Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2025

Charlotte Tetley

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2025-0465, written 14 Sep 2025. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report14 Sep 2025
Reference2025-0465
DeceasedCharlotte Tetley
CoronerSarah Murphy
Coroner areaCheshire
CategorySuicide (from 2015)
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

NOTE:  This form is to be used after an inquest.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT DEATHS

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:

1 Chief Constable of Cheshire Police

1

CORONER

I am Sarah Murphy, assistant coroner for the coroner area of Cheshire.

2

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

3

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On 30 September 2024 I commenced an investigation into the death of Charlotte Tetley aged
33.  The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 5 September 2025.  The
conclusion of the inquest was that:

Death was due to being struck by a train having deliberately sat on the tracks with an
intention to end life.  She had suffered a deterioration in mental health following a decision to
remove her from the inpatient bed list on the 25 June 2024, and subsequent accommodation
difficulties.

4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

On the 24 September 2024, Charlotte Tetley was hit by a train travelling though Macclesfield
after she had been sat on tracks. There was no easy access to the tracks at this point.

Ms Tetley had a complex longstanding mental health history and was a victim of the Rochdale
Grooming  where  she  suffered  significant  sexual  abuse.  She  was  diagnosed  with  Emotional
Unstable Personality Disorder and had previously been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder and substance misuse causing behavioural and mood disorder. Drug dependence was
a  coping  mechanism.  At  the  time  of  her  death,  she  was  prescribed  medication,  but  her
concordance was sporadic and influenced by whether she had accommodation. She had taken
multiple  previous  overdoses  with  intent  to  end  life.  She  had  been  under  the  Macclesfield
Community  Mental  Health  Team  since  July  2023  when  she  moved  from  Rochdale  after  her
abuser returned to the area.

On  the  18  June  2024,  Ms  Tetley  attended  the  Accident  and  Emergency  Department  at
Macclesfield Hospital voicing concerns for her safety and thoughts to jump in front of a train.
An informal admission was found to be clinically indicated to commence depot injection and to
maintain  safety.  She  was  reviewed  daily  until  the  24  June  where  on  each  day,  the  clinical
records  document  that  an  informal  admission  was  necessary.  The  minutes  of  the  bed
management meeting on the 24 June recorded that the Home Treatment Team did not think
that Charlotte required a mental health inpatient bed but that the homeless pathway needed
to be explored before taking off the inpatient list.  This was not recorded in Ms Tetley’s clinical
records  for  the  24  June  2024.    The  clinical  records  for  the  review  on  the  24  June  2024,
document that Ms Tetley felt that the only option for her to get better was for admission.

On the 25 June, Ms Tetley was discharged from the inpatient bed list by the bed management
team at 10:37 hours. This was before an attempted review by a Mental Health Practitioner at

Regulation 28 – After Inquest
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021

 11:30 hours who did not complete a review due to finding Ms Tetley asleep. A handover had
been obtained from Accident and Emergency nursing staff who reported no concerns or change
in  presentation.  It  was  concluded  that  Ms  Tetley  did  not  appear  to  require  a  mental  health
inpatient  admission  but  might  benefit  from  an  admission  to  a  medical  ward  to  address
homelessness. It was documented in the clinical records that she was amenable to a discharge.
Charlotte left the department at 12:57 hours.  It was documented in the clinical records on the
25 June that after discharge, she called her probation officer and was noted to be “screaming”
down  the  phone  stating  that  she  was going to  the railway  line  to kill  herself.   She  had  also
phoned her family expressing dismay about the discharge from the inpatient bed list.

The  community  Consultant  Psychiatrist  and  other  mental  health  practitioners  had  concerns
about the safety of the discharge on the 25 June 2025 which were documented in the clinical
records. Ms Tetley’s whereabouts were unknown to the community mental health team until
the 2 July when they were contacted by her probation officer. On the 3 July, Ms Tetely received
a  psychiatric  review  by  a  Specialist  Registrar,  and  it  concluded  that  there  was  no  clinical
indication for a mental health act assessment or informal admission.

Ms Tetley subsequently engaged with the community mental health team and community drug
services,  but  on  the  18  September  2024,  she  was  removed  from  railway  tracks  by  British
Transport Police and taken to the Accident and Emergency Department of Macclesfield Hospital.
She had reported feeling suicidal to workers who had found her, but she left the hospital before
being reviewed by the Mental Health Liaison Team.

The police were contacted by the Accident and Emergency Department to report Ms Tetley as
a high-risk missing person, but they were informed that under the “Right Place Right Person”
policy, nobody would be deployed.  The Liaison Psychiatry Clinical Lead requested for this to
be escalated to a supervisor and duly spoke with a supervisor. She expressed concerns about
an immediate risk to safety for Ms Tetley but was informed that as Ms Tetley had not voiced
intention to end her life, it could not be known that this was her intention when she left the
department.  It was explained by the Liaison Psychiatry Clinical Lead that the fact that Charlotte
was not engaging had concerned her more about her immediate safety.  The Police maintained
that  nobody  would  be  deployed  and  suggested  that  response  vehicle  should  go  out.    The
ambulance service was duly contacted to request a response vehicle, but the Clinical Lead was
informed that as the whereabouts of Ms Tetley was unknown, they would not deploy anyone.

Ms Tetley’s keyworker was able to contact her by telephone on the 18 September and arranged
to see her the following day. She was reviewed by her keyworker on the 19 September where
Ms Tetley requested that an outpatient appointment with her psychiatrist was re-arranged from
the 24 September as she had a court hearing that day. On the morning of the 24 September,
Ms  Tetley  did  not  attend  the  court  hearing  and  spoke  by  phone  with  her  mental  health
keyworker  and  expressed  longstanding  suicidal  ideation  without  immediate  intent.  She
attended the office of the community drug and alcohol team and was noted to be tearful and
in low mood. She was later fatally struck by a train when she deliberately sat on the tracks.

5

CORONER’S CONCERNS

During the course of the investigation my inquiries revealed matters giving rise to concern. In
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken.  In the
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:
(brief summary of matters of concern)

That despite Ms Tetley being found on train tracks on the 18 September 2024, and reporting
to workers who found her that she felt suicidal, the police would respond when she
absconded from the Accident and Emergency Department the same day.  When the Clinical
Lead of Psychiatric Liaison escalated the matter and expressed concern of an immediate risk
for safety given her extensive medical history, and her lack of engagement in the department
that day, she was informed that as Ms Tetley had not expressed an intention to end her life

Regulation 28 – After Inquest
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021

 before leaving the department, it could not be known that it was her intention to end life.
The police informed the Clinical Lead to contact the ambulance response vehicle.  When she
did this, they declined to respond as they were unaware of Ms Tetley’s wherabouts.

I am concerned that if a very narrow interpretation of policy is applied by the police when
professionals report a concern for a high risk missing person in circumstances where they
consider there to be an immediate risk to life, there will be a risk of future deaths occurring.
If the policy is interpreted such that police resources will only be deployed if the missing
person has expressed an intention to end life as they leave the hospital, there is a risk that
future deaths will occur.  It is unlikely that the ambulance response vehicle will be deployed if
the whereabouts of the missing person is unknown, which will result in the missing person
not being able to receive medical attention until their whereabouts are known.  By the time
that they are located, there is a risk that they will no longer be alive.

6

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you (and/or your
organisation) have the power to take such action.

7

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report,
namely by 9 November 2025 I, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the
timetable for action.  Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.
COPIES and PUBLICATION

8

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons

The family of Charlotte Tetley

I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all
interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.

I may also send a copy of your response to any person who I believe may find it useful or of
interest.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form.
He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of
interest.

You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response about the
release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.

9

Dated: 14.9.25

Regulation 28 – After Inquest
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Cheshire Constabulary (PDF)
Regulation 28 Response in the case of Charlotte Tetley  
(on behalf of Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary) 

We note the concerns expressed by the Coroner regarding the potential for future deaths as outlined in 
Section 5 of the Coroner’s Section 28 Report dated 14th September 2025.  

As the Coroner will appreciate, this is not an Inquest in which Cheshire Constabulary were named an 
interested party and we therefore have no sight of the bundle of evidence and the documents the Coroner 
considered in this case.  In light of this, we felt it may assist to provide some background information and 
copy policies /procedures which in turn will flow into our responses to the specific points raised. We hope 
this is found to be helpful in the circumstances.  

In this case, the report refers to the application of the “Right Care, Right Person” policy. It is that to which 
we respond and provide further information.  

Right Care, Right Person 

Right  Care  Right  Person  (RCRP)  is  a  national  project  that  commenced  in  January  2023  with  coordination 
between the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC), the Home Office, the College of Policing, HM Inspectorate 
of Constabularies, Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS), the Office for Independent Police Complaints (IOPC) 
and the Department for Health and Social Care (DHSC).  RCRP is a national operating model approved for 
police forces in England and Wales, which is locally implemented recognising the complexities of each police 
force and its corresponding NHS, Local Authority and other partnerships. This national approach was codified 
by the Home Office and Department for Health and Social Care under the National Partnership Agreement 
(“NPA”) published on 26th June 2023 (Copy attached at Appendix One).  

RCRP is an approach first developed by Humberside police to ensure people who call the police get the best 
support and service whilst ensuring the most suitable intervention to vulnerable members of the public who 
require  specialist  support.    RCRP  involves  partners  in  ambulance,  mental  health,  acute  hospitals,  social 
services and other organisations.  These partnerships ensure that RCRP can achieve its aim to provide the 
best care for the public by ensuring the most appropriate response to calls for service, by the professionals 
with the right skills, experience and expertise. In other words, this is about ensuring that when someone 
contacts the police they get help from the correct and most suitable service. Police will still respond where 
we are the right service to do so but RCRP recognises these are healthcare scenarios where others have 
responsibility and the specialist skills required to assist in the best interests of those involved. 

Central to RCRP is the assurance that all policies and guidelines on practice:- 

1.  Give clear guidance to officers and staff who use them  
2.  Are reasonably comprehensive  
3.  Are consistent with legal obligations  
4.  Promote the best interests not just of the force but the public it serves  

Extensive advice was sought prior to implementation in respect of legal requirements placed on the police – 
including  any  issues  surrounding  duty  of  care  -  in  various  circumstances  and  how  this  might  vary  with 
vulnerable callers (including children and young people).  Consideration was also given as to whether it was 
lawful and appropriate to conduct police system checks on calls where police did not have an obvious duty 
to respond. This took into account existing force operating models, Independent Office for Police Conduct 
(IOPC) investigations and law.  The RCRP approach was highlighted by HMICFRS in its 2018 report, and was 
reviewed by the College of Policing as best practice on 3rd April 2023.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cheshire Police RCRP Timeline 

Prior to the implementation of Right Care Right Person in Cheshire, Cheshire Constabulary received  over 
25,000 reports of a concern for welfare into the Force Control Centre each year.  The introduction of RCRP, 
working  with our partner  organisations, has  reduced  the  volume  of  some  reports  for  a  welfare check  as 
agencies now have their own internal escalation processes (including hospitals who have specific processes 
they should follow when someone leaves hospital for example), and there is a better understanding of what 
police will, and will not respond to.   This means, since RCRP was introduced in 2024 Cheshire Constabulary 
has received a lower number (22,098 in 2024) of reports of a concern for welfare.  We are on course to 
receive a similar number of reports in 2025 as 2024.   

Public Contact (known as the FCC) has around 400 members of staff. Prior to Right Care Right Person, they 
did not receive any detailed training regarding the legal basis on when we should, should not, must, can and 
indeed cannot accept a duty of care.  This meant that a report of a concern for welfare often generated an 
incident for deployment which upon review by the FIS or FIM identified that deployment was not the correct 
approach.  Upon examination this was a flawed approach and highlighted that the force was assuming a duty 
of care when it was not always appropriate or necessary.  This put Police officers in situations where they do 
not have the right skills, expertise or training to help the public when in need.  From a public perspective it 
meant police attending in a situation in which they were not best placed or able to assist, ie a healthcare 
scenario requiring expert practitioners.  

Cheshire Constabulary adopted the principles of Right Care, Right Person (RCRP) for reports of Concern for 
Safety (CFS) from 8th January 2024 (See policy at Appendix Two).  The change in how these incidents are 
described and categorised from ‘concern for welfare’ to ‘concern for safety’ underpins the move away from 
‘welfare checks’ as, in general terms, the police are not under any duty to act at common law regarding the 
general welfare of the public nor ought they to do so. In many cases there simply wouldn’t be any police 
powers enabling them to do so (eg to force entry in the absence of the threshold being met to utilise such 
powers). The RCRP principles were adopted in phases as follows:- 

•  Phase 1 launched on 8th January 2024 and focussed on ‘Concern for Safety’. This introduced a toolkit 
regarding general concern for welfare calls that Cheshire Police receive from the public and partners.   

•  Phase 2 launched on 15th May 2024 and focussed on ‘Walkout from Healthcare settings’ (a subset 
of Phase 1). This added greater clarity to incidents where mental health and detention under The 
Mental Health Act need to be considered.  This was underpinned by further training and a refresh of 
the fundamentals of RCRP.   

•  Phase  3  was  introduced  in  September  2024  and  relates  to  s135  MHA  warrants.  This  was  also 

supported by further training and refresher training of all aspects of RCRP.   

The training at each stage was accompanied by personal issue ‘RCRP Toolkits’ to support decision making.  
These physical workbooks are used by operators to follow the flow chart which highlights policing obligations 
and are designed to positively triage each case.  

The Toolkits are designed to identify the purpose and need for police to attend based  on legal / statutory 
obligations.   In short, the FCC call handler will answer a 101 or 999 call and listen to the caller.  They will ask 
questions  and  gather  information using  the toolkit  flow  chart  as  a  list  to  prioritise  and  confirm or  clarify 
information.  This is a rapid and dynamic assessment. At any point when then call handler identifies a policing 
purpose  via  the  toolkit  and  the  questions  asked  they  will  update  the  incident  for  deployment.    This  can 
happen very quickly in calls where there is a clear immediate threat to life. The call handler will complete 
the toolkit questions and listen to what is being reported.  They will apply their training and professional 
judgement to the report, applying the RCRP question set and seeking to identify what is being reported, and 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 what the police can reasonably do given the report.  An example of this is where a call is of a general concern 
for welfare such as when someone has missed an appointment or has elected to leave a hospital waiting 
area by choice.  Whilst these raise a general concern for the reporting person or agency, they do not reach 
the threshold for a police response.  The FCC call handler will add a digital ‘RCRP proforma’ to the Incident 
Management  Log  (“IML”)  which  captures  their  decision  which  they  show  by  ticking  the  specific  decision 
points  they  have been  through.    They will  then add  their THRIVE  rationale  to the  incident which  is  their 
decision regarding the urgency of the deployment in line with their training as per all other incidents.     

RCRP ensures that reports of Concern For Safety (CFS) are now always recorded in an IML on every occasion 
as  a  standard  approach.  This  allows  for  clear  documentation  of  decision  making  relating  to  CFS  incident 
reports and assists with audit of this type of incident.   

As mentioned, RCRP has introduced a standard set of questions for all FCC operators that they must consider 
and document, which previously did not exist. The RCRP Toolkit regarding Phase 2 “walkouts” is attached at 
Appendix Three.  

This is supported by a policy document that explains the legal and statutory obligations, as well as the context 
and considerations that underpin Right Care Right Person implementation in Cheshire.  Every member of 
staff  in  the  FCC  received  detailed  training  in  the  law,  the  process  and  the  application  of  RCRP  prior  to 
implementation.  This included all Force Incident Sergeants (“FIS”), Force Incident Managers (“FIM”), FCC 
Supervisors and the Senior leadership team.  Wider engagement and training was rolled out within the force 
to all departments.  The training and supporting documents have also been shared with partner agencies to 
assist their own training and approach to RCRP (RCRP Legal and Escalation slides attached as Appendix Four).  
The Constabulary also developed, offered and provided communication experience and material to assist 
other agencies in providing their own education and awareness of RCRP prior to go live.    

To support both public and professionals regarding when to call Cheshire police and to ensure we signpost 
when the police are not deploying to a request for assistance, Cheshire Police developed the public force 
website to host approved national and support service contacts.  This website page contains links to NHS 
111, Crisis Line, The Hub of Hope, and postcode specific services such as Live Well Cheshire (West and East), 
and others.  When a call generates a no deployment decision, the FCC call handler will inform the caller of 
this  by  reading  a  prewritten  script  which  avoids  any  misunderstanding.    They  will  then  direct  caller 
appropriately (for example in respect of further enquiries they can make, avenues available to them)  and 
can direct or send the caller to the website link verbally or by email or text. They may also indicate that the 
caller should undertake further enquiries and then call back if required.  

To be clear, the toolkit/ guide is aligned to the legal and statutory duties placed on the police and will lead 
to one of 4 end decision points.  They are:  

1.  Deploy 
2.  No Deployment 
3.  Caller insists on deployment (after no deployment decision reached) and the matter thus requires 

escalation to a Supervisor for review. 

4.  Unsure about deployment and escalate to Supervisor.  

With each of these end decision points there is an accompanying script that the FCC call handler must read 
to the caller in order to be completely clear on what action is or is not being taken.  These statements are to 
ensure clarity for everyone involved in a specific incident.  They are also the parameters for when FCC call 
handler will conduct primary, or secondary intelligence checks.     

The documentation available is important as if a further call for service is then received it is treated as a new 
incident with the RCRP methodology applied.  Any previous reported and recorded incidents will be clearly 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 visible.    Often  such  as  in  cases  where  a  neighbour  has  not  been  seen,  several  calls  may  be  received  all 
expressing a general concern which on their own do not meet the threshold for a police response.  However, 
these will all be recorded to ensure that an informed decisions can be made based on all the information 
and intelligence available.   

Escalation Process 

The escalation process in RCRP is a process to trigger a second and if needed, a third review should the public 
or partner agencies call and disagree with the police decision not to deploy. This is commenced when a caller 
states they disagree with the decision not to deploy and escalated the incident firstly to the FCC Supervisor 
(second review), and then to the Force Incident Manager (third and final review).   

Full training in the escalation points of incidents was delivered both internally to FCC staff and externally to 
partner agencies.  This was to ensure that all involved were clear that if a FCC call handler is unable to make 
a decision regarding deployment on a reported incident, or if the caller disagrees with the police decision on 
an incident (generally not to deploy), it will trigger an escalation to the FCC Supervisor.  This is triggered by 
a simple plain speech declaration that the caller does not agree with the decision.  This ensures the public 
or partner can trigger an escalation simple by stating in plain speech they disagree.  During the development 
of RCRP an action was set to all partner agencies to train their staff in this escalation process.   

These escalations are intentional designed as the RCRP toolkit and policy can never cover every eventuality, 
nor does it prohibit decision makers at any level from applying sound professional judgement and choosing 
to deploy police resources even if RCRP toolkit indicates no deployment and there appears no police power 
to do so.  All FCC team members, FCC Supervisors and Force Incident Managers (indeed anyone asked to 
make a deployment decision) has been trained and empowered that they can over-ride RCRP and choose to 
deploy at any time based on a clear explanation and reason.  The training around this was delivered prior to 
go  live  with  examples  where  this  might  occur.    This  ensures  those  using  RCRP  are  considering  all  the 
information and managing the risks reported.  RCRP is not a process of simply following a list.  Where we 
step outside of RCRP policy, all have been trained and understand that a “Sherratts” duty will then apply as 
we have chosen to take responsibility for the incident resolution.   

An additional option is available to the FIM escalation which supports police deployment when there is no 
clear policing purpose, but mutual aid is requested by a partner agency.  This was anticipated to be where a 
crisis situation has occurred and the partner agency is unable to meet their own demands.  This would be 
triggered by the FIM who would agree to deploy police resources and accompanied by the worded script 
read  to  the  caller.    These  deployments  would  then  trigger  an  escalation  for  review  and  learning  at  the 
appropriate statutory safeguarding board. 

Development of RCRP policy  

Over the full year of 2023 Cheshire Police worked with over 500 different private, public and third sector 
organisations  in  the  development  and  implementation  of  RCRP.    A  full  review  of  the  legal  and  statutory 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 obligations placed upon police was conducted with legal advice obtained from Kings Counsel.  This underpins 
the approach, framework, application and policy of RCRP.  Extensive discussion and development of RCRP 
took place in the 12- month period with regular governance meetings taking place.  These meetings were 
held frequently and were the development and instructional meetings attended by representatives from all 
organisations with a footprint across or within Cheshire and the UK.  This included HMICFRS,  IOPC, NHS, 
Local Authority service providers and other services.  They membership and attendance followed the pattern 
of:  

•  Strategic Coordination Group – chaired by Assistant Chief Constable and attended by strategic leads 

(Chief Exec level) initially every 6 weeks.  

•  Tactical Coordination Group – Chaired by Chief Inspector or Superintendent and attended by tactical 

leads  (Head of Department level) initially every 4 weeks.   

•  Operations Working Groups –  Chaired by RCRP project team.  Held regularly and attended by TCG 
attendees and practitioners, initially every 4 weeks and with six individual working groups running at 
the same time focussed on different professional groups.   

Over  2000  hours  have  been  invested  in  partnership  engagement  and  discussion  across  500  distinct 
organisations that operate with the Cheshire Constabulary geographical area.  The attendance records of 
who attended which meetings, and the meetings themselves is recorded and available for scrutiny.   

RCRP Training:  

Every member of staff in the FCC received detailed training in the law, the process, and the application of 
RCRP prior to implementation. This included all FIS, FIMS, FCC Supervisors, and the Senior Leadership Team.   
Extensive training of how to use the RCRP flowcharts known as toolkits was undertaken prior to go live and 
delivered  to  FCC  staff  by  experienced  and  competent  trainers.    The  training  package  was  developed  to 
complement the RCRP policy written to underpin its use.  Prior to go live of RCRP staff received initial training 
in RCRP of a 3-hour input in the law, the use of the toolkit, what to record and how to escalate if they were 
unsure to an FCC Supervisor.  This was followed up after go-live with further training sessions as Cheshire 
Police adopted a phased approach to implementation, to best support partners with their own preparations 
for the change in approach.   

During go live and throughout 2024 RCRP floorwalkers were employed to support staff in making decisions 
and answering questions.  This was via experienced staff who received additional training and were selected 
for their knowledge of law and procedure and their ability to consistently apply RCRP to reported incidents.  
This was complemented by the FCC Supervisors on duty, and the RCRP project team who worked alongside 
staff in FCC Calls room.  The training is as follows:  

•  A full day training on mental health to give understanding of the different sections.  
•  A full day training on RCRP which focusses on law, statutory duties and covers concern for safety and 
walkout  from  healthcare.    This  is  then  tested  against  scenarios  in  which  they  have  to  follow  the 
toolkits to see what decision they come to.  This is followed by a session on callers in crisis which 
covers suicide ideology and recaps Article 2 ECHR.  
Included in the training is a recap on mental health completed earlier in initial FCC training as a call 
handler, Article 2 ECHR, Article 3 ECHR, Common Law and Sherretts duty.  
Incident creation within RCRP i.e. If it’s a crime, child neglect or a MFH 

• 
•  RCRP QA and project team presentation and plenary discussion.  

• 

RCRP Quality Assurance 

Quality  assurance  is  undertaken  by  the  RCRP  project  and  implementation  team  conducting  live  QA  of 
incidents as they occur to ensure consistent application of RCRP in line with training.  Direct feedback is given 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 to FCC call handlers and they can discuss decision with the QA team as well as the FCC Supervisors.  At the 
commencement of RCRP the FCC call handlers were all supported by RCRP subject matter experts (SME’S) 
and professionals  from  the  mental  health  charity  MIND who  floor walked  to  assist  call handlers become 
familiar with using the toolkits.  

All FCC call handlers have their incidents reviewed by the RCRP team for quality assurance.  Any learning or 
development is undertaken with the individuals Supervisor.  If required a further development session with 
the RCRP team is arranged.  

To date under this process, Cheshire Police have received and created 35,092 Concern for Safety incidents 
reported by public and partner agencies.   The RCRP QA team have to date quality assured 24,711 incidents 
which is 70.4% of all incidents reported.  From the total of concern for safety reports received, as of June 
2025, 108 (0.37%) had been referred to Cheshire Constabulary Professional standards department for a DSI 
review.  Of that number 13 incidents (0.04% of total) have been referred to the Independent Office for Police 
Complaint (IOPC) and all have been examined and found to meet the standards expected by the IOPC, with 
3 (0.01%) returned to Cheshire Police with opportunities for local reflective consideration. This demonstrates 
the robust process in place including for escalation and review.  

Concerns raised by the Coroner 

The Coroner raises several concerns in the section 28 report dated 14th September 2025. We have 
attempted to extract and break these down as follows below and provide responses alongside each.  

(1) If a very narrow interpretation of policy is applied by the police when professionals report a concern 
for a high-risk missing person in circumstances where they consider there to be an immediate risk to 
life, there will be a risk of future deaths occurring.  

We note the concerns expressed by the Coroner regarding the potential for future deaths arising from a 
narrow interpretation of policy when professionals report concerns about high-risk missing persons.  

Right Care Right Person (RCRP) is designed to support police call handlers in identifying circumstances that 
may engage Article 2 (Right to Life) or Article 3 (Prohibition of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. These articles place legal obligations on all state agencies to act 
where there is a real and immediate risk to life or a serious risk of harm. 

These thresholds are clearly defined and apply only where the risk is present, continuing, and happening 
now. It is important to note that a general concern for an individual's welfare, while valid and taken 
seriously, does not meet the legal standard required to trigger these obligations. 

In addition, RCRP supports the identification of cases where an individual should be treated as missing from 
home, in accordance with force policy and Authorised Professional Practice (APP) as set by the College of 
Policing. This ensures that responses are aligned with nationally recognised standards and best practice. 

When Cheshire Constabulary receive a call from a member of the public or from an agency to report a 
missing person, the trained operative will conduct a THRIVE-SC assessment in which they consider; Threat, 
Harm, Risk, Investigation, Vulnerability, Engagement, Safeguarding, Scene Preservation and Crime. They risk 
assess based on all information available to them and this is a living assessment during the lifespan of an 
incident. The THRIVE-SC assessment is completed at the initial point of contact and can be repeated on 
multiple occasions as necessary throughout an incident and can lead to a change in the assessment of the 
deployment decision or grading of deployment as information develops.  It is very important to note that 
whether the caller is a professional or member of the public, questions are asked to extract the right 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 information but is reliant on the caller being able to provide information and taking steps to gather 
information.  

The Police have a duty to act: 

a)  where there is a real and immediate threat to life under Article 2 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. The risk must be real and immediate and substantial and significant (i.e. present, 
continuing and happening now and the police know or ought to know at the time of the risk to the 
life of an actual victim or potential victim and is a high threshold.) 

b)  Where there is a real and immediate risk of significant harm amounting to ‘inhumane or degrading 

treatment or torture under Article 3 ECHR, again the risk must be real and immediate.  

There are a number of considerations around RCRP and the relevant threshold as outlined in the policy. 
There are also procedures in place where individuals choose to leave hospital that they are to follow (Royal 
College of Emergency Departments publication – “The Patient who Absconds” (2020)). Equally part of RCRP 
and any missing from home process is ensuring appropriate lines of enquiry have been followed.  

In this case, calls were received from the accident and emergency department initially at 15.02hrs and then 
concluding with a final call at 16:47 hours. These can be summarised as follows below.  

An initial report is taken from the hospital that Charlotte Tetley has left the hospital and the Mental Health 
team are requesting a “welfare check”. She is described as a 33-year-old female who had been found 
sleeping by a train track, with suicidal thoughts and presenting danger to herself. The caller indicated that 
she had been brought in (voluntarily rather than under any section) to the hospital but they couldn’t not 
find her in the department and believe she might have left the hospital. 

The caller was asked questions in relation to the matter. The caller confirmed he did not know Charlotte, 
nor had he seen or triaged her that day. The RCRP process was explained and the requirement for police 
deployment to search for someone. The caller was asked for further details about expressions of intent to 
harm self or others but the caller was unable to answer having not seen Charlotte and not having that 
information available to him. The caller was advised that, on the information provided, it would not be for 
to deploy.  

 from the 

 appeared to have a slightly different instruction about the circumstances in which 
 was clear 

The caller asked the call handler to remain on the line and passed the phone to 
Mental Health team given the decision reached. The call handler explained the position. 
she also had not seen Charlotte that day but had historically and knew of her history. There is some 
discrepancy as 
Charlotte had been found, ie on the tracks asleep not at the side of the railway tracks. 
however that she felt that the historic concerns around mental health diagnosis, alcohol/drug issues and 
previous suicidal thoughts/attempts meant she was concerned about Charlotte. The position was again 
explained given lack of any indication of immediate risk and the fact this was a healthcare issue rather than 
police. The call handler offered to escalate to her supervision in line with standard process and 
asked 
that it be passed over given that in her opinion she was concerned given the history that we should be 
immediately concerned. It was clear at this stage that the concern appeared to be based on historic 
knowledge and location found.  

confirmed 

This call was escalated as agreed and that escalation resulted in a call back at 15:11 hours.   

It is clear from these calls that the report is that Charlotte has been brought in voluntarily rather than under 
s136 MHA or indeed any other power. She was reported to have been sleeping rough near the railway 
tracks. There had been no indication of any intention to harm herself or take her own life but Charlotte was 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 described as having a significant history of mental health concerns and indeed issues with alcohol and 
drugs. It is clear from the calls that the immediacy of any risk was being assessed not by anyone who has 
seen Charlotte or triaged her but based on historical information.  

It is apparent on escalation that the hospital felt that her history was the cause of concern. Charlotte had 
left hospital without saying anything and, whilst it was noted she appeared to be falling over as if under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs, she had made no indication of any intent to take her own life or harm herself, 
the hospital described that it may be she had just decided to go to bed.  

During this call, it is confirmed that the mental health team had visited Charlotte a few days earlier and 
reported that they did not have any concerns for her safety or wellbeing. It was noted that she was staying 
at a friends but would be sleeping rough in a matter of days after leaving hospital.  

During the escalation call (some 9 minutes after the original call), the hospital were asked whether they 
would send an ambulance now they confirmed they knew of an address where she had been staying. The 
hospital would not given they did not know if she was there. The RCRP process was referred to and the fact 
the onus was on the hospital to take further steps if they considered necessary. The hospital indicated they 
could send their response vehicle to the address and that they would go ahead and make that request 
(albeit it was for a different team to assess). It appears accepted that the concern relied on assumptions 
rather than any evidence or expression of intent to harm or end life.  The offer to escalate further to the 
FIM / Chief Inspector was made but declined at this stage.  

A further call was received at 16:32 hours seeking escalation and review by the FIM. That request was 
logged and referred. That call referred to 
brought in by NWAS not BTP as had previously been advised.  

 being found “lying by railway tracks” and having been 

Prior to the FIM calling back, a final call was received at 16:47hours from Macclesfield Hospital. 
was the caller and confirmed that she had been in touch previously regarding a high-risk missing person, 
Charlotte Tetley. The purpose of the call was to provide an update. 
been in contact with Charlotte and although she wasn’t returning to hospital, she no longer had any 
immediate concerns about risk so did not require that police deploy. The matter was thus concluded.  

 described that a colleague had 

In this case, the RCRP policy was correctly applied and appropriate advice given. The hospital have clear 
processes and procedures in place when patients simply walk out of hospital. Having made further 
enquiries, the hospital called back to confirm the matter was resolved.  

Whilst the RCRP process involves individual decision making, the toolkits and procedures ensure 
consistency and sound decision making to avoid differing interpretations of policy.  

(2) If the policy is interpreted such that police resources will only be deployed if the missing person has 
expressed an intention to end life as they leave the hospital, there is a risk that future deaths will 
occur.  

RCRP clearly sets out for police call handlers the legal and statutory obligations. All police call handlers 
receive RCRP training which helps them identify when a policing response is appropriate. Where there 
are any Article 2 risks, police (and other agencies) have a legal duty to respond which is what RCRP 
identifies. In such cases the police do deploy.  

The threshold applies where the risk is present, continuing, and happening now. It is important to note 
that a general concern for an individual's welfare, while valid and taken seriously, does not meet the 
legal standard required to trigger these obligations. We believe the narrative and information above 
covers this point in terms of the application in this particular case.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To reassure, it is not the case that police will only deploy if an expression to end life is made on leaving 
the hospital. In the case referred to, there was no such expression at all on the evidence available but 
in general terms, the assessment is detailed but there must be real and immediate risk to life or a 
serious risk of harm (ie present, continuing and happening now).  

(3)  It is unlikely that the ambulance response vehicle will be deployed if the whereabouts of the missing 

person is unknown, which will result in the missing person not being able to receive medical 
attention until their whereabouts are known.  By the time that they are located, there is a risk that 
they will no longer be alive. 

There are established and published protocols by North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) regarding 
their deployment policy, which are designed to ensure the safe and effective use of emergency 
resources. These protocols are based on clinical prioritisation and operational feasibility. Were are 
unable to comment on NWAS policy but are aware that ambulances are unlikely to be deployed where 
the whereabouts of the individual is unknown for obvious reasons. 

The Right Care, Right Person (RCRP) framework was developed collaboratively with multiple agencies, 
including NWAS and Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service, to ensure a shared understanding of the roles 
and responsibilities of each emergency service. There are joint operating procedures backing this 
shared understanding.  

RCRP ensures that the appropriate agency responds based on the nature of the risk and the 
information available. Where there is a real and immediate risk to life, all agencies are expected to act 
in accordance with their legal obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Within this framework, the police are the lead agency with statutory responsibility for responding to 
reports of missing persons. 

The definition of ‘missing’ is provided by the College of Policing within the Authorised Professional 
Practice on Missing Persons (APP-MP) as:  
“Anyone whose whereabouts cannot be established will be considered as missing until located, and 
their well-being or otherwise confirmed.”   

APP continues:  
“This is a broad definition, intended to ensure that all cases of people suspected of being missing who 
are reported to the police are considered for a policing response. The nature of the response is for 
operational decision makers. Not all reports of missing people will require immediate deployment of 
police resources.”   

Authorised Professional Practice on Missing Persons (APP-MP)  also sets out the ‘Joint Responsibility’ 
that the police are entitled to “expect parents and carers to undertake reasonable actions to try and 
establish the whereabouts of the individual”  It further sets out that in the context of a missing person 
investigation “Policing should concentrate on reducing harm or the risk of harm – the police are not to 
be used solely to trace people.”   

Cheshire Police revised the Missing From Home (MFH) policy to ensure it was aligned with the 
introduction of Right Care Right Person.  This sets three aspects for consideration if someone is missing.  
These three considerations were included in part of the training all FCC staff received prior to the 
introduction of RCRP.  They are:- 

•  Can you reasonable assume their location is known?  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 •  Have reasonable enquiries to establish their whereabouts been made?  
•  Are factors of concern being expressed?   

In this case, there were enquiries the hospital could and should undertake. Indeed, the Royal College of 
Emergency Departments publication “The Patient who Absconds” (2020) process makes that clear. In 
the case of incidents of this type, we would reasonably expect that the professionals calling would have 
made suitable checks with relevant teams and gathered information before contacting police. They 
would also utilise appropriate avenues at their disposal.  

It is also essential that further basic enquiries (eg searching the grounds, calling the individual or any 
appointed social workers) are undertaken before calling the Police back when complete and that those 
calling are closest to the matter (ie have seen the individual concerned directly or have at their disposal 
detailed accurate information).  

This is because evidence shows that when these basic enquiries are completed, they frequently lead to 
the person being located by the caller, and the concern negated.  In fact, that is exactly what happened 
in this case, further enquiries were made, the hospital made contact with Charlotte Tetley (albeit did 
not see her in person) and determined that there were no further concerns and that they did not need 
to send an ambulance. They further confirmed they no longer required police assistance or 
deployment.  

Had that not happened the matter could have been further escalated either via RCRP or the missing 
from home procedure. If the relevant threshold is met there would be a police response in missing 
person cases.  

 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 Appendix One 
National Partnership Agreement 
Right Care Right Person 

National Partnership Agreement_ Right Care, Right Person (RCRP) - GOV.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix Two 
Cheshire Constabulary Policy 
Concern for Safety Right Care Right Person 

Concern for Safety Policy Right Care Right Person.pdf 
 
 
 
 Appendix Three 
RCRP Toolkit “walkouts” 

RCRP Cheshire Toolkit v0.4 TABLETOP VERSION.pdf 
 
 
 
 Appendix Four 
RCRP Legal and Escalation Slide deck provided to Partner agencies 

RCRP LEGAL + ESCALATION.pptx

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