Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2014

Albert James Hand

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2014-0010, written 9 Jan 2014. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report9 Jan 2014
Reference2014-0010
DeceasedAlbert James Hand
CoronerTom Osborne
Coroner areaBedfordshire & Luton
CategoryCommunity health care and emergency services related deaths
Organisation namedEast of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1) 

NOTE: This form is to be used after an inquest. 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

Dr Anthony MARSH 
Chief Executive 
East of England Ambulance Service 
Ambulance Headquarters 
Building 1020 
Cambourne Business Park 
Cambourne 
Cambridgeshire.  CB23 6EB 

1 

CORONER 

I am Mr Tom Osborne, Senior Coroner, for the Coroner Area of Bedfordshire and Luton 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this Report under Paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 12th November 2013 I commenced an Investigation into the death of Albert James 
HAND  aged  79.  The  Investigation  concluded  at  the  end  of  the  Inquest  on  8th  January 
2014. The Conclusion of the Inquest was that the deceased had died as a result of an 
‘accident’ - the medical cause of death being: 

                          1(a) Subarachnoid Haemorrhage and Subdural Haemorrhage  

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

Albert Hand suffered a fall at around 13.00 hours on 1st November 2013 at the Arndale 
Shopping  Centre  in  Luton.  A  call  was  made  to  the  Ambulance  Service  via  999  and  a 
Paramedic  attended  at  13.32  hours  who  conducted  an  assessment  and  recorded  a 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) of 11.  The Paramedic then requested a “Hot 2” transfer to 
hospital.  The  “Hot  2”  ambulance  arrived  at  14.15  hours  and  left  the  scene  at  14.37 
hours, arriving at the Luton & Dunstable Hospital at 14.51 hours, almost an hour and a 
half following the original call. His GCS had then fallen to 7. The Clinical Manager for the 
Ambulance  Service  explained  in  his  evidence  that  a  patient  could  be  waiting  for  up  to 
three  hours  and  “……the  waits  are  getting  longer”.  Priority  is  given  to  diverting  an 
ambulance to an incident where the person has suffered a respiratory or cardiac arrest, 
even in situations where the patient has suffered a head injury 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the Inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my  opinion  there  is  a  risk  that  future  deaths  will  occur  unless  action  is  taken.  In  the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

1

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: 

(1)  That a patient who has suffered a head injury has to wait for over one and a half 
       hours to be conveyed to hospital 

(2)  That there are insufficient ambulance crews in the Luton and Bedfordshire area to 
       meet the emergency needs of the community. 

(3)  That the Protocols in place for dealing with emergency calls are putting patients at 
       risk and may result in future deaths. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you, as the 
Chief Executive of the East of England Ambulance Service, have the power to take such 
action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this Report within 56 days of the date of this Report, 
namely by the 7th March 2014; I, the Coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken, or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my Report to: 

The Chief Coroner  

and to the following Interested Person(s): 

I have also sent it to Luton MP’s who may find it useful or of interest - 

             Mr Gavin Shuker and Mr Kelvin Hopkins 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish, either or both, in a complete, redacted or summary 
form. He may also send a copy of this Report to any person who he believes may find it 
useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the Coroner, at the time of 
your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief 
Coroner. 

9 

 Dated this 9th day of January 2014 

                                                                         Tom OSBORNE 
                                                                          Senior Coroner 
                                                                          Bedfordshire & Luton 

2

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                         
                                                                           
 
 
 
 3

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust (PDF)
East of England Ambulance Service NHS |

NHS Trust
Our reference: ACM/TN Ambulance Headquarters
Cambourne Building 1020
. Cambourne Business Park
Date : 114 March 2014 Cambourne
Cambs
CB23 6EB
Mr T Osborne
HM Coroner — Bedfordshire District P|
The Court House
Woburn Street
Ampthill
Bedfordshire
MK45 2HX
Dear Mr Osborne
Re: Response to Regulation 28 — Mr Albert Hand (deceased)
| write further to your correspondence of February 2014, where you advised that you were making a
Regulation 28 recommendation to the Trust following the inquest into the death of Mr Albert Hand.
Following the inquest you asked the East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust (‘the Trust’) to
consider a number of points relating to your findings that | will highlight in my response. | can confirm
that the Trust has undertaken several actions to mitigate the risk of a similar incident occurring.
| have highlighted the Trust’s actions and progress under the specific headings you have asked us to
consider:
~ (4) That a patient who has suffered a head injury has to wait for over one and a half

hours to be conveyed to hospital

On this occasion a number of factors collectively contributed to the delay:

Initial response to original location with a solo paramedic in a rapid response vehicle (15 minutes)
Inability to find the patient as the incorrect location was given (9 minutes)

Assessment by the paramedic before requesting backup (11 minutes)

Waiting for an ambulance to arrive (23 minutes)

Re-assessment and extrication to the ambulance (22 minutes)

Conveyance to hospital (14 minutes)

OaARWN >

All users of the 999 system are triaged by our Call Handlers in the Health and Emergency Operations
Centre (HEOC) using the Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS). The purpose of the
triage is to identify the seriousness of the patient’s condition by asking a series of focused questions
around the chief complaint to arrive at a determined priority of call. The call priority then determines the
level and type of response sent in line with Trust policies and national and government targets.

= On 1 November 2013 at 13:17 hours, an emergency call was received within the Bedford HEOC from a
passer-by who had seen Mr Hand fall. The Call Handler used the AMPDS system outlined above and

1

from the information provided during the call, the call was coded as a Red 2 as Mr Hand was described
as not alert. Red 2 calls are immediately life-threatening and require an emergency response to arrive
_ within 8 minutes irrespective of location in 75% of cases.

Three further 999 calls were received into HEOC as the location was given by three separate callers,
none of whom were with Mr Hand, and caused some degree of confusion as to his exact location. On
this occasion the Trust was experiencing data problems with the Ambulances and Rapid Response
Vehicles (RRV) not receiving data via their Mobile Data Terminals (MDT). It is through the MDT system
that the details of addresses and problem texts for patients on 999 calls are sent. When received into the
vehicles this automatically activates the satellite navigation system giving the route to the address. It also
automatically pages the hand held radios carried by the ambulance personnel to alert them that they
have been assigned to attend a 999 call.

Due to the MDT failure, the EEAST Dispatchers were calling every resource dispatched to confirm
whether they were aware they had been allocated to an incident and to confirm location details. This can
cause some delays depending upon the volume of 999 calls being received in each area. The issues
with the MDT are further addressed in (3) below.

The Bedford HEOC, where this call was dispatched from, had received a large volume of calls and the
Trust had activated its internal Demand Management Plan (DMP) to level 1 at 13:10. This meant that
there were more calls than we had ambulances for at that time and Mr Hand’s call came in at 13:18,
eight minutes after the DMP was activated. The DMP puts in place actions to maximise ambulance
availability for life threatening patients.

An ambulance was dispatched towards the scene at 13:18 hours. Unfortunately, by the time confirmation
of the incident had reached the crew they were already committed to the M1 heading back towards
Bedford from Luton, with the nearest turnaround point being the junction at Flitwick. This ambulance was
diverted to a different 999 call as a further ambulance had become available in Luton and this was
dispatched towards the scene at 13:20 hours. An RRV was also dispatched to the scene as this was the
nearest available resource.

Unfortunately, the ambulance was diverted at 13:25 hours to a further 999 call where the patient was
confirmed to be unconscious with no other available resource to attend. However, the nearest available
resource was still en route to Mr Hand, which we can confirm was the RRV.

At 13:33 hours the RRV contacted HEOC via the radio as she had been unable to locate Mr Hand on the
original location given of Bute Street or near Lloyds Bank and was redirected by the Dispatcher to
George Street where subsequent callers had given the location. At 13:33 hours a fifth call was received.
This call was from a previous caller who was chasing up the ambulance. He was a shop worker who was
unable to leave the shop to be by Mr Hand. The caller stated the patient had fallen and was
unconscious.

The RRV arrived at the new location at 13:41 hours. Once a clinician arrives on scene it is usual to
undertaken an assessment and determine the care plan for the patient. The clinician undertook an
appropriate timely assessment and requested ambulance back up as a HOT 2 response to convey the
patient to hospital. A HOT 2 response is divertible under emergency conditions, meaning that allocated
ambulances can be diverted for a Red 1/Red 2 priority incident or a higher priority back-up request, such
as a HOT 1.

An ambulance became available to attend Mr Hand at 14:06 hours and was immediately dispatched to
the scene arriving at 14:15 hours. This was 57 minutes from the time of the first 999 call and nine
minutes from the time of the ambulance back up request. At this point, Mr Hand was able to
communicate with the RRV as he was able to tell the Paramedic what had happened and to give her all
his personal details. This was why the clinician had made the request as a HOT 2 back-up request
rather than an HOT 1. The patient would have been moved into the ambulance and re-assessed as well
as being attached to monitoring equipment; in this case it took 22 minutes which is not unusual.

In summary, the delay in this case was caused by a number of factors including a technology failure,
increased demand and the wrong location being given by the callers.

The Trust is absolutely committed to ensuring the Trust can consistently respond in a timely manner to
all calls. The Trust commissioned a Clinical Capacity Review in 2013 which clearly showed that we did
not have enough ambulances to enable the Trust to meet its call demand in certain areas. The findings
of this review have been shared with the Clinical Commissioning Groups as additional funding is
required.

(2) That there are insufficient ambulance crews in the Luton and Bedfordshire area to
meet the emergency needs of the community.

The Chief Executive Officer, Dr Anthony Marsh, joined the Trust on 1 January 2014. Dr Marsh has six
key priorities for the organisation which include recruiting 400 more staff and providing more ambulances
across the whole service. It is recognised that the Trust has had historic staffing problems due to a
national shortage of paramedics to recruit to the vacancies, but the Trust has in place a significant
recruitment drive which will enable more ambulances to be on the road over the next two years. As such,
it is envisaged that patients will receive a timelier and more appropriate response to their 999 calls.

Notwithstanding the priorities set out by Dr Marsh designed to increase resource availability across the
whole area covered by the Trust, Luton and Bedfordshire consistently achieve their commissioned target
and regularly exceed it across all Clinical Commissioning Groups within the county. The Trust is
commissioned regionally to reach 75% of all its life-threatening emergencies within eight minutes. This
is in line with the national targets set by the Department of Health. Clearly, due to the events described
previously, the Trust was not able to meet this target on this particular occasion.

Luton and Bedfordshire continue to produce results that are above the commissioned targets. The
county has a mixture of ambulances and Paramedic response cars which enable the patient to receive
clinical care in a timely manner and patients are transported to hospital where appropriate to their clinical
needs.

Bedfordshire has a full complement of staff and Luton has some Paramedic vacancies which are actively
being recruited to as part of the current recruitment programme by the Trust. The key priorities of Dr
Marsh will ensure that front line staff capacity will remain the critical focus of the Trust.

To address the issue of response availability in general, the Trust is taking internal action against the six
\ key priorities set. These are:

Recruit 400 Student Paramedics in 2014/15

Up-skill ECAs to technicians and EMTs to paramedics (staff development)
Maximise clinical staff on frontline vehicles

Reduce response cars and increase ambulances

Accelerate fleet and equipment replacement programme

Reinvest corporate spend in frontline delivery

QAakwWn>

(3) That the Protocols in place for dealing with emergency calls are putting patients at
risk and may result in future deaths.

The organisational priorities outlined above will continue to be augmented with the clinical coordination

function within the HEOCs. This function maintains a robust clinical review for those patients that require

further interrogation via the telephone in order to gain a more detailed clinical picture of the patient's

condition. This enables the Trust to change the priority assigned to a call based on any significant

changes in the patient’s condition. The clinical coordinators will continue to play a key role within the
\.. HEOCs to provide senior clinical presence within the rooms.

The Trust's Demand Management Plan referred to in (1) above has been reviewed and an updated
version has been approved and is now in use. This will enable earlier escalation to senior managers

.,. during excessively busy periods of demand.

To support our staff further we have commenced issuing a clinical manual. The clinical manual has been
developed by the Trust and is the first in the country. It supports the national guidelines by providing
further details on assessment, interventions and procedures.

The Trust is currently commissioning an upgrade to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system which
should see less technology failure. This is part of the on-going commitment of the Trust to ensure patient
safety against a backdrop of increasing demand on our services.

| trust this information will show that the Trust has implemented significant changes following this tragic
incident. Our thoughts remain with Mr Hand’s family and friends.

Should you require any further information or clarification then please do not hesitate to contact me and |
would be more than happy to come and meet with you.

Yours sincerely

Director of Patient Safety and Clinical Standards / Consultant Paramedic

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