Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023

Rebecca Fisher

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0154, written 15 May 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report15 May 2023
Reference2023-0154
DeceasedRebecca Fisher
CoronerAlison Mutch
Coroner areaManchester South
CategorySuicide (from 2015)
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: Chief Constable of Greater 
Manchester Police 

1  CORONER 

I am Alison Mutch, Senior Coroner, for the Coroner Area of Greater 
Manchester South 

2  CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners 
(Investigations) Regulations 2013 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 19th  April 2022 I commenced an investigation into the death of 
Rebecca Alice Fisher. The investigation concluded on the 18th  April 2023 
and the conclusion was one of Suicide. The medical cause of death was 
1a) Drug Toxicity 

4  CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

On 15th  April 2022, Rebecca Alice fisher was found deceased by her 
family in a secluded area of Reddish Vale. Post-mortem examination 
included toxicology. She had a fatal dose of drugs in her system including 
pregabalin. 

 Rebecca had been reported by the 

Norbury Ward to Greater Manchester Police (GMP) as a high-risk missing 
person on the 11th  April at about 6pm after she failed to return from 30 
minutes of unescorted leave. Rebecca had a complex mental health 
history 

 She had been admitted to the Norbury ward as a crisis 

patient. 

. She had been allowed to leave for 30 minutes of 

unescorted leave. It was recognised that this presented a risk. Her failure 
to return was correctly assessed by hospital staff as creating an 
escalated risk and a high-risk situation. Greater Manchester Police failed 
to correctly assess her as a high-risk missing person. As a consequence, 
this meant that mobile telephone enquiries were not immediately 
undertaken, and the investigation did not have specialised input in the 
hours immediately following her being reported missing. It is probable that 

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 if these enquiries had taken place Greater Manchester Police would have 
known she was in the area of her home address and Reddish Vale. It is 
possible that Rebecca would have been found before she died had she 
been treated as a high-risk missing person. 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise 
to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur 
unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to 
report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  – 

The inquest heard evidence that GMP have guidance to support officers 
in assessing risk and guiding actions when there is a missing person 
report. The evidence was that despite the existence of the 
policy/document the risk was not recognised as being high risk and the 
appropriate actions were not taken immediately. The evidence indicated 
that a number of factors were key in this failure to accurately assess the 
risk. This included: 

1.  Poor understanding by GMP staff of the fact that a patient detained 
on a voluntary basis in a mental health ward could still be high risk 
if they failed to return; 

2.  Lack of understanding by GMP staff that the use by mental health 
units of short periods away from the unit to support a patient’s 
recovery did not mean a patient could not be high risk if they did 
not return; 

3.  Lack of understanding by officers of how to apply the golden hour 
guidance and what was the expectation in terms of timeliness of 
undertaking the steps within the guidance coupled with a lack of 
understanding by some officers of the way/cost to GMP in 
accessing mobile phone data such as cell site; and 

4.  Poor quality documentation and information sharing between 

officers and supervision in relation to information from the family 
and the mental health unit. 

The inquest was told that GMP had rolled out an Aide Memoire system to 
try to embed greater consistency and understanding of the policy across 
GMP. The Aide Memoires were recognised as being an effective tool. 
However, there was no evidence available to assist in understanding if 
the Aide Memoires were being used effectively across the force and how 
GMP were measuring the implementation of them. 

Evidence was given to the inquest that GMP have introduced further 
training on missing persons. However, the effectiveness of that training 
was unclear given witnesses who had been on the training who gave 
evidence remained of the view that Rebecca was not a high-risk missing 
person despite all of the evidence available at the inquest. 

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 6  ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I 
believe you have the power to take such action. 

7  YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date 
of this report, namely by 10th  July 2023. I, the coroner, may extend the 
period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be 
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain 
why no action is proposed. 

8  COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following 
Interested Persons namely 1) 
2) Pennine Care, who may find it useful or of interest. 

 on behalf of the Family; 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your 
response. 

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted 
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who 
he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make 
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about 
the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9  Alison Mutch 

HM Senior Coroner 

15.05.2023 

3

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Greater Manchester Police (PDF)
Chief Constable 

Senior Coroner Alison Mutch 
HM  Coroner South 
Coroner's Court 
1 Mount Tabor Street 
Stockport 
SK13AG 

GREATER MANCHESTER 

POLICE 

23'd  June 2023 

Dear Ms Mutch 

Re  Regulation 28 report following the inquest into the death of Rebecca Alison Fisher 

Thank you  for your report dated  15t h  May 2023  in  respect  of the  tragic death  of Rebecca Alice 
Fisher pursuant to Regulation  28 and 29  of the  Coroners (Investigations)  Regulations  2013 and 
Paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the  Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 

Having carefully considered your report, I make the following observations and recommendations 
to address your matters of concern; 

1.  Poor  understanding  by GMP staff of the fact that a  patient  detained  on  a  voluntary 

basis in a mental health ward could still be high risk if they failed to return. 

2.  Lack  of  understanding  by  GMP  staff  that  the  use  by  mental  health  units  of  short 
periods away from the unit to support a patient's recovery did not mean a patient could 
not be high risk if they did not return. 

3.  Lack of understanding by officers of how to apply the golden hour guidance and what 
was  the  expectation  in  terms  of  timeliness  of  undertaking  the  steps  within  the 
guidance  coupled  with  a  lack of understanding  by some  officers of the way/cost to 
GMP in accessing mobile phone data such as cell site; and 

4.  Poor quality documentation and information sharing between officers and supervision 

in relation to information from the family and the mental health unit. 

The  inquest was  told  that GMP  had  rolled  out an  Aide  Memoire system  to  try to  embed  greater 
consistency and understanding of the policy across GMP. The Aide Memoires were recognised as 
being an effective tool. However, there was no evidence available to assist in understanding if the 
Aide  Memoires were  being  used  effectively across the force  and  how GMP were measuring the 
implementation of them. 

In providing this response  I have consulted with the Strategic Organisational Learning Team, the 
Professional  Standards  Branch  (PSB),  the  Missing  Person  Safeguarding  Unit  (MPSU)  and 
Greater Manchester Police's (GMP) in  house training  centre. 

Postal address:  Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11  2NS 

 
 Cont.d pg 2 

Response to Points one and two 

1.  Poor understanding  by  GMP  staff of the  fact that  a  patient  detained  on  a  voluntary 

basis in a mental  health ward could still  be high risk if they failed to return. 

2.  Lack  of  understanding  by  GMP  staff  that  the  use  by  mental  health  units  of short 
periods away from the unit to support a patient's recovery did not mean a patient could 
not be  high risk if they did not return. 

GMP want to ensure that its staff and officers understand the terminology used by mental health 
services  for  voluntary  mental  health  patients  and  for  those  who  have  unescorted  leave.  To 
address this, I have asked the Organisational  Learning  Development Group (OLDG) to produce 
a seven-minute briefing. A seven-minute briefing is widely used across organisations as research 
suggests  that  seven  minutes  is  an  ideal  time  span  to  concentrate  and  learning  is  more 
memorable, as  it is  simple  and  not clouded  by  other issues  and  pressures.  It is  delivered  in  a 
flow chart form , in  person  by supervisors.  This format also allows the recipients to ask questions 
following the  briefing to confirm their understanding. 

Specifically, this  briefing  will  cover what  the term  'voluntary' means when  referring  to a mental 
health patient.  It will explain that just because a person is a 'voluntary' mental health patient, this 
does  not  automatically  lower  the  level  of  risk  should  they  be  reported  as  a  missing  person. 
Similarly, if a mental health patient is allowed unescorted leave, this is part of their treatment plan 
and again it should not be  assumed that the risk level should be lower because of this fact.  Once 
officers  understand  this  terminology,  they  are  more  empowered  to  understand  the  risk  level 
identified  by  the  staff  caring  for the  patient.  This  allows  for  better  decision  making  especially 
regarding  classification of risk. 

The OLDG have been tasked to produce this briefing and  assist with its dissemination to  ensure 
that it reaches everyone across GMP who are responsible for dealing with missing persons. There 
are several avenues which can  be used to ensure this reaches the intended participants. 

This includes: 

•  Publication of a leading article on the intranet. All officers and staff have access to this site 

and would  be able to read the article. 
• 
Including the information in the organisational learning monthly top three bulletin. 
•  Circulation via organisational learning, which is accessible to all GMP staff and officers. 

I want to ensure that officers and staff understand the new information being  presented to them 
within the briefing and that they can effectively apply this in their everyday role when investigating 
a missing  person.  To  achieve this,  the OLDG  are  currently  exploring the  most effective way to 
monitor their understanding. There are several options available which are being considered. 

This includes; 

The use of a knowledge check at the end of the learning. 
Surveys for the staff to complete after the briefing. 

• 
• 
•  Using a QR code for delegates to provide course feedback.  This  can  be completed on a 
work phone with tailored questions to ask about their knowledge of this area  prior to the 
input and what they have learnt from the input. 

Postal address:  Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11  2NS 

 Cont.d pg  3 

All available options will be considered to ensure that the best methods are used to measure the 
effectiveness of this briefing across the organisation. 

Whilst  this  briefing  package  is  being  designed  by  the  OLDG,  GMP  have,  in  the  short  term, 
circulated a memorandum to all  District Commanders explaining the  issues highlighted from this 
inquest  and  an  explanation  of  the  terminology  used  in  mental  health  settings  and  previous 
misconception of risk. The notification also includes the information detailed within the response 
to point three below regarding golden hour tasks and a lack of understanding around the cost of 
accessing  mobile  phone  data.  The  District  Commanders  will  then  disseminate  this  to  their 
divisional supervisors and colleagues. 

This memorandum was sent out on the 2P1June 2023 to District Commanders across all divisions 
by  Detective Superintendent Higham from the MPSU. 

Response to Point three 

3.  Lack of understanding by officers of how to apply the golden hour guidance and what 
was  the  expectation  in  terms  of  timeliness  of  undertaking  the  steps  within  the 
guidance  coupled  with  a  lack  of understanding  by some  officers  of the  way/cost to 
GMP in  accessing mobile phone data such as cell site;  and 

The Missing from  Home Policy (MFH) 2022 sets out the Golden Hour principles for the actions to 
be  considered  'immediately' for a high-risk missing  person  and  as  a  'priority' for a medium  risk 
missing person. 

The  term  used  within  the  MFH  Policy  for  actions  relating  to  a  medium  risk  missing  person  is 
'priority'  and  it  is  acknowledged  that  this  was  misunderstood  by  some  officers  as to  what  time 
frame this is referring to. 

I  have  consulted  with  the  MPSU,  and  they  are  going  to  consider  this  terminology  and  will  be 
explaining it further to aid the officers understanding of what time frame this refers to. 

The MFH policy  is currently being  reviewed by the Prevention Branch  and as part of this review, 
the specific wording of this aspect of the policy will be considered to provide more clarity. 

One of the Golden  Hour considerations  is  regarding  mobile  phones  and  whether tracing  or cell 
citing is an  appropriate enquiry to locate the missing person. 

Specifically  on  the  Stockport  District,  the  Senior  Leadership  Team  have  already  circulated  a 
notification to all  response supervisors to ensure that they are aware that cell  citing , and  mobile 
phone  enquiries  should  be  considered  for  medium  risk  missing  persons,  as  well  as  high  risk 
missing persons if relevant. If supervisors are not going to pursue an avenue of investigation, they 
should have a proper rationale to explain why it is not a proportionate enquiry and this should be 
recorded on the MFH report.  This was also sent out to all  District Commanders by the MPSU . 

A Grade one urgent authority authorised  by a Superintendent is when there is an immediate risk 
to  life  (i.e., A  High-Risk  missing  person).  A  Grade Two  application  which  does  not  require  an 
urgent authority by a Superintendent can be used when there is not an immediate risk to life (i.e. , 
a  Medium-Risk  missing  person  investigation)  which  the  officer submits  for cell  site  information. 
The information is  still  returned quickly,  however the  process for Grade One is faster because it 
is treated as urgent. 

Postal address:  Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11  2NS 

 Contd pg 4 

Cycomms, cell siting, and mobile phone enquiries should be considered for medium and high-risk 
missing persons. A notification is also being sent out on the Organisation Learning Hub Top three 
bulletin June 2023 edition.  Item one of the bulletin  is  regarding  analysing communications data, 
and this covers the  use  of Cycomms and  Mobile  phone enquiries. A  comprehensive guide has 
been  created to address  the  learning  around  a  lack of knowledge  of this area.  The  bulletin will 
specifically detail that all  communications data can be sought for medium and high  risk missing, 
and a guide will direct officers on how to do this. The Organisation Learning Hub Top three bulletin 
goes to every member of staff and  officer within GMP. 

To further address this issue across the organisation, the professional standards branch referred 
the  matter  to  GMP's  training  school,  as  it  was  recognised  that  supervisors  who  have  been 
substantive  for  a  long  period  of  time  may  not  have  had  any  recent  training  or  continuous 
professional  development  (CPD)  with  regards  to  investigating  missing  persons,  Golden  Hour 
tasks and risk assessments. 

This  is  currently  with  the  Training  and  Commissioning  Group  for review  as  to  whether further 
training  could  be  provided  for  supervisors  and  what  form  this  would  take.  This  would  include 
guidance  on  understanding  and  applying  the  Golden  Hour principles.  Guidance  on  the  Golden 
Hour principles, accessing communications data and cost to GMP will also be included within the 
seven-minute briefing which  is  being  produced. 

The MPSU are also sending a notification to all  operational Superintendents across the Force to 
state that the  Golden Hour principles guidance is included within  operational briefings alongside 
information  regarding  the  cost  of  cell  siting.  The  briefings  will  also  include  a  reminder  to 
operational Sergeants to keep the next of kin  and family of the  missing  person  updated, as  per 
the concern raised  in  point four and include details of this case as an example of the importance 
of correct risk assessment and  understanding of mental health terminology . 

The  MPSU  Officers  have  been  tasked  to  check  with  each  districts  single  point  of contact  for 
Missing People, that the briefing has been completed . Detective Superintendent 
 will also 
be  speaking  to all  District  Commanders  in  July  2023 to confirm  this  has  been  done  across  all 
districts. 

The cost to GMP to access mobile phone data and using cell  siting  should  never be  a reason as 
to why it  is  not  used. The  inquest  highlighted a  lack of understanding from  some officers  about 
this  being  a  reason  as  to  why  GMP  may  not  use  cell  siting.  This  is  incorrect.  Operational 
Superintendents will be informed of this via the notification from the Missing Person Safeguarding 
Unit  and  they will  be  asked  to  disseminate this  information to  their respective  supervisors  and 
teams across  all  districts to  ensure that  officers  and staff are not considering this as  a factor in 
their decision making. This would also ensure it is not cited as a reason to members of the public 
as to why GMP would not utilise mobile phone data. 

Response to Point 4 

4.  Poor quality documentation and information sharing between officers and supervision 

in relation to information from the family and the mental health unit. 

We have a process of recording  information in  a formatted way and regular Sergeant reviews to 
agree the ongoing risk setting. 

Postal address:  Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex,  Lawton  Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11  2NS 

 Cont.d pg  5 

When  the  Force  Command and  Control Centre  receives  a call  to report a  person  missing, they 
set the initial risk based on the conversation with the informant to grade the incident. 

An  officer then attends and  gathers further information and  makes a further assessment around 
the risk.  At this  point there should be  a documented conversation  on the initial log  between the 
officer and  Sergeant for the Sergeant to be assured that the risk setting is correct. 

The  officer completes  a  15 points  update which  details  the  key  information  known at that  time 
regarding  the  missing  person  and  the  circumstances. This  can  be  viewed  on  the  PoliceWorks 
report.  The report information is transferred onto the MFH Report on PoliceWorks, and enquiries 
are managed from this report.  Every time the shift changes and a new Sergeant comes on  duty, 
they  conduct  a  review  of the  report  and  risk  to  assess  it  based  on  any  new  information.  The 
Sergeant is responsible for setting tasks to an allocated officer to continue appropriate enquiries 
and the officer should update this to ensure information is being shared effectively. 

All of the  information is  collated  onto the MFH report which  is easily accessible on  PoliceWorks 
and this  includes any incoming  information from the family or friends of the missing  person. Any 
contact with the Mental  Health Unit (MHU)  and what information was passed to them  or shared 
by them  should also be  recorded. 

After  three  days  the  report  is  reviewed  by  a  Chief  Inspector  and  after  seven  days  by  the 
Superintendent if the missing person has still not been found. 

Within the Aide Memoir,  it states that is the Sergeants responsibility to ensure that the next of kin 
and  family  are  updated  by  GMP  on  developments.  A  reminder  regarding  this  responsibility  is 
included in Continuous Professional Development (CPD) event training conducted by the MPSU. 
is  being  sent  to  the  operational 
This 
Superintendents as discussed previously. It will  act as  a reminder on their briefing to operational 
Sergeants about their role . 

information  is  included  in  the  notification  which 

The  inquest  was  told  that  GMP  had  rolled  out an  Aide  Memoire  system  to  try  to  embed  greater 
consistency and understanding of the policy across GMP. The Aide Memoires were recognised  as 
being an  effective tool.  However, there was no evidence available to  assist in understanding  if the 
Aide  Memoires  were  being  used  effectively  across  the  force  and  how  GMP  were  measuring  the 
implementation of them. 

Evidence was given to the inquest that GMP have introduced further training on missing persons. 
However, the effectiveness  of that training  was  unclear given that witnesses  who  had been  on 
the  training  and  who  gave  evidence,  remained  of the  view  that  Rebecca  was  not  a  high-risk 
missing person despite all the evidence available at the inquest. 

GMP  are  in  the process  of re-circulating  the  MFH  Policy  2022  and  Aide  Memoirs.  These  have 
already been shared through the CPD sessions that have been provided by the MPSU. 

As discussed in the  response to point one,  there are several  channels  available to cascade this 
learning to ensure that it reaches all relevant officers. 

The seven-minute briefing  that is  being  developed will  also  include further guidance  on the use 
of the Aide Memoir, the Missing from Home Policy 2022, and Golden Hour principles. 

As referenced  in  the  response to  points  1 and  2, measuring  the  effectiveness  of this additional 
circulation and the briefing can be done via several channels  and this  is  still currently 

Postal address:  Greater Manchester Police,  Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M 11  2NS 

 Cont.d pg 6 

under consultation  by the Organisational  Development Group, as to which  methods would  yield 
the best data to allow us to measure the overall effectiveness. 

Governance of Missing People within  Greater Manchester Police 

The strategic lead for Missing People in  GMP is a Detective Superintendent in  Public Protection, 
supported  by  a  MFH  Coordinator,  and  eight  Missing  Person  Safeguarding  Officers  who  work 
locally with officers on district and provide specialist advice. 

The  Force  has  a  clear  missing  people  delivery  plan  which  remains  a  live  document.  Any 
organisational  learning,  such  as  in  this  case  will  be  added  to  the  plan  and  monitored  for 
improvement. 

There  is  a  clear  governance  structure  for  missing  people  which  is  overseen  by  a  Quarterly 
Strategic Board chaired by an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC). 

,  Chair  a  monthly 
  and  Subject  Matter  Expert, 
Detective  Superintendent 
meeting for all District points of contact.  This is an opportunity to identify good practice and share 
learning. 

In  addition, Missing  Persons  performance  features  periodically  in  the  Victim, Communities  and 
. This is a monthly meeting 
Performance Forum chaired by Deputy Chief Constable 
that focuses on different themes. 

The  Vulnerability  Board  meets  monthly  and  is  chaired  by  the  ACC  for Crime  and  Vulnerability . 
Missing Persons features every other month. 

The Performance Improvement Oversight Team (PIOT) conduct regular audits of thematic areas 
relating to missing from home reports. In March and August, they audited 240 missing from home 
incidents Force wide. 

The audits looked at the following areas: 

•  Was the  person a repeat missing? 
•  Were there any vulnerabilities identified? 
•  Was a risk documented? 
•  Was there evidence of rationale on the risk? 
•  Was there a clear investigation plan? 
•  Was the plan followed? 
•  Was there supervisory input? 
• 
•  Was there reference to partnership working? 
•  Was there evidence of problem solving? 
•  Was there a safe and well  check? 
• 

If yes, did it guide the investigation? 

If a  safe  and  well  check was  not  completed  in  person  by  GMP  staff,  has  a  satisfactory 
rationale  been given? 

•  Has the person, in the last three months, gone missing more than  3 times? 
• 

If there  is  no  clear  investigation  plan,  has  a  rationale  been  provided  for  what  actions 
have/have not been completed? 
•  Was a house search completed? 
•  What was the average time the person was missing? 

Postal address:  Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw,  Manchester M11  2NS 

 Contd pg  7 

These audits are conducted every six months and samples have been reviewed before the MFH 
training  and  Aide  Memoir CPD  was  implemented.  Recent audits  have  shown  an  improvement 
across the districts since the training has been delivered. 

Each  district has  a  quarterly  performance  review team  chaired  by their ACC  where  the  above 
performance information is shared, and actions raised to improve in appropriate areas. 

GMP  is  committed  to  constantly  improving  its  response  to  Missing  People.  It  is  vital  we  learn 
lessons  in  such  tragic  cases.  The  strategic  lead  for  safeguarding  will  put  out  immediate 
instructions to all  district leads regarding the  learning  in this case and highlight the Golden  Hour 
tasks that must be completed by all  staff. 

The  Strategic  Learning  Board  will  monitor  the  actions  highlighted  within  this  Regulation  28 
response to ensure that these are completed  in  a timely manner. 

I hope that this response addresses the concerns that you have raised , and in demonstrating our 
total commitment to continuous learning and  improvement in the service we offer to the public of 
Greater Manchester. 

Yours sincerely 

Chief Constable 

Postal address:  Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11  2NS

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