Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2021
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2021-0046, written 18 Feb 2021. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 18 Feb 2021 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2021-0046 |
| Deceased | Kevin Clarke |
| Coroner | Andrew Harris |
| Coroner area | London Inner (South) |
| Category | Police related deaths · Emergency services related deaths (2019 onwards) |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1. 2. Service, Broadway, London, SW1H 0BG Ambulance Service, 220 Waterloo Road, London SE1 8SD , Chief Executive Officer, London , Metropolitan Police 1 CORONER I am Andrew Harris, Senior Coroner, London Inner South jurisdiction 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 3 INQUEST . I opened an This report arises from the death of Mr Kevin Clarke, who died aged 35 on 09.03.18 at Lewisham Hospital inquest into the death on 28th March 2018, which was concluded on 9th October 2020. The delay in writing this report is occasioned by three matters: The complexity of proceedings led to several applications by interested persons for extensions to the period to make submissions (the family submission ran to 40 paragraphs). Secondly the senior coroner was engaged in another jury inquest at the time the submissions were completed. Thirdly the Covid-19 pandemic created unprecedented pressures on the coroner’s service. The staffing was substantially below establishment and ill equipped to cope with the surge in deaths, which reached a peak of 40 on one day. This led to the senior coroner commissioning support from the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry and personally directing triage and case managing new death reports for seven weeks. The jury recorded the medical cause of death as 1a Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD) (in a relapse of schizophrenia) leading to exhaustion and cardiac arrest, contributed to by restraint struggle and being walked. They returned a long critical narrative conclusion. 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Mr Clarke was a 35 year-old black man with complex mental health problems. On 9 March 2018, he was found by police officers in a disturbed state. He was restrained prior to being taken to an ambulance. While in the ambulance but still handcuffed, he was found to be in cardiac arrest, which proved to be fatal. The narrative conclusion included these relevant extracts: The police officers’ decision to use restraint was inappropriate because it was not based on a balanced assessment of the risks to Mr Clarke compared with the risks to the public and police. Supervision was not appropriate as his vital signs were not monitored; there was lack of attention to what Mr Clarke was saying due to radio cross talk and opportunities to release restraint were missed. The paramedic failed to conduct a complete clinical assessment on her arrival and failed to provide appropriate clinical advice on conveyancing to the police and these amounted to a failure to provide basic medical care. There were not adequate dynamic risk assessments by the paramedical staff together with the police officers. There is no evidence of police and paramedics considered the length of time he had been restrained or his position during conveyance, the fact that none spoke up or spoke out about either of these concerns is indicative of the lack of a dynamic risk assessment by the police and paramedics together. The absence of adequate initial and subsequent dynamic risk assessments before and during conveyance meant that the changing and increasing risks to Mr Clarke were not appropriately considered. This led to unsuitable choices, which ultimately increased his exhaustion. While police and paramedics offered a range of conveyance options they were not based sufficiently on his clinical needs and seemingly prioritised speed over safety. The way that Mr Clarke was moved from the playing fields was inappropriate. Forcing him to stand up and walk added to considerable extra strain on his body. The position in which he was conveyed including being bent forward with the back of his head held down by the hood and the elevated positions of his arms impaired his breathing and increased the stress on his body. 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. 1. Evidence was adduced that the police officer training programmes are run by a specialist in officer safety, the core being Officer Safety Training, and another module being Emergency Life Support (ELS) and a bolt on of ABD Training. The focus of ELS is upon action in the event of a cardiac arrest, so that there is little attention to given to health and safety of the detainee in non-emergency situations and an inadequate input by health professionals. It is illustrated by the officer who said that he had not been taught how to measure vital signs as part of monitoring a detainee. The expert consultant physician who viewed the video of restraint observed a highly abnormal fast breathing rate, but none of the officers had noticed this at the time. 2. Despite organization protocols and the MoU there was a conspicuous lack of leadership, risk assessment or challenge on health and safety of the detainee by the paramedic, who appeared to have insufficient seniority or experience to know what to do in a detention situation. Equally there was a lack of expectation or request by police for her input and advice. My expert physician opined that if the detainee was to be moved, he wouldn’t recommend standing him and walking him, which would make things worse. Yet the paramedic recalls no professional dialogue between police and paramedics about the critical conveyance decision, says she left it to them to decide, although preferring a safer method and then later changes her evidence. 3. The protocols of the MPS require a Safety Officer to monitor the detainee’s health and safety in restraint situations. Evidence heard suggested that this was either not carried out or was ineffective. No officer challenged the decision to cuff the detainee when he started to get up and the Safety Officer at the time agrees he did not consider whether his illness made the decision unreasonable, as laid out in ACPO guidance. An officer agreed that the risks of restraint to the detainee were not balanced against the risks to everyone from not restraining. The Safety Officer at the head changed several times, making any monitoring of trend difficult and for a critical period the most inexperienced officer was the Safety Officer, who was unaware of the benefits of looking at gums or nails. At the time he was escorted, the Safety officer agreed that the face could not be observed as it was hidden by a hood. The risks are further augmented by the MPS submission that it is not always possible to identify a safety officer in all incidents. 4. There was serious inadequacy of supervision. The initial scene was managed by “collective leadership”, where decision making seemed to emerge without discussion. An experienced serjeant who arrived after the initial restraint, alleged she had conducted a risk assessment, without getting an adequate briefing on the circumstances of his restraint. She was unable in questioning to identify any situation in which restraints should be released due to the length of restraint, unless directed by a paramedic or emerged from mania. She asserted that she knew that whatever her officers had done prior to her arrival, she could trust that they made the right decision. The steps that have been taken by the MPS and LAS have begun to address the concerns, but do not provide sufficient assurance of mitigation of risks to the lives of future detainees. Whilst policies and corporate commitments have acknowledged the challenges and agreed approaches, the dominance of the primacy of police officer safety in comparison with the attention to detainee health officer training and the weaknesses in leadership and supervision of both police and ambulance service staff in managing challenging incidents continue to create future risks to lives. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths. I believe that the following organizations would wish to learn of the evidence given in the inquest about the circumstances of this death and are in a position to mitigate or prevent future deaths: The Metropolitan Police Service The London Ambulance Service. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by Wednesday, April 14th 2021. I, the coroner, may extend the period. If you require any further information or assistance about the case, please contact the case officer, tel: and 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I am also copying this report to the interested persons: Solicitors for the Family from , Solicitor for Jigsaw from BLM Law Solicitor for Police Officers from Reynolds Dawson Saunders Law Solicitors (South London Maudsley) Claims and Litigation Manager for SLAM The Secretary of State for Justice is copied into this report for two reasons. Firstly a lengthy submission by the family urged me to write to Report, citing all stakeholders to review their response to the recent assertion that she had not seen detailed report of progress against each of her 100 recommendations. I have not accepted that submission, as the evidence related to this was not specifically heard during my investigation, and I do not consider this Regulation 28 Report a suitable vehicle for instigating such a review. Secondly this inquest has had high publicity and been the subject of a TV programme and the matter of police conduct in restraint of ethnic minority detainees is of high public interest. I thought it courteous to bring concerns to his attention. I also copy this to the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Emergency Medicine, who may have a professional interest and to my expert witness, Care, West of England University. , Professor of Emergency I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 [DATE] [SIGNED BY CORONER] 18th February 2021 Andrew Harris, Senior Coroner
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
London Ambulance Service NHS NHS Trust 220 Waterloo Road London SE1 8SD Mr Andrew Harris Tel: HM Senior Coroner for London Inner South Fax: 0207 783 2009 Southwark Coroner's Court www.londonambulance.nhs.uk 1 Tennis Street London SE11YD 14" April 2021 Dear Sir, Regulation 28; Prevention of Future Deaths Report (PFD) arising from the inquest into the death of Kevin CLARKE Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report dated 18th February 2021 setting out your concerns to be addressed. | would like to begin by expressing my deepest condolences to the family of Mr Clarke and to reaffirm the sincere apology that was expressed on behalf of the London Ambulance Service NHS Trust (the LAS) at the inquest for the failures in our care for Mr Clarke, for these | am truly sorry. Prior to the inquest a detailed review was undertaken to investigate the circumstances surrounding the LAS attendance to Mr Clarke on 9th March 2018. It was recognised and accepted by the Trust in evidence heard at the inquest that the care provided to Mr Clarke by the attending ambulance clinicians fell significantly below our expected standard. The Trust fully accepts the findings and conclusion of the Jury in setting out the failures which were determined to have contributed to Mr Clarke’s tragic death. The concerns set out in the PFD report, as directed to the LAS were in respect of the clear lack of leadership, risk assessment or challenge on health and safety of Mr Clarke by the paramedic, for whom it appeared to you to have insufficient seniority. In addition, your concerns detail inadequate communication with police on scene about the critical conveyance decision as well as inadequacy of supervision and the ‘collective leadership’ approach where decision making seemed to emerge without discussion. | will set out the LAS response to these as follows: Leadership training and Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD) refresher training The Royal College of Emergency Medicine sets out that Acute Behavioural Disturbance (ABD) is the accepted terminology adopted by the UK Police Forces, the Ambulance Services and the Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine. It describes the sudden onset of aggressive and violent behaviour and autonomic dysfunction, typically in the setting of acute on chronic drug abuse or serious mental illness. Page 1 of 4 The LAS fully recognises the need to ensure that all our front line staff are trained to recognise and manage appropriately patients who are displaying signs of ABD and that whilst when attending Mr Clarke, our first on scene ambulance clinicians were appropriately clinically trained to manage such a medical emergency, it is accepted that there was clearly a lack of provision of adequate clinical leadership. The Trust fully appreciates that clinical skills alone are not enough when faced with these circumstances and additional clinical leadership training that supports the clinical skill set is equally essential. Our expectation is that front line clinicians need to immediately recognise and manage their role on scene as having clinical primacy for the patient and be confident in managing a multi-disciplinary scene, always advocating for their patient and utilising the skills of others on scene to ensure their safety whilst putting the clinical need to the patient at the forefront. The ability to communicate effectively with our emergency service colleagues to ensure the best interests of the patient are being constantly reviewed and risk assessed. We provided evidence at the inquest to explain how our front line staff are trained and kept up to date via our Core Skills Refresher (CSR) training, which is a mandatory annual programme providing front line staff with three, eight hour training sessions per year. Since 2010 our crews have been trained in ABD and in recognition of how important ABD training is for ambulance clinicians, we have introduced ABD training as part of the syllabus for all clinicians joining the LAS and this wilt be incorporated for every new entrant who joins from April 2021. As we set out in evidence, we are committed to regularly increasing the knowledge and awareness of our front line staff on ABD and it will be included in our next CSR training which is due to be delivered in 2021/2022, subject to Covid-19 restrictions. The ABD (CSR) training will cover the spectrum across which a patient with ABD can present and will be focussed towards scenarios and practical application of the assessment and management of ABD, including communicating with other agencies on scene. Our intention is to make sure regular refreshers are not only available through mandatory training but that we engage staff in additional methods to keep the subject at the forefront of clinical updates and as such we have created an ABD podcast which will be available to all staff with the next clinical update bulletin. This will be complete before the end of the August 2021. A clinical update article on ABD is currently being finalised and will be disseminated to all front line staff via our intranet ‘The Pulse’ as well as received by email sent directly to staff. Communicating with our emergency service colleagues The vital need to advocate for the safe and effective management of the patient is core to this and the Trust expects that all our ambulance clinicians are trained for and confident in knowing the importance of their role on scene. The CSR training will include communication strategies to further empower ambulance clinicians to communicate with the police in such situations. Resourcing the scene and providing senior leadership Recognising the challenge which you have highlighted around the “insufficient seniority or experience” of the ambulance clinicians who attended Mr Clarke, there has been a program of national change in respect of how paramedics transition into fully independent clinical practice, when they initially qualify. This program has Page 2 of 4 introduced the formal role of Newly Qualified Paramedic (NQP) where there is a two-year preceptorship program, where the graduate paramedic has a formal period of direct supervision on qualification, this then transitions through to a period of further supported development during their first two years in clinical practice. This process has formal ‘gateways’ which the paramedic must meet in order progress and the entire process is supported by a development portfolio. This development program is linked to the paramedic’s remuneration and in order to achieve the uplift in salary, this program must be completed. This program now aims to provide a structured development program for paramedics entering the profession and improve the experience and seniority of the national paramedic workforce. The LAS recognises the importance of getting resources to scene to treat patients with ABD in the fastest possible time and recognises that the complexity of the scene can call for enhanced clinical leadership presence to support the care of the patient and the management of the scene. This can be especially important in a dynamic scene such as in the circumstances of Mr Clarke, where multi agency working is necessary. We provided evidence at the inquest to detail our commitment to continue to monitor and review the use of ‘Category 1’ triage for potential ABD patients, which goes above the national position and demonstrates the importance the LAS place on ensuring the timeliest of response to this cohort of patients. The LAS will continue to work with the police to ensure this is used correctly to maximise benefit and will continue to highlight the need for accurate and concise sharing of information where ABD is suspected. The LAS will continue to ensure that the process for this upgrade of calls is shared within our Emergency Operations Centres. You also heard evidence that where pharmacological tranquilisation of an ABD patient is indicated, our Advanced Paramedic Practitioners (critical care) are trained to undertake rapid pharmacological tranquilisation and where possible we will continue to provide this treatment option when it is indicated. We are one of the few UK ambulance services where this intervention is delivered by the ambulance services’ own paramedic workforce, and we actively target this cohort of staff to this group of patients. In order to further enhance the clinical leadership and experience on scene we are working through a process of change in order to pro-actively send either a Clinical Team Manager (or an Incident Response Manager) to calls where the Metropolitan Police Service or other Potice service, report a case of suspected ABD. This must not distract from the timely response of the nearest available clinical resource, but will provide additional leadership on scene to support our frontline clinicians and enhance patient care. In order to optimise this response, ABD training will be to be included in the package of education for our Clinical Team Managers (CTM) to further develop their core knowledge. There are two, two hour online learning sessions taking place before the end of April 2021. Staff attendance will be recorded and each CTM will have to report to confirm that they have completed the sessions. National clinical guidance updates The Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee (JRCALC) and the National Ambulance Services Medical Directors Group (NASMED) have published an ABD clinical guideline, specifically for ambulance staff, within the Clinical Practice Guidelines. This is the first national guidance on ABD for ambulance staff in the UK. The LAS have worked in partnership with a national team in developing this guideline welcomes this significant improvement in patient care. Page 3 of 4 The LAS has established processes for sharing updated clinical guidelines digitally with our clinicians through the use of personally issued tablet devices to staff which alert staff to updated clinical guidelines. Further to this my Chief Medical Officer, who chairs the National Medical Directors Group is keen to ensure the regular update of these guidelines to reflect learning. our Clinical Practice Development Manager for Critical Care, who you heard from at the inquest, has joined the group which is developing and reviewing these guidelines and the learning from Mr Clarke’s death has been presented to the chair of the JRCALC guidelines group. | very much hope this response helps in setting out the ongoing work that the LAS are engaged with to ensure staff are fully up date and trained in the importance of ABD as the priority and the ongoing work to further develop and monitor Trust wide learning and communicate this to our staff. ABD training and will remain at the forefront of our agenda and our expectations of our staff in demonstrating not only high standard of clinical treatment but also leadership and the absolute requirement to advocate for their patient, always putting their best interests at the forefront of clinical decision making. The LAS will continue to further this work with our staff to ensure they are well trained and on a national basis in respect of the development of clinical learning in an ongoing commitment to learn from Mr Clarke’s tragic death, with the overarching aim to do all we can to mitigate the risks of another death in these circumstances. Yours sincerely > Chief Executive, London Ambulance Service NHS Trust Page 4 of 4
PROFESSIONALISM HQ
Mr Andrew Harris
Senior Coroner
London Inner South
Southwark Coroners Court Victoria Embankment
1 Tennis Street London
London
SE1 1YD
SW1A 2JL
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
New Scotland Yard
Tel:
Email:
Our Ref:
Date: 15 April 2021
Dear Mr Harris
I am the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Professionalism in the Metropolitan Police Service
(MPS) and I am responding on behalf of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis to your
Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, dated 18th February 2021. Your report was
sent following the conclusion of the inquest into the death of Mr Kevin Clarke who died on 9th
March 2018.
The MPS has acknowledged and reviewed the four matters of concern raised by the Coroner
and our response to the matters of concern are as follows:
Evidence was adduced that the police officer training programmes are run by a
specialist in officer safety, the core being Officer Safety Training, and another module
being Emergency Life Support (ELS) and a bolt on of ABD Training. The focus of ELS is
upon action in the event of a cardiac arrest, so that there is little attention given to health
and safety of the detainee in non-emergency situations and an inadequate input by
health professionals. It is illustrated by the officer who said that he had not been taught
how to measure vital signs as part of monitoring a detainee. The expert consultant
physician who viewed the video of restraint observed a highly abnormal fast breathing
rate, but none of the officers had noticed this at the time.
Since the inquest into the death of Mr Clarke, the MPS has made a number of changes to the
delivery of first aid training. Although the training has always consisted of monitoring the
casualty, including the pulse and breathing rate, the practice of this in the classroom was
limited and mainly carried out during the unresponsive breathing casualty scenarios. This
training is now included in all scenarios and especially when monitoring responsive casualties
in relation to signs of deterioration. The training now includes the ‘goalposts of life’ which state
that the breathing rate should be between 10 and 30 breaths per minute and anything outside
of this is a medical emergency. During classroom training the monitoring of the casualty is now
fully practised and assessed as a learning outcome.
We are currently in the process of producing an aide memoir which provides the relevant vital
information. It is anticipated that this will be published in May 2021 and will be available to
anyone who undertakes emergency life support training. I have attached a copy of the draft
(Appendix A).
Officers and staff are instructed that once a healthcare professional is at the scene of the
incident, the healthcare professional takes primary care of the casualty. The officer or member
of staff should provide a handover to the healthcare professional using the pneumonic ATMIST
(Age, Sex, Name, Time, Mechanism of injury, Injuries or Illness identified, Signs and
Symptoms and Treatment given) which provides a framework for the information required by
the healthcare professional. Officers and staff are instructed to call an ambulance because
the casualty requires medical assistance beyond the first aid the officer or member of staff can
provide. They are instructed that the paramedic may ask them to assist them when they arrive,
and that they should follow their instructions. This is made clear in officer and staff training
that they will be following the direction of the healthcare professional. If specific instructions
are not provided, there will be the assumption that they are taking the correct action for the
casualty.
It should be noted that in this specific case, the paramedics made no comment nor challenged
any of the officer safety tactics used and therefore the officers acted in accordance with their
training.
Despite organisation protocols and the MoU there was a conspicuous lack of
leadership, risk assessment or challenge on health and safety of the detainee by the
paramedic, who appeared to have insufficient seniority or experience to know what to
do in a detention situation. Equally there was a lack or expectation or request by police
for her input and advice. My expert physician opined that if the detainee was to be
moved, he wouldn’t recommend standing him and walking him, which would make
things worse. Yet the paramedic recalls no professional dialogue between police and
paramedics about the critical conveyance decision, says she left it to them to decide,
although preferring a safer method and then later changes her evidence.
As previously stated, officers and staff are instructed that once a healthcare professional is at
the scene of the incident, the healthcare professional takes primary care of the casualty and
that they should therefore take instruction from them.
The MPS is conducting a review of both policy on restraint removal (or otherwise) during a
medical emergency as well as carriage methods of individuals. Work has already begun in
terms of identification and initial testing of carriage equipment, namely the Megamover ® (a
compact, portable unit used to transport or transfer patients from areas inaccessible to
stretchers). Following a recent event this year in the Thames Valley Police area, as part of
their investigation the IOPC are looking into the use of FLACS (Flexible Life and Carry System)
used by officers to assist with carrying the detainee. This is under scrutiny with direction being
given from the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) that its use is suspended pending further
investigation. The MPS is assisting with this investigation and will be in an informed position
to provide an appropriate evidence base to support any future trial or implementation of
carriage mechanisms along with fully considered medical implications assisted by the
Independent Medical Advisory panel (IMSAP).
The protocols of the MPS require a Safety Officer to monitor the detainee’s health and
safety in restraint situations. Evidence heard suggested that this was either not carried
out or was ineffective. No officer challenged the decision to cuff the detainee when he
started to get up and the Safety officer at the time agrees he did not consider whether
his illness made the decision unreasonable, as laid out in ACPO guidance. An officer
agreed that the risks of restraint to the detainee were not balanced against the risks to
everyone from not restraining. The Safety Officer at the head changed several times,
making any monitoring of trend difficult and for critical period the most inexperienced
officer was the Safety Officer, who was unaware of the benefits of looking at gums or
nails. At the time he was escorted, the Safety Officer agreed that the face could not be
observed as it was hidden by a hood. The risks are further augmented by the MPS
submission that it is not always possible to identify a safety officer in all incidents.
MPS officer safety training now contains a reminder to all officers and staff, through classroom
training delivery and practical sessions, that all use of force needs to be justified and needs to
take into account all factors including the balance of risk of restraint to the subject, officers and
the wider public. This training includes an additional requirement for the Safety Officer at the
scene to identify themselves using terminology equal to:
“I am the Safety Officer. Everyone listen to me. If you have any concerns, speak up and speak
out”.
The role of the Safety Officer is self-appointed with the default position being that the person
at the head of the subject will be responsible for monitoring the health, welfare and safety of
the subject.
The training schedule for April to September 2021 includes a specific lesson on Acute
Behavioural Disorder (ABD) as well as a mandate for all officers to complete the National ABD
2021 package created by the MPS, endorsed by IMSAP and published by the College of
Policing. The College of Paramedics and Association of Ambulance Chief Executives have
been consulted during the creation of this package.
Of further note, the MPS is committed to increasing the contact time denoted to officer safety
training and indeed how this is delivered. The proposal is that from October 2021, officers will
receive two days’ officer safety training and a separate emergency life support day, which is
an increase of one day per year from the current position. This proposal is in line with the
national work being led by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Matt Twist as NPCC Lead for Self
Defence, Arrest and Restraint which will try to achieve consistency across police forces in
terms of time dedicated to training as well as content delivery. Moving to a scenario based
framework will allow for a greater transition of tactics from the training setting to the operational
environment. Furthermore, the concepts ‘quality of encounters’ (providing an explanation of
what is happening, obtaining an agreement or understanding and thus co-operation, providing
an acknowledgement of the encounter and a positive departure) and ‘trauma informed policing’
(recognising that the subject’s perceived disproportionate response to police requests may be
predicated on a previous negative experience), are also introduced to officer safety refresher
training as well as the increase in the number of days afforded to foundation training.
In January 2021, initial recruit officer safety training increased from five days to eight days
which is a significant increase in contact time and material delivered. This increase includes
the addition of concepts such as performance under pressure through scenario assessment,
the effects of stress and de-escalation and safety in mind.
In autumn 2021, the MPS Police Power and Encounters Unit (PPEU) will be formed and will
see Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from across business groups come together to holistically
deal with issues such as those identified in your report. This new unit will consist of SMEs from
the Officer Safety Unit, Specialist Firearms Command, Continuous Policing Improvement
Command for Stop and Search and the Directorate of Professional Standards. This team will
have the capacity to reactively and proactively engage with supervisors and support them in
scrutinising their officers’ use of force.
The unit will work symbiotically to support each other and lead on; officer safety policy,
curriculum design, use of force reviews, Taser Policy, Stop and Search Policy/review and
represent the MPS at national level to identify and address use of force and officer safety
concerns. It will translate its work into organisational learning, which will be embedded in
training and policy and work reciprocally with the MPS Learning and Development Officer
Safety Training Delivery Unit and the MPS Learning and Development Quality Assurance
Team to add value to officer safety training provision and ensure training is evidence-based.
The unit will act as an initial point of contact for all MPS units that want to develop learning
around individual incidents or wider trends. It will also be responsible for identifying potential
risks and emerging opportunities and issues regarding officer safety; Taser and stop and
search across the MPS, nationally and internationally, and proactively and pre-emptively
addressing these in the MPS.
Scenario based training is being introduced into officer safety training from April to September
2021 with the intention of incorporating a largely scenario based, uplifted package from
October 2021. The training will also include supplementary material to solidify key learning
outcomes, including:
Recording encounters accurately
When to use force
When to use restraint
De-escalation before, during and after an encounter
Situational awareness
Tactical communication
Procedural justice
Recognising the impact of stress on behaviour
Reflecting on your actions
There was serious inadequacy of supervision. The initial scene was managed by
“collective leadership”, where decision making seemed to emerge without discussion.
An experienced sergeant who arrived after the initial restraint, alleged she had
conducted a risk assessment, without getting an adequate briefing on the
circumstances of his restraint. She was unable in questioning to identify any situation
in which restraints should be released due to the length of restraint, unless directed by
a paramedic or emerged from mania. She asserted that she knew that whatever her
officers had done prior to her arrival, she could trust that they made the right decision.
It is the responsibility of the Safety Officer to look after the health, welfare and safety of the
subject prior to the arrival of the supervisor. In the delivery of officer safety training from April
to September 2021, supervisors will be informed of the requirement that upon arrival at the
scene of an incident, they need to clearly identify themselves, their role and to liaise with the
Safety Officer to be briefed on the circumstances of the incident including the welfare of the
subject.
The requirement will include the need for the Supervisor to verbalise the following:
“I am the Supervisor at scene. I am reviewing the incident. Who is the Safety officer? Can I
have a briefing?”
The use of body worn video will also allow for these instructions to be recorded.
I wish to express my sincere condolences to the family of Mr Clarke. I trust this provides the
reassurance that the MPS has considered the matters of concern you have raised and are
addressing these in officer safety and emergency life support training for all police officers and
staff who attend these courses.
Please do not hesitate in contacting me should you have any queries.
Yours sincerely
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Enc.
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