Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023

Hilary Guedalla

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0198, written 8 Jun 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report8 Jun 2023
Reference2023-0198
DeceasedHilary Guedalla
CoronerEdwin Buckett
Coroner areaInner North London
CategorySuicide (from 2015)
Organisation namedEast London NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Regulation 28:  Prevention of Future Deaths report 

Hilary Clare (Billy) Guedalla (died 30.10.2021) 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

 (Chief Executive) 

East London NHS Foundation Trust 
Robert Dolan House 
Trust Headquarters 
9 Alie Street 
London E1 8DE 

1 

CORONER 

I am:   Coroner Edwin Buckett  
           Assistant Coroner  
           Inner North London 
           Poplar Coroner’s Court 
           127 Poplar High Street 
           London E14 0AE 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,  
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and  
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, 
regulations 28 and 29. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On the 11th November 2021 I commenced an investigation into the death 
of  Hilary  Clare  (Billy)  Guedalla  who  died  aged  46  on  the  30th  October 
2021 

. 

The investigation resulted in an inquest, which was conducted by myself 
over a period of 5 days and concluded on 19th May 2023. 

I  made  a  determination  at  inquest  that  the  deceased  died  as  a  result  of 
suicide and returned a narrative conclusion as follows: 

1. 
The deceased suffered from long standing psychiatric conditions of 
a  Recurrent  Depressive  Disorder  and  complex  Post  Traumatic  Stress 
Disorder. 

2. 

On  occasions,  the  deceased’s  psychiatric  conditions  led  to 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 psychiatric in-patient admission to hospital, usually as a voluntary patient, 
on  a  number  of  occasions  between  2013  and  2021.  Those  admissions 
were  associated  with  the  deceased  exhibiting  suicidal  ideation  and 
sometimes involved attempts to take their own life. 

3. 
On  the  26th  October  2021,  the  deceased  was  admitted  to 
Gardener  Ward,  Homerton  Hospital,  London  E9  as  a  voluntary  patient 
suffering a worsening of their psychiatric condition. 

4. 
At  a  ward  round  at  that  hospital  on  the  28th  October  2021,  at 
around 11am, the deceased indicated to staff that they had tried to take 
her  own  life  the  night  before  in  hospital  and  that  they  had  equipment  at 
home for the purposes of ending their life. 

5. 
The  deceased’s  condition  worsened  thereafter  and  staff  at  the 
hospital  considered  that  the  deceased  should  not  be  allowed  out  of  the 
ward alone, for her own safety because, in effect they were a high risk of 
suicide. That decision was made in the morning of the 29th October 2021 
but not communicated to all staff on the ward. 

6. 
The  deceased  asked  a  member  of  the  clinical  staff  to  leave  the 
ward, at around 6pm on the 29th October 2021. That member of staff was 
unaware  of  the  decision  that  had  been  made  that  the  deceased  should 
not  be  allowed  out  alone.  The  member  of  staff  carried  out  a  brief 
assessment of the deceased, largely based on their appearance, but did 
not  refer  to  any  medical  notes  and  records.  The  deceased  was  then 
allowed to leave the ward.  

 Sometime between leaving the ward and around 3pm on the 30th 

7. 
October 2021, the deceased took their own life by hanging themselves 

  No-one  else  was 
involved.  The  deceased  was  found  by  members  of  the  London  Fire 
Brigade between 3 and 4pm, on that day. 

8. 
After  the  deceased  had  left  the  ward,  night  staff  found  the 
deceased  to be missing  at  around  8pm on the 29th  October 2021.  Staff 
first  contacted  the  police  2.10am  and  again  at  2.46am  on  the  30th 
October,  2021  and  requested  that  the  police  carry  out  a  welfare  check. 
They  did  not  inform  the  police  that  the  deceased  was  a  serious  suicide 
risk. They were advised to contact the London Ambulance Service but did 
not  do  this  until  3pm  on  the  30th  October  2021  and  in  any  event,  that 
request did not generate attendance at the deceased’s home address. 

9. 
At around 2pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased’s mother 
attended  the  ward  having  made  a  pre-arranged  booking  to  visit  the 
deceased.  She  was  shocked  to  be  informed  that  the  deceased  had  left 
the  ward.  She  enlisted  support  from  family  and  friends  which  led  to  the 
attendance  of  emergency  services  at  the  deceased’s  home  address, 
between 3-4pm on the 30th October 2021. 

2 

 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 10. 
The  deceased  should  not  have  been  permitted  to  leave  the  ward 
alone. Had clinical staff observed the decision not to allow the deceased 
out without a staff member, the deceased would not have taken their own 
life when they did. 

The  decision 

11. 
the  deceased  should  not  be  permitted 
unescorted leave failed to be communicated to all staff members on the 
ward. 

that 

12. 
The  information  that  the  deceased  had  tried  to  end  their  own  life 
on  the  ward  on  the  evening  of  the  27th  October  2021  was  also  not 
properly communicated to all staff on the ward or added to any document 
which concerned a proper risk of assessment of them. Also, the hospital 
staff  did  not  fully  comply  with  the  patient  admission  policy  when  the 
deceased  was  admitted  on  the  26th  October  2021  as  records  were  not 
properly  updated  and  no  physical  health  assessment  was  made  of  the 
deceased within 24 hours. 

13. 
The  decision  that  the  deceased  was  to  receive  1:1  support 
following the ward round of the 28th October 2021 could not realistically 
be  met  because  of  staff  shortages  on  the  ward.  There  was  a  failure  to 
recognise that this plan would could not realistically be achieved because 
of those staffing issues.  

14. 
The assessment made of the deceased before the deceased was 
allowed  to  leave  the  ward  at  6pm  on  the  29th  October  2021  by  that 
member of staff was inadequate as a risk assessment of the deceased’s 
mental state  for the  purposes  of assessing their  safety.  That  member of 
staff relied solely on the deceased’s presentation at that moment and did 
not  consider  any  written  record  about  the  deceased  or  ask  any  other 
member of staff about how the deceased was. 

15. 
There was a complete failure to appreciate the urgency of locating 
the deceased once the night staff found them to be missing at about 8pm 
on the 29th October 2021 and to follow the hospital policy which applied 
to missing patients. 

16.  Night shift staff took far too long to contact the emergency services 
and  failed  to  contact  the  ambulance  service  as  advised  by  the  police  in 
the early hours of the 30th October 2021.  

17.  When the police were contacted, staff completely failed to state the 
urgent  and  serious  suicide  risk  which  the  deceased  presented  to 
themselves. 

18.  Hospital  staff  also  failed  to  properly  contact  Billy’s  family  and 
friends after they went missing from the ward or leave messages for them 
which could have enabled them to be located.  

19. 

Staffing  levels  on  both  the  29th  and  30th  October  2021  were  not 

3 

 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 adequate and this contributed to the failings set out above. 

20. 
The failure set out above which relates to the staff member being 
unaware  that  the  deceased  should  not  leave  the  ward  unaccompanied, 
amounts  to  a  serious  failure  which  directly  caused  or  contributed  to  the 
deceased’s death. 

The  other  failures  set  out  above  amount  to  missed  opportunities 

21. 
which may directly or indirectly, have prevented the deceased’s death.   

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

The circumstances surrounding the death are set out in Box 3 above. 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During  the  course  of  the  inquest,  the  evidence  revealed  matters  giving 
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur 
unless  action  is  taken.  In  the  circumstances,  it  is  my  statutory  duty  to 
report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  

Evidence  was  given  by  staff  members  of  the  East  London  Foundation 
NHS Trust that: 

1.  The  deceased  was  allowed  to  leave  Gardener  Ward  (“the  unit”) 
which  was  part  of  a  secure  facility  of  the  hospital,  alone,  when  a 
clinical decision had been taken that they should not be allowed to 
leave  the  unit  unaccompanied  by  staff,  because  they  posed  a 
serious risk of suicide. 

2.  The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted 
leave was not communicated to all members of staff working in the 
unit such that the person who allowed the deceased to leave was 
unaware that the decision had been made. 

3.  The  relevant  information  gathered  during  the  Ward  Round  on  the 
28th October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had 
attempted  to  take  their  own  life,  the  night  before,  was  not 
adequately communicated to all staff on the unit. 

4.  The  “Sign  in/Sign  out”  book  which  was  supposed  to  record  the 
movements  of  service  users  in  the  unit  was  frequently  not 
completed,  particularly  when  service  users  went  out  for  short 
periods. 

5.  There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user 

4 

 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 should be permitted to leave the unit. 

6.  The  member  of  staff  who  allowed  the  deceased  to  leave  the  unit 
made  a  brief  risk  assessment  of  them  before  deciding  whether 
they  should  be  allowed  to  leave.  That  person  did  not  consult  any 
medical  notes  or  records  about  the  deceased  when  making  that 
assessment.  Had  that  member  of  staff  consulted  the  deceased’s 
medical  notes  and  records,  the  serious  suicide  risk  which  they 
posed would have been evident. 

7.  Once  the  deceased  was  found  to  be  missing  from  the  unit,  there 
was  an  unexplained  delay  in  informing  the  police  and  ambulance 
service,  a failure to  inform  either of  the  serious  suicide  risk  which 
the  deceased  posed  to  themselves  and  a  lack  of  appreciation  of 
the urgency of the situation by staff generally. 

8.  The  hospital  policy  which  applied  to  missing  patients  was  not 
properly  adhered  to  by  staff  and  there  was  confusion  about  who 
should  be  contacted  and  in  what  manner,  once  a  patient  was 
found to be missing. 

9.  No  proper  efforts  were  made 

to  contact  members  of 

the 

deceased’s family once the deceased was found to be missing. 

10. The  unit  was  short-staffed  and  this  affected  the  care  provided  to 
the  deceased,  the  assessment  of  the  deceased  whilst  in  the  unit 
and record keeping generally. 

The  summary  of  the  evidence  given,  as  set  out  above,  sets  out  the 
matters of concern. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In  my  opinion,  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  future  deaths  and  I 
believe that your organisation has the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date 
of this report, namely by the 4th August 2023. I, the coroner, may extend 
the period in appropriate circumstances. 

Your  response  must  contain  details  of  action  taken  or  proposed  to  be 
taken,  setting  out  the  timetable  for  action.  Otherwise,  you  must  explain 
why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I have sent a copy of my report to the following. 

•  HHJ Thomes Teague KC, the Chief Coroner of England & Wales. 
•  The Care Quality Commission for England. 
•  The parents of the deceased. 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response 
and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted 
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who 
he  believes  may 
interest.  You  may  make 
representations  to  me,  the  coroner,  at  the  time  of  your  response,  about 
the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

it  useful  or  of 

find 

9 

DATE  8th June 2023 

Edwin Buckett 

ASSISTANT CORONER 

6

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust (PDF)
Private & Confidential 

HM Assistant Coroner Edwin Buckett 

Office of the Chief Medical Officer 
Trust Headquarters 
5th Floor 
9 Alie Street 
London E1 8DE 

4 August 2023 

Dear Sir  

RE: Regulation 28 Response for Billy Guedalla  

This is a formal response to your Regulation 28 report sent on 12 June 2023 where 
you set out concerns relating to the care of Billy Guedalla whilst under East London 
NHS Foundation Trust’s (the Trust’s) care. 

I  understand  that  at  the  inquest  into  Billy’s  death  you  heard  evidence  from  the 
Clinical Director for City and Hackney outlining the learning that has taken place as 
a consequence of their death. However, you remained concerned about the risk of 
future deaths in relation to the following areas: 

1.  The deceased  was allowed  to  leave  Gardner Ward  (“the  unit”)  which  was 
part  of  a  secure  facility  of  the  hospital  alone,  when  a  clinical  decision  had 
been taken that they should not be allowed to leave the unit unaccompanied 
by staff, because they posed a risk of suicide. 

2.  The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted leave was 
not communicated to all members of staff working in the unit such that the 
person who allowed the deceased to leave was unaware that the decision 
had been made.  

3.  The  relevant  information  gathered  during  the  Ward  Round  on  the  28th 
October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had attempted to 
take their own life, the night before, was not adequately communicated to all 
staff on the unit.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.  The “Sign in/Sign Out” book which was supposed to record the movements 
of service users in the unit was frequently not completed, particularly when 
service users went out for short periods. 

5.  There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user should be 

permitted to leave the unit. 

6.  The member of staff who allowed the deceased to leave the unit made a brief 
risk assessment of them before deciding whether they should be allowed to 
leave. That person did not consult any medical notes or records about the 
deceased when making that assessment. Had that member of staff consulted 
the deceased’s medical notes and records, the serious suicide risk that they 
posed would have been evident.  

7.  Once  the  deceased  was  found  to  be  missing  from  the  unit,  there  was  an 
unexplained delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to 
inform  either  of  the  serious  suicide  risk  which  the  deceased  posed  to 
themselves and a lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff generally. 

8.  The  hospital  policy  which  applied  to  missing  patients  was  not  properly 
adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted 
and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing.  

9.  No proper efforts were made to contact members of the deceased’s family 

once the deceased was found to be missing.  

10. The  unit  was  short  staffed  and  this  affected  the  care  provided  to  the 
deceased, the assessment of the deceased whilst in the unit and recording 
generally. 

I would like to offer my sincere apologies to Billy’s family on behalf of the Trust. I 
would also like to assure Billy’s family and the Coroner that the Trust has reviewed 
the issues highlighted by the Regulation 28 report and has planned or undertaken 
the actions outlined below. 

1)  The  clinical  decision  made,  that  Billy  should  not  leave  Gardner  Ward 
unescorted was not followed and 2) this decision was not communicated to 
all members of staff. 

I share your concern that critical information surrounding clinical decision making in 
relation to Billy’s leave was not followed nor passed  on to all Gardner Ward staff 
members.   

Expected  practice  at  the  Trust  is  that  all  clinical  decisions  made  in  relation  to  all 
inpatient  service  users’  leave  should  be  recorded  on  RIO  (the  Trust’s  electronic 
patient record) by the relevant clinician.  I understand that this information was not 
recorded nor was it reviewed or disseminated amongst the Gardner Ward staff.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In order to ensure that this does not occur again, at the next Gardner Ward away 
day on 23 August 2023 all staff will be reminded again of the importance of properly 
recording clinical decisions (whether made by themselves or in Ward Management 
Meetings  or  Ward  Rounds)  as  well  as  reviewing  the  RIO  notes  prior  to  making 
important clinical decisions. This same discussion will be repeated at the next away 
days for all City and Hackney inpatient wards. Considerations about the differences 
in  recording  such  information  between  formal  and  informal  service  users  will  be 
discussed.  A  memo  has  been  sent  out  to  all  ward  staff  on  27  July  2023  by  the 
Clinical Director reinforcing these expectations too. 

Additionally, the Clinical Director for City and Hackney has updated the junior doctor 
induction programme to include this information.  

In order to provide an additional safety net to ensure that appropriate information 
sharing occurs, a daily Safety Huddle comprised of the entire multi-disciplinary team 
now  takes  place  on  all  City  and  Hackney  inpatient  wards  each  morning.  Critical 
clinical  information  about  all  service  users  is  shared  during  the  Safety  Huddles. 
Important  clinical  decisions  and  risk  information  discussed  at  the  Safety  Huddles 
are  expected  to  be  documented  on  RIO  (this  expectation  will  also  be  further 
reinforced at the away day and junior doctor induction). 

Additionally, all inpatient leave arrangements (for both formal and informal service 
users) are now documented on the relevant nursing office whiteboard in each City 
and Hackney inpatient ward. The leave arrangements are reassessed at every shift 
handover  and  the  whiteboard  is  updated  accordingly.  It  is  expected  that  all  staff 
members check the whiteboard before allowing leave of any type.  

Further, junior stuff members are now required to speak to the shift co-ordinator (the 
most senior staff member) prior to allowing patient leave.  

3)  The  information  from  the  ward  round  that  Billy  made  a  serious  suicide 
attempt the previous night was not communicated to staff members.  

I was also troubled to hear that important risk information about Billy, highlighted at 
a Ward Round was not communicated to staff members.  

As mentioned above, I anticipate that the daily Safety Huddles will assist in ensuring  
that  important  new  risk  information  about  service  users  is  passed  onto  all  staff 
members. 

4) The ‘Sign in/Sign Out book was frequently not completed.  

I  have  been  provided  with  assurances  that  the  process  for  managing  the  Sign 
In/Sign Out book (the “book”) on all inpatient units in City and Hackney has been 
improved. The book is now located at the nursing office to enhance completion. It 
has been revised to include the following information: service user name, whether 
leave is escorted (and by whom) or not,  location of planned leave, time left and time 
returned, the validity of Section 17 leave papers for detained patients, description of 
items taken, and whether search on return was completed.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Presently, either the nurse in charge or the shift coordinator spot checks the book 
to ensure completion one time per shift. However, work is being done to develop a 
more robust audit system.  

5)  There  was  no  proper  system  for  identifying  whether  a  service  user  is 
permitted to leave. 

The Trust’s approach to address this via the whiteboard system, the Safety Huddles 
and the additional expectations on junior staff members to check leave with the shift 
co-ordinator prior to allowing leave are explained under point 1 and 2 above.  

6)  The medical notes were not reviewed prior to deciding that Billy should be 
allowed to leave.  

The  Gardner  Ward  away  day  outlined  above,  will  highlight  the  importance  of 
regularly reviewing RIO notes. Further, the implementation of Safety Huddles, the 
whiteboard system and the requirement to seek approval of senior staff members 
prior to allowing service user leave will ensure only those patients permitted to take 
leave are allowed to do so.  

7)  Once  Billy  was  found  to  be  missing,  there  was  a  delay  in  informing  the 
police  and ambulance  service,  a  failure  to convey  suicide  risk  to  the  police 
and ambulance service, and lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff. And 
8) The policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to 
by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted  

I  acknowledge  that  the  delay  in  notifying  the  police,  ambulance  and  family  when 
they were discovered missing should not have occurred. Further, when emergency 
services were notified, there was a failure to convey Billy’s suicide risk. 

The following actions have taken place to ensure that this does not occur again: 

a.  On the 13 July 2022, staff from Gardner Ward attended the “Time to 
Think” forum. There, the Trust’s Health, Safety and Security Planning 
Manager  led  the  meeting  and  reinforced  the  correct  escalation 
processes to use when a service user is missing. 

b.  In  June  2023,  the  Trust’s  Missing  and  Absent  without  Leave  policy 

was reviewed and it is now awaiting ratification. 

c.  The Trust is now engaged at a senior level with the Metropolitan Police 
to  develop  a  strategy  around,  “Right  Care,  Right  Person”  which  is 
anticipated to lead to improvements in the coordination of response to 
missing inpatients by both organisations.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9) No efforts were made to contact Billy’s family once it was discovered they 
were missing 

I am aware that you heard oral evidence at inquest that a single attempt was made 
to call Billy’s family when they went missing. However, this call took place well after 
it was discovered and no further attempts were made to contact their family. The 
Trust wholeheartedly acknowledges  that this response was not commensurate to 
the situation. 

I can confirm that explicit information about contacting family members is provided 
in the updated policy and was discussed with Gardner Ward staff during its review 
of the policy. 

Staff  also  specifically  reflected  upon  the  impact  of  not  contacting  Billy’s  family 
promptly when they were discovered missing at the Time to Think Forum on 13 July 
2022. 

10)  Gardner  Ward  was  short  staffed  and  this  affected  the  care  provided  to 
Billy. 

Although there is a particular need to focus on the staffing levels of nurses, the issue 
of  staffing  levels  across  the  full  multi-disciplinary  team  is  relevant  to  the  care 
provided on a ward. The current vacancy rate, as of June 2023, for all staff in City 
&  Hackney  Mental  Health  Directorate  is 4.4%.  This  rate  varies  amongst  different 
staff groups, for example:  

a)  Nursing staff: 8.4%  
b)  Doctors: 5.7%  
c)  Psychologists and social workers: 3.2%  
d)  Allied Health Professionals (e.g. occupational therapists, art therapists): 14% 
e)  Support to nursing staff (e.g. Life skills recovery workers): 1.2%  

As highlighted at inquest, there are currently national challenges with staffing in the 
NHS which impact on the Trust’s efforts to achieve full recruitment with substantive 
staff. But, I can assure Billy’s family that the Trust is making best efforts to achieve 
this across all staff groups.  

City and Hackney is currently managing nursing staff vacancies using the following 
strategies: 

a)  Staffing  levels  across  the  directorate  are  discussed  face  to  face  at  a  daily 
Huddle  every  Monday  –  Friday  at  a  designated  venue.  The  Duty  Senior 
Nurse, Borough Lead Nurse, Ward Managers and matrons are present. The 
Psychiatric  Liaison  Teams  and  Home  Treatment  Team  also  feed  into  the 
Huddle.  Safe  staffing  levels  are  considered  alongside  appropriate  actions 
such as redeployment, booking temporary staff and block booking Trust bank 
staff.   

b)  A  Band  5  registered  nurse  is  currently  responsible  for  ‘red  flag’  reporting 
(reviewing staff shortages on the daily rota and the numbers of service users 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 requiring  enhanced  observations).  This  information  is  fed  into  the  daily 
Huddle (outlined above) and to the Borough Lead Nurse for consideration of 
a planned response. It also supports matrons in planning. 

c)  Twilight  Shifts  have  been  introduced.  Band  6  nursing  colleagues  from  the 
community teams attend between 5.30 to 9 pm when the wards are busiest 
to ensure smooth transitions to night shifts.  

d)  A live spreadsheet is maintained and reviewed weekly by the ward matrons 

to highlight recruitment gaps and support the recruitment process 

e)  There is a recruitment drive in City and Hackney for band 5 and 6 nurses.  

A  recent  Trust-wide  review  of  the  Trust’s  inpatient  activity  (clinical  demand  and 
benchmarking against national standards for comparable services) was undertaken 
in January 2023. This review contributes to ensuring the Trust meets Safer Staffing 
expectations for services. In particular, that the right staff with the right skills are in 
the right place at the right time. The review has resulted in an increased investment 
in inpatient staffing based on the identified needs of the services. Since April 2023, 
an  £800,000  investment  for  Safer  Staffing  has  been  provided  to  the  City  and 
Hackney directorate within ELFT. The benefits of the increased investment will be 
reduced reliance on temporary staffing at times of high acuity and better resourced 
teams to meet the needs of service users. In addition to this we have reviewed our 
recruitment strategy and processes. 

I hope I have provided reassurance to you and Billy’s family about the learning that 
has taken place as a consequence of their sad death.  

I offer my sincere and heart-felt condolences to the family at this difficult time.   

Yours sincerely,  

Chief Medical Officer

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