Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0089, written 13 Mar 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 13 Mar 2023 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2023-0089 |
| Deceased | Charlotte Comer |
| Coroner | David Reid |
| Coroner area | Worcestershire |
| Category | Suicide (from 2015) |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: Chief Executive, Herefordshire & Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust 1 CORONER I am David Donald William REID, HM Senior Coroner for Worcestershire. 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST [the details below are fictional] On 27 July 2021 I commenced an investigation and opened an inquest into the death of Charlotte Comer. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 17 February 2023. The conclusion of the inquest was as follows: “Charlotte Comer died as the result of suicide. The following failings on the part of the Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust ( 'the Trust' ) probably caused or contributed to her death: (a) The erroneous decision at the beginning of 2021 to seek to pause Charlotte's referral to the Priory Hospital for specialist treatment for Body Dysmorphic Disorder; (b) The high turnover of care coordinators for Charlotte whilst she was under the Trust's care, together with a five month period when she was without a care coordinator at all, which led to a loss of awareness on the Trust's part about the seriousness and complexity of Charlotte's needs; and (c) The failure by the Trust to provide sufficient focus on the important issue of Charlotte's Body Dysmorphic Disorder. Charlotte's death was contributed to by neglect.” 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH In answer to the questions “when, where, how and in what circumstances did Charlotte come by her death?”, I recorded as follows: “On 18.7.21 Charlotte Comer, who lived with a number of significant mental health disorders, including Body Dysmorphic Disorder, and had a known history of attempts at suicide and self-harm, left Worcestershire Royal Hospital before doctors there could treat a substantial, recently self-inflicted wound to her upper arm. She returned initially to her parents' home, before then making her way to her own address in Worcester, where she proceeded to take a substantial overdose of Propranolol and Amlodipine medication. She was taken by ambulance back to Worcestershire Royal Hospital where, despite treatment, she succumbed to the effects of the overdose and died on the morning of 20.7.21.” 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS 1 During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. – (1) During the 2½ years in which Charlotte’s mental health care was provided by the Trust, she had total of 8 different care coordinators. Furthermore, in those 2½ years there was a 5 month period when Charlotte had no appointed care coordinator at all. The care coordinator role is particularly important for a patient with such a complex case history as Charlotte. I heard evidence that at the time of these events, the Trust had been experiencing an unprecedented level of instability, with many staff who might have been expected to fulfil care coordinator roles going off sick or even leaving the service. The witness who had conducted the Trust’s own internal investigation into these events gave evidence that one of the major reasons for this instability was that staff were unable to cope with ever-increasing workloads. The Trust’s Community Services manager for the Worcestershire Neighbourhood Teams appeared to corroborate this in his evidence, confirming that whilst national guidelines recommend a maximum of 30 patients per care coordinator, at the time of these events the Trust’s care coordinators had around 100 patients each. Whilst he was able to provide some reassurance that a recent recruitment drive has reduced individual care coordinator caseloads to around 25 patients, he was unable to explain how individual caseloads had been able to reach the levels they did at the time of these events, and was unable to give accurate figures as to current levels of staff sickness/absence. I am concerned that the Trust is unable to understand fully how the care coordinator system failed at the time of these events, and that it is therefore not in a position to guard against a repeat of these circumstances in the future. (2) The erroneous decision to pause Charlotte’s referral to the Priory Hospital for specialist treatment for Body Dysmorphic Disorder was taken by a senior clinician acting on her own, despite a Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting having decided that the referral was appropriate. When asked about how the senior clinician could have overridden the MDT decision, the Trust’s Community Services manager for the Worcestershire Neighbourhood Teams told the inquest that he could not say whether the senior clinician was not aware of the correct decision-making procedure, or whether she was, but chose instead to ignore it. When asked whether the same issue could arise in future, he told the inquest that he himself would be in a position to prevent the senior clinician making the wrong decision, but could not guarantee that he would be made aware of the issue so as to be able to do so. I am concerned that the Trust has not properly established how the senior clinician was able to override the MDT decision, and does not have a sufficiently robust system in place to ensure that MDT decisions cannot be overridden in this way in future. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you, as Chief Executive of the Herefordshire & Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust, have the power to take such action. YOUR RESPONSE 7 2 You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 8 May 2023. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: Novum Law solicitors ( representing Charlotte’s family ); ( Charlotte’s parents ); I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 13 March 2023 David REID HM Senior Coroner for Worcestershire 3
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Chief Executives Office 2 Kings Court Charles Hastings Way Worcester WR5 1JR 5th May 2023 Mr D D W Reid HM Senior Coroner Worcestershire Coroner’s Court Dear Mr Reid, Re: Inquest touching the death of Charlotte Comer Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths - response Thank you for forwarding on your Regulation 28 report. I have read your report with great care and note the concerns that you have raised as a result of the coronial inquiry into the death of Charlotte Comer. In your report, you highlighted the following points of concern and I will respond to these concerns together, as each concern represents a sequence of events. Concerns During the 2½ years in which Charlotte’s mental health care was provided by the Trust, she had a total of 8 different care coordinators. Furthermore, in those 2½ years there was a 5 month period when Charlotte had no appointed care coordinator at all. The care coordinator role is particularly important for a patient with such a complex case history as Charlotte. The Trust fully recognises that the care coordinator system as it existed at the time failed Charlotte, and we are focused on ensuring no other patient has the experience that Charlotte very regrettably did. At the time of Charlotte’s death, the Trust had already embarked on Transformation of its community service provision in line with national developments. In October 2020, we received additional funds to test new models of integrated care as set out in the national Long Term Plan. The roll-out of the Transformation was phased across the county, and Worcester City began its process of Transformation in October 2021, after Charlotte had died. The period of uncertainty associated with the Transformation, as with any significant change, did see a turnover of staff. Coupled with the effects of the pandemic, and a growing and acknowledged national scarcity of qualified and registered healthcare staff, this unfortunately did see a period of acute staffing shortage particularly evident among those staff fulfilling care co-ordination and leadership roles. It is worth explaining at this point that the traditional function of care co-ordination, historically core to the delivery of Community Mental Health Services, has evolved through Transformation. Central to the new model is an approach to personalised care and support planning embodied in the role of key worker. The key worker can be any member of the multidisciplinary team (MDT) working with a patient, but will typically be the team member with the most input into that patient’s care who is therefore best placed to provide meaningful continuity of care. This separates out a crucial continuity function from the registered professional statuses (Registered Mental Health Nurse, Occupational Therapist, Social Worker) historically associated with care coordination, with the aim of enabling a more flexible and efficient allocation of capacity across a team also including others e.g. link workers, psychologists, and ultimately intended to ensure that each patient is consistently looked after in a way best suited to their needs. It’s important to note that this does not mean that core professional roles have been dispensed with, or that the professional input to the now Neighbourhood Mental Health Teams (NMHTs) has reduced. In fact, under Transformation, the established numbers of Mental Health Practitioner (MHP) fulfilled by the professions previously listed has increased on the former number of Care Coordinators. In many cases, and where clinically indicated, MHPs will also continue to act as key workers, and after the acknowledged dip in staffing numbers, recruitment and retention for these groups of staff is improving. At the time of and in the period running up to Charlotte’s death, though, Care Co-ordinators faced large caseloads and an emphasis on fulfilling all the needs of their patients themselves, (whereas Transformation enables a more dynamic team approach led by key worker input to ensure that patients’ needs are met by the right professionals at the right time). I am pleased to be able to say that caseloads for MHPs and key workers are now lower than they were at the time Charlotte was under our care. C.20-25 patients per Care Coordinator is now typical, and within national guidelines. The management and leadership of the NMHTs across the county has also been significantly reinforced, so that effective oversight of team activity has been enhanced. The leadership structure for Worcestershire NMHTs consists of fourteen posts (an increase on the previous structure) and all those posts have now been substantively recruited to. You have asked whether we have fully understood the circumstances that pertained at the time and how the resultant discontinuity of care contributed to Charlotte’s sad death. I believe Charlotte’s experience of multiple care coordinators is effectively addressed in part through the change to a key worker approach and the overall expansion of the team inherent in the Transformation. Further, though, we now have in place systems and processes to ensure that patients whose acuity is escalating can be appropriately overseen. The Worcester City “huddle” takes place twice-weekly and focuses on those in high-need groups taking into account acuity, diagnosis and other concerns or vulnerabilities such as high-risk medications. In the event that a patient does not have an allocated MHP and it is judged that their risk has escalated materially such that they require that (or other) input, then this is picked up, and other work reprioritised if necessary to facilitate this. I hope the above serves to alleviate your concerns about our ability to effectively manage patient care especially for those patients with more complex presentations. The erroneous decision to pause Charlotte’s referral to the Priory Hospital for specialist treatment for Body Dysmorphic Disorder was taken by a senior clinician acting on her own, despite a Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting having decided that the referral was appropriate. When asked about how the senior clinician could have overridden the MDT decision, the Trust’s Community Services manager for the Worcestershire Neighbourhood Teams told the inquest that he could not say whether the senior clinician was not aware of the correct decision-making procedure, or whether she was, but chose instead to ignore it. When asked whether the same issue could arise in future, he told the inquest that he himself would be in a position to prevent the senior clinician making the wrong decision, but could not guarantee that he would be made aware of the issue so as to be able to do so. The Trust fully accepts that a lead clinician sought to cancel Charlotte’s Priory referral in error. Evidence of this human error was reflected in the original Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and, consequently, actions have been put in place for a new process for funding arrangements. 2 Any decisions regarding funding arrangements for specialist services are now established at weekly MDT meetings. Any proposed change to an application must therefore also be brought to a subsequent MDT meeting, and any clinician wishing to challenge or change the MDT decision must be present to make their case. Each decision or change, and the rationale for it, must be clearly and contemporaneously recorded in the patient’s clinical notes. This process ensures mandatory open discussion in a recorded forum (MDT) as a precondition for any change. If the MDT is unable to come to a consensus, the issue will be escalated to the Associate Director (or Deputy Associate Director in their absence) and the Associate Medical Director for a decision. The rationale for the initial decision and challenge must be presented to them, and the decision of the Associate Director and Associate Medical Director will be final. Finally, the whole is overseen by an already extant funding oversight board within the Trust which meets once a month. This process has been clearly communicated to all staff. I hope this reassures you that the Trust has understood how a senior clinician was originally able to override the MDT decision in Charlotte’s case, and how there is now a robust system in place to ensure that such a thing cannot occur in future. I hope that the above adequately addresses your concerns. I do not have any submissions to make in respect of publication of this response. I shall be grateful if you could kindly send a copy of my response to those to whom you copied your Regulation 28 report. Yours sincerely Chief Executive 3
See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching Suicide (from 2015), and how often a new one appears.
What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text
Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.
These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.