Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2016

Alan Dimbleby

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2016-0120, written 23 Mar 2016. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report23 Mar 2016
Reference2016-0120
DeceasedAlan Dimbleby
CoronerRichard Travers
Coroner areaSurrey
CategoryAccident at Work and Health and Safety related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published2

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

IN  THE  SURREY  CORONER’S  COURT  
IN  THE  MATTER  OF:  

__________________________________________________________  

The  Inquests  Touching  the  Death  of  Alan  George  DIMBLEBY  
A  Regulation  28  Report  –  Action  to  Prevent  Future  Deaths  
__________________________________________________________  

THIS  REPORT  IS  BEING  SENT  TO:  

•  Dr  Richard  Judge,  Chief  Executive  HSE  
• 

  Bateman  Engineering  Ltd    

1   CORONER  

Richard  Travers  HM  Senior  Coroner  for  Surrey  

2   CORONER’S  LEGAL  POWERS  

I  make  this  report  under  paragraph  7(1)  of  Schedule  5  to  The  Coroners  
and  Justice  Act  2009.  

3  

INVESTIGATION  and  INQUEST  
The  inquest  into  the  death  of  Mr  Dimbleby  was  opened  on  the  4th  August  
2015  and  was  resumed  on  the  22nd  March  2016  with  a  jury  and  concluded  
the  following  day,  23rd  March  2016.  

The  jury  found  the  cause  of  death  to  have  been:  

1a.  Hypoxic  Brain  Injury  
1b.  Cardiac  Arrest  
1c.Traumatic  Fracture  of  Cervical  Veterbrae  

They  concluded  with  a  short  form  conclusion  of  ‘Accidental  Death’.  

4   CIRCUMSTANCES  OF  THE  DEATH  

On  the  23rd  July  2015,  Mr  Dimbleby,  a  very  experienced  crop  sprayer,  was  
spraying  areas  of  cover  at  Warren  Barn  Farm,  Woldingham,  Surrey.  He  
was  driving  his  usual  vehicle  a  Bateman  RB35  self-­‐‑propelled  sprayer  with  
which  he  was  very  familiar.  The  land  was  undulating  and  in  parts  very  
steep.  As  Mr  Dimbleby  was  making  his  way  from  the  second  area  of  
cover  to  the  third  area,  the  sprayer  became  unstable  and  rolled  down  the  
incline.  Mr  Dimbleby  was  thrown  from  the  cabin  and  died  as  a  result  of  

Rtdoc/02512-2015/Reg28/23-3-2016 

1 

  
  
  
  
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
 injuries  that  were  sustained  when  he  was  struck  by  the  rolling  vehicle.  
The  cabin  of  the  vehicle  was  still  intact  and  generally  undamaged,  but  
there  was  no  form  of  operator  seat  restraint.  The  jury  found  that  the  
gradient  of  the  slope  on  which  he  was  working  together  with  the  absence  
of  a  seatbelt  made  a  material  contribution  to  his  death.    

5   CORONER’S  CONCERNS  

During  the  course  of  the  inquest  the  evidence  revealed  matters  that  gave  
rise  to  concerns  that  circumstances  creating  a  risk  of  other  deaths  will  
continue  to  exist  in  the  future  unless  action  is  taken.  

The  MATTERS  OF  CONCERN  are:  

Operator  Seat  Restraint    

1.  Consideration  should  be  given  to  fitting  operator  seat  restraints  
to  self-­‐‑propelled  sprayers.  The  cabin  of  the  vehicle  was  such  
that  it  would  have  provided  adequate  protection  to  Mr  
Dimbleby  had  he  not  been  thrown  out  of  the  vehicle.  However,  
without  appropriate  operator  seat  restraints  there  is  a  serious  
risk  that  the  operator  will  be  thrown  from  the  vehicle  should  it  
overturn  and,  as  such,  a  safe  cabin  does  not  provide  adequate  
protection.  

2.  Consideration  should  be  given  to  removing  self-­‐‑propelled  

sprayers  from  the  class  of  vehicles  in  respect  of  which  the  HSE  
guidance  suggests  that  operator  seat  restraints  may  not  be  
needed  or  are  inappropriate  [Agriculture  Information  Sheet  37  
(revision1)].  

6   ACTION  SHOULD  BE  TAKEN  

In  my  opinion  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  future  deaths  and  I  
believe  that  the  persons  listed  in  paragraph  one  above  are  in  a  position  to  
draw  these  concerns  to  the  appropriate  authority  in  Portugal  who  has  the  
power  to  take  such  action.    

7   YOUR  RESPONSE  

You  are  under  a  duty  to  respond  to  this  report  within  56  days  of  its  date;  I  
may  extend  that  period  on  request.  

Your  response  must  contain  details  of  action  taken  or  proposed  to  be  
taken,  setting  out  the  timetable  for  such  action.  Otherwise  you  must  
explain  why  no  action  is  proposed.  

Rtdoc/02512-2015/Reg28/23-3-2016 

2 

  
  
  
  
    
  
  
 8   COPIES  

I  have  sent  a  copy  of  this  report  to  the  following:  
1.  Dr  Richard  Judge,  Chief  Executive  HSE  
2. 
3. 
4.  DAC  Beachcroft  Claims  Ltd  (
5.  The  Chief  Coroner  

(Mr  Dimbleby’s  widow)  

  Bateman  Engineering  Ltd  

Signed:  

Richard Travers 

DATED  this  23rd  March  2016  

Rtdoc/02512-2015/Reg28/23-3-2016 

3

Responses

2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Bateman Engineering Ltd (PDF)
BYCOTT, CHULMLEIGH, NORTH DEVON. EX18 7DS.

H.M. Coroner for Surrey

ry to HM Coroner = Surrey

25 April 2016

Dear Sir,

| write in response to the prevention of future deaths report issued following the Inquest into the death
of Alan Dimbleby. As | understand your report, it requests that consideration should be given to fitting
operator seat restraints to self-propelled sprayers.

As | set out in my statement provided for the inquest, there is no requirement for sprayers to have seat
restraints. We have always focussed on making the cab enclosure as safe and secure as possible so that
the driver is protected irrespective of whether they are wearing a seat restraint. In the report you
acknowledge that the cabin of the sprayer was still intact and generally undamaged following the
accident.

However, since | became aware of the circumstances of Mr Dimbleby’s accident, | have changed the
design of the cabs to include seat restraints and no vehicle leaves our workshop without one being
fitted.

| hope that you find the action taken to be adequate and | am happy to discuss matters further with you
if you think that would be helpful.

Yours sincerely,

PO Company Reg. No, 1497923 England VAT No. 321 1848 85
Response from Respondent Not Named (PDF)
Chief Executive

Dr Richard Judge
Redgrave Court
Mr R Travers Merton Road
HM Coroner for Surrey Bootle
HM Coroner's Court Merseyside L20 7HS
Station Approach
Woking Tel: 0151 951 5766
Surrey Fax: 0151 951 3932
GU22 7AP

http://www.hse.gov.uk/

Date: 29 June 2016

Our ref: CE-87-16
Your ref: Rtdoc/02512-2015/Reg28/23-3-2016

Dear Mr Travers

Re: Mr Alan Dimbleby (deceased) Regulation 28 Report to Prevent
Future Deaths

Thank you for your letter of the 23 March regarding Alan Dimbleby’s tragic
death on 23 July 2015.

You asked me to consider two issues:

{a) whether; operator seat restraints should be fitted to self-propelled
sprayers; and

(b) whether HSE guidance Agricultural Information Sheet 37 requires
revision to remove self-propelled sprayers from the class of vehicles
where operator seat restraints may not be needed or may not be
appropriate.

On the first issue, the use of seat restraints has to be considered in
conjunction with the design of the machine. If a seat restraint is to be
effective in an overturn situation it must be in conjunction with a roll over
protective structure (ROPS). A ROPS is a protective structure intended to
provide the operator with a protective zone to reduce the risk of injury.
Vehicles fitted with ROPS are fitted with seat restraints so that the operator
remains within the protective zone. In 2009 the relevant standard was revised
and required seat belt anchorage points if the sprayer was fitted with ROPS.
However the standard, which was most recently revised in 2013, allows the
manufacturer to choose how to reduce the risk of an overturn, or to mitigate
the likelihood of injury in an overturn and ROPS is only one of the options

available. Not all sprayers manufactured now, or in the past, will have a
ROPS cab.

Where a non-ROPS cab is present, which is particularly likely on older
machines, the fitting and wearing of seat restraints is not recommended as it
can increase the risk of injury in the event of a roll over. A non-ROPS cab is
not designed to, nor will it have been tested to demonstrate that it can,
withstand the forces to which it is exposed during a roll over. Consequently,
in an overturn, the structure is likely to deform, and penetrate the zone
occupied by the restrained driver resulting in a risk of serious personal injury.
Additionally, on older machines regardless of whether or not they have ROPs
fitted, there may not be any suitable anchorage points for seat restraints and
fitting them may be unfeasible.

The key to preventing an overturn on sloping ground is for employers to
assess the work, including travel to and from the site in question, to select the
right equipment for the conditions, to ensure the work is planned so that it can
be carried out safely and to ensure that the operator is trained and competent
for the task. Where a risk of overturning has been identified as significant,
one of the means by which this can be reduced is to specify a machine fitted
with ROPS and operator restraint. HSE’s guidance about overturning
vehicles! gives a range of practical considerations that the employer needs to
consider when planning the work. Overall we cannot advocate a policy that
all self-propelled sprayers be fitted with seat restraints.

HSE works with the relevant British Standards (BSI) and European Standards
(CEN) committees on agricultural machinery safety, and we will raise this
issue at the next appropriate meeting for the consideration in future revisions
of the applicable standards.

On your second point, concerning HSE guidance on the use of seat
restraints’, similar constraints apply to how far this can be changed. Our
guidance has to apply to the full range of self-propelled work equipment
(including those fitted with ROPS and those not fitted with ROPS). It gives
advice on the steps that should be taken to comply with health and safety
legislation. The guidance is not intended to be comprehensive, and does not
cover every possible configuration of self-propelled work equipment. Very
specifically we cannot recommend the use of seat restraints for a vehicle that
is not also fitted with a ROPS for the reasons given above. We do
nonetheless keep all of our guidance under review and at the next opportunity
we will consider whether the wording can be revised to better inform the
choice of vehicle when working on slopes.

In your report (Section 6) you state that HSE is in a position to draw these
concerns to the appropriate authority in Portugal who has the power to take
action. We do not understand the reference to Portugal which does not
appear to have any relevance to this incident. Therefore, we do not intend to
take this action.

1 http-/www.hse.gov. uk/agriculture/topics/machinery/farm-vehicles-2.htm
? AIS 37 Operator seat restraints for tractors and mobile work equipment in agriculture and forestry

Yours sincerely

(an fee

Dr Richard Judge
Chief Executive

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