Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024

Kelly Stevens

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0512, written 24 Sep 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report24 Sep 2024
Reference2024-0512
DeceasedKelly Stevens
CoronerDavid Reid
Coroner areaWorcestershire
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Organisation namedWorcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:

, Chief Executive, Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust,

Charles Hastings Way, Worcester WR5 1DD;

1

CORONER

I am David Donald William REID, HM Senior Coroner for Worcestershire.

2

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act
2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made

3

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On 21 February 2024 I commenced an investigation and opened an inquest into the
death of Kelly Marie STEVENS. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest
on 24 September 2024

The conclusion of the inquest was that Ms. Stevens “Died from complications
associated with an excessively low, and unrecognized, sodium level while in hospital.
Her death was contributed to by neglect.”

4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

In answer to the questions “when, where and how did Ms. Stevens come by her
death?”, I recorded as follows:

“On 28.12.23 Kelly Stevens, who lived with profound learning and physical disabilities,
and received all nutrition, hydration and medication via a percutaneous endoscopic
gastrostomy ( PEG ) tube, was admitted to Worcestershire Royal Hospital with
abdominal distension and concern about her PEG tube. She was diagnosed with a
likely pseudo-bowel obstruction and a plan was made for her to undergo endoscopic
investigation. In the meantime, she was prescribed intravenous fluids but her intake of
these was not properly recorded, and her electrolyte levels were not monitored. On
the morning of 3.1.24 she suffered a seizure during which she aspirated some vomit.
This seizure was caused by an excessively low sodium level which had not been
recognized. She went on to develop aspiration pneumonia and, despite treatment,
declined and died in hospital later that night.”

5

CORONER’S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern.
In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –

1)  Despite being under the care of the medical team, Ms. Stevens did also

receive input from the surgical team. Her situation was further complicated by
the fact that for most of her admission she was placed as a medical outlier on

1

 a surgical ward. In the event, no one consultant was in overall charge of her
care, which meant that the issues identified in this case were not picked up
on. I heard evidence that there was no policy in place at the Trust to give
guidance as to how this sort of situation should be resolved, but instead that it
was expected that consultants would liaise with each other in order to do so.
That did not happen in this case;

2)  No doctor providing care for Ms. Stevens followed the established principle

that the prescription of intravenous fluids for a patient must be accompanied
by regular testing of electrolytes. In Ms. Stevens’ case, this was particularly
important because her baseline sodium level was low anyway, so the
overprescription of fluids put her at greater risk of hyponatraemia;

3)  There was no proper recording of Ms. Stevens’ fluid intake and output on fluid

balance charts for most of her hospital admission. For the reasons set out at
2) above, this was vitally important in her case;

4)  Ms. Stevens’ hospital notes revealed evidence of the routine “copying and
pasting” of out-of-date care plans by previous doctors. This meant that the
next person reading her notes would be left with an erroneous view of her
current care plan.

6

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you, as
the Chief Executive of Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust, have the power to
take such action.

7

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report,
namely by 19 November 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting
out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.

8

COPIES and PUBLICATION

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following:

(a) 
(b)  Dimensions UK, who run the supported living accommodation where Ms.

, Ms. Stevens’ mother;

Stevens’ lived;

(c)  The Care Quality Commission.

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it
useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of
your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief
Coroner.

9

24 September 2024

David REID
HM Senior Coroner for Worcestershire

2

 3

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS (PDF)
08 November 2024 

Mr David Reid 
HM Senior Coroner 
Worcestershire Coroners Court 
The Civic 
Martin’s Way 
Stourport on Severn 
Worcestershire 

Sent via email:  

Dear Mr Reid 

Re Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths  

Please accept this letter in response to your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future 
Deaths received on the 16th October 2024, following the Inquest touching on the death 
of Kelly Stevens. 

In your Regulation 28 report, you identified the following matters of concern relating to 
the Worcestershire Acute Hospitals NHS Trust (WAHT). 

1)  Despite being under the care of the medical team, Ms. Stevens did also 
receive 
input  from  the  surgical  team.  Her  situation  was  further 
complicated by the fact that for most of her admission she was placed as 
a medical outlier on a surgical ward. In the event, no one consultant was 
in overall charge of her care, which meant that the issues identified in this 
case were not picked up on. I heard evidence that there was no policy in 
place at the Trust to give guidance as to how this sort of situation should 
be resolved, but instead that it was expected that consultants would liaise 
with each other in order to do so.  

That did not happen in this case; 

2)  No  doctor  providing  care  for  Ms.  Stevens  followed  the  established 
principle that the prescription of intravenous fluids for a patient must be 
accompanied by regular testing of electrolytes. In Ms. Stevens’ case, this 
was  particularly  important  because  her  baseline  sodium  level  was  low 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 anyway,  so  the  overprescription  of  fluids  put  her  at  greater  risk  of 
hyponatraemia; 

3) There was no proper recording of Ms. Stevens’ fluid intake and output 
on  fluid  balance  charts  for  most  of  her  hospital  admission.  For  the 
reasons set out at 2- above, this was vitally important in her case;  

4) Ms. Stevens’ hospital notes revealed evidence of the routine “copying 
and pasting” of out-of-date care plans by previous doctors. This meant 
that the next person reading her notes would be left with an erroneous 
view of her current care plan. 

RESPONSE: 

1) 

At the time of the incident, there was no policy in place for the management of 
medical outliers. In the action plan of the report the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) 
has an action relating to the review of a patient outlier policy and to taking over 
patient care. These actions are almost completed. Meetings were held between 
the senior clinical leaders and the Chief Medical Officer on 11th October 2024 
and the 4th November to review the policy. The policy has been agreed and will 
be  shared  through  the  Improving  Safety  Actions  Group  (ISAG)  on  14th 
November  2024  and  approved  through  Trust  Management  Board  on  20th 
November 2024 with immediate implementation thereafter. 

Any  issues  with  outliers  are  escalated  via  the  capacity  meetings/the  flow 
WhatsApp group which is monitored on a daily basis by the bed lead for the 
Division.  This process  is followed  Monday  to  Friday  and  ensures any  issues 
with either review or management of outlier patients are picked up in a timely 
manner. 

2) 

Blood  monitoring  training  is  included  as  part  of  the  core  medical  curriculum 
covered within medical training.  

3)  

There have been multiple actions to improve fluid balance records: 

•  A Trust wide “Lesson of the Week” was shared on 5th August 2024 to 
share learning and actions required to support immediate improvements 
in Fluid Balance documentation in EPR. 

•  Additional opportunities for education around nutrition and hydration are 

included throughout the ward:  

o  Local  induction  to  the  ward  for  Healthcare  Assistants  (HCA) 
covers MUST and fluid balance; this is an informal local training 
and is completed with the Band 6.  

o  Fluid balance training provided by the Acute Kidney Injury nurse.  
o  Rolling  HCA  study  day  programme  which  includes  MUST  and 

nutritional risk.  

o  Due to changes with fluid balance and the introduction of EPR, 
the Division recognise there is a gap in training; the Division are 
currently formulating a training package to be delivered locally. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 o  Training compliance will be monitored through the Nutrition and 
Hydration  steering  group,  a  trajectory  has  been  submitted  to 
improve  compliance  with  training  over  the  next  3  months  to 
provide assurance around learning 

4)  

The copy forward function on EPR was removed from 3 documents on 14th May 
2024: Medical Clerking, Ward Round and Specialty Review. Copy forward was 
then  removed  from  all  documents  within  the  EPR  system  on  4th  September 
2024. 

I  hope  that  the  above  addresses  the  concerns  which  you  raised.    I  have  no 
representations in respect of publication of the Regulation 28 or this response by the 
Chief Coroner. 

I shall be grateful if you could kindly send a copy of my response to anyone to whom 
you copied your Regulation 28 report.  

Yours sincerely                   

Chief Executive

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