Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2019

Graham Jones

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2019-0131A, written 18 Apr 2019. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report18 Apr 2019
Reference2019-0131A
DeceasedGraham Jones
CoronerKaty Skerrett
Coroner areaGloucestershire
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Organisation namedGloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

H M Senior Coroner for Gloucestershire
Ms Katy Skerrett

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
Chief Executive, Ms D Lee, Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust,
Gloucestershire Royal Hospital, Great Western Road, Gloucester, GL1 3NN

——}—

CORONER

| am Katy Skerrett, Senior Coroner for Gloucestershire.

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

| make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On the 17" April 2018 | commenced an investigation into the death of Graham Philip Jones. The
investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on the 5th April 2019. The conclusion of the
inquest was a hybrid conclusion of accidental death and a narrative conclusion. The medical
cause of death was 1A subdural haematoma, 2 repaired perforated duodenal ulcer.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

Mr Jones was a 63 year old man with a significant medical history that included end stage renal
failure, he had been receiving dialysis since January 2016, hypertension, stroke and prostatic
cancer. On the 5” March 2018 he was admitted to hospital suffering with vomiting and
abdominal pain. Later that day he underwent a laparotomy and repair of a perforated duodenal
ulcer. Post operatively he was transferred to the high dependency unit within the department of
critical care for monitoring. Whilst there he experienced two unwitnessed falls on the 14'" and
15" March 2018. The staff caring for him were aware that he was at risk of falling. They had put
in place steps to reduce that risk, and after the first fall they instigated further preventative
measures. A thorough handover of his care provision was done when he was transferred to the
renal ward on the 16" March 2018. These first two falls were on balance unavoidable. During the
second fall he sustained a large swelling to his right elbow, and on the 25" March 2018 he
underwent a right elbow haematoma evacuation. On the 21" March he was transferred to the
surgical ward. On the latter ward he suffered three further falls on the en, 7 and 12" April. The
falls all occurred overnight. Mr Jones was not being nursed in a floor level bed. Following his fifth
fall on the 12" April Mr Jones’ neurological observations were not done in accordance with the
falls protocol, and consideration was not given as to whether his anticoagulation medication
should be stopped. As a result of this latter fall, Mr Jones suffered a significant head injury.
There was a delay in the diagnosis of this injury. A CT head scan had been requested. However
it did not occur. Approximately 19 hours after the last fall Mr Jones’ conscious levels deteriorated
acutely. He was then sent for urgent CT imaging at approximately 01.00 hours on the 13” April.
This revealed a large right sided extra axial bleed, which was thought likely to be subdural, with a
significant mid line shift. After discussion between clinicians and family members it was decided
that referral for neurosurgical treatment would not be appropriate. It is probable that this clinical
decision would have been the same even if his head injury had been diagnosed earlier. Mr
Jones’ condition steadily deteriorated. He passed away at 17.30 hours on the 13" April 2018.

Gloucestershire Coroner's Court, Corinium Avenue, Barnwood, Gloucester, GL4 3D)
Tel 01452 305661 | coroner@gloucestershire.gov.uk

CORONER’S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my
opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it
is my statutory duty to report to you.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. —

1. Whether sufficient consideration is given to falls prevention measures on the surgical
ward,

2. Whether there is sufficient understanding of the post falls protocol that must be followed
on the surgical ward,

3. Whether there is sufficient understanding that a medical review of a patient post fall must
include review of their current medications,

4. When a patient is transferred between wards, whether there is sufficient handover of
safety information pertaining to a patient.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and | believe you have the power
to take such action.

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by
4pm 13" June 2019. |, the Coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details
of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must
explain why no action is proposed.

COPIES and PUBLICATION

| hay f my 5 h ief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons

{ am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He
may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest.
You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the
release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.

Dated 18” Apri 2019
Signature.

Ms K Skerrett
Senior Coroner for Gloucestershire

Gloucestershire Coroner's Court, Corinium Avenue, Barnwood, Gloucester, GL4 3DJ
Tel 01452 305661 | coroner@gloucestershire.gov.uk

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Trust (PDF)
At the end of the inquest into the death of Mr Jones, the coroner indicated that she was considering issuing a PFDR 
to reflect her remaining concerns on a number of issues arising from the evidence given. At that the time the Trust 
was offered 5 days to respond with any additional information which might assist with this decision. 

As a result the Trust has reviewed the Coroner's areas of concern and responds as below. 

I would be grateful if you would place this email in front of the Coroner. 

1&2 Whether sufficient consideration is given to falls prevention measures on surgical wards and sufficient 

understanding of the post falls protocol .  

All Trust nursing staff are trained locally in their ward areas on the use of Trust policy and documentation 
connected with falls assessment, preventative measures and the protocol for managing a patient following a 
fall. These are regularly refreshed by mandatory training and other educational opportunities. 

Evidence was heard from 
ll at the inquest about specific measures being taken to improve staff 
awareness and appreciation of falls prevention and management on Ward 5b. One main measures is the 
Silver QI project being undertaken by 
reliably acquiring knowledge of individual patient risks, and also ensuring more consistent use of 
preventative measures eg magnet signage above patients beds (see attached Driver diagram and GSAIA 
Quality Improvement summary which details the issues to be addressed). The aim of the project is to 
increase completion of the First Hour Priority Form (renamed Safety Hour Checklist) by 70% by May 2019. 
This form will record (amongst other factors) the handover of any falls risks for the patient being 
transferred. The intention of this form is that it will transfer with the patient if they are moved to another 
clinical area, thus providing a falls history in one document. 

, part of which is directed at reducing the risk of falls by more 

The most recent audit of Ward falls documentation shows that for the 10 patient falls care plans audited 

there was a 90-100% compliance with the documentation, which is an improvement (see attached audit) 

Patient falls are routinely investigated and learning from those falls is disseminated to staff in all clinical 
areas through the use of Safety Briefings (see attached Safety briefings — patient falls for March and October 
2018) 

3.  Whether there is sufficient understanding of post falls management including consideration of 

anticoagulants (this refers to the fact that anticoagulants were not stopped at the time of medical review of 
5th  fall)  

After the inquest the Trust has reviewed the medical contribution to post falls management and , in 
particular, the inpatient post falls assessment sticker. Although this sticker is an effective tool for 
standardising medical post falls care and assessment, the Trust's conclusion is that this could be improved. 
Analysis of Mr Jones' drug chart shows that he was prescribed a daily dose of anticoagulant in the form of a 
prophylactic dose of Dalteparin. Despite this, on the post falls assessment stickers the reviewing doctor has 
answered 'No' to the question 'is the patient on anticoagulation'. The Trust proposes to undertake some 
work to address the fact that low dose prophylactic anticoagulants in the form that Mr Jones received must 
be included in this medical assessment, and instructions given to nursing staff as to whether this medication 
should be continued or stopped. This likely to include redrafting part of the post falls sticker to this effect, 
and providing accompanying training to doctors about this change, and the reason for it. 

4.  Whether when the patient is transferred between wards there is handover of all safety information for the 

patient 

2 

 Following the inquest, this concern was put to Matron 
reviewed the evidence/supporting information provided to the inquest with Sr
Matron for Surgery. In the context of the prevention of harm to future patients, she confirms the following 

 Divisional Chief Nurse for Surgery who 

 and 

, 

•  The safety' huddles' are now embedded across surgery to ensure effective communication and that on the 
5th  floor wards these now take place regularly at 10am and 3pm (see Daily Safety Briefing form attached). 

•  The Trust nurse handover documentation is currently subject to a Quality Academy Silver project to be 

 (Ward 5a) and 

 (Ward 5b) have trialled a modification to 

presented in June. 
the usual handover process. The modification now enables all previous handover information from all 
clinical areas where the patient has been placed to be contained on one form, rather than on several forms 
from each of the previous clinical settings . the intention is that this will ensure that a receiving ward can see 
a complete history of concerns during that admission of concerns from all the previous clinical settings from 
which the patient has been transferred, thus giving a more complete picture. This was not available for Mr 
Jones. 
If this improvement work is successful the suggestion will be to modify the Trust handover allowing an audit 
trail of all risks identified throughout a patient's stay. So far they have achieved 90% completion, and a reduction in 
falls on 5b by 60% since the start of the trial. 

5. When a patient is sent to be scanned for CT there are sufficient checks made before scanning takes place, 

The identification of patients undergoing an investigation using Ionising radiation is covered by the Trust 

Procedure 

'EMPLOYER'S PROCEDURES FOR EXAMINING PATIENTS WITH IONISING RADIATION' and I have copied the 

relevant sections below: 

4. PROCEDURE FOR PATIENT IDENTIFICATION 
The operator initiating the radiation exposure is responsible for ensuring that the patient has been correctly 

identified, in accordance with this procedure. 

If the exposure is carried out by more than one operator, then at least one operator in the team must 
identify the patient in accordance with this procedure. The operator designated to identify the patient must identify 
the patient to the other operators making the exposures. 

4.1 Outpatients 

• Patients who present themselves at reception should be asked to provide their full name, address and 

date of birth by the receptionist. 

• Porters must notify reception when they bring a patient to a department. The person responsible for 

booking the patient in must ask the patient for their full name, address and date of birth. 

• The operator carrying out the exposure must ask the patient for their full name, address and date of birth. 
• Babies and small children must be identified by asking parent or carer to give the patients name, address 

and date of birth. 

• For patients with learning difficulties, the operator must ask the carer to give the patients name, address 

and date of birth. 

• For patients with communication difficulties (including non-English speakers) the operator may need to 
use the services of the Trust's interpreters/sign language interpreters if the patient cannot give his/or her 
own name, address and date-of birth. Relatives or carers may be able to assist with communication or 
provide identity on behalf of the patient. 

4.2 Inpatients 

• Where verbal identification is possible, this should be carried out as described above, but the wristband 

must also be checked. This includes checking name, date of birth and medical record number from the standard 
identity wristband. 

• For interventional radiology procedures it may be the responsibility of the nursing staff to identify the 
patient by asking the patient their full name, address and date of birth. The operator receiving the patient 

3 

 must then confirm the patient's identity verbally if possible, otherwise from the identity name band issued 
by the nursing staff. 
Unconscious or confused patients whose name is not known should be issued with an Emergency 
Department number and identity band prior to arrival in the department. If an identity band has not been 
issued the accompanying nurse must confirm the patient's identity including Emergency Department 
identity number to the operator and this information must be used to identify all information appertaining 
to the patient. 
• For patients in theatre, the operator must confirm the correct identity of the patient with the theatre 
nursing staff or the anaesthetist caring for the patient, the standard identity band and WHO surgical safety checklist 
should be used for this purpose. 

4.3 All Patients 
If the referral information does not tally with the patient identity information, then the operator identifying 
the patient must seek further confirmation before he or she proceeds. It may be helpful to enquire if the 
patient has recently changed address. It may be necessary to contact the referrer for further confirmation. If 
identity wrist band information appears to be incorrect or unclear the nursing staff caring for the patient 
must confirm the identity for the operator before the exposure can be carried out. In either of these cases a 
brief note of the action taken must be made in the comments 
Section on the CRIS system 

Evidence suggest that these checks, in addition to the additional questions relating to Clinical history, are 
proving effective in identifying patient referral errors. We know that for the period Oct 2018 to Mar 2019 
there was one wrong patient scanned, however there were an additional 5 incident reports where the 
Radiographer had identified a referral error and did not perform the investigation. 

I hope this information is of assistance. 

Yours sincererely 

Head of Legal Services 
Lead for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 

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