Aditya Puri

Update to the Regulation 28 response from Highways England concerning the death
of Aditya PURI.

A)  Traffic data speeds and  flows of the  A50 between junction 3 and
junction 4 will be collected and compared to national averages.

Traffic speed and flow data was collated from permanent Traffic Monitoring
Units (TMU) sites. The traffic speeds and flows between junctions 3 and 4
were broadly in line with other sections of the A50  between junction 4 and  the
M1 motorway.  No unusual traffic levels or speeds were apparent on the
section between junction 3 and junction 4.

B)  Road  Surface condition information will be collated and examined.

SCRIM

Sideway-Force Coefficient Routine Investigation Machine (SCRIM) is a surface
friction test that is used to measure wet-road skidding resistance.

The  vertical  load  and  the  sideway  force  generated  by  frictional resistance  to
skidding of  a test  wheel  are  measured and  the  output is  used  to  calculate the
Sideway Force Coefficient (SFC)  value. The  SCRIM  operates at  50km/hr with
continuous measurement of the  SFC  value.

SCRIM investigatory levels (IL)  are  defined for  every  part  of the  network. This
section  of  the  Eastbound  A50  carriageway  has  been  classified  with  an  IL  of
0.35.

SCRIM  sites  with  a  Polished  Stone  Value  (PSV)  between 0  and  -0.05  of  the
classified  IL  are  monitored  and  would  only  be  reviewed further  if  a  cluster  of
collisions were identified at the  location. Currently sites with  a  SCRIM  value  of
-0.1  below  the  classified  IL  trigger  temporary  warning  sign  installation  and
remedial schemes subject to funding being available.

None  of  the  locations  investigated  fell  below  the  classified  IL,  therefore,
intervention is not required.

TRACS

Rutting  data 
from  TRACS  (Traffic  Speed  Condition  Survey)  measures
longitudinal profile variance, texture, transverse profile, cracking and fretting of
the  road  surface.  In  deciding  whether further  maintenance investigations  are
required  it  is  the  rutting,  fretting,  cracking  and  texture  data  that  is  of  most
interest.

The  results  of  the  rutting  data  values  returned from  the  TRACS  analysis  are
within  prescribed tolerances. None  of  the  locations examined required further
investigation.

1

 Update to the Regulation 28 response from Highways England concerning the death
of Aditya PURI.

C)  Detailed investigations will be undertaken on the fatal accidents

occurring on the A50 between junction 3 and junction 4 to understand
the wider context of the accidents occurring, gathering information
pertaining to the highway and its environs.

Five Fatal Accident Reports have been completed by Highways England for
the incidents listed below: -

23-2-2017 A50 Eastbound protected layby east of Junction 4, Findern, Derby

10-7-2017 A50 Eastbound Marker Post B80.8 Chellaston, Derby

9-1-2018 A50 Eastbound protected layby east of Junction 4, Findern, Derby

9-4-2018 A50 Eastbound, 500m east of Junction 4 entry slip road, Derby

29-5-2018 A50 Westbound east of protected layby west of Junction 3
Chellaston.

The investigations concluded that there were no highway defects or
conditions that contributed to the cause of the collision.

D)  Accident analysis will be undertaken to combine data sources of speed
and flow and detailed accident investigation with examination of the
Police reports.

The initial road accident investigation undertaken by Highways England
examined the road accident history on the A50 between junctions 3 and 4 of
the A50 using the last three years of available data from the Stats 19 police
information. For context, the road accident history was examined on the wider
A50 network, to provide a comparison baseline for this section. These
investigations established the following:-

(cid:127) 

(cid:127) 

In the last 3 years there is a higher than national average of accidents
occurring on a wet road surface.
In the last 3 years there is a higher than national average of accidents
occurring during the hours of darkness.

(cid:127)  Accident rates and accident types occurring on the A50 between

junction 3 and junction 4 are not indicative of a wider problem along the
length within other lit or unlit sections.

(cid:127)  Examination of historical accident data between 2010 and 2014 for the
A50 between junction 3 and junction 4 shows accident rates on wet
road and during the hours of darkness to be in line with national
averages.  The higher than national average levels have occurred
more recently on this section of the A50 and are not indicative of a
long-term trend.

(cid:127)  Close following and drivers failing to judge the path and speed of other

drivers was a common factor along the length.

2

 Update to the Regulation 28 response from Highways England concerning the death
of Aditya PURI.

(cid:127)  Contributory factors show that the highest proportion of accident

causations were behavioural, followed by environmental and vehicle
defects to a much lesser extent.

Further investigations into the issues established above resulted in the
following conclusions:-

Road Surface -  Visual inspections and specific testing has confirmed there is
no evidence to suggest that the road surface had deteriorated to a point that
may lead to an increase in loss of control accident or accidents on a wet road
surface.  The high percentage of behavioural contributory factors points to
drivers failing to adapt their style of driving to the prevailing road conditions.

Darkness accidents — The Design Manual for Roads and Bridges (DMRB)
Advice Note TA 49/07 Appraisal of  New and Replacement Lighting on the
Strategic Motorway and All-Purpose Trunk Road Network states;

New lighting schemes should not be introduced as a standalone
improvement to mitigate a high darkness accident rate unless a road
safety engineer has examined the types and circumstances of the
accidents occurring and concluded that street lighting would be the best
solution.

Commonly, the types of accidents that would be treated by the introduction
of street lighting would be;

(cid:127)  Loss of control accidents due to the bendiness of the road which .
leads to a loss of definition and forward visibility of the direction of
the carriageway.

(cid:127)  Loss of control type accidents due to the vertical alignment of the
road; sharp crests and dips which lead to a loss of definition and
forward visibility of the direction of the carriageway.

(cid:127)  Accidents occurring to vulnerable road users where those road
users would be expected to use/cross the carriageways and
adjacent footways such as in urban/built up areas.  High quality,
high speed all-purpose trunk roads without footways and
motorways would not usually be retrospectively lit for this purpose
other than at known conflict points such as junctions or areas where
lane change manoeuvres are required.

The next step would be to increase the definition of the carriageway using
lining/reflective road studs and/or any other engineering measures specific
to the location.  Only once all other engineering measures had been
introduced or discounted would new street lighting be considered.

Visual inspections undertaken by the road safety team during the hours of
darkness concluded that the forward visibility and definition of the carriageway
at night was adequate for drivers to understand the gentle sweeping curves
and undulations of the route.  The lining and reflective road studs were all in
good condition.

3

 Update to the Regulation 28 response from Highways England concerning the death
of Aditya PURI.

The types of accidents occurring during the hours of darkness did not fall into
the above three categories.  Two of the fatal accidents involved pedestrians,
however the A50 has no pedestrian facilities and drivers should not be
expecting to see pedestrians in the carriageway.  It was only due to other
incidents or driver behaviours that the pedestrians were in the carriageway
and therefore the introduction of street lighting would not be appropriate to
address these incidents.

Three of the fatal accidents involved drivers losing control of their vehicles,
however it is either not known why the drivers lost control or some form of
driver impairment/behaviour was identified in Coroners proceedings.

Close following

Close following and drivers failing to judge the path and speed of other drivers
was a common factor along the length.

Conclusion

The high percentage of behavioural contributory factors points to drivers
failing to adapt their style of driving to the prevailing road conditions and not to
any deficiency in the highway environment.

The accident patterns examined on the A50 do not identify any highway
improvements that could be introduced to prevent future deaths.

The need for street lighting on this section of the A50 has been examined.
The types of accidents identified would not conclusively be prevented by the
introduction of street lighting.

4

 REGULATION 28  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

THIS  RESPONSE IS  BEING SENT TO:

1.  The Assistant Coroner for Derby & Derbyshire, Rachel Syed  of St
Katherine’s House, St Mary’s Wharf, Mansfield Road,  Derby, DEi
3TQ in response to a ‘Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths’ following
an inquest hearing into the death of  Aditya PURI that concluded on 09 August
2018.

1

HIGHWAYS ENGLAND

I am 
on  behalf of 
of  Bridge House, 1 Walnut Tree Close, Guildford, SURREY, GUi 4LZ.

 Regional Director Operations Midlands responding
, Chief  Executive of  Highways England Company Limited

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CORONER’S MATTERS OF CONCERN

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:-

(a)  The  A50  in  question  (between Junction  3  and  4,  Eastbound and  Westbound)
does  not  have street lighting. Street lighting in  this area  would  be  beneficial  to
prevent future deaths occurring.

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4

DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN

We have undertaken an  initial investigation of  the A50 Derby Southern Bypass Junction
3  (Chellaston  Roundabout)  to  Junction  4  (Toyota  Roundabout)  Eastbound  and
Westbound  to  review  the  available collision  data  and  produce the  strategy for detailed
analysis as described in Section 4 below. This was completed on 26 September 2018.

DETAILS OF FURTHER ACTION PROPOSED

The tasks of  detailed data collection, analysis and investigation, as outlined at (a) to (d)
below, are to run concurrently. It is anticipated this work will take a period of  up to six
months to complete. The work commenced on 01 October 2018 as planned.

(a)  Traffic data speeds and flows of  the A50 between Junction 3 and Junction 4 will

be collected and compared to the national averages;

(b)  Road surface condition information will be collated and examined;

(c)  Detailed investigations will be undertaken on the fatal accidents occurring on

the A50 between Junction 3 and Junction 4 to understand the wider context of
the accidents occurring, gathering information pertaining to the highway and its
environs; and

(d)  Accident analysis will be undertaken to combine data sources of  speed and flow,
and detailed accident investigation with examination of  the police reports.

The outcome of  the investigations and analysis identified at (a) to (d) above, may require
a feasibility study to establish if  there are options for changes to the assets (such as
lighting) on the A50 Junction 3 to Junction 4 to improve safety. If  so, the feasibility
study will commence at the beginning of  April 2019.

Implementation of  the above strategy, and  the outcome of  a feasibility study (if
required), will be dependent upon funding being made available for improvement
projects using Highways England’s value management process.

I

 5

TIMETABLE FOR ACTION

Date 

Action

26 Sept 2018 

Conduct initial investigation and produce the strategy for detailed
analysis
Collect traffic data on speeds and flows.

01 October 2018 
-  31 March 2019  Collate and examine road surface condition information.

Detailed investigations on relevant fatal road traffic collisions.
Accident analysis to be undertaken with examination of  the police
reports.
Feasibility study to commence (if  required).

April 2019 

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SAFETY OF ROAD USERS

Safety is the number one priority for Highways England Company Limited. Our
company vision for safety is that “no one should be harmed when travelling or working
on the strategic road network”. Any improvements we make must be done in a
considered and controlled fashion so that the consequences of  any improvements are
fully understood, and any safety risks linked to the proposed changes are eliminated or
reduced as far as possible. The actions proposed and  underway are drawn up with this
foremost in mind as we try to help to prevent future deaths at this location.

Highways England commit to providing the Assistant Coroner with an update on the
actions proposed at Section 4 above at the end of  the six-month period to provide a fuller
response to the matters giving rise to concern.

7

03 October 2018  Signed:

Midlands on behalf of 

 Regional Director Operations

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