Darren Reilly and Tyler Cox

REGULATION 29 RESPONSE TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS RESPONSE IS BEING SENT TO: 

The Area Coroner for Hertfordshire, Jacques Howell of The Old Courthouse, St Albans Road 
East, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, AL10 0ES.  

1  RESPONDING AUTHORITY 

National Highways Limited is the government owned Strategic Highway Company appointed by 
the Secretary of State for Transport as highway authority for the Strategic Road Network in 
England including the M1 motorway in Hertfordshire. 

I am 
, Head of Service Delivery within Operations South-East at National Highways, 
Bridge House, 1 Walnut Tree Close, Guildford, GU1 4LZ and the operation of this part of the M1 
falls within my remit. 

I would wish to take this opportunity to express my condolences, and those of everyone at National 
Highways, to the family and friends of Mr Reilly and Miss Cox. 

2  CORONER’S MATTERS OF CONCERN  

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: –  

Along this section of the M1 southbound there are safety barriers to the nearside of the carriageway.  
The safety barrier is designed to prevent a vehicle from leaving the carriageway – the idea being 
that a vehicle that has lost control will continue along the safety barrier before coming to a more 
controlled stop, thereby minimising the risk of serious injury of death to passengers. 

The  provision  of  barriers  is  particularly  important  when  a  high-speed  carriageway  (such  as  a 
motorway) is lined with established trees, as is the case here.  This is because any vehicle that has 
lost  control  and  leaves  the  carriageway  is  likely  to  do  so  at  high  speed  and  collide  with  these 
established trees.  This would likely lead to a very sharp and sudden deceleration, and may cause 
the vehicle to overturn, which significantly increases the likelihood of serious injury and death to 
passengers. 

At  the  collision  scene  in  this  case,  safety  barrier  is  present  shortly  before  and  shortly  after  the 
collision site.  In general, gaps are sometimes inserted into the safety barrier for the purposes of 
access or due to the presence of other safety measures (e.g. a grassed bank). The witnesses from the 
Roads Policing Unit could not offer any explanation for why there is a gap in the safety barrier at 
this location. 

There is a gap in the safety barrier at this location, which for the reasons outlined above gives rise 
to a risk that future deaths may occur. 

3  PURPOSE OF NOTE 

This note has been prepared in response to a Regulation 28 report, received from the Hertfordshire  
Coroner’s Service by National Highways on 18 July 2025, in response to a fatal road traffic collision 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 on  1  April  2024.  The  incident  occurred  on  the  southbound  carriageway  of  the  M1  motorway 
between junction 6 and 5 near Marker Post 30/0B. 

National Highways was not an Interested Person in the inquest and was not asked to provide any 
witness  evidence  at  the  inquest.  To  assist  therefore,  this  note  also  sets  out  relevant  background 
information pertaining to the matter raised by the coroner. 

3  RELEVANT BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

Nature of the current barrier provision at the material location 

The M1 motorway between junction 6 and 5 is a conventional 3 lane motorway comprising of 3 
lanes and a hard shoulder. The section of motorway was first open to traffic on 2 November 1959.  

This  section  of  motorway  has  a  vehicle  restraint  system  (VRS)  continuously  within  the  central 
reservation. In the verge, VRS is provided intermittently to reduce the risk of road users colliding 
with physical roadside infrastructure such as road signs, technology equipment and other roadside 
hazards. 

There is a section of VRS which ends approximately 50m north of the incident location in front of 
some steps leading down an embankment. There is a further section of VRS starting approximately 
210m to the south of the incident location in front of an electronic message sign. There is a gap of 
approximately 260m between these two sections of barrier. 

At this location there is 1.5m wide level verge immediately adjacent to the hard shoulder. Beyond 
this area the verge slopes down to the motorway boundary fence which, at the incident location, is 
approximately  7m  from  the  edge  of  the  hard  shoulder.  Within  this  area  there  is  no  physical 
infrastructure  but  there are  a  number  of  small  trees between the fence and  the  edge of the hard 
shoulder. 

Standards Relating to Provision of Vehicle Restraint Systems 

Vehicle Restraint  Systems (VRS) such  as roadside  barriers  are designed to contain  and redirect 
vehicles  in  a  controlled  manner  and  are  installed  to  reduce  the  risk  of  collision  with  roadside 
hazards. They are typically designed and tested based on a vehicle of 1500kg, striking the barrier 
at an angle of  20  degrees  at 70mph.  If these parameters are  exceeded the  barrier is likely to be 
breached by the vehicle. 

VRS  themselves  present  a  level  of  injury  risk  to  road  users  and  are  therefore  only  installed  in 
locations where a hazard cannot be removed, relocated, or made frangible, and the level of injury 
risk from the VRS is lower than the level of injury risk posed by the hazard located behind the VRS.  

VRS also require installation, inspection, maintenance, repair and removal, all of which present a 
level of risk to our roadworkers, but also to the travelling public whilst temporary lane closures and 
speed restrictions may be in place to undertake such works. 

National Highways’ current requirements for VRS are contained within the document CD 377 – 
Requirements for Road Restraint Systems. These were first published in March 2020, with the 
latest revision (revision 4) published in January 2021 
(https://www.standardsforhighways.co.uk/search/1fe48581-82ba-4b6f-95a1-ee93309bd1b5). 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The standard sets out a risk-based approach to the provision of VRS using an analysis tool known 
as the Road Restraint Risk Assessment Process (RRRAP). 

CD 377 is normally only applied where a new hazard is introduced on the verge or when the road 
layout is altered to bring traffic closer to hazards in the verge. As with most new highway standards, 
there is no requirement within CD 377 to review and upgrade existing highways where there are no 
alterations being made.  

Sections of highway which have not been altered for many years, including the M1 at this location, 
would  have VRS  provided to an earlier  standard which  set  specific  criteria for the provision of 
verge barrier based on the nature of physical items in the verge, and the height of any embankment.  

A gap in the VRS was left along this section probably due to the absence of physical infrastructure 
in the verge at this location and the relatively small level difference between the highway and the 
adjacent land. 

At junctions or emergency access points, gaps are left in VRS for access purposes. Where access is 
required, two sections of barrier would overlap with the section of upstream barrier placed closer 
to the carriageway edge to prevent vehicles striking the end of the downstream VRS. 

The  current  standard  (CD  377)  requires  gaps  of  less  than  100m  to  be  closed  unless  there  are 
significant  cost,  technical  and/or  access  requirements  for  the  gap  to  remain  open.  As  the  gap 
between the two lengths of barrier at the incident location is 260m this part of the standard does not 
require this gap to be closed. 

Risk Management Approach 

Current standards for VRS provide a hierarchy of controls for hazards in the verge. This advocates, 
that where possible, hazards are removed from the verge in preference to a VRS being provided.  

Where vegetation is the only potential hazard in the verge, the risk of vehicles colliding with trees 
is managed through a programme of tree removal work. Where there is no VRS present we remove 
any tree within 5m of the carriageway edge. There is a cyclical programme of verge tree clearance 
that aims to ensure that trees close to the carriageway are regularly removed. Prior to the incident 
on 1 April 2024, trees at this location were last cleared on 19 February 2024. 

Whilst  we  would  not  upgrade  VRS  to  current  standards  as  a  matter  of  course  unless  we  were 
undertaking substantial work at a location, we monitor the safety performance of our network and, 
based on this analysis, bring forward proposals for safety improvement. This may include providing 
additional safety barrier to current standards where a high risk of vehicles leaving the carriageway 
has been identified.  

Our monitoring of the M1 had not, prior to this incident, identified a significant trend of vehicles 
leaving the carriageway at this location.  

5  ACTIONS TAKEN 

On 17 February 2025 we undertook routine clearance of trees within 5m of the carriageway edge 
along this section of the M1. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4  PLANNED ACTIONS 

We will undertake the Road Restraint Risk Assessment Process (RRRAP) in accordance with the 
requirements of CD 377 to assess the need for VRS, or other mitigations such as additional tree 
clearance, at this location based on the current technical standards. 

5  TIMETABLE FOR PLANNED ACTION  

We will complete the planned action before 31 December 2025 and report on our findings to you 
no later than 13 February 2026. 

6  Signed and dated 

9th September 2025