Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024

Joseph Parker

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0389, written 19 Jul 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report19 Jul 2024
Reference2024-0389
DeceasedJoseph Parker
CoronerMaria Voisin
Coroner areaAvon
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published3

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

M. E. Voisin  
 Her Majesty’s Senior Coroner 
Area of Avon 

13 June 2024 

REF:  

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:   

•  Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCOA)  
• 
Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine (FICM) 
•  Royal College of Emergency Medicine (RCEM)  
•  NHS England 

1 

CORONER 

I am M. E. Voisin HM Senior Coroner for Avon  

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 
28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 21/4/22 an investigation into the death of Joseph Lawrence Parker was commenced. The 
investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 4/5/24. The conclusion of the inquest was a 
narrative, recorded as follows:  

“The deceased Joseph Lawrence PARKER died on 16 April 2022 at Southmead Hospital. On 17th February 
2022 he had taken an overdose of medication which caused his collapse. He was taken to hospital and 
required intubation. During the procedure the tube was accidentally positioned in the oesophagus, this 
accidental misplacement should have been identified due to the volume of vomit coming from the tube 
and  the  lack  of  a  recognisable    capnograph  at  that  time.  Once  accidental  osophageal  intubation  was 
recognised  he  was  correctly  intubated.  The  incorrect  placement  caused  him  to  suffer  a  cardiac  arrest, 
which led to hypoxic encephalopathy and his death.“   

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

On 17th February 2022 Joe’s parents couldn't wake him, so called 999.   

The first paramedic was on scene at 07.16hrs. Joe was unconscious, but not in cardiac arrest, his oxygen 
levels were low at 12, he could see evidence of vomit, an oropharyngeal airway was put in and his 
oxygen levels went up to 48%. Joe vomited and they had to suction his airway.   

Telephone 01275 461920  
Email AvonCoronersTeam@bristol.gov.uk         Website www.avon-coroner.com 
The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 Joe was taken to Southmead Hospital. During the journey Joe confirmed he had taken 
and an unidentified tablet.  

, 

The Consultant in Emergency Medicine, 
, confirmed that after Joe arrived, and following a rapid 
assessment of him, colleagues from the Intensive care unit were called as Joe needed to be intubated.    

, attended from the intensive care unit to carry out the intubation, he called his colleague 

 to assist and to supervise the intubation. Joe was pre-oxgenated. Intubation began at around 

9.37am.  

Video laryngoscope was used to view the chords, both 
could be viewed. 
saw the bougie enter the windpipe, 
over the bougie, as he did this it became stuck on cartilage which meant that he had to rotate the tube, 
the bougie was then taken out, and the cuff was inflated. The tube was not tied in and he accepted that 
it should have been done immediately.   

then inserted the bougie into the airway, both doctors said that they 
 then inserted the breathing tube, by railroading it 

 said that the chords 

 and 

It appears from the evidence that both 
to check for an end tidal trace. 
tube placement, he added that he didn't think he would ever have confirmed without seeing at least 3; 

 checked the capnograph at this point 
 said he didn’t know how many, but that he had confirmed 

 and 

 said we saw 3 breaths on the monitor.   

 also referenced the other indicators which were: chest wall movement, breath sounds in the 

chest, fogging in the tube. He accepted that on their own they are unreliable but that they supported the 
view that the tube was in the right place. 
 said that she would have been looking at the monitor 
as well and she thinks she saw a few end tidal carbon dioxide traces 2 or 3.   

What is clear from the evidence is that at the time there was no standard guidance on what the 
requirement was in relation to the capnography. At the time the campaign was no trace wrong place.   

What happened next and the exact sequence of events varied slightly between the witnesses. There was 
aspirate/vomit which resulted in suctioning of the airway which I am told was not unexpected, as they 
were aware that Joe had previously vomited. The aspirate then quickly became larger volumes of vomit. 
Both doctors accepted that with hindsight the amount of vomit was too much to come from the lungs.   

During this time Joe’s oxygen levels were dropping and he was heading to cardiac arrest so he called for 
, Consultant in Anaesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine.  
back-up from 

Joe went into cardiac arrest, at around 9.41am, chest compressions were started, advanced life support 
was given. 

 arrived, he noted no trace on the capnograph and asked if the tube was in the right 

When 
place, he said, because of the uncertainty, he looked with the laryngoscope and saw that it was in the 
osopahagus, he took it out and put in a new tube   

Return of spontaneous circulation was achieved after Joe had been correctly intubated at around 9.48 - 
9.49am  

Joe was taken to the intensive care unit but unfortunately did not recover due to a significant brain 
injury.  

, Specialist in Intensive Care Medicine and Anesthetist provided his expert opinion, of note 

he said:   
• 

The initial cause of Joe’s neurological decline was the opiate overdose, with initial early recovery due 
to the actions of the ambulance staff.   

•  He continued to have impaired respiratory function but his respiratory rate was normal with low 

oxygen saturations.   

•  Once at the emergency department the decision was made to intubate  

Telephone 01275 461920  
Email AvonCoronersTeam@bristol.gov.uk         Website www.avon-coroner.com 
The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL 

 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 That the tube was found to be in the oesophagus, this is a recognized complication.   
It was after accidental oesophageal intubation that Joe went into cardiac arrest.   
That it was during the cardiac arrest that the hypoxia caused the brain injury.   
That the standard at the time was to see a recognisable waveform trace on the capnograph.   
That if the tube is in the oesophagus you can still get some trace  

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•  He agreed that they needed to pass suction to deal with the aspirate which was expected, but that 
the volume of vomit was not questioned, he said that it is a much smaller volume of vomit that 
would be in the airways,   
That the time when the clinicians should have focused most attention on the end tidal trace is after 
intubation and then if not progressing as expected to re-assess the end tidal trace.   
It is unlikely that there was a recognizable capnograph trace in this case. So recognition of the 
accidental oesophageal intubation should have occurred relatively early, but in this case did not. 
That the volume of vomit should also have triggered a suspicion of accidental oesophageal 
intubation.   
That they should have re-intubated, which would have meant that the period of hypoxia would have 
been transient and would not have resulted in Joe’s death.   

• 

• 

• 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion 
there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory 
duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

Both 
report should be written in this case.  

 and 

 who were involved with this case have written to me supporting that a PFD 

(1) I have been told that capnography is the only reliable test, the gold standard, to confirm that a 
tracheal tube is in the right place, that no other test should override it.   
(2) That the more recent PUMA (Project for Universal Management of Airways) guidelines states, the 
detection of sustained exhaled carbon dioxide using waveform capnography is the mainstay for excluding 
oesophageal placement of an intended tracheal tube. The PUMA guidance deserves the widest possible 
endorsement and dissemination which has not happened yet.  
(3) Unrecognised oesophageal intubation was a “Never Event” by NHS England but is no longer.  
(4) There have already been a number of Prevention of Futures Deaths Reports written by Coroner’s in 
relation to this concern but to date, I am told there have been no changes.  

Telephone 01275 461920  
Email AvonCoronersTeam@bristol.gov.uk         Website www.avon-coroner.com 
The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the power to take 
such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 16th 
September 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for 
action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the chief coroner and to the following interested persons: 

• 
Family of the deceased 
•  North Bristol NHS Trust 
• 
• 

South Western Ambulances Service Trust 

I have also sent a copy to 

. 

I am also under a duty to send the chief coroner a copy of your response.  

The chief coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a 
copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make 
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of 
your response by the chief coroner. 

9 

19.7.24 

Signature   
M. E. Voisin 
HM Senior Coroner for Avon 

Telephone 01275 461920  
Email AvonCoronersTeam@bristol.gov.uk         Website www.avon-coroner.com 
The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL

Responses

3 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Association of Anaesthetists Rcoa and Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine Joint Respons (PDF)
11th September 2024 

Dear Ms Voisin, 

Re: Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths in the matter of Mr Joseph Parker 

Thank you for sending us a copy of your Regulation 28 Report regarding the sad death of Mr Joseph Parker. 
We have jointly reviewed the information available to us in the report via our Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group 
(SALG). SALG is a collaborative project between the Association of Anaesthetists, NHS England’s Patient 
Safety team and the Royal College of Anaesthetists. One of its core objectives is to analyse anaesthesia-
related serious incidents and to share the learning with the specialty across the UK. We have also reviewed 
the information available with the Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine (FICM) in order to prepare this joint 
response. 

As your report highlights, this is sadly not the first death as a result of unrecognised oesophageal intubation 
that has been referred to our organisations by your fellow coroners. It remains a great concern to our 
organisations that such incidents continue to take place, despite the work previously carried out by the 
specialty to try to ensure that oesophageal intubations are swiftly recognised and corrected. 

Your report highlights that “capnography is the only reliable test, the gold standard, to confirm that a 
tracheal tube is in the right place and that no other test should override it.” We agree entirely and this is 
made clear in the Association of Anaesthetist’s “Standards of monitoring during anaesthesia and recovery”1. 
The message has been emphasised in our previous communications to members on the topic2 and will 
continue to be at the heart of future communications. Our previous campaigns, in 2018 and again in 2021/22, 
have emphasised the “no trace = wrong place” message3. The Project for Universal Management of Airways 
(PUMA) consensus guidelines for the prevention of unrecognised oesophageal intubation’s4,  emphasise 
“sustained exhaled carbon dioxide” as the test to exclude potential oesophageal intubation.  This reflects the 
fact that in some cases of oesophageal intubation the capnograph trace has not been flat, but instead 
attenuated and abnormal. Our organisations are all supportive of the PUMA guidelines and plan to 
disseminate the key messages to our members through our safety communications and events. SALG 
publishes regular Patient Safety Updates, which are distributed to all members of the Association of 
Anaesthetists and Royal College of Anaesthetists. FICM publishes regular Safety Bulletins, which are distributed 
to all their members.  

Guidelines are in place, but in order for them to be successful in preventing unrecognised oesophageal 
intubation, we also recognise the importance of human-factors based strategies to enable their use, as 
outlined in the Association of Anaesthetists’ guidance “Implementing human factors in anaesthesia”5. In 
particular, multidisciplinary team training in the management of emergency situations is key in preventing 
unrecognised oesophageal intubation. As well as helping to ensure that individuals are familiar with the 
relevant algorithms, by rehearsing emergency drills, teams practise non-technical skills and learn how to 
function well as a whole within a flattened hierarchy, which contribute to safe and efficient task 
performance.5 Regular, multidisciplinary team training is one of the standards for the RCoA’s Anaesthesia 
Clinical Services Accreditation (ACSA) scheme.  However, in practice, it is a standard that many departments 
find difficult to meet to an adequate level due to the pressure on theatre time. To support this, we have 
created and promoted resources that can be delivered regularly within the normal working day.2,6 

The RCoA’s Quality Improvement Network is currently undertaking a project to look at the implementation of 
airway-related recommendations across the country, including those related to unrecognised oesophageal 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 intubation. We will use the information gained from this project to focus our activity to support departments of 
anaesthesia to make improvements. 

Your report mentioned that unrecognised oesophageal intubation was a suspended never event. We are 
aware that the never events framework is under review by NHS England. In our consultation response, we 
were clear that, whatever changes are made to the framework, we believe that unrecognised oesophageal 
intubation should be a nationally reportable incident, so that lessons can be learned from every tragic event 
to prevent its occurrence in the future. 

We would be happy to respond to any questions that you might have. 

Yours Sincerely 

President,  
Royal College of Anaesthetists 

President 
Association of Anaesthetists 

Dean 
Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine

References 
1.  Association of Anaesthetists, Recommendations for standards of monitoring during anaesthesia  and 

recovery, 2021, https://anaesthetists.org/Home/Resources-publications/Guidelines/Recommendations-
for-standards-of-monitoring-during-anaesthesia-and-recovery-2021  

2.  RCoA, Patient safety: unrecognised oesophageal intubation, https://www.rcoa.ac.uk/safety-standards-

quality/patient-safety/prevention-future-deaths 

3.  RCoA, No trace, wrong place https://www.rcoa.ac.uk/safety-standards-quality/guidance-

resources/capnography-no-trace-wrong-place 

4.  Chrimes, N. et al, (2022), Preventing unrecognised oesophageal intubation: a consensus guideline from 
the Project for Universal Management of Airways and international airway societies*. Anaesthesia, 77: 
1395-1415. https://doi.org/10.1111/anae.15817 

5.  Association of Anaesthetists, Implementing human factors in anaesthesia: guidance for clinicians, 

departments and hospitals, 2023, https://anaesthetists.org/Home/Resources-
publications/Guidelines/Implementing-human-factors-in-anaesthesia-guidance-for-clinicians-
departments-and-hospitals 

6.  RCoA, Flash Card Team training, https://www.rcoa.ac.uk/safety-standards-quality/patient-safety/flash-

card-team-training
Response from NHS England (PDF)
Ms Maria Voisin  
Senior Coroner  
Avon Coroner’s Office  
37 Old Weston Road 
Bristol 
BS48 1UL 

Dear Coroner, 

National Medical Director  
NHS England  
Wellington House 
133-155 Waterloo Road  
London 
SE1 8UG 

18 September 2024 

Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Joseph Lawrence Parker 
who died on 16 April 2022.   

Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 19 July 
2024 concerning the death of Joseph Lawrence Parker on 16 April 2022. In advance 
of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express 
my deep condolences to Joseph’s family and loved ones. NHS England are keen to 
assure the family and the Coroner that the concerns raised about Joseph’s care have 
been listened to and reflected upon.   

Your Report raises  concerns that  the Project for Universal Management of Airways 
(PUMA) guidelines for preventing unrecognised oesophageal intubation (including the 
use of capnography to confirm the correct placement of a tracheal tube) have not been 
widely endorsed or disseminated, and that there have been a number of Prevention 
of Future Death Reports written by Coroners in relation to concerns around this issue.  

My  response  focuses  on  those  areas  of  concern  that  fall  under  the  remit  of  NHS 
England’s national policy or programmes. NHS England notes that you have also sent 
your Report to the Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCoA), Faculty of Intensive Care 
Medicine (FICM), and  the  Royal College of  Emergency Medicine (RCEM),  who  are 
better  placed  to  respond  to  your  matters  of  concern.  NHS  England  will  carefully 
consider their responses to the Coroner in due course.  

We  note  that  the  RCoA  does  have  a  webpage  dedicated  to  Patient  safety: 
unrecognised  oesophageal  intubation  which  endorses  the  PUMA  guidelines  and 
highlights  the  previous  Prevention  of  Future  Death  Reports.  The  page  links  to 
resources for the ‘No Trace = Wrong Place’ campaign launched by the RCoA and the 
Difficult  Airway  Society  (DAS),  which  was  intended  to  highlight  the  correct  use  of 
capnography  to  prevent  undetected  oesophageal  intubation.  This  is  aimed  at  all 
clinicians involved in airway management.  

Your Report also raised the concern that unrecognised oesophageal intubation is no 
longer categorised as a “Never Event” by NHS England.  

                                                                                                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The use of capnography for intubation was included on the Never Events list in 2018. 
NHS  England’s  national  Patient  Safety  Team  quickly  received  feedback  that  there 
were differing views on the type of capnography that should be used, depending on 
the  age  of  the  patient,  and  national  guidance  was  required  on  how  capnography 
should be interpreted, so the Never Event was suspended until this guidance became 
available.  The  Association  of  Anaesthetists  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  (AAGBI) 
developed  recommendations  for  standards  of  monitoring  during  anaesthesia  and 
recovery  in  2021  and   a  consensus  guideline  in  2022  ‘Preventing  unrecognised 
oesophageal  intubation:  a  consensus  guideline  from  the  Project  for  Universal 
Management of Airways and international airway societies’, both of which make clear 
that ‘waveform capnography is the mainstay for excluding oesophageal placements of 
an intended tracheal tube’.   

The  mitigations  used  to  avoid  oesophageal  intubation,  primarily  the  use  of 
capnography,  which  is  included  in  the  2021  AAGBI  recommendations  referenced 
above, does not meet the definition of a Never Event. As part of NHS England’s current 
work  to  review  the  Never  Events  Framework  and  list  of  Never  Events,  we  will  be 
clarifying the future direction for the Never Events Framework. Since the completion 
of a widespread consultation in May 2024, a decision will be made on next steps which 
will determine if the current definition of a Never Event should change and whether 
this has implications for including oesophageal intubation on any future list. Further 
information on the consultation can be found here and NHS England can update the 
Coroner in due course if this would assist.  

I  would  also  like  to  provide  further  assurances  on  the  national  NHS  England  work 
taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are 
discussed  by  the  Regulation  28  Working  Group,  comprising  Regional  Medical 
Directors,  and  other  clinical  and  quality  colleagues  from  across  the  regions.  This 
ensures  that  key  learnings  and  insights  around  events,  such  as  the  sad  death  of 
Joseph, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us 
to  pay  close  attention  to  any  emerging  trends  that  may  require  further  review  and 
action.   

Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please 
do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.  

Yours sincerely,  

National Medical Director
Response from Royal College of Emergency Medicine (PDF)
Ms M E Voisin 
Her Majesty’s Senior Coroner 

The Coroner’s Court 
Old Weston Road 
Flax Bourton  

BS48 1UL 

13th September 2024 

Dear Ms Voisin, 

Further to your prevention of Future Deaths Notice following the conclusion of your inquest 
(4th  May  2024)  into  the death  of  Joseph  Lawrence Parker  who  died  on 16th  April  2022,  we 
would like to extend our sympathy and condolences to the family and friends of Mr. Parker. 

We note Mr Parker sustained a cardiac arrest after being intubated by the intensive care team 
whilst  in  the  emergency  department.  Initially  the  oesophagus  was  intubated  and  then 
subsequently (approximately 7 minutes later) this was rectified by tracheal intubation which 
resulted  in return  of  spontaneous  circulation.  Unfortunately,  Mr  Parker  did  not  recover  and 
died whilst in the intensive care unit.   

The Royal College of Emergency Medicine (RCEM) fully supports: 

•  adequate staffing for Resuscitation Areas (one registered nurse for each patient and 

two nurses for cardiac arrests) 

•  multi-speciality  and  multidisciplinary  simulation 

training  between  departments 

(including failed or difficulty airway drills) 

•  standardisation of equipment between critical areas, including difficult airway trolleys 
• 
• 

the use of intubation checklists 
the use of capnography both in the resuscitation area and for transport monitors 

These and other standards and recommendations currently form part of an existing document 
which provides a framework for collaborative working between Emergency Medicine (EM) and 
Intensive Care Medicine (ICM) [1].  As a specialty we will continue to work closely with the 
Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine and seek to improve upon our existing guidance to highlight 
the importance of waveform capnography in the early recognition of oesophageal intubation. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yours sincerely, 

Chair, Quality in Emergency Care Committee 

1. BETTER TOGETHER: Collaborative working between Emergency and Critical Care. COLLABORATIVE WORKING BETWEEN 
EMERGENCY AND CRITICAL CARE. July 2021  
https://rcem.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/RCEM_FICM_Better_Together_Framework.pdf

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