Rebekah Arter

Professor Andrew Harris 
Assistant Coroner for South London 

Minister of State for Policing and 
Crime  

2 Marsham Street 
London SW1P 4DF 
www.gov.uk/home-office 

15 December 2025 

Dear Professor Harris,  

Thank you for sharing the Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) report concerning the tragic 
death of Rebekah Arter. I am responding as the Minister responsible for crime and 
policing. 

I would like to express my sincere condolences to Rebekah’s loved ones.  I was deeply 
saddened to read the details in your report and cannot imagine the significant impact that 
her death and the awful experiences she endured leading up to it will have had on those 
close to her.  

I am very sorry to hear about the experiences Rebekah went through as a victim of 
domestic and sexual abuse, as noted in your report.  I recognise the devastating impact 
these awful crimes can have on their victims.  I would like to reassure you that this 
Government is committed to tackling all forms of violence against women and girls 
(VAWG), including domestic and sexual abuse. We have set out an unprecedented 
mission to halve VAWG in a decade.  Improving policing practice is a key part of this, and 
we have provided £13.1m this year to establish a new National Centre for VAWG and 
Public Protection which will help drive consistency nationally, including through the 
development of specialist training on VAWG to ensure that officers are well equipped to 
manage offences and provide consistent support to victims.   

Our full programme of work to tackle VAWG will be published in our upcoming cross-
Government VAWG Strategy. The Strategy will set out concrete actions to prevent 
violence and abuse, pursue perpetrators, and provide the support to victims that they 
deserve. 

Your report also highlights multiple issues related to Rebekah’s then husband, a former 
police officer, abusing his position. I echo the concerns you raise and am clear that all 
officers should be held to the highest standards.  All members of the public should feel 
confident in reporting crimes or raising complaints and know that they will be taken 
seriously and treated with respect when they do. 

It is crucial that allegations against police officers, including of VAWG, are handled 
robustly. Your report notes that Rebekah met her husband as a victim of crime whilst he 
was a police officer.  A police officer abusing their position for a sexual purpose or for the 
purpose of pursuing an improper emotional relationship is, rightly, a very serious conduct 
matter. By law, if a force becomes aware of such allegations, they must refer them to the 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) for consideration.  The College of Policing’s 
Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings, which was updated in 2022, is 
also clear that misconduct involving VAWG is unacceptable and sets an expectation as to 
the seriousness with which it should be treated. 

I take these issues extremely seriously, and this Government is implementing a range of 
reforms in the police misconduct and vetting systems to help ensure that those who 
commit heinous crimes such as domestic abuse and sexual offences have no place in 
policing.  In spring this year we introduced a set of reforms, including a route to remove 
those officers who fail to maintain their vetting, and a presumption of dismissal for any 
officer found to have committed gross misconduct.  We are currently working to place 
vetting standards on a statutory footing and strengthen requirements on forces to suspend 
officers under investigation for domestic abuse or sexual offences.  

You may be aware that the independent Angiolini Inquiry is examining a range of issues in 
policing and the safety of women so that women, and the wider public, can have 
confidence that the police are there to protect them. The first report of Part 2 of the Inquiry 
examined the prevention of sexually motivated crimes against women in public spaces and 
was published on 2 December 2025. It can be found here: The Angiolini Inquiry Part 2 
First Report: Prevention of sexually motivated crimes against women in public – The 
Angiolini Inquiry. The Government is now carefully considering its findings and 
recommendations. 

The Inquiry will produce a second report under Part 2 next year which will examine a 
number of other issues relevant to your report. These include the adequacy of measures 
to identify and manage the risk of VAWG-related misconduct as well as aspects of police 
culture. 

I hope this letter reassures you that there is work taking place at a national level to 
improve the response to police-perpetrated VAWG.  My thoughts remain with Rebekah’s 
family. 

Ver  best wishes  

Minister of State for Policing and Crime  

MP

OFFICIAL 

Professor Andrew Harris 
HM Coroner South London 

14 November 2025 

Dear Sir, 

Inquest touching on the death of Rebekah Arter 

Prevention of future death report 

I write on behalf of the Director General of the IOPC 
matters of concern raised in your Prevention of Future Death report arising from the 
inquest into the death of Ms Arter, which concluded on 29 August 2025. This letter is the 
IOPC’s formal response to your report in accordance with Regulation 29 of the Coroners 
(Investigations) Regulations 2013.  

 with regards to the 

Matter of concern: missed opportunities for the IOPC and Metropolitan Police Service from 
their investigations to identify that Rebekah was a victim of domestic abuse and coercive 
control, which would have enabled her to be protected 

Your report identified the following matters as illustrative of the potential missed 
opportunities: 

•  That Rebekah had met her husband initially as a victim of a crime. 
•  That police investigations uncovered a large number of women with whom he had 

inappropriate relationships and that he misused his police powers.  

•  That he was dismissed from the police for drug offences in May 2023, but the risk to 

Rebekah was not apparently considered at that time. 

•  A witness has alleged that a video was sent by him of Rebekah 

shame and enforce control over her, allegedly in 2023. 

•  A history of her having unexplained repeated bruises and injuries was available in 

2024 to anyone who enquired about the risk of domestic abuse. 

, which the family allege was used to 

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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• 

•  That in retrospect it is recognised by a Detective Chief Inspector that he was an 

exceptionally persistent and damaging offender against women, but no charges in 
relation to that had ever been brought. 

Background context:  

Before responding to the matter of concern, it may assist to set out the relevant duties and 
responsibilities of the IOPC, and to summarise the investigations into DI 
history of which was outside the scope of the inquest.  

 the full 

Relevant IOPC duties and responsibilities: Police Reform Act 2002 (as in force at the time 
of Op Venta) 

(1) Duties to provide information: 

(a) The IOPC must provide information about its investigations and outcomes to 
complainants and interested persons (sections 20 and 21 Police Reform Act 
2002). For matters which do not concern a death or serious injury caused as a 
result of police action, the IOPC has a discretion to recognise someone as 
having interested person status where they have sufficient interest to make it 
appropriate to receive information about the investigation, provided the person 
consents to receive it.  

(b) At the time of Op Venta, the requirements in the legislation were to provide 

information on the progress of the investigation and any provisional findings, the 
outcome of the investigation and the outcome of any related disciplinary 
proceedings.1 

(c) These entitlements are subject to exceptions set out in Regulation 13 of the 

Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. Among other matters 
these exceptions provide for information to be withheld where is a real risk of a 
significant adverse effect, including in relation to criminal and disciplinary 
proceedings.  

(d) For witnesses who do not have interested person status there is no statutory 

requirement to provide information about the investigation or regular updates.  

1 Paragraph 23(9) Schedule 3 Police Reform Act 2002 (prior to amendments made by the Policing and 
Crime Act 2017), and Regulation 12 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 

OFFICIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
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(2) Decision making process: 

(a) At the time of Op Venta, the process at the end of an investigation was as 

follows: 

(i)  The IOPC makes a decision whether to refer the report to the CPS to 

consider any criminal charges; 

(ii) 

(iii) 

The Appropriate Authority [AA] (the chief officer under whose direction 
and control the officer was at the time of the conduct in issue – here, 
the MPS) makes a determination whether the officer has a case to 
answer for misconduct or gross misconduct and whether to bring 
disciplinary proceedings; 
The IOPC decides whether the AA’s determination on these matters is 
appropriate. If it disagrees, the IOPC can recommend and ultimately 
direct the AA to give effect to its recommendation.  

(iv)  Proceedings are then brought by the AA, following the process in the 

Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012. The disciplinary case is presented 
by the AA and the IOPC will not necessarily have any formal role in 
proceedings. However, the IOPC will assist by providing disclosure 
and will often continue engagement with witnesses, particularly if 
witnesses are vulnerable, to provide continuity of contact as far as 
possible. 

(3) IOPC jurisdiction: 

(a) Under section 12 Police Reform Act 2002 the IOPC has jurisdiction to 

investigate persons serving with police.  

(b) The IOPC can investigate persons who have ceased serving with the police 
since the time of the conduct in question, the conduct of concern must have 
taken place while the person was serving with police. 

(c) Once a police officer has ceased serving, they are no longer subject to the 

Standards of Professional Behaviour so their actions subsequent to leaving the 
force cannot amount to a disciplinary matter. 

(d) Any criminal conduct committed after the person ceased serving would fall to be 
investigated by a police force as would be the case for any other member of the 
public.  

Investigations into DI 

The MPS commenced an investigation into alleged misconduct by DI 
became an IOPC independent investigation in 2017 and developed in scale and 
complexity, eventually being split into 3 separate matters named Operation Venta 1, 2 and 
3. Operation Venta 1 concerned allegations of potential abuse of position for sexual 

 in 2016. This 

OFFICIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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purposes (“APSP”), Operation Venta 2 concerned misuse of police systems and 
inappropriate involvement by DI 
victim, and Operation Venta 3 concerned allegations of illegal drug use by DI 
assist with understanding the key dates and developments in the investigation, we have 
compiled a timeline which we enclose as Annex A.  

in a criminal investigation for which he was the 

. To 

Operation Venta 1 identified 7 potential victims of APSP behaviour, one of whom was 
Rebekah Arter. Mrs Arter was pseudonymised in the investigation as ‘Ms G’. The 
allegations concerning Ms G related to the circumstances in which the consensual 
relationship between DI 
via an anonymous report to Crimestoppers in January 2016. At no point did Rebekah Arter 
come forward to either the MPS or the IOPC to make any kind of allegation about DI
either in relation to the commencement of their relationship or anything occurring 
subsequently.  

 and Ms G commenced. These allegations had been made 

 that he first met Rebekah Arter in February 2006, when 

It was not disputed by DI
acting as a police officer to investigate criminal matters which she had reported as a victim 
of crime. DI 
2006, when he met her again on a night out when not on duty, after any professional 
involvement on her case had ceased.  

 maintained that their relationship only started in late April or early May 

In 2017 when the investigation become independent, the IOPC investigator made a policy 
decision that Rebekah Arter would not be made an interested person in the investigation. 
As outlined above, interested persons are entitled to specific information about the 
investigation, subject to a harm test, and must receive regular updates. It was considered 
that as Rebekah Arter was now married to DI 
allegation herself, that it would not be appropriate to share information with her about the 
investigation especially as it was considered she was likely to be loyal to her husband.  

 and had not come forward with any 

 home address. Mrs Arter declined to provide a statement but her remarks 

Rebekah Arter was spoken to by the IOPC in 2018 when a search warrant was carried out 
at DI 
were recorded in a statement by an IOPC staff member. She corroborated her husband’s 
account that their relationship only started two months after DI 
crime report. No other allegation was raised by Mrs Arter at the time. A statement was also 
provided by her son 
Rebekah Arter’s phone, as well as DI 
While the IOPC phone analysis used parameters pertinent to the terms of reference of 
Operation Venta, and was not looking for any evidence of any domestic abuse behaviour 
as no such allegation had been made by or about DI 
the material reviewed by the IOPC did not disclose any cause for concern in respect of 
domestic abuse. 

. This did not make any allegations in relation to DI 

, was seized under the warrant, and analysed. 

and Rebekah Arter at that time, 

 had dealt with her 

OFFICIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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The investigations concluded in 2020 and resulted in referrals to the CPS to consider 
criminal charges and referral to gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings. The CPS 
confirmed no charges would be brought in relation to either referral in 2020.  

 received cancer treatment, Operation Venta 3, which concerned 

After delay while DI 
allegations of illegal drug use, resulted in DI 
Notwithstanding that DI 
law enforcement for at least 5 years) as a result, the MPS (with whom the IOPC agreed) 
considered there remained a public interest in holding a further gross misconduct hearing 
in relation to the outstanding allegations concerning APSP behaviour. This was to include 
allegations concerning how DI 
 relationship with Rebekah commenced, which was 
to proceed on the basis of documentary evidence alone.  

 was placed on the barred list (preventing him from working in 

 dismissal in May 2023. 

Following confirmation of this decision in November 2023, the IOPC’s Proceedings 
Support Unit planned engagement with the potential witnesses for the APSP allegations. 
In respect of Rebekah Arter, the PSU noted that she had not provided a statement to the 
investigation, and decided she would not be contacted until there was confirmation that DI 

had been informed the hearing would go ahead.  

In December 2023, the PSU made contact with Ms B in respect of the proposed hearing.  
In an email exchange a family member of Ms B’s made reference to the fact that Mr 
was still contacting Ms B, but no detail of the content of the messages was provided (it is 
not known whether the family member was aware of the nature of the messages). It was 
agreed that Ms B should be advised not to contact Mr 
received from him. Arrangements were made for a meeting on 15 March 2024 to discuss 
potential special measures should Ms B be prepared to give evidence at the gross 
misconduct hearing.  

 and to save any messages 

It was during this meeting, attended by 
 (IOPC Survivor Engagement Manager) that Ms B described the content 
and 
of the messages that she had received. Ms B stated she had deleted the messages so the 
IOPC were unable to view these. Th IOPC’s 
 then prepared a report detailing the 
description of the messages Ms B had provided, which the IOPC then reported to MPS by 
25 March 2024.  

 (IOPC Proceedings Support Unit) 

At the time the messages were sent to Ms B, December 2023, Mr 
dismissed from the MPS. Therefore at the time these potential offences appear to have 
been committed, he was an ordinary civilian and not a person serving with police. As a 
result, the IOPC had no jurisdiction to investigate Ms B’s disclosures itself. The only proper 

 had already been 

OFFICIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OFFICIAL 

action open to the IOPC in the circumstance was to report the potential offences to the 
MPS, which it duly did – at the latest by 25 March 2024. 

As you will be aware from the evidence provided at the inquest, the IOPC reported the 
potential offences to the MPS’s Directorate of Professional Standards, with whom the 
IOPC had been liaising in respect of the outstanding gross misconduct matters. The DPS 
endeavoured to transfer the report to the appropriate team within the MPS to investigate 
the matter and this was when the delays with the MPS’s internal Connect system 
occurred. For clarity, the IOPC has no direct access to the Connect system and all issues 
with this system were internal to the MPS. Once the IOPC had reported the matter to the 
MPS to take action, there was nothing further the IOPC could properly do in relation to it, 
given that it did not concern an alleged crime committed by a person while they were 
serving with police.  

In the course of the MPS investigation, Ms B made further allegations in relation to Mr 

 These allegations had not previously been made to either the IOPC or the MPS.   
The IOPC maintained regular contact with Ms B throughout its investigation to ascertain 
whether she wished to provide a statement or attend an ABE interview, however Ms B 
never provided a formal account during the IOPC investigation.  

Matter of concern 

Your report has raised a concern whether there were opportunities missed to recognise 
the risk to Rebekah posed by Mr 

Our purpose in setting out the IOPC’s investigations in detail as above is to set out exactly 
what was known by the IOPC and when, and the rationale for our decisions in respect of 
our contact with Rebekah Arter.  

 conduct in this regard was 

, a number of potential victims / witnesses of APSP 

In relation to the risk posed by Mr 
behaviour were identified in the investigation. Mr 
considered sufficiently serious to warrant a referral to the CPS to consider a potential 
offence of Misconduct in a Public Office, and the intention had been to bring gross 
misconduct disciplinary proceedings against Mr 
for these allegations notwithstanding 
that he had already been placed on the barred list. This was on the basis that there was a 
public interest in a police misconduct panel making findings of fact on these allegations, so 
that this could be taken into account when deciding whether he should ever be permitted 
to work in law enforcement again. However, prior to July 2024, no allegation had been 
made of sexual assault.  

Prior to Rebekah’s death, the IOPC was not on notice of any allegations of controlling or 
coercive behaviour or any other domestic abuse allegation in respect of Mr 

 When in 

OFFICIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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2018 the IOPC had direct contact with Rebekah, and her son, no concerns of this kind 
were raised and downloads of devices seized at that time similarly did not disclose 
indications of this behaviour (from the material examined which fell within the parameters 
for the IOPC investigation). The IOPC had no cause to seek further evidence after 2018. 

During the visit with Ms B in 2024, it was not possible for the IOPC to have identified the 
as Rebekah, as Ms B had deleted the images. The IOPC 
victim of the 
assumes that these were subsequently recovered on forensic examination of the device. 

While we do not think a specific risk to Rebekah was apparent from the information 
available to the IOPC, we wish to reassure you that the IOPC has robust safeguarding 
procedures in place, which were updated and strengthened in 2024. We will take this 
opportunity to review whether any additional content to this guidance would be appropriate 
in respect of risk assessments for spouses and intimate partners.   

Conclusion 

I express my sincere condolences to the family of Rebekah Arter.  

I am grateful to you for raising this issue with the IOPC and trust this response provides 
reassurance that I have considered the matter of concern raised in your report. Please do 
not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries arising from this letter.  

Yours sincerely, 

Deputy Director of Investigations 
For the Director General 

OFFICIAL 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ANNEX A 

Date 
27 January 
2016 

April 2016 
6 December 
2016 
13 December 
2016 

16 December 
2016 
04 April 2017 

7 April 2017 
29 June 2017 

OFFICIAL 

Event 
Crimestoppers anonymous report alleging DI Arter has had 
inappropriate sexual relations with a number of women 
encountered as victims of crime in his professional role   
MPS commences local investigation into conduct of DI Arter 
MPS arrest of DI Arter, phones/computers seized 

Conduct referral from MPS.  
Allegation re inappropriate contact and relationship with victim in 
investigation he was supervising (not Ms Arter) 
MPS arrested DI Arter  
IOPC decide conduct matter should be investigated by MPS 
(local investigation) 
MPS re-refer conduct matter to IOPC due to developments in 
the case 
IOPC redetermine MOI to independent 
Policy decision that Rebekah Arter (pseudonymised as ‘Ms G’) is 
a potential witness only at this stage. Notes “appears Ms G may 
have experienced inappropriate behaviour by DI Arter and that 
they are now married. We are not making contact with her at this 
time due to her marriage to the subject and I do not consider it 
appropriate to keep her updated on the investigation especially 
considering her probably[sic] loyalty to her husband”. 
Countersigned by case supervisor 17 July 2017 

4 January 2018  Further referral following evidence obtained in IOPC 

1 June 2018 

investigation suggesting drug use and supply by DI Arter (Op 
Venta 3) 
Further referral to MPS re misuse of police systems (Op Venta 
2) 
IOPC execute warrant at DI Arter’s address. Rebekah Arter is 
spoken to and statement obtained from her son 
Analysis of downloads from Rebekah Arter’s phone completed 

Op Venta 2 report and provisional opinions sent to MPS 

26 October 
2018 
29 January 
2019 
7 June 2019 
22 August 2019  Op Venta 1 Final report completed 
18 February 
2020 
17 January 
2020 

IOPC decision to refer Op Venta 1 to CPS for charging decision 

Reviewable copy of downloads from DI Arter’s devices seized 
26 October 2018 available and collected from forensic supplier, 
review commenced 17 Jan 2020 and completed 18 Mar 2020 
IOPC decision maker’s provisional opinions on case to answer 
for Op Venta 1 
MPS provides statutory determinations on Op Venta 1 & 2, 
finding case to answer for gross misconduct for allegations 
concerning Rebekah Arter  

5 March 2020 

1 May 2020 

OFFICIAL 

 
 
 
 
 7 May 2020 

17 June 2020 
June 2020 
7 July 2020 
16 July 2020 

July 2020 

8 September 
2020 
Jan 2021 

23 May 2023 

6 Nov 2023 

18 Dec 2023 

28 Dec 23 

4 Jan 24 

OFFICIAL 

IOPC letter to MPS agreeing with determinations including that 
allegations concerning Rebekah Arter should be taken forward 
to gross misconduct hearing 
Final report in Op Venta 3 approved 
IOPC refer Op Venta 3 allegations to CPS 
MPS provides case to answer determinations on Op Venta 3 
IOPC response to AA on Op Venta 3. Agreement that 
allegations, including of supply of drugs to Ms G, should be 
taken to GM hearing  
CPS decision to take no further action in relation Op Venta 1 
referral 
CPS decision to to take no further action in relation Op Venta 3 
referral 
MPS propose splitting conduct hearing into two parts and 
dealing with Op Venta 3 allegations first. Hearing delayed due to 
ill health of DI Arter. 
DI Arter dismissed in absentia at gross misconduct hearing re 
Op Venta 3 allegations & placed on barred list 
MPS confirm public interest in Op Venta 1 allegations 
proceeding to gross misconduct hearing. IOPC tasked with re-
establishing contact with witnesses to assess if willing to engage 
with hearing 
IOPC proceedings support unit note in relation to contacting 
Rebekah Arter: “Miss G is Arter’s wife. She did not provide a 
statement to the investigation. She has not been contacted to 
date, pending the MPS confirming that  a hearing will go ahead. 
This is to avoid alerting Arter of a hearing in the event that it 
doesn’t take place. My understanding is that he is suffering with 
ill-health. The MPS know more about his health from Op Venta 3 
hearing.” 
Email from to IOPC from a family member of a potential victim of 
abuse of position for sexual purposes in Op Venta 1, known as 
‘Ms B’. The context is a discussion in relation to arranging a 
meeting with IOPC/Ms B in the new year to discuss special 
measures for the misconduct hearing.  
The message includes the following: 

“I would also like to make you aware that Warren is still 
contacting [Ms B] via whatsapp. I have told [Ms B] to ignore all 
contact but screenshot and save anything he sends” 
Email from IOPC to Ms B’s family member explaining who will 
be point of contact going forward who will meet with Ms B re 
special measures.  
Acknowledges information given in 28 Dec message: 

“Thank you for bringing to my attention that Warren is 
messaging [Ms B] on WhatsApp – something I would have been 
unaware about. I think the right approach is your own 
suggestion, that she saves any messages she receives from 

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him.”  

15 Mar 24 

25 Mar 24 

Meeting IOPC and Ms B. Disclosures made re nature of 
messages received from former DI Arter, including upskirt photo 
of sleeping female.  
IOPC makes report to MPS DPS (PC Shane O’Neill and t/CI 
Jamie Newman) of disclosures made by Ms B 

OFFICIAL

Professor Andrew Harris 
HM Assistant Coroner 
Croydon Coroners Court and Offices                        New Scotland Yard 
2 Robert St Croydon                                                  Victoria Embankment 
London 
CR0 1QQ                                                                   SW1A 2JL 

                  Deputy Assistant Commissioner 
                  Metropolitan Police Service 

       London 

Friday 12th December 2025 

Dear Professor Harris, 

On  behalf  of  the  Commissioner  of  Police  of  the  Metropolis,  I  write  to  provide  the 

response  to  the  matters  of  concern  addressed  to  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service 

(MPS) in your Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 19th September 2025 following 

the inquest into the tragic death of Mrs Rebekah Arter. 

On behalf of the MPS, may I first express my sincere condolences to the family and 

friends of Mrs Arter, our thoughts and sympathies are very much with them. 

The MPS has acknowledged and reviewed all the matters of concern raised in your 

Regulation 28 Report and responds as follows: 

The Coroner’s “Matters of Concern” and the MPS’ Responses 

Matter of Concern  

“That there may have been missed opportunities for the IOPC and Metropolitan Police 

Service  from  their  investigations  to  identify  that  Rebekah  was  a  victim  of  domestic 

abuse  and  coercive  control,  which  would  have  enabled  her  to  be protected.  This  is 

illustrated by these facts: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 •  That Rebekah had met her husband initially as a victim of a crime. 

•  That police investigations uncovered a large number of women with whom he 

had inappropriate relationships and that he misused his police powers.  

•  That he was dismissed from the police for drug offences in May 2023, but the 

risk to Rebekah was not apparently considered at that time. 

•  A witness has alleged that a video was sent by him of Rebekah 

 which the family allege was 

used to shame and enforce control over her, allegedly in 2023. 

•  A history of her having unexplained repeated bruises and injuries was available 

in 2024 to anyone who enquired about the risk of domestic abuse. 

• 

•  That in retrospect it is recognised by a Detective Chief Inspector that he was 

an  exceptionally  persistent  and  damaging  offender  against  women,  but  no 

charges in relation to that had ever been brought. 

It  is  recognised  that  the  MPS  will  have  taken  a  number  of  steps  to  improve 

investigations since 2016. The public will want to know of these. The issue of the abuse 

of  police  powers  threatening  the  safety  and  lives  of  women  has  been  a  matter  of 

considerable public interest. In my opinion this is a national issue of concern and that 

ministers should be informed of these matters to consider if any further investigation 

is needed to prevent future deaths and/or for the public to be reassured.” 

MPS Response 

In addressing the coroner’s concerns, this response will set out the improvements the 

MPS has made since 2016 to address these concerns, including in response to the 

Baroness Casey review on culture and standards in the Metropolitan Police Service, 

the Angiolini Inquiry Part 1 and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & 

 
 
 
 
 Rescue Services (HMICFRS) concerns on vetting, misconduct and misogyny in the 

police service. 

We  will  highlight  the  changes  to  MPS  policy  and  practice  in  relation  to  Vetting  and 

address the work that has been undertaken in relation to the public concern regarding 

the abuse of police powers and its impact on the safety of women. This includes the 

creation of the Domestic Abuse and Sexual Offences Investigation Unit (DASO) and 

the new mandatory training on Abuse of Position for Sexual Purpose (APSP). We will 

also address the work that the MPS has undertaken in the last three years to tackle 

violence against women and girls.  

Lastly, we will reference the Angiolini Inquiry which is scrutinising the issue of safety 

of women and girls in Part 2.    

Vetting 

As part of our New Met for London plan, we are reforming the way we vet officers and 

staff.  We have changed our approach and are confident that, following our reforms, 

only those who meet the highest standards will be granted vetting clearance and able 

to join the Met.  Our policy and practice on screening out individuals, via vetting, who 

have misogynistic and/or predatory attitudes and behaviours is strong and robust – 

and believe it is one of the strongest positions taken by any police force in the UK.   

Today, the presumption is an individual who has been previously arrested for rape and 

applies to join the Met, will not receive vetting clearance, unless there are exceptional 

circumstances.  And  in  line  with  national  guidance,  applications  for  a  position  as  a 

police  officer,  special  constable  or  member  of  police  staff  are  rejected  in  all  cases 

where  the  applicant  is,  or  has  been,  a  registered  sex  offender.  Applicants  with 

convictions/cautions  for  offences  where  vulnerable  people  were  targeted  or  the 

offences were of domestic abuse should also be rejected.  

The  MPS’  new  Force  Vetting  Policy  was  launched  in  June  2024  and  includes  a 

Statement  of  Vetting  Tolerances  and  Vetting  Decision-Making  Framework 

(VDMF).  The  Statement  of  Vetting  Tolerances  provides  direction  on  the  level  of 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 tolerable risk for vetting clearances, applied for or held by personnel and contractors. 

It  states  that  the  organisation  has  a  low  tolerance  to  any  person  holding  a  vetting 

clearance who, amongst other things: 

•  Has been cautioned or convicted of domestic abuse, coercive or controlling 

behaviour or stalking and harassment.    

•  Has been cautioned or convicted of sexual offences.    

•  Has been cautioned or convicted of offences against vulnerable people.    

•  Been  the  subject  of  a  non-molestation  order  or  Domestic  Violence 

Prevention Order.    

Since the policy was introduced in June 2024, we do not believe anyone who has a 

caution  or  conviction  for  any  sexual  offence  or  offences  involving  domestic  abuse, 

stalking  or  controlling  and  coercive  behaviour  has  joined  the  force.  While  our 

strengthened processes have seen refusal rates move from 5.4 per cent in 2020-21 

to 11.4 per cent in 2023-24.  

In addition, the MPS has also lobbied for, and worked with the Home Office on, new 

vetting  legislation  to  give  police  chiefs  greater  ability  to  dismiss  officers  who  are 

unsuitable tohold vetting clearance after serious incidents or where intelligence points 

to a pattern of behaviour that deems an officer unsuitable to continue in their role. 

Domestic Abuse and Sexual Offences Investigation Unit (DASO) 

The MPS acknowledges the public concern regarding the abuse of police powers and 

its impact on the safety of women. Since 2016, the MPS has undertaken significant 

reforms 

to  strengthen 

investigations, 

improve  safeguarding,  and  ensure 

accountability. 

DASO – this was created in early 2022 in response to the cases relating to former 

Police Constables 

 and 

, a unique reactive department 

committed  to  investigating  Police-Perpetrated  Domestic  Abuse  (PPDA)  and  Sexual 

    
 
 
 
 
 
 Offending (SO).  DASO comprises of four investigation teams and a separate Victim 

Support Unit (VSU), part of the Professionalism Command. 

DASO is made up of specialist officers with safeguarding experience and the requisite 

skill set.  DASO is responsible for investigating all PPDA SO gross misconduct cases 

however, they also take primacy for the parallel criminal investigation when offences 

are committed ‘on duty.’   

In addition to its core business, DASO is committed to raising awareness of PPDA and 

SO  by  visiting  Basic  Command  Units  (BCUs)  and  Operational  Command  Units 

(OCUs)to  present  a  DASO  input,  providing  anonymised  case  studies  highlighting 

common themes and reinforcing the reporting of wrongdoing. 

Victim Support Unit (VSU) – this is a team of trained Sexual Offences Investigation 

Technique  Officers  (SOITs)  who  are  victim  focused  to  support  victims  through  the 

misconduct  hearing  process  when  a  case  to  answer  in  gross misconduct has  been 

determined.  At present the team are currently supporting in the region of 180 victims. 

The  VSU  also  support  victims  through  the  trial  process,  particularly  if  the  criminal 

investigation  was  held  by  one  of  the  DASO  investigation  teams.  The  VSU  are  also 

involved in DASO roadshows, providing bespoke support to BCU/OCU’s (Operational 

Command  Units)  when  required,  supporting  officers  and  police  staff.  Most  recently 

following the BBC Panorama documentary support was provided to officers and staff 

at Central West BCU (including Charing Cross Police Station). The VSU work closely 

with  external  partners  such  as  Hestia  (an  organisation  that  supports  adults  and 

children in times of crisis) to further support victim-survivors. 

Operation Assure was created in 2023.   It was a programme of prioritised vetting 

reviews  for  serving  officers  and  staff  where  the  MPS  held  significant  adverse 

information that necessitated a review of that individual’s vetting clearance. The trigger 

for this process could come from various circumstances, including at the conclusion 

of a criminal investigation, following a misconduct hearing where a written warning, 

final  written  warning  or  a  reduction  in  rank  had  been  issued,  or  when  adverse 

information about an individual came to the notice of the Directorate of Professional 

Standards (DPS).  Once a review was triggered, it would be carried out by a senior 

 
 
 
 
 vetting officer and could lead to the individual retaining their current vetting status, or 

a decision to revoke the individual’s minimum vetting status.  If revoked, the individual 

would have been unable  to  access  police premises  and  systems, which  could  then 

trigger  a  process under  the  performance  regulations  which  could  lead  to dismissal. 

This process ceased following  judicial review in February 2025. 

However,  from  1st  September  2025,  the  MPS  operationalised  the  Police  Vetting 

Regulations (2025). The regulations, which were laid by the Home Office in April and 

took effect in May, provide police chiefs the ability to dismiss officers who cannot hold 

vetting clearance. 

The main changes for policing are:  

•  The  ability  to  hold  and  maintain  vetting  will  become  a  legal  requirement 

for all serving officers, including senior officers and special constables. 

•  Forces will have the ability to dismiss officers who aren’t able to maintain/hold 

vetting. 

•  The regulations also set out how appeals against withdrawal of vetting should 

be held, including the inclusion of an independent panel member. 

Through a parallel change in MPS policy, police staff will now be required to maintain 

vetting clearance in order to be employed by the MPS.  The MPS priority is to affect 

the regulations in a fair and transparent way, initially working through cases for those 

officers and staff who were in the Operation Assure process before it closed. 

Abuse of Position for Sexual Purpose (APSP)  

It is critical that all officers and staff know the signs and symptoms of abuse of position, 

how it may begin with professional contact and then quickly progress. Through training 

and  internal  communications  channels,  MPS  officers  and  staff  are  reminded  of  the 

need to be willing to and know how to speak up with any concerns they might have 

regarding colleagues.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As part of a recent inspection by HMICFRS, the MPS reviewed HMICFRS Standard 

6.1.3, specifically looking at how we seek to raise awareness of Abuse of Position for 

Sexual  Purpose,  both  internally  and  externally.  As  a  result,  this  summer  the  MPS 

introduced  a  mandatory  training  package  for  all  officers  and  staff  on  the  subject  of 

APSP.  

In  the  training,  we  highlight  a  likely  offender  profile,  and  the  potential  indicators  of 

sexual misconduct. Alongside we raise awareness of the potential “red flags” to look 

out for such as misogynistic or extreme sexual comments often being dismissed as 

‘banter’  being  an  indicator  of  potentially  dangerous  behaviour.  The  training  also 

highlights  and  raises  awareness  of  the  likely  characteristics  of  those  that  could  be 

targeted, most often being vulnerable females. 

Lastly, we seek to make clear how to get help both internally and externally, through 

MPS  and  external  reporting  mechanisms,  aiming  to  eliminate  any  barrier  that 

individuals  may  face when  reporting  concerns  of  the  behaviour  of  a  member of the 

organisation or the service they have received. This seeks to instil confidence in those 

reporting that their complaints will be taken seriously and dealt with appropriately. 

These  principles  are  now  embedded  in  MPS  training  and  shared  with  external 

agencies and organisations across London that support vulnerable people, to ensure 

those inside of the MPS and those outside are able to identify warning signs of APSP 

within  policing  and  safeguard  potential  vulnerable  victims  and  take  the  appropriate 

next steps. 

DASO  also  participates  in  the  national  APSP  working  group,  seeking  best  practice 

from other forces. 

Wider training 

Additionally, the MPS has mandated that officers and staff complete training on sexual 

harassment in the workplace of which compliance for this is also tracked. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We have delivered training to our whole workforce – that is around 40,000 officers and 

staff - that underlines our standards, values and provided tools to assist officers and 

staff  to  stand  up  to  inappropriate  behaviour.  We  have  also  rolled  out  five  days  of 

specific leadership training on culture and values.  

In  conjunction  with the  mandatory  training,  DASO  and the  VSU  work  alongside  the 

DPS Prevention and Engagement Team presenting the DASO awareness sessions 

as well as DASO/ Guardian roadshows. The roadshows bring together a combination 

of  support  from  DASO,  VSU,  Helping  Employees  Affected  or  Living  with  domestic 

abuse (H.E.A.L DA), Hestia, Stalking Threat Assessment Centre (STAC), Network of 

Women  (NoW)  and  Human  Resources  (HR)  as  appropriate.  The  primary  aim  is  to 

encourage staff to report wrongdoing, ensuring them that they will be supported if they 

come  forward.  Topics  covered  include  how  to  report  wrongdoing  or  unethical 

behaviour,  sexual  harassment  in  the  workplace,  what  protection  and  support  are 

available, confidential reporting channels and practical advice with a Q & A session. 

Integrity Assurance Unit  

The Integrity Assurance Unit (IAU) manages officers or staff who are the subject of an 

Adverse  Judicial  Finding  (AJF),  evidentially  tainted  by  virtue  of  a  criminal  or 

misconduct outcome or in respect of whom adverse information is held. The IAU will 

ensure that such officers or staff are risk assessed and handled fairly to protect both 

the individual, the public and the organisation. This is achieved by holistically reviewing 

all  known  information  and,  where  applicable  convening  a  management  meeting  to 

decide on whether Risk Management Measures need to be imposed to manage the 

risk presented by the taint, AJF or adverse information. The IAU oversees disclosure 

requirements associated with taint and maintains confidential records. The unit also 

liaises  with  legal  and  professional  standards’  teams,  monitors  fairness  and 

compliance,  and  makes  referrals  to  the  Disclosure  and  Barring  Service  where 

necessary. Its overall purpose is to uphold integrity, reduce risk, and maintain public 

confidence in the police service.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 Workforce 

Almost 1,500 officers and staff have been exited from the MPS in the last three years 

– this is the biggest shake up on police standards in 50 years.  

We have invested in 200 more professional standards’ officers (working in the MPS’s 

Directorate  of  Professional  Standards),  who  proactively  seek  out  wrongdoing,  and 

almost doubled the number of annual criminal conduct investigations to nearly 500 in 

the year 2023/2024. 

Our legacy review of historic domestic and sexual allegations against 1,636 officers 

and staff – Operation Onyx – has resulted in 378 leaving the MPS through retirement, 

resignation or dismissal. 

Whistleblowing 

Alongside strengthened vetting, we have introduced a range of measures to root out 

those who should not serve in the MPS. They include a dedicated DASO team with 

victim care specialists. We have enhanced proactive work under our Anti-Corruption 

and  Abuse  Command  and  we  have  a  dedicated  team  to  support  ‘whistle-blowers’. 

Internal reports have trebled from 405 in 2021/22 to 1,389 in 2024/25. 

We take reports seriously, and support those who make them. In November 2022, we 

were  the  first  force  to  partner  with  Crimestoppers  and  launched  an  anti-corruption 

hotline for the public to report wrongdoing including police perpetrated abuse. This has 

been rolled out nationally.   

In 2024, 137 officers and staff were arrested for sexual or domestic abuse offences 

compared with 89 in 2022. This demonstrates a stronger confidence in the MPS by 

victims to report this type of offending, and we have seen an increase in allegations 

made  year  on  year.  For  sexual  matters,  86  per  cent  of  cases  result  in  a  formal 

disciplinary outcome. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Angiolini Inquiry 

In addition to the work being done in the MPS to address the safety of women and 

girls, the issue is being scrutinised as part of the ongoing Angiolini Inquiry.   

On  22  November  2021, 

  was  commissioned  to  conduct  an 

independent inquiry as to how off-duty Metropolitan Police officer, 

, 

had the ability to kidnap, rape, and murder 

, a member of the public. 

The  inquiry  has  been divided  into  3  Parts  with  the  final  report  for Part  1  (regarding 

), having been published on 29 February 2024. 

On 11 May 2023, the Home Secretary announced the Terms of Reference for Part 2 

of the Inquiry. The terms of reference are available publicly, and include: 

1.  The extent to which systems, policies and processes for the recruitment, vetting 

and transfer of police officers are fit for purpose and help to identify those who 

display misogynistic and/or predatory attitudes and behaviours 

2.  The  extent  to  which  aspects  of  police  culture  observed  across  police  forces 

enable misogynistic and/or predatory attitudes and behaviours, and what the 

role of standards is. 

3.  The  extent  to  which  existing  measures  prevent  sexually  motivated  crimes 

against women in public spaces. 

The latter is the subject of the recently published second report of 

 (Part 

2(iii) report). 

Whilst the Part 2(iii) report is focused on its review of the safety of women and girls in 

public spaces only, it should be noted that the issues outlined in the coroner’s PFD 

concerns are being explored in significant detail across all of Part 2 of the Angiolini 

Inquiry.  

The Inquiry will draw upon evidence from relevant reports to inform its work, including 

the recent HMICFRS report and Baroness 

 reports. The Inquiry will take into 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 account the views of those most affected by these issues which will include those who 

work in policing and those who have been the victim of relevant crimes.  

The MPS are continuing to actively support this Inquiry and address recommendations 

arising from the reports accordingly.  

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require further information from the 

MPS. 

Yours sincerely 

Deputy Assistant Commissioner 

Metropolitan Police Service 

Professionalism