaken with the National Pursuit Group to explore the re-configuration of Chronical to include 
specific arrest information. 

The local data (via Chronicle) will be fed into training to inform of considerations around risk and the 
duty to apprehend suspects. Similarly, the national data reporting will be consistently fed into driver 
training. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Collaboration with the National Pursuit Group regarding whether all Forces routinely debrief pursuit 
activity (incorporating airmax/ watchguard) and to adapt as local practice is ongoing.  

The  ongoing  assessment  of  trends  in  pursuit  outcomes  and  the  link  to  driver  training  (national 
standards) has been raised with 

 (national lead for Pursuit). 

2.  The rules governing spontaneous police pursuits in residential areas place an onerous burden 
upon police drivers to review continuously the safety of proceedings whilst at the same time 
driving  at  high  speed.  The  pursuit  manager  who  authorises  the  continuance  of  a  pursuit  is 
dependent on fragments of verbal messages relayed over the radio, due to the perceived need 
to leave airtime for other TPAC units to input information. The inquest heard evidence to the 
effect that real time camera pictures from the police vehicle are not always available due to IT 
issues. This means the pursuit manager must largely trust the judgement of the police driver. 

In order to lessen the burden upon the police driver in having to weigh numerous factors in 
continuing,  complex  judgement,  consideration  should  be  given  to  a  refinement  of  the 
parameters  in  which  pursuits  in  residential  areas  are  permitted.  Such  guidance  to  pursuit 
managers (informed by data regarding the effectiveness and risks arising in previous disputes) 
would  help  to  promote  consistency  and  lessen  dependence  upon  a  case-by-case  judgement 
made in a pressured timescale 

It is important to state that UK Policing works to achieve national consistency around training, tactics 
and  decision-making.  Consideration  of  collating  and  using  statistical  data  to  re-define  parameters 
would require a National-level discussion to ensure any decision taken was a consistent one. 

It  is  an  operational  reality  that  every  pursuit  has  different  and  distinct  dynamics  which  relate  to: 
environmental factors; suspect identity, capability and intent; suspect vehicle capability; police officer 
capability; police vehicle capability; offence severity; and the ongoing risk assessment. Taking these 
into account,   and in order to provide the best possible decision-making capability, West  Yorkshire 
Police’s Driver Training utilises Authorised Professional (National) Practice, in conjunction with robust 
training  around  the  use  of  the  National  Decision  Model,  which  outlines  the  relevant  roles  and 
responsibilities  as  below.  Our  organisational  code  of  ethics  also  demands  that  officers,  pursuit 
commanders and supervisors consider strongly what the public would expect of them in any given 
situation and also what the expectations of West Yorkshire Police would be and this sits at the centre 
of all decision-making activity. 

Control/communications room supervisor 

In  addition  to  providing  support  and  advice  to  the  operator  engaged  with  the  pursuit,  the 
control/communications room supervisor is responsible for: 

the overall control of the pursuit 
• 
constantly risk assessing the activity, based on information and intelligence received 
• 
approving initial and continued authorisation for pursuit, at the earliest opportunity 
• 
•  ensuring  that  tactical  phase  trained  advanced  drivers  in  suitable  vehicles  have  been 
assigned to a pursuit and can respond within a timeframe that balances operational need 
with the potential for harm, where initial phase trained drivers/motorcyclists have been 
authorised to conduct initial phase pursuit 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • 
• 

identifying and agreeing a pursuit commander 
considering the current level of authority in light of incoming information (dynamic risk 
assessment process, and sources of intelligence) and advice  from an appointed pursuit 
tactical advisor 

•  ordering additional units to assist if necessary. 

The  control/communications  room  supervisor  should  also  ensure  that  forces  are  notified  when  a 
pursuit  is  approaching  force  boundaries  and  provide  them  with  information  regarding  any 
tactical authorisations previously given and current. 

The emphasis should be on the fact that Control Room Supervisors manage the pursuit in terms of 
available appropriately trained resources / tactics, and the overview of other resources or operations 
that may impact. E.g. A firearms operation running in the same immediate area.  

Pursuit (Ground) Commander 

This role is not rank based and is undertaken by the person most appropriately placed and equipped 
to make necessary tactical decisions. The pursuit commander is an appropriate officer within one of 
the pursuing tactical phase vehicles, responsible for executing tactics and maintaining communication 
during the management of a pursuit. They should clearly identify themselves as such to all officers 
engaged in the pursuit, and to control/communications room staff. 

The  pursuit  commander  co-ordinates  the  deployment  of  tactics  whilst  providing  relevant  risk 
assessments throughout. 

Throughout  the  pursuit  the  risk  assessment  should  be  refreshed  and  include  the  following 
considerations, in accordance with the national decision model: 

the current level of risk posed by the pursued driver 

• 
•  whether or not the suspect’s identity is known 
the seriousness of any known offence committed or suspected 
• 
the weight of intelligence as to whether the suspects are, or are likely to be, armed  
• 
•  whether  the  driver  is,  or  appears  to  be,  a  juvenile  or  whether  it  appears  that  other 

vulnerable persons are in the vehicle 
the type of vehicle being pursued, e.g. car or motorcycle 
the current/anticipated route in respect of the time of day, road, weather, traffic, specific 
considerations such as schools, licensed premises or off-road terrain 
the availability of tactical options. 

• 
• 

• 

For wider context and reassurance, the actions taken to reduce the inherent risks posed by pursuit 
driving are: 

• 

• 

the training of the officers (both driving and risk management – including development 
of the use of the National Decision Model); 
refreshing that training regularly (training within West Yorkshire is refreshed in line with 
the  College  of  Policing  guidance  (Standard/Advanced  –  every 5  years and  Initial  Phase 
Pursuit/Tactical Phase And Containment – every 3 years). 

 
 
 
 
 
 •  providing other assigned resources such as NPAS (air assets, helicopter and fixed wing 

aircraft) and Dog Units; 

•  oversight from the Force Control Hub (FCH) Supervisor who has autonomy to discontinue 

the pursuit based on the risk assessment.   

The  FCH  Supervisor  has  the  capability  to  watch  the pursuit  through  a  live  feed.  The  inquest  heard 
evidence that this can be affected by connectivity issues when in heavily populated or rural locations 
and  as  such  does  sometimes  have  a  time  lag  but  generally  provides  valuable  information  to  aid 
decision-making.  However,  this  reinforces  the  rationale  for  affording  the  decision-making  primacy 
with the Ground Commander (as below). 

The Force Control Hub Supervisor is involved in conducting a joint risk assessment with the Ground 
Commander,  but  it  is  for  the  Ground  Commander  to  lead  this  assessment  and  there  are  natural 
advantages  in  doing  so.   The  FCH  Supervisor  is  inevitably  unable  to  view  everything  the  ground 
commander can see, hear and feel from within the vehicle.  Should the Ground Commander only be 
requested to provide a limited risk assessment (to mitigate their decision-making burden) then there 
exists the potential for a detrimental effect on the overall assessment.   Driver training courses  are 
already  heavily  orientated  towards  the  assessment  of  risks  in  built  up  areas  with  the  majority  of 
training being on urban roads along with an emphasis on key features officers should be looking out 
for when conducting risk assessments and of course the use of APP for risk assessments. 

Post-incident Procedures 

Should any pursuit result in death or serious injury, referrals are made to the IOPC via our Professional 
Standards  Department  and  a  Post-incident  Procedure  instigated  with  trained  and  accredited  Post-
incident Managers. This procedure is also a nationally standardised and accredited one which seeks to 
determine  causation,  any  degree  of  blameworthiness  and/  or  learning  &  improvement  activity  for 
individuals and/ or the force involved. 

Nationally, Deputy Chief Constable Woods (National Police Chiefs Council for Driver Training) leads on 
the  standardisation  of  training,  trainer  student  ratios,  how  many  days  training  per  annum,  force’s 
compliance reporting via Chief Officer Teams and is working towards Driver Training products being 
licensed via the College of Policing. 

I do hope that the information provided above allays your concerns which you expressed in your letter 
dated 3rd March 2022. I also hope this provides the family and any interested parties with assurance 
that West Yorkshire Police are committed to ensuring the safety of all persons during police pursuits. 

Yours sincerely 

Chief Constable 
West Yorkshire Police

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