Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2017

Johan Pambou

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2017-0125, written 20 Apr 2017. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report20 Apr 2017
Reference2017-0125
DeceasedJohan Pambou
CoronerLouise Hunt
Coroner areaBirmingham and Solihull
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1,
2. NHS England

CORONER

| am Louise Hunt Senior Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

{ make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations
28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On 21/12/2016 | commenced an investigation into the death of Johan Stone Pambou. The investigation
concluded at the end of an inquest on 19th April 2017. The conclusion of the inquest was:

Died from pneumococcal septicaemia contributed to by not receiving a necessary pnuemovax 23
vaccination. His death was contributed to by neglect.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

The deceased suffered from sickle cell disease. On 07/12/16 at 02.47 he was admitted to the emergency
department at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital with severe abdominal pain and joint pains. He was
initially reviewed by a junior doctor who suspected an abdominal sickle cell crisis and he was admitted at
08.55 to the paediatric assessment unit for observation, He was seen by the consultant at 10.30 who
diagnosed a sickle cell crisis and he was given morphine for pain relief. There was discussion with
Birmingham Children’s hospital about whether he required a transfusion and a decision was initially
made to arrange a transfusion as he was pale and his HB was just below the baseline. He was transferred
to HDU at approximately13.50. He became drowsy following the morphine and a further review was
undertaken at 16.20. A decision was made to reverse the morphine. Johan became more alert but
continued to be distressed and in pain so a lower dose of morphine was then given. At 16.50 the CRP
result was received and the level was 433. At this time Johan was tachycardic and his HB had dropped to
49, At18.40 he had continued to deteriorate and a repeated HB confirmed a result of 48. The critical care
outreach team was called to assess and support him. Antibiotics were started at 18.50 having been
prescribed at 18.00, He acutely deteriorated at 18.40. A blood transfusion was started at 19.35.
Arrangements were made for him to be transferred urgently to Birmingham Children’s hospital. He was
admitted to ITU where he was diagnosed with pneumococcal septicaemia. He died despite further
treatment on 11/12/16. Sickle cell patients are recommended to have pneumovax 23 vaccination after
the age of 2. Four letters were sent to the deceased’s GP to request this in February 2016, March 2016,
August 2016 and November 2016. Attempts were made to obtain the vaccine in June 16 when the
vaccine was said to be unavailable. No further attempts were made to find and give the vaccine before
Johan became unwell in December 2016.

Based on information from the Deceased’s treating clinicians the medical cause of death was determined
to be:
1a PNEUMOCOCCAL SEPTICAEMIA

2. SICKLE CELL DISEASE

CORONER’S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion
there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory
duty to report to you.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. —

1. System and record keeping in the GP practice. Four letters were received asking for this child to
receive pneumovax23 vaccination from February 2016 to November 2016. None of the letters
were actioned by the GP. They were simply filed away. | am concerned that there was no
adequate system in place to monitor and act on letters received from hospitals which means
other essential treatment may be missed for other patients.

2. Availability of ppeumovax vaccine 23. | heard evidence from the GP in this case that attempts
were made to obtain the vaccine in June 2016 but it was unavailable. | was also told the vaccine
continued to be unavailable now. | am concerned about the availability of the vaccine and
whether GPs fully understand where to access the vaccine.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and | believe you have the power to take
such action.

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 15
June 2017. |, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for
action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.

COPIES and PUBLICATION

| have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons:-
The family, CQC and Cross City CCG and to the LOCAL SAFEGUARDING BOARD.

| am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a
copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of
your response by the Chief Coroner.

20/04/2017

Signature Lochhead

Louise Hunt
Senior Coroner
Birmingham and Solihull

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Respondent Not Named (PDF)
England
Professor Sir Bruce Keogh
National Medical Director
Skipton House
80 London Road
Mrs Louise Hunt SE1 6LH
HM Senior Coroner
Birmingham & Solihull Districts
50 Newton Street XB: June 2017
Birmingham
B46NE

Dear Mrs Hunt
Re: Johan Stone Pambou (deceased)

Thank you for agreeing to an extension of time for us to respond to your
Regulation 28 Report into the tragic death of Johan Pambou. | would like to
express my deep sympathy to Mr Pambou’s family.

In this letter | outline-the actions that have been taken and proposals for next
steps. :

In your report you identified two main matters of concern.

1. Systems and record keeping in the GP practice. Four letters were
received asking for this child to receive pneumovax23 vaccination from
February 2016 to November 2016. None of these letters were actioned by
the GP. You raised concern that there was no adequate system in place to
monitor and act on letters received from hospitals which means other
essential treatment may be missed for other patients.

2. Availability of pneumovax vaccine 23. You heard evidence from the GP
in this case that attempts were made to obtain the vaccine in June 2016
but it was unavailable. You were advised that the vaccine continues to be
unavailable, raising concern that GPs will not be aware where to access
the vaccine.

To inform our response, we have engaged with Public Health England and Merck
Sharp & Dohme (MSD) the manufacturers of the Pneumococcal Polysaccharide
vaccine (Pneumovax) over the issue of availability of the pneumovax vaccine 23.
In addition, a serious incident group has been established which has met on 22
May 2017 and 9 June to discuss the local issues relating to the care provided to
Johan Pambou at his general practice.
The serious incident group representatives include;
e Dr Dhamija and the practice manager from the GP practice — Lea Village
Surgery
e Screening & Immunisation lead and manager (Public Health England,
West Midlands)
e NHS England Quality lead (West Midland)

High quality care for all, now and for future generations

e Birmingham Cross-City Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG)

e The Clinical Governance lead for the Midland Medical Partnership

e Consultant paediatric haematologist — Birmingham Children’s Hospital
(BCH)

The outcome of the serious incident process is to establish a root cause analysis
(RCA) and to identify learning that can inform actions which can be taken locally
to improve safety as well as to inform wider learning which can be shared across
NHS England.

Systems and record keeping in the GP practice.

Your Regulation 28 Report identified deficiencies in how communication from
Birmingham Children’s Hospital had been actioned by the GP practice.

Once a patient with sickle cell disease reaches the age of 2 years of age they
should receive a single dose.of Polysaccharide Pneumococcal Vaccine (PPV).
BCH routinely request this for affected patients from their GP Practice. Sickle cell
patients would then need subsequent PPV immunisation every 5 years.

NHS England commissions a national PPV enhanced service which requires
participating practices to identify and offer PPV to eligible patients through a
‘proactive call and recall basis.’ The enhanced service requires practices to have
a system for identifying and calling / recalling at risk individuals which should
occur independent of any letter from specialist services. :

Lea Village Surgery had signed up to deliver the PPV enhanced service, however
the significant incident review identified that there was poor record keeping in the
practice with no documentation that the requested action in the February and
March letters were undertaken on receipt of the letters. This falls short of the
expectations of a practice providing this service and the commissioning team will
consider what contractual action should be taken in the circumstances.

In June 2016, prompted by a conversation with Johan’s parents, the practice
state that they had sought advice from the community specialist nurse about the
appropriate vaccine.

The serious incident review has identified confusion over terminology regarding
the name of the appropriate vaccine. Communication between the practice nurse
and the community specialist nurse failed to establish that ‘Polysaccharide
Pneumococcal Vaccine’ (which the practice had in stock) was the same vaccine
as ‘Pneumovax23’ which was the recommendation from BCH.

The Incident group has found that the systems and processes governing patient
related communication at the Lea Village surgery was poor, however, since the
inquest, the practice has merged to become a member of the Midland Medical
Partnership (MMP). At the time of the merge, MMP were not aware of the
findings at inquest.

The Incident group have received assurances that MMP have undertaken a
thorough review of Lea Village Surgery’s systems and processes. The review
has established that PPV was likely to have been available at the practice in
June 2016 and further stocks were received in October 2016.

High quality care for all, now and for future generations

An action plan has been developed and implemented by MMP which has
included the setting up of regular dedicated immunisation clinics and a recent
audit has demonstrated robust electronic recording of actions from hospital
letters.

Availability of pneumovax vaccine 23

Although you heard at inquest that attempts were made to obtain the vaccine in
June 2016 but it was unavailable, findings from the serious incident meeting have
subsequently shown this to have been mistaken.

This has been supported by our inquiry of MSD who have confirmed that whilst
there had been some intermittent interruptions in the availability of PPV vaccine
between September 16 until the end of the year, there had been no interruptions
in vaccine availability between January and September.

Many vaccines have supply issues from time to time as they are a biological
products that can take a long time to manufacture and can fail quality testing and
are influenced by worldwide demand/supply issues

GP practices are kept up to date with vaccine supply issues through a publication
‘Vaccine Update’ which is the monthly PHE publication for anyone involved in
delivering immunisations https://Awww.gov.uk/government/collections/vaccine-
update. Public Health England (PHE) informs commissioners via the National
Immunisation Network (scheduled every 2 weeks) of vaccine supply problems
with instruction to cascade to local providers what action to take and which
cohorts of patients should be prioritised. PHE also alerts providers via notification
on the ImmForm ordering and data collection system of supply problems.

Further clinical advice is available from the screening and immunisation team
(SIT) via england.wmid-imms@nhs.net — the team can signpost to any national
guidance on prioritisation of patients during a period of vaccine shortage.

Despite these systems, the system broke down in relation to the care offered to
Johan Pambou. It is evident that this was not due to a vaccine supply shortage
but in part caused by confusion over vaccine nomenclature. NHS England will
write to Public Health England to inform them of this incident so that they can
include the learning in their planning for further communication with front line
staff. We are aware that PHE is considering further means by which
communication with practices can be enhanced by developing a regional or
national cascade.

Next steps

Whilst the serious incident review process is not yet complete, it has identified a
number of issues which need to be addressed locally and which need to be
disseminated more widely so that lessons can be learnt.

These are:
1. The need for adequate coding of significant disease to allow robust follow
up and recall :

2. The need for a robust system in general practice to ensure actions
requested by outside parties are managed
High quality care for all, now and for future generations

3. Ensuring practices are aware of the escalation process if there are issues
with availability of vaccinations.

In addition, there is a need to establish how a provider like a Trust (in this case
Birmingham Children’s Hospital) escalates a concern if they become aware that
a required action is not being addressed by a patient's GP.

A letter to GPs has been developed and shared with Local Medical Committee
(LMC) for comment prior to dissemination to all local GPs by the regional Medical
Director, Dr Kiran Patel. The LMC has also contacted all practices on 15 June to
reinforce the responsibilities and actions required at practice level in compliance
with the enhanced service.

The letter will be shared with all regional medical directors in NHS England for
onward circulation to ensure there is national sharing of these learning points.
The incident group is next meeting on June 29 and will continue to oversee the
process to establish effective systems and processes at the Lea Village Surgery
site so that NHS England can be confident.that the practice is providing safe and
effective care.

Contractual or regulatory issues will be addressed by the relevant teams within
NHS England and the commissioning CCG.

| can confirm that NHS England has convened a Performance Advisory Group to
consider the issues and the roguiatory process is underway to address capability
and conduct issues of the GP.

Summary

This is a tragic case of what could have been a preventable death of a young
child. We are taking action to ensure individuals and the wider system, learn the
lessons of how such deaths could in the future be prevented.

Thank you for raising these issues through the formal processes, | hope | have
been able to reassure you that whilst your concerns were well founded. NHS
England is taking action to address the risks of such an event occurring again in
the future. .

Professor Sir Bruce Keogh KBE, MD, DSc, FRCS, FRCP
National Medical Director
NHS England

High quality care for all, now and for future generations

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