Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0198, written 8 Jun 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 8 Jun 2023 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2023-0198 |
| Deceased | Hilary Guedalla |
| Coroner | Edwin Buckett |
| Coroner area | Inner North London |
| Category | Suicide (from 2015) |
| Organisation named | East London NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths report
Hilary Clare (Billy) Guedalla (died 30.10.2021)
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
(Chief Executive)
East London NHS Foundation Trust
Robert Dolan House
Trust Headquarters
9 Alie Street
London E1 8DE
1
CORONER
I am: Coroner Edwin Buckett
Assistant Coroner
Inner North London
Poplar Coroner’s Court
127 Poplar High Street
London E14 0AE
2
CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013,
regulations 28 and 29.
3
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On the 11th November 2021 I commenced an investigation into the death
of Hilary Clare (Billy) Guedalla who died aged 46 on the 30th October
2021
.
The investigation resulted in an inquest, which was conducted by myself
over a period of 5 days and concluded on 19th May 2023.
I made a determination at inquest that the deceased died as a result of
suicide and returned a narrative conclusion as follows:
1.
The deceased suffered from long standing psychiatric conditions of
a Recurrent Depressive Disorder and complex Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder.
2.
On occasions, the deceased’s psychiatric conditions led to
1
psychiatric in-patient admission to hospital, usually as a voluntary patient,
on a number of occasions between 2013 and 2021. Those admissions
were associated with the deceased exhibiting suicidal ideation and
sometimes involved attempts to take their own life.
3.
On the 26th October 2021, the deceased was admitted to
Gardener Ward, Homerton Hospital, London E9 as a voluntary patient
suffering a worsening of their psychiatric condition.
4.
At a ward round at that hospital on the 28th October 2021, at
around 11am, the deceased indicated to staff that they had tried to take
her own life the night before in hospital and that they had equipment at
home for the purposes of ending their life.
5.
The deceased’s condition worsened thereafter and staff at the
hospital considered that the deceased should not be allowed out of the
ward alone, for her own safety because, in effect they were a high risk of
suicide. That decision was made in the morning of the 29th October 2021
but not communicated to all staff on the ward.
6.
The deceased asked a member of the clinical staff to leave the
ward, at around 6pm on the 29th October 2021. That member of staff was
unaware of the decision that had been made that the deceased should
not be allowed out alone. The member of staff carried out a brief
assessment of the deceased, largely based on their appearance, but did
not refer to any medical notes and records. The deceased was then
allowed to leave the ward.
Sometime between leaving the ward and around 3pm on the 30th
7.
October 2021, the deceased took their own life by hanging themselves
No-one else was
involved. The deceased was found by members of the London Fire
Brigade between 3 and 4pm, on that day.
8.
After the deceased had left the ward, night staff found the
deceased to be missing at around 8pm on the 29th October 2021. Staff
first contacted the police 2.10am and again at 2.46am on the 30th
October, 2021 and requested that the police carry out a welfare check.
They did not inform the police that the deceased was a serious suicide
risk. They were advised to contact the London Ambulance Service but did
not do this until 3pm on the 30th October 2021 and in any event, that
request did not generate attendance at the deceased’s home address.
9.
At around 2pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased’s mother
attended the ward having made a pre-arranged booking to visit the
deceased. She was shocked to be informed that the deceased had left
the ward. She enlisted support from family and friends which led to the
attendance of emergency services at the deceased’s home address,
between 3-4pm on the 30th October 2021.
2
10.
The deceased should not have been permitted to leave the ward
alone. Had clinical staff observed the decision not to allow the deceased
out without a staff member, the deceased would not have taken their own
life when they did.
The decision
11.
the deceased should not be permitted
unescorted leave failed to be communicated to all staff members on the
ward.
that
12.
The information that the deceased had tried to end their own life
on the ward on the evening of the 27th October 2021 was also not
properly communicated to all staff on the ward or added to any document
which concerned a proper risk of assessment of them. Also, the hospital
staff did not fully comply with the patient admission policy when the
deceased was admitted on the 26th October 2021 as records were not
properly updated and no physical health assessment was made of the
deceased within 24 hours.
13.
The decision that the deceased was to receive 1:1 support
following the ward round of the 28th October 2021 could not realistically
be met because of staff shortages on the ward. There was a failure to
recognise that this plan would could not realistically be achieved because
of those staffing issues.
14.
The assessment made of the deceased before the deceased was
allowed to leave the ward at 6pm on the 29th October 2021 by that
member of staff was inadequate as a risk assessment of the deceased’s
mental state for the purposes of assessing their safety. That member of
staff relied solely on the deceased’s presentation at that moment and did
not consider any written record about the deceased or ask any other
member of staff about how the deceased was.
15.
There was a complete failure to appreciate the urgency of locating
the deceased once the night staff found them to be missing at about 8pm
on the 29th October 2021 and to follow the hospital policy which applied
to missing patients.
16. Night shift staff took far too long to contact the emergency services
and failed to contact the ambulance service as advised by the police in
the early hours of the 30th October 2021.
17. When the police were contacted, staff completely failed to state the
urgent and serious suicide risk which the deceased presented to
themselves.
18. Hospital staff also failed to properly contact Billy’s family and
friends after they went missing from the ward or leave messages for them
which could have enabled them to be located.
19.
Staffing levels on both the 29th and 30th October 2021 were not
3
adequate and this contributed to the failings set out above.
20.
The failure set out above which relates to the staff member being
unaware that the deceased should not leave the ward unaccompanied,
amounts to a serious failure which directly caused or contributed to the
deceased’s death.
The other failures set out above amount to missed opportunities
21.
which may directly or indirectly, have prevented the deceased’s death.
4
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
The circumstances surrounding the death are set out in Box 3 above.
5
CORONER’S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur
unless action is taken. In the circumstances, it is my statutory duty to
report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.
Evidence was given by staff members of the East London Foundation
NHS Trust that:
1. The deceased was allowed to leave Gardener Ward (“the unit”)
which was part of a secure facility of the hospital, alone, when a
clinical decision had been taken that they should not be allowed to
leave the unit unaccompanied by staff, because they posed a
serious risk of suicide.
2. The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted
leave was not communicated to all members of staff working in the
unit such that the person who allowed the deceased to leave was
unaware that the decision had been made.
3. The relevant information gathered during the Ward Round on the
28th October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had
attempted to take their own life, the night before, was not
adequately communicated to all staff on the unit.
4. The “Sign in/Sign out” book which was supposed to record the
movements of service users in the unit was frequently not
completed, particularly when service users went out for short
periods.
5. There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user
4
should be permitted to leave the unit.
6. The member of staff who allowed the deceased to leave the unit
made a brief risk assessment of them before deciding whether
they should be allowed to leave. That person did not consult any
medical notes or records about the deceased when making that
assessment. Had that member of staff consulted the deceased’s
medical notes and records, the serious suicide risk which they
posed would have been evident.
7. Once the deceased was found to be missing from the unit, there
was an unexplained delay in informing the police and ambulance
service, a failure to inform either of the serious suicide risk which
the deceased posed to themselves and a lack of appreciation of
the urgency of the situation by staff generally.
8. The hospital policy which applied to missing patients was not
properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who
should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was
found to be missing.
9. No proper efforts were made
to contact members of
the
deceased’s family once the deceased was found to be missing.
10. The unit was short-staffed and this affected the care provided to
the deceased, the assessment of the deceased whilst in the unit
and record keeping generally.
The summary of the evidence given, as set out above, sets out the
matters of concern.
6
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I
believe that your organisation has the power to take such action.
7
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date
of this report, namely by the 4th August 2023. I, the coroner, may extend
the period in appropriate circumstances.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise, you must explain
why no action is proposed.
8
COPIES and PUBLICATION
5
I have sent a copy of my report to the following.
• HHJ Thomes Teague KC, the Chief Coroner of England & Wales.
• The Care Quality Commission for England.
• The parents of the deceased.
I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response
and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who
he believes may
interest. You may make
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about
the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.
it useful or of
find
9
DATE 8th June 2023
Edwin Buckett
ASSISTANT CORONER
6
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Private & Confidential HM Assistant Coroner Edwin Buckett Office of the Chief Medical Officer Trust Headquarters 5th Floor 9 Alie Street London E1 8DE 4 August 2023 Dear Sir RE: Regulation 28 Response for Billy Guedalla This is a formal response to your Regulation 28 report sent on 12 June 2023 where you set out concerns relating to the care of Billy Guedalla whilst under East London NHS Foundation Trust’s (the Trust’s) care. I understand that at the inquest into Billy’s death you heard evidence from the Clinical Director for City and Hackney outlining the learning that has taken place as a consequence of their death. However, you remained concerned about the risk of future deaths in relation to the following areas: 1. The deceased was allowed to leave Gardner Ward (“the unit”) which was part of a secure facility of the hospital alone, when a clinical decision had been taken that they should not be allowed to leave the unit unaccompanied by staff, because they posed a risk of suicide. 2. The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted leave was not communicated to all members of staff working in the unit such that the person who allowed the deceased to leave was unaware that the decision had been made. 3. The relevant information gathered during the Ward Round on the 28th October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had attempted to take their own life, the night before, was not adequately communicated to all staff on the unit. 4. The “Sign in/Sign Out” book which was supposed to record the movements of service users in the unit was frequently not completed, particularly when service users went out for short periods. 5. There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user should be permitted to leave the unit. 6. The member of staff who allowed the deceased to leave the unit made a brief risk assessment of them before deciding whether they should be allowed to leave. That person did not consult any medical notes or records about the deceased when making that assessment. Had that member of staff consulted the deceased’s medical notes and records, the serious suicide risk that they posed would have been evident. 7. Once the deceased was found to be missing from the unit, there was an unexplained delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to inform either of the serious suicide risk which the deceased posed to themselves and a lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff generally. 8. The hospital policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing. 9. No proper efforts were made to contact members of the deceased’s family once the deceased was found to be missing. 10. The unit was short staffed and this affected the care provided to the deceased, the assessment of the deceased whilst in the unit and recording generally. I would like to offer my sincere apologies to Billy’s family on behalf of the Trust. I would also like to assure Billy’s family and the Coroner that the Trust has reviewed the issues highlighted by the Regulation 28 report and has planned or undertaken the actions outlined below. 1) The clinical decision made, that Billy should not leave Gardner Ward unescorted was not followed and 2) this decision was not communicated to all members of staff. I share your concern that critical information surrounding clinical decision making in relation to Billy’s leave was not followed nor passed on to all Gardner Ward staff members. Expected practice at the Trust is that all clinical decisions made in relation to all inpatient service users’ leave should be recorded on RIO (the Trust’s electronic patient record) by the relevant clinician. I understand that this information was not recorded nor was it reviewed or disseminated amongst the Gardner Ward staff. In order to ensure that this does not occur again, at the next Gardner Ward away day on 23 August 2023 all staff will be reminded again of the importance of properly recording clinical decisions (whether made by themselves or in Ward Management Meetings or Ward Rounds) as well as reviewing the RIO notes prior to making important clinical decisions. This same discussion will be repeated at the next away days for all City and Hackney inpatient wards. Considerations about the differences in recording such information between formal and informal service users will be discussed. A memo has been sent out to all ward staff on 27 July 2023 by the Clinical Director reinforcing these expectations too. Additionally, the Clinical Director for City and Hackney has updated the junior doctor induction programme to include this information. In order to provide an additional safety net to ensure that appropriate information sharing occurs, a daily Safety Huddle comprised of the entire multi-disciplinary team now takes place on all City and Hackney inpatient wards each morning. Critical clinical information about all service users is shared during the Safety Huddles. Important clinical decisions and risk information discussed at the Safety Huddles are expected to be documented on RIO (this expectation will also be further reinforced at the away day and junior doctor induction). Additionally, all inpatient leave arrangements (for both formal and informal service users) are now documented on the relevant nursing office whiteboard in each City and Hackney inpatient ward. The leave arrangements are reassessed at every shift handover and the whiteboard is updated accordingly. It is expected that all staff members check the whiteboard before allowing leave of any type. Further, junior stuff members are now required to speak to the shift co-ordinator (the most senior staff member) prior to allowing patient leave. 3) The information from the ward round that Billy made a serious suicide attempt the previous night was not communicated to staff members. I was also troubled to hear that important risk information about Billy, highlighted at a Ward Round was not communicated to staff members. As mentioned above, I anticipate that the daily Safety Huddles will assist in ensuring that important new risk information about service users is passed onto all staff members. 4) The ‘Sign in/Sign Out book was frequently not completed. I have been provided with assurances that the process for managing the Sign In/Sign Out book (the “book”) on all inpatient units in City and Hackney has been improved. The book is now located at the nursing office to enhance completion. It has been revised to include the following information: service user name, whether leave is escorted (and by whom) or not, location of planned leave, time left and time returned, the validity of Section 17 leave papers for detained patients, description of items taken, and whether search on return was completed. Presently, either the nurse in charge or the shift coordinator spot checks the book to ensure completion one time per shift. However, work is being done to develop a more robust audit system. 5) There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user is permitted to leave. The Trust’s approach to address this via the whiteboard system, the Safety Huddles and the additional expectations on junior staff members to check leave with the shift co-ordinator prior to allowing leave are explained under point 1 and 2 above. 6) The medical notes were not reviewed prior to deciding that Billy should be allowed to leave. The Gardner Ward away day outlined above, will highlight the importance of regularly reviewing RIO notes. Further, the implementation of Safety Huddles, the whiteboard system and the requirement to seek approval of senior staff members prior to allowing service user leave will ensure only those patients permitted to take leave are allowed to do so. 7) Once Billy was found to be missing, there was a delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to convey suicide risk to the police and ambulance service, and lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff. And 8) The policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted I acknowledge that the delay in notifying the police, ambulance and family when they were discovered missing should not have occurred. Further, when emergency services were notified, there was a failure to convey Billy’s suicide risk. The following actions have taken place to ensure that this does not occur again: a. On the 13 July 2022, staff from Gardner Ward attended the “Time to Think” forum. There, the Trust’s Health, Safety and Security Planning Manager led the meeting and reinforced the correct escalation processes to use when a service user is missing. b. In June 2023, the Trust’s Missing and Absent without Leave policy was reviewed and it is now awaiting ratification. c. The Trust is now engaged at a senior level with the Metropolitan Police to develop a strategy around, “Right Care, Right Person” which is anticipated to lead to improvements in the coordination of response to missing inpatients by both organisations. 9) No efforts were made to contact Billy’s family once it was discovered they were missing I am aware that you heard oral evidence at inquest that a single attempt was made to call Billy’s family when they went missing. However, this call took place well after it was discovered and no further attempts were made to contact their family. The Trust wholeheartedly acknowledges that this response was not commensurate to the situation. I can confirm that explicit information about contacting family members is provided in the updated policy and was discussed with Gardner Ward staff during its review of the policy. Staff also specifically reflected upon the impact of not contacting Billy’s family promptly when they were discovered missing at the Time to Think Forum on 13 July 2022. 10) Gardner Ward was short staffed and this affected the care provided to Billy. Although there is a particular need to focus on the staffing levels of nurses, the issue of staffing levels across the full multi-disciplinary team is relevant to the care provided on a ward. The current vacancy rate, as of June 2023, for all staff in City & Hackney Mental Health Directorate is 4.4%. This rate varies amongst different staff groups, for example: a) Nursing staff: 8.4% b) Doctors: 5.7% c) Psychologists and social workers: 3.2% d) Allied Health Professionals (e.g. occupational therapists, art therapists): 14% e) Support to nursing staff (e.g. Life skills recovery workers): 1.2% As highlighted at inquest, there are currently national challenges with staffing in the NHS which impact on the Trust’s efforts to achieve full recruitment with substantive staff. But, I can assure Billy’s family that the Trust is making best efforts to achieve this across all staff groups. City and Hackney is currently managing nursing staff vacancies using the following strategies: a) Staffing levels across the directorate are discussed face to face at a daily Huddle every Monday – Friday at a designated venue. The Duty Senior Nurse, Borough Lead Nurse, Ward Managers and matrons are present. The Psychiatric Liaison Teams and Home Treatment Team also feed into the Huddle. Safe staffing levels are considered alongside appropriate actions such as redeployment, booking temporary staff and block booking Trust bank staff. b) A Band 5 registered nurse is currently responsible for ‘red flag’ reporting (reviewing staff shortages on the daily rota and the numbers of service users requiring enhanced observations). This information is fed into the daily Huddle (outlined above) and to the Borough Lead Nurse for consideration of a planned response. It also supports matrons in planning. c) Twilight Shifts have been introduced. Band 6 nursing colleagues from the community teams attend between 5.30 to 9 pm when the wards are busiest to ensure smooth transitions to night shifts. d) A live spreadsheet is maintained and reviewed weekly by the ward matrons to highlight recruitment gaps and support the recruitment process e) There is a recruitment drive in City and Hackney for band 5 and 6 nurses. A recent Trust-wide review of the Trust’s inpatient activity (clinical demand and benchmarking against national standards for comparable services) was undertaken in January 2023. This review contributes to ensuring the Trust meets Safer Staffing expectations for services. In particular, that the right staff with the right skills are in the right place at the right time. The review has resulted in an increased investment in inpatient staffing based on the identified needs of the services. Since April 2023, an £800,000 investment for Safer Staffing has been provided to the City and Hackney directorate within ELFT. The benefits of the increased investment will be reduced reliance on temporary staffing at times of high acuity and better resourced teams to meet the needs of service users. In addition to this we have reviewed our recruitment strategy and processes. I hope I have provided reassurance to you and Billy’s family about the learning that has taken place as a consequence of their sad death. I offer my sincere and heart-felt condolences to the family at this difficult time. Yours sincerely, Chief Medical Officer
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