Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2018

Thomas McAuley

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2018-0309, written 29 Oct 2018. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report29 Oct 2018
Reference2018-0309
DeceasedThomas McAuley
CoronerAndrew Harris
Coroner areaLondon Inner (South)
CategoryState Custody related deaths
Organisation namedOxleas NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

London Inner South Coroner Service
1 Tennis Street, SE1 1YD

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:

1. Commissioner Cressida Dick CBE, QPM Metropolitan Police Service,
Broadway, London SW11 OBG

2. es :...: Thameside Prison, Serco Ltd, Griffin Manor
Way, London SE28 OFJ

3. Mr Ben Travis, Chief Executive, Oxleas NHS Trust, Pinewood House,
Pinewood Place, Dartford, Kent DA2 7WG

CORONER

Tam Andrew Harris, Senior Coroner, London Inner South jurisdiction

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act
2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations
2013.

INQUEST

On 29" August 2017, I opened an investigation and on 8" September 2017 an
inquest into the death of Mr Thomas Patrick McAuley (02314-17 PF), who was
found dead in his prison cell on 23 August 2017

The medical cause of death given at autopsy was

la Bronchopneumonia

Il Chronic Bronchitis. Alcohol and Drug Dependence

The inquest concluded on 18" September 2018, before a jury, who delivered a
narrative conclusion, by answering a questionnaire. The conclusion as to the death
was natural causes, contributed to by two failures:

1. There was a failure not to have ensured that the clinical information on the
police custody medical form was available to all clinical staff in the prison, which
probably contributed to his death.

2. There was a failure not to have conducted clinical observations in the first five
days of Methadone treatment, which probably contributed to the death.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

The deceased was in police custody from 5“ to 7" The narrative demonstrated that
death was probably preventable (“pneumonia can generally be treated
successfully”) and the jury highlighted that:

1. “Dr L said that had he known about the report of current pneumonia in the
police station, he would have taken a history and made more enquities. He might
examine the chest.... or repeat a chest X-Ray.” (There was evidence that there was a
past history of pneumonia and from police that he was seeking medication,
possibly for pneumonia, but no diagnosis had been made).

2. “Nurses and doctors all agree that [the Detained Persons Medical Form DPMF]
would have been useful to them. It was not available to health care staff on the
wings unless its contents had been transcribed onto System One Records.”

3. “This is significant because there were multiple missed opportunities for
detection, monitoring and treatment”

CORONER’S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise to
concerns that in my opinion means that there are still risks that future deaths will
occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report
to a number of organizations, both locally and nationally.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. -

1. The reception nurse said that she would have had access to DPMFs but does
not always have time to look at these. The DPMF was not available in the wings.
2. A manager of the drug addiction services in the prison said that health care staff
were not always given the DPMF,

3, An Oxleas manager said that the case history notes from the prison were
uploaded onto PNomis, but a prison doctor did not think he had access to this.
4. A representative of Oxleas HC reported that a new process required a nurse to
tick a box when the DPMF was uploaded onto the medical records, but there was
no evidence that the DPMF is universally available to health care staff.

5. There was no evidence that police doctors communicated directly with health
care staff in prison, or arranged for transfer of medical information between
doctors. (The police doctors were not called).

6. In conclusion, there is no assurance that doctors attending in custody, the
prison service and those providing health care in prisons have established a fail-

safe mechanism of ensuring that medical assessments on vulnerable individuals
and records from custody are seen and considered by medical staff in prison.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe that
the organizations to whom this report is sent have the power to take such action.
and would wish to be sighted of the details of this potentially avoidable death.

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this
report, namely by Monday 24 December 2018. I, the coroner, may extend the
period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken,
setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is
proposed. If you require any further information or assistance about the case,

_ contact the coroner’s officer,

COPIES and PUBLICATION
T have sent a copy of my report to:

Mr Michael Spurr, Director of Prisons, The Ministry of Justice
The Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine
The Department of Health

who may find it useful or of interest.

Lam also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or
summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes
may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the
coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your
response by the Chief Coroner.

[DATE] [SIGHED BY CO R]
RY to. 08 jo

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Metropolitan Police (PDF)
DIRECTORATE OF PROFESSIONALISM

Mr Andrew Harris Richard Martin
Senior Coroner Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Southwark Coroner's Court 6" Floor
Tennis Street New Scotland Yard
London SE1 1YD Victoria Embankment
London
Coroner’s Clerk: SW1A 2JL

Ema:

To!

Your ref: 2341-2017
Our ref: [X/1676/18

Date: 24th December 2018

Dear Mr. Harris

Re: Inquest Touching the Death of Thomas Patrick McAuley
Response to Prevention of Future Deaths Report

| am the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Professionalism in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).
| write in response to your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 31st October 2018.
Your report was initially sent to Commissioner Cressida Dick following the conclusion of the inquest
into the death of Mr Thomas Patrick McAuley.

| note that the medical cause of Mr Thomas Patrick McAuley's death was recorded as:

1a) Bronchopneumonia;

1b) Chronic Bronchitis. Alcoho! and Drug Dependence;

In your report, you raised the following six matters of concern:

1.

The reception nurse said that she would have had access to DPMFs (Detained Persons Medical
Form) but does not always have time to look at these. The DPMF was not available in the wings.

. A manager of the drug addiction services in the prison said that health care staff were not

always given the DPMF.

. An Oxleas manager said that the case history notes from the prison were uploaded onto

PNomis, but a prison doctor did not think that he had access te this.

. Arepresentative of Oxleas HC reported that a new process required a nurse to tick a box when

the DPMF was uploaded onto the medical records, but there was no evidence that the DPMF
is universally available to health care staff.

There was no evidence that police doctors communicated directly with health care staff in
prison, or arranged for transfer of medical information between doctors. (The police doctors
were not called).

6. In conclusion, there is no assurance that doctors attending in custody, the prison service and
those providing health care in prisons have established a fail-safe mechanism of ensuring that
medical assessments on vulnerable individuals and records from custody are seen and
considered by medical staff in prison.

In drafting our response, we have consulted with the relevant subject matter experts namely
es Medical Director, the College of Policing, HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS)

and National Offender Management Service (NOMS).

When considering this response, it should be remembered that the MPS was not afforded the benefit

of being involved in the inquest touching the death of Mr McAuley and was not invited to be an

interested person to the proceedings. We have therefore lacked the disclosure that other interested

persons will have had, as well as the benefit of hearing the oral evidence.

Response to Matters of Concern:

Matters 1-4 relate to actions of the prison service and are beyond the responsibility of the MPS to
influence. Matters 5-6 raise issues relating specifically to police handover of detainees and sharing of
medical information; we have responded to these below:

5. There was no evidence that police doctors communicated directly with health care staff
in prison, or arranged for transfer of medical information between doctors. (The police
doctors were not called).

‘erbal communication between heaith professionals within the
IPS and those we courts or prison service. The MPS Custody Policy provides”
instructions regard tained at police stations. This policy supports, and should be
read in conjunction with legislation and the College of Policing’s Authorised Professional
Practice (APP). It should be noted that the MPS Custody Policy will continue to reflect APP
however, for officers and staff, the Custody Policy is the primary source of instruction and
should be referred to in the first instance.

Prisoner Escort and Custody Services (PECS) are part of the National Offender Management
Service (NOMS) and are responsible for managing contracts for escorting detainees. The
contract for transferring detainees from MPS custody suites to court is provided by SERCO,
who accept responsibility for the detainee upon leaving custody.

Prior to departure, custody staff complete a Person Escort Record (PER) and give the form to
SERCO officers. If the detainee has been assessed by a Health Care Professional (HCP) in
custody, the HCP will complete a Detained Person’s Medical Form (DPMF). The purpose of the
DPMF is to highlight areas of medical concern to custody staff, and to provide, where
necessary, a chronological medical report relating to a detainee’s period of detention. The
information contained in the DPMF together with a risk assessment contribute to the safe and
effective detention of the detainee. The MPS Custody Policy states that the DPMF (where
applicable) is to be included in the documentation attached to the PER and should be referred
to in the ‘escort handover’ page. The MPS also provide a print of all risk assessments, property
sheets, PNC warning signals, ‘exceptional risk’ forms (where applicable) and Juvenile
Detention Certificates (where appropriate) with the PER.

The transfer of medical information to SERCO is further supported by a verbal briefing by MPS
custody Staff at the time of transfer. The handover procedure identifies any heightened risk or
increased vulnerability, both verbally and in writing. All relevant risks pertaining to the detainee
are to be further considered, upon arrival at court or prison, by their HCPs or doctors as part of
their medical and risk assessment procedure.

6. In conclusion, there is no assurance that doctors attending in custody, the prison
service and those providing health care in prisons have established a fail-safe
mechanism of ensuring that medical assessments on vulnerable individuals and records
from custody are seen and considered by medical staff in prison.

There is currently work in progress to change the PER to mitigate such risks when transferring _

a delaines between pariner agenclés. HMPPS are leading o on this project, which includes
attaching additional documentation and notes to highlight the increased risks to partner
agencies. The new PER will contain additional health and social care information, which will
mitigate the identified risks when vulnerable people are being transferred between the police

escort contractors and HMPPS custody. It is anticipated that this project will be completed and
delivered by April 2019.

record system (EMRS) for several years. The EMRS is ; expected to a to allow a better facilitation of
healthcare information on an électronic platform. Information will be shared across police,
prison and potentially court services and may include mental health, physical health and
medication information, where appropriate agreements are in place. The first stage of
implementing the communication network (N3) and the hardware into all MPS custody suites
has been completed. The N3 connection provides healthcare professionals in MPS S custody
suites, with access to NHS Summary Care Records and is required for an EMRS. The full
implementation’ has been inadvertently delayed due to factors beyond the control of the MPS,
however it is now likely that delivery could be achieved withi

record stem (EMR working in partnership with the NHS to introduce an electronic medical

There is also further work being undertaken by NHS England and HMPPS to develop an
electronic. version of the PER. (ePER) wi i
ePER is being used in five prisons and is bein | piloted b 6Y PoliGes The |

that, by the time the new PECS contract is operational iI (late 2020) the product will be fully digital.
In the interim period, whilst these innovations are taking place, the MPS will continue to ensure

that any relevant medical information available on NSPIS is also recorded in the PER.

Conclusion:

The MPS will continue to attach all relevant medical information to the PER when detainees leave our
custody suites to highlight any increased health risks. We are committed to continual training and
partnership working and in the short-term it is anticipated by April 2019 the new PER will be introduced,
‘ which will seek to address limitations on the current PER. The MPS has also supported the
dissemination of the learning opportunities presented by your report through engagement with NOMS,
NHS England and HMPPS leads in the preparation of this response and as a result, we have been
invited to evaluate and comment on the new ePER. The MPS will be introducing the EMRS platform,
hopefully within one year, which will enable the medical assessments and treatments of vulnerable
individuals to be considered by medical staff in prison.

Yours sincere, “a

Richard Martin
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Professionalism

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