Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2019
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2019-0135, written 12 Apr 2019. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 12 Apr 2019 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2019-0135 |
| Deceased | Duncan Tomlin |
| Coroner | Elisabeth Bussey-Jones |
| Coroner area | West Sussex |
| Category | Alcohol, drug and medication related deaths · Police related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1. The Chief Constable Mr G York QPM Sussex Police 13 London Rd, Pulborough RH20 1AP 2. Chief Executive Officer Sir H Orde QPM Association of Chief of Police Officers (ACPO) 10 Victoria Street, London SW1H 0NN 3. Chief Executive Officer Mr M Cunningham QPM College of Policing Ltd Leamington Road Ryton-on-Dunsmore Coventry CV8 3EN 1 CORONER I am Elisabeth Bussey-Jones, Assistant Coroner, for the Coroner area of West Sussex. 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST The Inquest was initially opened on the 8th August 2014. I had conduct of the matter as Coroner from the 1st December 2015. The inquest was suspended due to other legal processes taking place. The Inquest resumed on the 11th March 2019, lasted 4 weeks and 2 days and concluded on the 9th April 2019. It was an Article 2 Inquest with a Jury. The Jury returned a narrative conclusion which found the death was contributed to by neglect. The medical cause of death was found to be: “Cardiorespiratory failure due to both restraint in a prone position and the effects of cocaine and mephedrone”. 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH The narrative conclusion of the Jury sets out the circumstances of the death as the Jury found them to be: “Duncan Tomlin died 29 July 2014 at Princess Royal Hospital, Haywards Heath due to cardiac arrest, following the use of a combination of drugs together with police prone restraint. On the evening of 26 July 2014, following the use of a combination of drugs mixed with alcohol, Duncan’s behaviour became irrational and erratic although at that point he remained coherent. The loud and aggressive nature of the disturbance at Ryecroft, Haywards Heath, led to a call from a neighbour to the police believing there was a domestic assault in progress. Upon the arrival of the police, Duncan ran away and was pursued into Wood Ride, where he was detained in the prone position, and captor spray was used. He continued to resist and struggle, and so the restraint escalated to the use of handcuffs and leg restraints. Additional officers arrived along with a police van. There was no clear continuity of the sharing of information relating to the risk assessment of Duncan’s care as different police officers exchanged positions within the restraint, and it was unclear who was in charge in this fast-moving situation. During this period of restraint, prior to and after the arrival of other officers Duncan was resisting and making loud, albeit incoherent noises and so the police drew the conclusion he could still breathe. Duncan was removed to the van, still in the prone position, including folding his legs back to allow the doors of the van to close. There was an insufficient sense of urgency to move Duncan onto his side to address the risks of positional asphyxia from prone restraint coupled with the use of handcuffs, limb restraints, the effects of Captor spray and the suspicion that Duncan had taken stimulant drugs. Duncan should have been moved onto his side earlier. Following a kick, Duncan continued to be restrained in the prone position in the van. A short period of time later, concerns were raised about Duncan’s condition. The handcuffs and leg restraints were not removed at this point. He became unresponsive and a call was made for an ambulance, but due to a shortage of available SECAMB resources, the nearest available help was too far away so the decision was made to take him straight to the hospital. Duncan had a pulse but his breathing was laboured. At the point when the officers could no longer find a pulse the decision was made to take Duncan out of the van to commence CPR. Officers were immediately despatched to collect a defibrillator from the police station and to fetch a doctor from PRH. A return of circulation was gained following approximately 30 mins of CPR, first by police officers until paramedics and a doctor arrived. Duncan was stabilised and was taken to hospital where he received intensive treatment but following multiple organ failure, he died at 03.59 on 29th July 2014. Although the police receive training in Positional Asphyxia and the available policies extensively cover it, the efficacy of this training is inadequate. The death was contributed to by neglect”. Although Duncan Tomlin’s history of seizures and epilepsy does not feature in the Jury’s conclusion, knowledge and understanding of epilepsy was examined in detail in the Inquest due to the fact that before police arrived at the scene a phone call had been made to Ambulance Services reporting that Duncan Tomlin had suffered a suspected seizure of a different kind to a grand mal seizure, and the fact that it was suspected a seizure had occurred was also told to the police officers who first arrived at the scene. 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows : Importance of heightened risk of prone restraint when multiple factors affecting breathing are present 1. The current and earlier training plans, manuals and policies examined as part of the evidence in this inquest make clear references to risks associated with: (a) positional asphyxia; (b) handcuffs and limb restraints; (c) incapacitant spray; (d) acute behavioural disorder or symptoms thereof; (e) lack of oxygen due to physical exertion; (f) drug/alcohol intoxication; and (g) seizures. Although there is some cross-referencing between the various risk factors, the heightened risk to a person in prone restraint when a number of these factors are present is not emphasised or sufficiently emphasised. The multifactorial matters that can impact on a person’s ability to breathe and the heightened risks to a person in a position of prone restraint when experiencing such multiple factors are critical to the assessment of risk. Timing of decisions and opportunity to assess 2. A further concern relates to how officers are trained to prioritise options available to them and the timing of decisions in circumstances similar to those in this inquest. It is appreciated that officers are not medically trained, they do not make clinical decisions and more detailed history will be taken formally in custody suites. However, officers do need to be in a position to have sufficient information to enable them to assess the safety of the restraint situation in which they are involved, and this includes sharing information and requesting information when participants in the restraint may not have been present from the outset. These points are particularly so when medical evidence suggests fatal consequences can arise in a matter of minutes and that by the time a detainee is unresponsive, action may be too late. In this inquest a priority of the officers, said to be in line with their training, was to remove the restrained person from the scene as soon as practicable. The officers also all gave evidence on the risks involved in turning the detainee on his side and the possible acts that a violent individual can take towards officers and themselves which raise other risks of harm. However my concern is that in future similar situations officers may prioritise the need to act speedily to remove a person from the scene, rather than, when a measure of control is obtained (such as by the use of handcuffs and limb restraints), taking an opportunity to take stock in order to assess the detainee they are dealing with and why they are struggling or resisting. Are they dealing with a person who is struggling because they are violent, or because they are confused, or psychotic, or in a post seizure state, or because they are in pain, uncomfortable or struggling to breathe? Once a measure of control is obtained, the speed of the incident is dictated by the actions the officers decide to make and balancing the risks of harm which, in the case of positional asphyxia, are fatal and therefore must be a priority. Monitoring 3. The training plans, manuals and policies considered in evidence in this inquest refer to monitoring in different ways, depending on the circumstance. Phrases such as close, constant, careful and regular monitoring are used. Guidance as to what constitutes monitoring does not appear to be included within the literature available to officers. A different type of monitoring may be required for, for example, a detainee who poses a suicide risk or who has a known medical condition, as compared to the type of monitoring required for a person restrained in the prone position, particularly when affected by other factors impacting on breathing. Listening to noises associated with breathing may be entirely insufficient, particularly when they can be hard to hear, misheard or misinterpreted. Commencing CPR 4. The evidence relating to current training and training at the time of the death concerned in this inquest indicates that CPR should commence when a person is not breathing normally (described as in 2-3 breaths in 10 seconds for an adult and 3-5 in 10 seconds for small children) or if breathing is distressed (snoring, rasping) known as agonal breathing. The evidence in the inquest was that individual officers of some experience understood CPR should commence when breathing had stopped. Whilst that may be a misunderstanding on the part of individual officers, owing to the importance of commencing CPR at the earliest opportunity when time is critically of the essence, the timing of when CPR should start should be a central point of when training CPR and when reacting to situations akin to that seen in this inquest. Understanding aspects of Epilepsy and Seizures 5. The training material which has been provided to me on behalf of Sussex Police covers many aspects of epilepsy and seizure that were explored during the inquest. The training material indicates that if it is available to the trainer, participants will be shown a video which informs the viewer of the way in which a person may present post seizure, namely confused, vulnerable, perceiving aggression from others and at risk of lashing out due to misunderstanding. I have also been provided with a copy of a training manual provided by Epilepsy Action which was sent to ACPO in 2011. Aspects of the evidence from the family in this inquest were entirely consistent with the less common presentations of a person in an atypical or post seizure state. Although epilepsy was not found to be causative in the death in this Inquest, in another situation with a similar set of circumstances, the reactions of a person suffering an atypical seizure or in a post seizure state, could be misconstrued as violence and resistance were officers not to appreciate that fact that their presentation may be part of a medical condition and restraint in such circumstances could have inherent and fatal risks. It is therefore of importance that training extends beyond the two more well known types of seizure and that post seizure behaviour is also understood in general terms. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you (and/or your organisation) have the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by June 08, 2019. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: The Family of Duncan Tomlin; ; Police Officers Watson, Bennett, Jewell, Jackson and Sergeant Glasspool; and The Sussex Police I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 Elisabeth BUSSEY-JONES Assistant Coroner for West Sussex Coroner's Service Dated: 12/04/2019
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Col le e of College of Policing college police uk g PO Box 58323 cw LONDON Policing non on 0800 496 3322 contactus@college pnn police uk Elisabeth Bussey-Jones Assistant Coroner for West Sussex 3 June 2019 Dear Ms Bussey-Jones, | am writing to explain the actions that we have taken, together with others, to address the concerns raised in the Reg 28 Prevention of Future Deaths notice that you issued in respect of the death of Mr Duncan Tomlin (deceased) to the College of Policing (College) dated the 12" April 2019 | was not aware of this incident previously and | am sorry to learn of the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of Mr Tomlin My thoughts are with his family and friends | understand that the jury in the case of Mr Tomlin returned a narrative conclusion which found his death was contributed to by neglect. The medical cause was found to be “cardiorespiratory failure due to both restraint In a prone position and the effects of cocaine and mephedrone” These findings led to you raising the following matters of concern 1 Importance of heightened risk to a person in a prone position when multiple factors affecting breathing are present. The current and earlier training plans, manuals and policies examined as part of the inquest evidence make clear references to risks associated with (a) positional asphyxia, (b) handcuffs and limb restraints, (c) irritant spray, (d) acute behavioural disturbance or symptoms thereof (e) lack of oxygen due to physical exertion, (f) drug / alcohol intoxication, and (g) seizures Although there is some cross referencing between the various risk factors, the heightened risk to a person in prone restraint when a number of these factors are present is not emphasised or sufficiently emphasised The multifactorial matters that can impact on a person’s ability to breathe in a position of prone restraint when experiencing such multiple factors are critical to the assessment of risk 2. Timing of decisions and opportunity to assess. A further concern relates to how officers are trained to prioritise options available to them and the timing of decisions in circumstance similar to those tn this incident It is appreciated that officers are not medically trained, they do make clinical decisions and a more detailed history will be taken formally in custody suites However, officers do need to be in a positon to have sufficient information to enable them to assess the safety of a restraint situation in which they are involved, and this includes sharing of information and requesting information when participants in the restraint may not have been present from the onset These points are particularly so when medical evidence suggests fatal consequences can arise in a matter of minutes and that by the time a detainee 1s unresponsive, action may be too late In this inquest a priority of the officers, said to be in line with their training, was to remove the restrained person from the scene as soon as practicable The officers also gave evidence on the risks involved in turning the detainee on his side and the possible acts that a violent individual can take towards officers and themselves which raise other risk of harm Cotiege of Policing Linuted 1s a company registered in England and Wales, with registered number 8235 199 and VAT registered number 152023949 Our registered office 1s at Colteye of Policing Limited, Leamington Road, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, Coventry CV8 3EN However, my concern ts that in future similar situations officers may prioritise the need to act speedily to remove a person from the scene, rather than, when a measure of control 1s obtained (such as the use of handcuffs and limb restraints), taking the opportunity to take stock in order to assess the detainee they are dealing with and why they are struggling or resisting Are they dealing with a person who ts struggling because they are violent, or because they are confused, or psychotic, or in post seizure state, or because they are in pain, uncomfortable or struggling to breathe? Once a measure of control is obtained, speed of incidents is dictated by the actions of the officers decide to make and balancing the risks of harm which, in the case of positional asphyxia, are fatal and therefore must be a priority 3 Monitoring The training plans, manuals and policies considered in evidence in this inquest refer to monitoring in different ways, depending on the circumstances Phrases such as close, constant, careful and regular monitoring are used Guidance as to what constitutes monitoring does not appear to be included within literature avaiable to officers A different type of monitoring may be required for, for example, a detainee who poses a suicide risk or who has a known medical condition, as compared to the type of monitoring required for a person restrained in the prone position, particularly when affected by other factors impacting on breathing Listening to noises associated with breathing may be entirely insufficient, particularly when they can be hard to hear, misheard or misinterpreted 4 Commencing CPR The evidence relating to current training and training at the time of the death concerned in this inquest indicates that CPR should commence when a person ts not breathing normally (described as 2-3 breathes in 10 seconds for and adult and 3-5 breathes for second for small children) or if breathing is distressed (snoring, rasping) known as agonal breathing The evidence in this jnquest was that individual officers of some experience understood CPR should commence when breathing had stopped Whilst this may be a misunderstanding on the part of individual officers, owing to the importance of commencing CPR at the earliest opportunity when time 1s critically of the essence, the timing of when CPR should start should be a central point of when training CPR and when reacting to situations akin to that seen in this inquest 5. Understanding aspects of Epilepsy and Seizures The training material that has been provided to me by Sussex Police covers many aspects of epilepsy and seizure that were explored during this inquest. The training material indicates that if it is available to the trainer, participants will be shown a video which informs the viewer of the way that a person might present post seizure, namely confused, vulnerable, perceiving aggression from others and at risk of lashing out due to misunderstanding | have also been provided with a copy of a training manual provided by Epilepsy Action which was sent to ACPO in 2011 Aspects of the evidence from the family in this inquest were entirely inconsistent with the less common presentation of a person in an atypical or post seizure state Although epilepsy was not found to be causative in this inquest, in another situation with a similar set of circumstances, the reaction of a person suffering an atypical seizure or in post Seizure state, could be misconstrued as violence an resistance were officers not to appreciate that fact that their presentation may be part of a medical condition and restraint in such circumstances could have inherent and fatal risks It is therefore of importance that training extends beyond the two more well types of seizure and that post seizure behaviour is also understood in general terms In responding | will explain the role of the College of Policing (the College) and what has either been done or where work and review ts currently being undertaken In order to address each cause for concern in turn An Overview The College ts the professional body for policing and provides everyone working in policing with the skills and knowledge necessary to prevent crime, protect the public and secure public trust The College has three complementary functions: m Knowledge developing the research and infrastructure for improving evidence of ‘what works’. Over time, this ensures policing practice and standards are based on knowledge, not custom and convention = Education supporting the development of individual members of the profession The College sets educational requirements to assure the public of the quality and consistency of policing skills, and facilitate academic accreditation and recognition of our members’ expertise. m Standards drawing on the best available evidence of ‘what works’ to set standards in policing for forces and individuals, for example, through authorised professional practice and peer review The College licences Home Office Forces, including Sussex Police, to use the Personal Safety Programme to train their staff The programme is endorsed by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) Self Defence Arrest and Restraint (SDAR) group of which the College is a member The Personal Safety Programme uses the National Personal Safety Manual (NPSM - a secure online manual of guidance and tactical options) and other national training products, including centrally prepared PowerPoint presentations, as its source of training material The College owns and publishes the NPSM in conjunction with the NPCC SDAR and the SDAR national practitioners’ working group The SDAR are responsible for updating, developing and maintaining the NPSM and other national training products SDAR membership includes physicians, self-defence and restraint trainers, academics, senior managers and experts (including from the independent Office for Police Conduct, the Home Office, the Defence science and technology laboratory and the Police Federation amongst others) The College publishes the NPSM to the police service and then individual forces choose the tactical options contained within it that best meet the needs of their officers and staff in responding to local threats and deliver this through a local Personal Safety Training programme The current recommendation to chief officers (ACPO Personal Safety Training guidelines 2009) 1s that forces must ensure that personal safety training 1s delivered with such frequency as to maintain competence and develop skills and knowledge As a minimum, forces must ensure that staff receive assessed refresher and development training on an annual basis, unless an auditable risk assessment clearly identifies why this frequency is not necessary for a particular role The College also licences Home Office Forces, including Sussex Police to use the First Aid Learning Programme The programme ts endorsed by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) The College of Policing 1s responsible for ensuring appropriate quality assurance processes are in place to guide forces in the implementation of the HSE guidelines relating to the provision of first aid The First Aid Learning Programme has five modules and the national recommendation is that police officers receive a minimum of Module 2 training (the equivalent to the qualification of an HSE Emergency First Alder) Action to address the causes for concern raised in your report: 1. Importance of heightened risk to a person in a prone position when multiple factors affecting breathing are present. All officers and staff are expected to be trained in and understand the medical implications that arise from the use of force and which are contained within NPSM (Module 4) ‘medical implications +These medical implications clearly address the risks associated with Positional Asphyxia_ They specifically include, amongst others, the risks associated with body position, especially being in a prone position and being unable to escape a body position and drugs/alcohol The SDAR have historically assisted in the effective oversight and response to national issues which include the consideration of Regulation 28 PFD reports and their matters for concern The SDAR are in the process of considering the matters that have been raised by the tragic death of Mr Tomlin and have received medical advice that the combination of multiple risk factors may increase the risk of positional asphyxia occurring The SDAR will amend the existing advice with a specific safety warning to officers about this potential increased risk The SDAR have previously looked at the issues of Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD) and Positional Asphyxiation and in 2016 produced national training tools for officers to assist them to understand and respond to the risks involved as well as ensuring that they were properly addressed within the NPSM This has continued to be updated as new information has become available The SDAR are currently completing a review of the national ABD training package which Is provided through a College PowerPoint for training in the risks of prone restraint in light of recent findings from the Terrence Smith inquest tn Surrey and that of Mr Tomlin This will include important updates and the reinforcement of existing good practice to help improve the safety of all Once this work has been completed, the NPCC lead for SDAR, Deputy Assistance Commissioner (DAC) Matt Twist will write to chief officers advising them to include this information in the Personal Safety Training programmes within their forces 2. Timing of decisions and opportunity to assess. Dealing with individuals who are presenting a high level of aggression and agitation is extremely difficult and officers may not be able to initially establish if the subject is resisting because they are being violent or because they are in an agitated state due to mental iI health, a pre-existing medical condition or are struggling to breathe The overarching principle in the use of force Is to gain control Officers will utilise the national decision model to make an informed decision on the appropriate tactical option which will enable them to gain control of the situation The SDAR have considered this matter for concern and Is amending the guidance, using ‘safety boxes’, to emphasise that, once control has been gained, officers should take an opportunity to ‘take stock’ and reassess the risks to establish if there are any medical implications which would require any immediate medical intervention and to follow their first aid training if this Is the case The guidance will also include a link to Module 5 of the NPSM, ‘Personal Management’, as that includes content on how the human brain works and of the influences of the rational and trrational mind on decision making Advice Is given in the national ABD training package on sharing information with other emergency services Officers are advised to utilise the ATMIST (age of subject, time of incident, mechanism of injury / medical condition, injuries sustained or suspected, signs and symptoms and treatment given) handover to ensure that the relevant information is passed on the medical professionals The SDAR will also be reviewing this advice in light of the matters of concern that you have raised 3. Monitoring. The national ABD training package contains information regarding the use of a safety officer whose sole responsibility is to monitor the restrained subject Officers are instructed to ‘Speak up, Speak out’ and voice their concerns, regardless of rank, if they observe any sign or symptom that could indicate that the subject is in distress Personal Safety Training has for many years included the role of the ‘safety officer’ who's role 1s (1) to secure the person’s head within the multi-officer restraint techniques, and (1!) to communicate with the person to help establish ‘calm, rapport, and control’ The overarching responsibilities of the safety officer are to monitor the person’s breathing and visible life-signs during the restraint period, and to direct colleagues (owing to their vantage point and ability to monitor of the person’s demeanour and welfare) during the restraint and especially during the exit phase Although the guidance instructs officers to monitor the subject’s airway the SDAR will further amend the guidance to emphasise the role of the safety officer The guidance will emphasise the need for staff to follow therr first aid training (which also contains advice on monitoring) and to act immediately if they identify that the subject is in need of medical assistance Additionally the SDAR will be looking at how best to amend the national ABD training package to provide some detail of what monitoring actually means based on medical advice 4. Commencing CPR. & 5. Understanding aspects of Epilepsy and Seizures As already mentioned the First Aid Learning Programme has five modules and the national recommendation is that police officers receive a minimum of Module 2 training (the equivalent to the qualification of a HSE Emergency First Aider) While Module 2 does not seek to provide coverage of all medical conditions it does cover conducting CPR and managing a casualty who !s convulsing, as a high level learning outcome (and Is included as part of the rolling three year refresher training process) It is recognised within the training that, in instances where officers are required to use restraint following suspicions of drug consumption, incidents should be dealt with as a medical emergency The Police First Aid Programme Is monitored via both the College’s own governance and the national NPCC portfolio The NPCC portfolio includes the Health and Safety Executive, and is supported by a dedicated subject matter expert group of force first aid leads, and a national clinical governance structure which includes a broad range of independent clinical expertise Consideration of the learning from Inquests Is already a standing item on the first aid forum’s agenda and the matters for concern raised in your report will be examined at the next scheduled meeting in July The issues raised will also be brought to the attention of the national clinical governance panel who are also meeting in July for their consideration The College and NPCC will also ensure that there Is laison between the First Aid and SDAR groups that are considering these causes for concern to ensure that advice provided to practitioners Is consistent across the two portfolios Summary The College is committed to continuing its work with forces and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to raise standards of practice in the care of suspects in detention and custody This includes their safe restraint and care while in police custody | would like to thank you for bringing the circumstances of Mr Tomlin’s death to our attention so that we can ensure that our future work ts informed by the events that culminated in his death Please let me know if you require any further information Yours sincerely Faculty Lead Uniformed Policing
Giles York OPM Chief Constable Friday 7** June 2019 Elisabeth Bussey-Jones Assistant Coroner for West Sussex County Record Office Orchard Street Chichester West Sussex PO19 1DD Dear Ms Bussey-Jones, Sussex Police Response to Regulation 28 issues arising from the inquest into the death of Duncan TOMLIN. Thank you for including Sussex Police within the scope of this notice. | welcome the notice as it is vital that all public authorities learn from significant incidents and strive to learn from them and make improvements where necessary. It is of course important to note that the tragic death of Mr TOMLIN was in 2014 and in the 5 years since that time there have been significant developments in national police training in this area. | shall deal sequentially with the 5 points you raise: 1. Importance of heightened risk of prone restraint when multiple factors affecting breathing are present It is acknowledged that all documentation relating to training presented to the court highlighted clear risks involved when dealing with a wide variety of issues. Any alteration to these lesson plans will be done in conjunction with the College of Policing (CoP) through a documented clinical process including expert involvement from the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and National Personal Safety Training (PST) working groups. @ 01273 404001 @giles.york@sussex.pnn.police.uk Ww @CCGilesYork Sussex Police, Malling House, Church Lane, Lewes, East Sussex, BN7 2DZ We are currently delivering nationally agreed training packages and any alteration to these should be agreed nationally with approval of all parties. The benefit in delivering training packages (for all mandatory training, not just Personal Safety Training) is they are consistent across the UK, all police officers are trained in the most current, relevant and up to date thinking which is designed using the latest research and learning from all Forces. We are aware this is currently being reviewed by NPCC and any alterations passed onto Forces in order for them to include in their training. It would be expected these alterations would be completed by the end of 2020. 2. Timing of decisions and opportunity to assess The College of Policing Specification document makes it clear that “where learning outcomes require the learners to demonstrate their learning, deliverers must ensure their learners can achieve this through the use of realistic and practical operationally-based scenarios”. In Sussex we teach and assess monitoring as part of assessment of a casualty. Over the last three years using practical scenarios, we operated assessments in the dark, which combines First Aid and Personal safety scenarios with strobe lighting and loud recorded street noises. However, it should be noted that when attending incidents officers must pause to consider a variety of factors, one of which is their duty to protect others, (including their colleagues), and their legal right to protect themselves. Where there is conflict in doing this, 1.e. to protect one party may put another at an increased risk, then an informed decision using the National Decision Model (NDM) needs to be taken that would prioritise who would receive the greater protection. Officers are required to prioritise individuals requiring treatment at a scene where there ts conflict and an inability to protect everyone present. Officers are also trained in Equality, Diversity and Human Rights — Article 8 of the Human Rights Act describes the rights of the victim in protecting their privacy and dignity. This would also have been considered in the officer’s decision-making to remove an individual from the scene having carried out their assessment 3. Monitoring Monitoring is covered across a number of Lessons such as ABD, Epilepsy, conscious and unconscious casualty and Positional Asphyxia_ The information given on monitoring breathing in training includes more than noisy breathing — it also includes feel, touch and rise and fall of the rib cage. This ts ncluded in the lesson plans and 1s refreshed each year. For the last two years Sussex Police has trained and assessed each learner monitoring an unconscious casualty who has fallen face first (another learner is the casualty during this exercise) and point out the appearance of rise and fall looks different than those on their backs ~ which links to those being placed in a prone position. We also use state of the art computerised cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) manikins to assess each learner individually. This gives live accurate feedback on the effectiveness of CPR technique with percentile scoring of both breathing and compressions This is a pass/fail assessment. 4. Commencing CPR The training is delivered in line with College of Policing recommendations and guidelines. Officers’ understanding of what is expected of them during the training session is tested by practical assessments. The Force will explore whether it is practicable to also include a knowledge test after completion of the training to ensure officers have fully understood what has been taught and subsequently implemented in the workplace. It is hoped this review will be completed by the end of 2019 and if a change ts proposed that this will be implemented by the end of 2020. Refresher training is carried out annually to ensure officers remain up to date and compliant with their skills. A report of attendance on these refresher sessions 1s issued weekly to line managers to ensure they are attending. Improvements have been made in Personal Safety Training recently. Refresher training is now delivered on a one day session twice a year. There will now be only 6 months between refresher sessions which allows for current concerns/issues/updated training to be delivered more regularly. It also enables the trainers to reinforce the importance of this training. Historically, lesson plans and attendance on courses have not been archived. However, the introduction of a new system (EQUIP) will improve this record keeping and it will be possible to check back over a period of time to see exactly what was contained in each lesson at any given point, as well as attendees on that learning programme. It is anticipated this will be introduced early 2020. 5. Understanding aspects of Epilepsy and Seizures Police officers are not trained to the level of medical practitioners. All police officers have basic first aid training (First Aid - Module 2 of the College of Policing curriculum which includes conducting CPR and managing a casualty who ts convulsing) which gives them the knowledge and skills suitable for their role. It is the expectation that they recognise signs and symptoms of a wide variety of medical conditions. It is unrealistic to expect officers to have the knowledge of medical professionals, as the risks posed to themselves and others in trying to take action in which they are not trained is too great Officers will carry out a dynamic risk assessment of any risk posed by a violent individual — whether the violence ts caused by a medical condition or otherwise — and make a decision based on that risk assessment at that time There have been numerous national public campaigns for individuals to identify that they have a particular condition. This 1s not a police matter to decide, but one of public health. Certainly this would be of benefit for officers in dealing with similar high risk situations. In relation to epilepsy in particular, there is a video which is included in the initial officer training course and 1s refreshed every 3 years in the refresher training. Sussex Police are considering hosting a link to that video on their internal website for all officers to be able to view. 1am aware that you have contacted both the NPCC and the College of Policing and that they will be submitting separate reports. All three organisations have shared our thinking to ensure a comprehensive and constructive response. If there are follow-up questions about this response, please come back to myself or T/ ACC May and | will do my best to resolve them. Thank you again Yours sincerely, Giles Yo Chief Constable QPM
See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching Alcohol, drug and medication related deaths, and how often a new one appears.
What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text
Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.
These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.