Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2018
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2018-0309, written 29 Oct 2018. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 29 Oct 2018 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2018-0309 |
| Deceased | Thomas McAuley |
| Coroner | Andrew Harris |
| Coroner area | London Inner (South) |
| Category | State Custody related deaths |
| Organisation named | Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
London Inner South Coroner Service 1 Tennis Street, SE1 1YD REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1. Commissioner Cressida Dick CBE, QPM Metropolitan Police Service, Broadway, London SW11 OBG 2. es :...: Thameside Prison, Serco Ltd, Griffin Manor Way, London SE28 OFJ 3. Mr Ben Travis, Chief Executive, Oxleas NHS Trust, Pinewood House, Pinewood Place, Dartford, Kent DA2 7WG CORONER Tam Andrew Harris, Senior Coroner, London Inner South jurisdiction CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. INQUEST On 29" August 2017, I opened an investigation and on 8" September 2017 an inquest into the death of Mr Thomas Patrick McAuley (02314-17 PF), who was found dead in his prison cell on 23 August 2017 The medical cause of death given at autopsy was la Bronchopneumonia Il Chronic Bronchitis. Alcohol and Drug Dependence The inquest concluded on 18" September 2018, before a jury, who delivered a narrative conclusion, by answering a questionnaire. The conclusion as to the death was natural causes, contributed to by two failures: 1. There was a failure not to have ensured that the clinical information on the police custody medical form was available to all clinical staff in the prison, which probably contributed to his death. 2. There was a failure not to have conducted clinical observations in the first five days of Methadone treatment, which probably contributed to the death. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH The deceased was in police custody from 5“ to 7" The narrative demonstrated that death was probably preventable (“pneumonia can generally be treated successfully”) and the jury highlighted that: 1. “Dr L said that had he known about the report of current pneumonia in the police station, he would have taken a history and made more enquities. He might examine the chest.... or repeat a chest X-Ray.” (There was evidence that there was a past history of pneumonia and from police that he was seeking medication, possibly for pneumonia, but no diagnosis had been made). 2. “Nurses and doctors all agree that [the Detained Persons Medical Form DPMF] would have been useful to them. It was not available to health care staff on the wings unless its contents had been transcribed onto System One Records.” 3. “This is significant because there were multiple missed opportunities for detection, monitoring and treatment” CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concerns that in my opinion means that there are still risks that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to a number of organizations, both locally and nationally. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. - 1. The reception nurse said that she would have had access to DPMFs but does not always have time to look at these. The DPMF was not available in the wings. 2. A manager of the drug addiction services in the prison said that health care staff were not always given the DPMF, 3, An Oxleas manager said that the case history notes from the prison were uploaded onto PNomis, but a prison doctor did not think he had access to this. 4. A representative of Oxleas HC reported that a new process required a nurse to tick a box when the DPMF was uploaded onto the medical records, but there was no evidence that the DPMF is universally available to health care staff. 5. There was no evidence that police doctors communicated directly with health care staff in prison, or arranged for transfer of medical information between doctors. (The police doctors were not called). 6. In conclusion, there is no assurance that doctors attending in custody, the prison service and those providing health care in prisons have established a fail- safe mechanism of ensuring that medical assessments on vulnerable individuals and records from custody are seen and considered by medical staff in prison. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe that the organizations to whom this report is sent have the power to take such action. and would wish to be sighted of the details of this potentially avoidable death. YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by Monday 24 December 2018. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. If you require any further information or assistance about the case, _ contact the coroner’s officer, COPIES and PUBLICATION T have sent a copy of my report to: Mr Michael Spurr, Director of Prisons, The Ministry of Justice The Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine The Department of Health who may find it useful or of interest. Lam also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. [DATE] [SIGHED BY CO R] RY to. 08 jo
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
DIRECTORATE OF PROFESSIONALISM Mr Andrew Harris Richard Martin Senior Coroner Deputy Assistant Commissioner Southwark Coroner's Court 6" Floor Tennis Street New Scotland Yard London SE1 1YD Victoria Embankment London Coroner’s Clerk: SW1A 2JL Ema: To! Your ref: 2341-2017 Our ref: [X/1676/18 Date: 24th December 2018 Dear Mr. Harris Re: Inquest Touching the Death of Thomas Patrick McAuley Response to Prevention of Future Deaths Report | am the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Professionalism in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). | write in response to your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 31st October 2018. Your report was initially sent to Commissioner Cressida Dick following the conclusion of the inquest into the death of Mr Thomas Patrick McAuley. | note that the medical cause of Mr Thomas Patrick McAuley's death was recorded as: 1a) Bronchopneumonia; 1b) Chronic Bronchitis. Alcoho! and Drug Dependence; In your report, you raised the following six matters of concern: 1. The reception nurse said that she would have had access to DPMFs (Detained Persons Medical Form) but does not always have time to look at these. The DPMF was not available in the wings. . A manager of the drug addiction services in the prison said that health care staff were not always given the DPMF. . An Oxleas manager said that the case history notes from the prison were uploaded onto PNomis, but a prison doctor did not think that he had access te this. . Arepresentative of Oxleas HC reported that a new process required a nurse to tick a box when the DPMF was uploaded onto the medical records, but there was no evidence that the DPMF is universally available to health care staff. There was no evidence that police doctors communicated directly with health care staff in prison, or arranged for transfer of medical information between doctors. (The police doctors were not called). 6. In conclusion, there is no assurance that doctors attending in custody, the prison service and those providing health care in prisons have established a fail-safe mechanism of ensuring that medical assessments on vulnerable individuals and records from custody are seen and considered by medical staff in prison. In drafting our response, we have consulted with the relevant subject matter experts namely es Medical Director, the College of Policing, HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) and National Offender Management Service (NOMS). When considering this response, it should be remembered that the MPS was not afforded the benefit of being involved in the inquest touching the death of Mr McAuley and was not invited to be an interested person to the proceedings. We have therefore lacked the disclosure that other interested persons will have had, as well as the benefit of hearing the oral evidence. Response to Matters of Concern: Matters 1-4 relate to actions of the prison service and are beyond the responsibility of the MPS to influence. Matters 5-6 raise issues relating specifically to police handover of detainees and sharing of medical information; we have responded to these below: 5. There was no evidence that police doctors communicated directly with health care staff in prison, or arranged for transfer of medical information between doctors. (The police doctors were not called). ‘erbal communication between heaith professionals within the IPS and those we courts or prison service. The MPS Custody Policy provides” instructions regard tained at police stations. This policy supports, and should be read in conjunction with legislation and the College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice (APP). It should be noted that the MPS Custody Policy will continue to reflect APP however, for officers and staff, the Custody Policy is the primary source of instruction and should be referred to in the first instance. Prisoner Escort and Custody Services (PECS) are part of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and are responsible for managing contracts for escorting detainees. The contract for transferring detainees from MPS custody suites to court is provided by SERCO, who accept responsibility for the detainee upon leaving custody. Prior to departure, custody staff complete a Person Escort Record (PER) and give the form to SERCO officers. If the detainee has been assessed by a Health Care Professional (HCP) in custody, the HCP will complete a Detained Person’s Medical Form (DPMF). The purpose of the DPMF is to highlight areas of medical concern to custody staff, and to provide, where necessary, a chronological medical report relating to a detainee’s period of detention. The information contained in the DPMF together with a risk assessment contribute to the safe and effective detention of the detainee. The MPS Custody Policy states that the DPMF (where applicable) is to be included in the documentation attached to the PER and should be referred to in the ‘escort handover’ page. The MPS also provide a print of all risk assessments, property sheets, PNC warning signals, ‘exceptional risk’ forms (where applicable) and Juvenile Detention Certificates (where appropriate) with the PER. The transfer of medical information to SERCO is further supported by a verbal briefing by MPS custody Staff at the time of transfer. The handover procedure identifies any heightened risk or increased vulnerability, both verbally and in writing. All relevant risks pertaining to the detainee are to be further considered, upon arrival at court or prison, by their HCPs or doctors as part of their medical and risk assessment procedure. 6. In conclusion, there is no assurance that doctors attending in custody, the prison service and those providing health care in prisons have established a fail-safe mechanism of ensuring that medical assessments on vulnerable individuals and records from custody are seen and considered by medical staff in prison. There is currently work in progress to change the PER to mitigate such risks when transferring _ a delaines between pariner agenclés. HMPPS are leading o on this project, which includes attaching additional documentation and notes to highlight the increased risks to partner agencies. The new PER will contain additional health and social care information, which will mitigate the identified risks when vulnerable people are being transferred between the police escort contractors and HMPPS custody. It is anticipated that this project will be completed and delivered by April 2019. record system (EMRS) for several years. The EMRS is ; expected to a to allow a better facilitation of healthcare information on an électronic platform. Information will be shared across police, prison and potentially court services and may include mental health, physical health and medication information, where appropriate agreements are in place. The first stage of implementing the communication network (N3) and the hardware into all MPS custody suites has been completed. The N3 connection provides healthcare professionals in MPS S custody suites, with access to NHS Summary Care Records and is required for an EMRS. The full implementation’ has been inadvertently delayed due to factors beyond the control of the MPS, however it is now likely that delivery could be achieved withi record stem (EMR working in partnership with the NHS to introduce an electronic medical There is also further work being undertaken by NHS England and HMPPS to develop an electronic. version of the PER. (ePER) wi i ePER is being used in five prisons and is bein | piloted b 6Y PoliGes The | that, by the time the new PECS contract is operational iI (late 2020) the product will be fully digital. In the interim period, whilst these innovations are taking place, the MPS will continue to ensure that any relevant medical information available on NSPIS is also recorded in the PER. Conclusion: The MPS will continue to attach all relevant medical information to the PER when detainees leave our custody suites to highlight any increased health risks. We are committed to continual training and partnership working and in the short-term it is anticipated by April 2019 the new PER will be introduced, ‘ which will seek to address limitations on the current PER. The MPS has also supported the dissemination of the learning opportunities presented by your report through engagement with NOMS, NHS England and HMPPS leads in the preparation of this response and as a result, we have been invited to evaluate and comment on the new ePER. The MPS will be introducing the EMRS platform, hopefully within one year, which will enable the medical assessments and treatments of vulnerable individuals to be considered by medical staff in prison. Yours sincere, “a Richard Martin Deputy Assistant Commissioner Professionalism
See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust, and how often a new one appears.
What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text
Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.
These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.