Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2020
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2020-0160, written 11 Aug 2020. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 11 Aug 2020 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2020-0160 |
| Deceased | Moses Boardman |
| Coroner | Graeme Irvine |
| Coroner area | East London |
| Category | Other related deaths |
| Organisation named | Barts Health NHS Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths report
Moses Victor Boardman (died 27/12/19)
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1. Barts Health NHS Trust
2. London Borough of Tower Hamlets
3. Three Sisters Care Ltd
1 CORONER
I am: Graeme Irvine. HM Assistant Coroner for Inner London North,
Poplar Coroners Court, 127 Poplar High St, Poplar, London E14 0AE
2 CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013,
regulations 28 and 29.
3
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 2nd January 2020, HM Senior Coroner Mary Hassell commenced an
investigation into the death of Moses Vidor Boardman, The investigation
concluded at the end of the inquest on 11th August 2020. I made a
determination of Accidental Death. The medical cause of death was: 1a
Aspiration Pneumonia, 1.b Cerebrovascular Accident.
4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
Mr Boardman was an elderly and frail man who experienced a decline in
his health in late 2019. Following a period of inpatient care at the Royal
London Hospital ("RLH"), the London Borough of Tower Hamlets
("LBTH") assessed his care need to require a placement in sheltered
accommodation with 4 x daily domiciliary care.
On the 17th December 2019 Mr Boardman was mistakenly discharged to
his home address by RLH. The error was discovered by LBTH on 18th
December 2019 who learned that Mr Boardman had not arrived at his
sheltered accommodation.
LBTH immediately contacted the RLH who could not assist with Mr
Boardman's whereabouts as no note had been made by the discharge
note regarding where he had been taken.
LBTH located the patient at his home address, the address had no
heating, light or food. Mr Boardman was taken to his sheltered
accommodation where he was assessed to have deteriorated. The
patient was was readmitted to hospital where it was discovered he had
suffered a further Cerebrovascular Accident ("CVA").
Whilst in RLH Mr Boardman was ·assessed for risk of aspiration, he was
determined to be at risk and accordingly he was to be fed at risk,
requiring soft food, in small pieces, whilst supervised.
On the evening of 26th December 2019 was found in his room eating a
whole fruit whilst unsupervised. The fruit had not been provided to him
by the hospital, a quantity of fruit on his bed table was removed from his
bedside.
·
In the early hours of 27th December 2019 Mr Boardman was found to
have experienced a choking incident, suction was utilised to remove
aspirate. A witness indicated that a piece of fruit was found in the
aspirate, other witnesses indicated this was not the case.
As a DNACPR order was in place no attempt to commerce CPR was
made by staff. Mr Boardman died at 04.48.
5
CORONER'S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise
to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless
action is taken. In the circumstances, it is my statutory duty to report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.
1. The absence of a clear computerised record in the RLH departure
. lounge explaining the change of address.
2. The lack of a clear safeguard to ensure that a vulnerable patient is
discharged to the correct address.
3. The failure of RLH transport staff to properly assess the suitability
of the venue that a patient is being taken to.
4. The responsiveness of the care provider commissioned by LBTH to
escalate the fact that they had been unable to reach Mr Boardman
for his first 3 care visits.
5. The proper monitoring of patients on RLH ward 14F who have been
· assessed as being ''fed at risk". Specifically, why was a vulnerable
patient left with unsuitable foods within his reach.
6. The RLH failure to commence CPR when a potential reversible
cause for collapse existed that would override the effect of the
DNAR order.
6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe
that your organisation has the power to take such action.
7 YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of
this report, namely by 6th October 2020 I, the coroner, may extend the
period.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why
no action is proposed.
8 COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the following.
• Mr Boardman's next of kin.
• The Nursing and Midwifery Council.
• The Secretary of State for the Department of Health.
I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or
summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he
believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to
me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the
publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.
9
DATE
11th August 2020
SIGNED ·BY ASSISTANT CORONER IRVINE
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Bera
I amet: Barts Health
12 OCT 2020 | NHS Trust
POPLAR CO RO! YER Trust Executive Office
COURT Ground Floor
— : Pathology and Pharmacy Building
The Royal London Hospital
80 Newark Street
London Ei 2ES
Telephone:
Date: 9" October 2020
Private & Confidential
Mr Graeme Irvine
HM Assistant Coroner for Inner London
North
° Deputy Chief Medical Officer
www.bartshealth.nhs.uk
Dear Mr Irvine,
RE: Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths Report: Moses Victor Boardman
| write in response to your Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths, dated 11" August
2020. Your concerns are related to the discharge of Mr Boardman from the Royal London
Hospital in December 2019.
At the inquest you raised 6 matters of concern for Barts Health NHS Trust and Tower Hamlets
Local Authority.
41. The absence of a clear computerised record in the RLH departure lounge
explaining the change of address.
This issue was identified as part of the trusts Serious Incident (SI) investigation and
action was taken at the time. The departure lounge changed its practice to ensure that
the staff document in the patients electronic record in line with trust practice.
Confirmation of this has been detailed within the departments most recent version of
the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). At the inquest you were shown this SOP in
draft form but | can update you now to say that it has now been signed off by the Royal
London Hospital's Executive Board.
At the inquest you asked for evidence of this change in documentation and whether
any audits had taken place. As an action in light of this query the departure lounge will
now complete documentation audits in line with trust practice for clinical areas to
provide assurance that this is being completed.
NHS
Barts Health
NHS Trust
2. The lack of a clear safeguard to ensure that a vulnerable patient is discharge to
the correct address.
Again, action was taken for this concern at the time of the SI Investigation. The
departure lounge clarified in their SOP that when a patient is discharged via hospital
transport the Discharge Lounge staff will confirm with the Patient Transport Service
driver the location and agreed destination for the patient. Any discrepancy must be
escalated to the ward area for confirmation and Senior Clinical Site Manager if this
discrepancy persists. Again, as per point 1, the staff will document this within the
patients electronic medical records.
3. The failure of RLH transport staff to properly assess the suitability of the venue
that a patient is being taken to.
The trusts transport team have a safeguarding process for completion when a discharge
destination raises concerns. At the time of the incident the process that the crews follow
was similar to the rest of the Trust, they will raise both safeguarding and adult care
concerns using the safeguarding form which is then uploaded onto Datix (our risk
management system for reporting adverse incidents) by an assistant manager. However,
if the crew member is on scene and is worried about heat, light, care package, or patient
safety then they will call control to return the patient to hospital. Direction is then taken
from the ward, if they are able to come back to the ward, then they take the patient there,
if the ward has already allocated the bed to another patient, then the patient is taken back
to the ED (Emergency Department).
As an action the Associate Director of Transport has arranged to review the current
safeguarding processes in place and this process will be amended according to their
findings. ,
4. The responsiveness of the care provider commissioned by LBTH to escalate the
fact that they had been unable to reach Mr Boardman for his first 3 visits
This is a matter for LBTH to respond to
§. The proper monitoring of patients on RLH ward 14f who have been assessed as
being “fed at risk”. Specifically, why was a vulnerable patient left with unsuitable
foods within his reach.
The trusts clinical guidelines “Guidelines for Best Practice: Eating and Drinking at Risk
{Adults)” was approved in September 2019. This guideline was developed by Speech
and Language Therapy and lays out the roles and responsibilities of the whole
multidisciplinary team (MDT) in managing risk feeding in patients. The guideline
contains a decision making tool as well as explaining the role and importance of patient
preference and choice in the decision making alongside the MDT. We have reviewed
this document and recognise that it is silent on the counselling of patients and their
relatives as part of the process for managing their risk. As an action now we will review
this guideline and make amendments to include details regarding this.
NHS
Barts Health
NHS Trust
6. The RLH failure to commence CPR when a potential reversible cause for collapse
existed that would override the effect of the DNAR order
After the initial Serious Incident (SI) investigation we understand there was concern
about Mr Boardman choking on fruit, therefore a second investigation was carried out to
look at this particular potential incident.
It’ s clear from staff statements that Mr Boardman had taken a bite out of the kiwi fruit
before it was removed at 2000. At 0200 he is heard coughing and when the nurse
attends she finds him unresponsive. Although he has a DNR order the cardiac arrest
team Is called. They arrive and find him unresponsive with agonal breathing. This type of
breathing would not occur with any form of upper airway obstruction; it was also six
hours after he had taken a bite of the kiwi fruit. This related to poor blood flow to the
brain, fitting with the description of him having an impalpable pulse. In view of no
immediate reversible cause, such as an airway obstruction the DNR order was followed
and the gentleman passed away peacefully two hours later.
Thank you for bringing your concerns to my attention. | trust that you are assured that | have
taken them seriously and that the hospital has investigated them appropriately. | am very
happy to discuss or clarify any of the above points.
Yours sincerely
Dr .
Deputy Chief Medical Officer
Response to Regulation 28 report arising out of the inquest regarding Mr Boardman (died 27.12.2019) on behalf of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets The matters of concern raised which LBTH are to respond to is (4):- The responsiveness of the care provider commissioned by LBTH to escalate the fact that they had been unable to reach Mr Boardman for his first three care visits Three Sisters Care not informing the LA that they had been unable to provide care to MB as arranged. The Failed Visits policy requires all commissioned domiciliary care providers to inform the local authority speedily of all occasions when the provider is unable to provide care as arranged because the provider does not seem to be at home or does not admit them. Commissioned providers are routinely reminded of the Failed Visits policy at quarterly providers meetings and the importance of adhering to the policy will be reiterated to them at the next forum. The quality of service provided by Three Sisters Care is currently under review with the lead commissioner requiring targets on an improvement plan to be met. Failure to achieve the standards required may result in the provider being de-commissioned. Sue Starkey House not informing the LA that MB did not arrive with them from hospital as expected. The lead commissioner will speak to the provider and remind them of the importance of letting the emergency duty team know if a patient does not arrive as expected from hospital discharge. London Borough of Tower Hamlets 12th October 2020
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