Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2021

Jason O’Rourke

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2021-0032, written 10 Feb 2021. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report10 Feb 2021
Reference2021-0032
DeceasedJason O’Rourke
CoronerHenrietta Hill QC
Coroner areaLondon Inner (South)
CategoryState Custody related deaths · Mental Health related deaths · Suicide (from 2015)
Organisation namedOxleas NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS  

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

1.  Governor 
2. 

, HMP Belmarsh 

, Director General for Prisons, HM Prison Service 

1 

CORONER 

I am Henrietta Hill QC, assistant coroner for the coroner area of Inner South London. 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

Jason O’Rourke died on 2nd April 2019 at HMP Belmarsh, aged 34 years.  An investigation 
into his death was commenced.  The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 
21st January 2021.  The jury found that the medical cause of Mr O’Rourke’s death was 
hanging.  Their conclusion was that he died by suicide, to which a series of factors possibly 
contributed, as explained further under section 4 below. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

Jason O’Rourke died in his single occupancy cell on House Block 3 in HMP Belmarsh at 
some point between 7.28 pm on the 1st April 2019 and when he was found at 9.33 am on 
2nd April 2019, hanging from the window bars in his cell using a ligature made from a 
bedsheet. He had clearly been dead for some time.   

No one had entered Mr O’Rourke’s cell overnight.  The roll checks scheduled to take 
place at 9.00 pm on the night of 1st April 2019 and 6.00 am on the morning of 2nd April 
2019 had not been carried out, although it cannot be said that had those checks been 
done, the outcome would have been any different. 

Prior to his death Mr O’Rourke had chosen to self-isolate in his cell.  The jury found that 
Mr O’Rourke’s suicide was possibly contributed to be the following factors: 

(i) 

(ii) 

(iii) 

The serious failure to take further steps with respect to Mr O’Rourke’s mental health 
after the Primary Care Mental Health Nurse’s attempt to triage him on 8th March 
2019;  

The fact that healthcare staff did not provide sufficient information about Mr 
O’Rourke’s mental health to prison staff during the month that he was resident on 
House Block 3;  

The fact that  prison staff on the wing did not have sufficient understanding of Mr 
O’Rourke’s mental health history and his history of self-harm from (a) information 
received from healthcare; (b) the information on the Cell Sharing Risk 
Assessment and (c) information on the OASYS record; and 

(iv) 

The fact that the Safety Intervention Meetings in March 2019 were an inadequate 
way of addressing the issue of self-isolation and risk in relation to Mr O’Rourke. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. 

(1)  The ‘immediate needs’ form completed for prisoners on arrival at HMP Belmarsh 
does not facilitate a clear assessment of any risk of self-harm or suicide and the 
actions to be taken if such a risk is identified.   

The  form  poses  a  question:  “Is  there  any  specific  concerns  re  self-harm  or 
suicide?” and then gives the guidance “If yes, amend care plan”.  However, this 
guidance  is  only  effective  for  those  prisoners  who  already  have  a  care  plan, 
meaning  those  who  are  already  on  an  open  Assessment,  Care  in  Custody  and 
Teamwork  (‘ACCT’)  plan.      The  action  to  be  taken  for  those  prisoners  where 
specific  concerns  regarding  self-harm  or  suicide  are  identified,  but  who  do  not 
already have a care plan, is unclear from the form. 

It is also unclear how the above question interacts with further questions below it 
which  address any past ACCTs/F2052SHs, the  level of support  available to the 
prisoner and the answer the prisoner gives to the question “Do you feel suicidal 
now?” 

Accordingly,  this  form  does  not  sufficiently  highlight  prisoners  who  are  in  fact 
suicidal,  or  where  there  are  concerns  about  their  risk  of  self-harm  or  suicidal,  to 
those on the wing. 

(2) 

The  nightly  roll  checks  at  HMP  Belmarsh  are  due  to  be  carried  out  by  a  single 
member of Operational Support Grade (OSG) staff at 9.00 pm and 6.00 am.  Their 
stated purpose is to check for escape or death among the prisoners.  On handing 
over to the morning staff, the OSG signs paperwork indicating that the roll checks 
have been completed.  There is no robust system by which the prison management 
audit  this  process.    This  means  that  the  prison  management  can  be  under  the 
impression  that  the  checks  have  been  carried  out,  when  they  have  not  been,  as 
occurred here. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and/or 
your organisation have the power to take such action. 

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 namely by 7th April 2021.  I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons: 

(1)  The family of Jason O’Rourke 
(2)  The member of OSG staff on duty on the night of 1st/2nd April 2019 
(3)  Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust. 

I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all 
interested persons who in my opinion should receive it. 

I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I believe may find it 
useful or of interest. 

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary 
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful 
or of interest. 

You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about 
the release or the publication of your response. 

9 

10th February 2021

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Hmpps (PDF)
Director General Prisons 
HM Prison and Probation Service 
8th Floor Ministry of Justice 
102 Petty France 
London SW1H 9AJ 

Ms Henrietta Hill QC 
HM Assistant Coroner for Inner South London 
1Tennis St 
London  
SE1 1YD 

Dear Ms Hill 

6 May 2021 

Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 10 February 2021 following the inquest into the 
death of Jason O’Rourke at HMP Belmarsh on 2 April 2019. I am grateful to you for granting 
an extension to the statutory deadline for my response. 

I know that you will share a copy of this response with the family of Mr O’Rourke and I 
would like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and 
the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority. 

Following evidence heard at the inquest you have raised concerns in relation to the 
‘immediate needs’ form completed for prisoners on arrival at HMP Belmarsh. This is a 
locally produced document created in line with the Prison Service Instruction (PSI) 07/2015 
Early days in Custody. You will be aware that the early days in custody is a period in which 
risk of self-harm or suicide is heightened and the wellbeing of prisoners in our care is the 
primary concern of staff throughout the reception and first night process. Following the 
inquest a review of the form has taken place, and a new version is now in use. This 
provides clearer guidance to staff on the actions to take should any concerns about a 
prisoner’s risk of suicide or self-harm be identified, including communicating concerns or 
previous ACCT history to healthcare colleagues, and documenting decision making so that 
information is available to wing staff once the prisoner moves onto the wings after their 
induction period. I attach a copy of the updated immediate needs form for your information. 

As well as using the immediate needs form to capture information shared by prisoners on 
how they are feeling, staff working in the reception and first night areas receive specific 
training in how to recognise risks and triggers for self-harm and suicide and how to support 
prisoners through the first few days in prison. Beyond the reception and first night process, 
all staff are trained in how to open an ACCT should they identify evidence of increased risk 
of self-harm or suicide. 

You also raised a concern in relation to the nightly roll checks carried out by Operational 
Support Grade (OSG) staff and the lack of a robust system to ensure that these checks 
have been completed. The purpose of roll checks is to ensure that prisoners are accounted 
for, located where they should be, and alive and well. It is mandated that four roll checks 
are carried out over each 24 hour period and the times of the checks are locally agreed and 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 set out in each prison’s Local Security Strategy (LSS). The duties and expectations of night 
staff are clearly communicated and staff receive training and shadowing before working 
alone on the wings overnight. For OSGs these duties include carrying out a roll check at the 
beginning and end of each shift which must be reported to the control room and signed for.  

Spot checks by the Night Orderly Officer (NOO) and night visits by an operational manager 
are in place in establishments, including Belmarsh, to ensure that staff are carrying out their 
required duties and these provide an opportunity for OSGs to raise any issues or concerns 
with workload or any unexpected incidents that have occurred during their shift which may 
prevent them from being able to carry out the roll check or report the roll at the required 
time. The NOO can be called upon for assistance by OSGs at any time during the night 
shift. 

In the light of the concerns that you have expressed, the Governor of HMP Belmarsh is 
working with the Long Term and High Security Estate (LTHSE) safety team to review the 
quality assurance processes in place for roll checks. As a first step, a system has been 
implemented whereby when a night OSG arrives a discipline officer remains on the wing 
until a full roll check has been completed, recorded and signed for on the wing and reported 
to the Orderly Officer. Spot checks are in place to ensure that the process is being followed. 
The LTHSE safety team will be visiting Belmarsh to identify further opportunities for 
improvement and to test compliance with this new process, and the LSS more generally.  

I understand that the question of using CCTV for assurance was explored at the inquest. 
CCTV is deployed in prisons for reasons of safety and security and not for general 
surveillance or monitoring staff performance. Playback of CCTV coverage is only authorised 
in certain circumstances, such as where there is reason to believe that safety or security 
has been compromised, or to assist with a formal investigation. Where there is suspicion 
that roll checks are not being carried out, CCTV could be used as part of an investigation 
into those suspicions, but it cannot routinely be monitored as part of the assurance process. 
Staff are aware that CCTV is in use around the establishment and that their actions may be 
scrutinised following an incident such as a death in custody. 

If staff are found to have failed to carry out the required tasks or when there is a question 
over their performance and ability to manage the wing overnight there will be a thorough 
investigation to determine what has happened and to ensure that staff who fail to uphold the 
values of HMPPS by putting prisoner’s safety at risk are held to account through disciplinary 
procedures.  Staff are aware that failure to carry out the duties entrusted to them will result 
in disciplinary action, and that, depending on the circumstances, the outcome may range 
from advice and guidance in order to support them to perform better, to dismissal from the 
service. 

Thank you again for bringing your concerns to my attention.  I trust that this response 
provides assurance that action is being taken to address the matters that you have raised.  

Yours sincerely 

Director General for Prisons

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