Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2022

Corrie McKeague

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2022-0097, written 1 Apr 2022. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report1 Apr 2022
Reference2022-0097
DeceasedCorrie McKeague
CoronerNigel Parsley
Coroner areaSuffolk
CategoryAlcohol, drug and medication related deaths · Other related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published4

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO  PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1) 

REGULATION 28  REPORT TO  PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS  REPORT IS  BEING SENT TO: 

The British  Standards Institute 
389 Chiswick High  Road 
London 
W44AL 

The Container Handling Equipment Manufacturers Association 
Three Tree Barn 
Mill House Lane 
Croft 
Warrington 
WA37HA 

Dennis  Eagle Ltd 
Heathcote Way, Heathcote Ind. Est. 
Warwick 
CV34 GTE 

Biffa Waste Services Ltd 
Coronation Road 
Cressex 
High Wycombe 
Buckinghamshire 
HP12 3TZ. 

1 

CORONER 

I am Nigel Parsley,  Senior Coroner,  for the coroner area of Suffolk. 

2 

CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph  7,  Schedule 5,  of the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 and  Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On  22nd  January 2020 I commenced an  investigation  into the tragic death of Corrie 
MCKEAGUE 

The investigation concluded  at the end  of the  inquest on  22nd  March 2022.  The jury 
conclusion of the inquest was that:-

Corrie McKeague died on  the 24th  September 2016 at approximately 04:20am in 
Bury St Edmunds as a result of compression asphyxia in  association with 
multiple injuries, whilst in  the  back of a refuse lorry. 

Corrie's  death was contributed to  by: 

Impaired judgement due to alcohol consumption. 

Climbing into a 1100L commercial waste bin. 

Ineffective bin  locks. 

Ineffective search of the bin. 

 Any driver not having the means to search the bin thoroughly or safely. 

Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on the lorry 

The medical cause of death was confirmed  as: 

1a Compression asphyxia in association with multiple injuries 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

Corrie McKeague had been serving in the RAF for three years, and at the time 
of his disappearance on the 24th  September 2016, was based at RAF Hanington, 
in Suffolk. 

On the evening of Friday 23 rd  September 2016, Corrie drove his car into Bury St 
Edmunds where he subsequently met up with some of his RAF  colleagues lo 
go drinking and socialising. They ended up in the Flex nightclub in Bury St 
Edmunds. 

Corrie consumed a significant quantity of alcohol during the evening, although 
he remained both happy and friendly during the course of the night. However, 
due to his intoxication Corrie was ultimately asked lo leave the nightclub. 

Corrie was seen on a number of occasions on CCTV cameras as he made his 
way through Bury St Edmunds. 

At 03.25 hrs on the 24th  September 2016, CCTV showed Corrie entering a 
"horseshoe" shaped area in Brentgovel Street, behind a chemists and  bakers. 

In that area were a number of commercial size (1100 litre) waste bins. 

At 04.19  hrs a Biffa Dennis-Eagle dust cart arrived at the horseshoe area and 
collected a bin from the rear of a Greggs bakers. 

The bin weight recorded by the lifting mechanism on the dust cart was 116kgs, 
which was significantly heavier than  usual. 

Corrie was reported missing when he failed to report to work on the 26th 
September 2016. 

Subsequent analysis of the CCTV footage, failed lo identify Corrie again after 
03.25 and confirmed he did not leave the horseshoe area on foot. 

An extensive investigation and search operation failed to find Corrie, leading to 
the hypothesis that Corrie had been  in the bin, and his body had been  lost in a 
landfill site. 

Despite extensive searches Corrie was never found. 

At the request of Corrie's family, the Senior Coroner for Suffolk made an 
application to the Chief Coroner for England and Wales to hold an inquest into 
Corrie's death, in the absence of his body being found. 

The Chief Coroner for England and Wales subsequently directed that this 
inquest should be heard on the basis that, on a balance of probabilities, Corrie 
did come by his death on or about the 24th  September 2016  in the vicinity of 
Bury SI Edmunds. 

 5 

CORONER'S CONCERNS 

During the  course of the  inquest the evidence revealed  matters giving rise for 
concern.  In  my opinion  there  is  a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is 
taken.  In  the circumstances it is my statutory duty to  report to you; 

the MATTERS OF CONCERN as follows.  -

In the conclusion returned  by the jury, they identified 6 issues, which directly 
contributed to Corrie's death. This PFD  Reports relates to 4 of those issues. 

1. Ineffective bin locks. 

The court heard that bin  locks were designed to keep waste within the bin, keep 
inclement weather out, but were not designed to keep individuals out. The locks 
were described as not robust, and a determined or strong individual would get 
in. Due to their design the locks were also frequently broken. 

Stronger locks (such as snap locks) had been considered, but due to the risk of 
entombing (an  individual inadvertently becoming locked inside a bin), stronger 
locks had been discounted. However, the court heard there are currently no 
stronger bin locks available which would allow an individual to open them from 
the inside should they become entombed in a bin. 

There were 740  reported incidents of people in bins over a 6-year period (i.e. 10 
per week), which are likely to be reduced if stronger locks are fitted. 

2.  Ineffective search of the bin. 

Despite the lifting mechanism recording the weight of each bin every time it is 
lifted, there is no automated/digital system to recognise when a bin is 
significantly heavier than it usually is. 

In this case the usual weight in the bin (based on an average of 13 previous 
collections) was approximately 15kgs. The bin weight recorded by the lifting 
mechanism on the dust cart was 116kgs.  Such a significant difference in 
weight of a particular bin, is something that should be recognisable and should 
warrant a further check being completed. 

3. Any driver not having the means to search the bin thoroughly or safely. 

The court heard that drivers are now told to use a 'push stick' to allow a more 
thorough search of the contents of a bin. This instruction was not in place at 
the time of this incident. 

However, it was not clear from the evidence if the push stick is an  identifiable 
piece of equipment on every vehicle, or if it is deemed as  a piece of safety 
equipment, and therefore included in the daily safety checks of the vehicle. 

4. Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on the lorry 

In relation to the poor visibility through the Perspex viewing aperture/window 
on the lorry two factors were identified: 

Firstly, it is physically impossible to undertake a check of the hopper 
mechanism on the Biffa lorry as the viewing aperture window is too high for 
this to be achieved by an  average height driver. 

 Secondly, on the six-year-old vehicle in  question the Perspex had become 
opaque. 

A Detective  Constable who had watched the  lifting  process to  provide evidence 
of its  operation for the court, described the driver as standing on  tiptoes to try a 
check the vehicle hopper, whilst peering around the wing of the lifting 
mechanism. When asked  specifically about the viewing window the officer said 
it was too high to see through and  opaque. The officer told the  court the 
viewing  aperture was  'totally useless' as a means of checking what was  being 
loaded into the hopper. 

Whilst viewing the  hopper is  impossible on  the current vehicle, it renders the 
instruction for drivers to view the hopper prior to compaction (contained in  the 
Biffa  Operating  Instructions for Trade Waste Vehicles) impossible to achieve. 

In  addition, the automatic nature of the compaction  process,  also makes 
adherence to the Operating Instructions impossible on  some vehicles, as 
compaction starts immediately the bin  is tipped. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In  my opinion  action should be taken  in  order to  prevent future deaths, and  I believe 
you or your organisation  have the  power to take any such action you  identify. 

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are  under a duty to  respond  to this report within 56 days of the date of this  report, 
namely by 26th  May 2022 I,  the Senior Coroner,  may extend the  period if I consider it 
reasonable to do so. 

Your response  must contain details of action taken or proposed to  be taken,  setting 
out the timetable for action.  Otherwise,  you  must explain why  no action is  proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to  the  following  Interested 
Persons;  -

1.  Corrie's family. 
2.  Suffolk Constabulary 
3.  Ministry of Defence 
4.  The vehicle driver 

I am under a duty to  send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. 

The Chief Coroner may  publish  either or both in  a complete or redacted  or summary 
form.  He may send a copy  of this report to any  person who he believes may  find  it 
useful or of interest.  You  may  make representations to  me,  the Senior Coroner,  at the 
time of your response,  about the release or the publication  of your response by the 
Chief Coroner. 

9 

1s t Aoril 2022 

Ninel Parslev 

I

Responses

4 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Bsi (PDF)
Head of Standards Governance 

BSI  

389 Chiswick High Road 

London W4 4AL 

Nigel Parsley 

Senior Coroner for Suffolk  

BY EMAIL  

26 May 2022  

Dear Sir, 

Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths  

I. 

Introduction  

1.  This letter constitutes BSI’s response to your Regulation 28 Report (“the 

Report”).  

2.  BSI would like at the outset to express its deepest sympathy and condolences for 

the family of Mr Corrie McKeague, who died in tragic circumstances.  

II. 

Executive Summary 

1.  BSI’s role as the National Standards Body (“NSB”) is to facilitate expert committees 

to  achieve  consensus  on  industry  standards  and  best  practice  and  to  act  as  the 

publisher of standards and specifications.  

2.  BSI has consulted experts from two committees which it considers have relevant 

expertise  to  advice  on  factors  involved  in  Mr  McKeague’s  death,  and  summaries 

their response herein.  

1 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.  BSI is not a regulatory body nor an enforcement authority. It is therefore unable 

to advise on regulatory matters, which are a matter for HM Government. Nor is it 

able  to  compel  or  monitor  compliance  with  its  standards,  which  are  voluntary 

documents. As such, BSI has a limited ability to prevent further tragedies such as 

the death of Mr McKeague.  

4.  BSI  believes  nonetheless  that  the  views  of  its  experts  will  be  of  interest  to  the 

Coroner.  Should  any  further  questions  or  issues  arise,  BSI  would  be  pleased  to 

assist.   

III.  The role of BSI  

5.  BSI’s role as the NSB is established by Royal Charter. BSI has several governing 

documents (available online at  

https://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/standards/Information-about-standards/how-

are-standards-made/The-BSI-Guide-to-Standardization/ ):  

a.  BSI’s Royal Charter and Bye-laws 1981;  

b.  A  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  of  20  June  2002  between  the 

United  Kingdom  government  and  BSI  in  respect  of  BSI’s  activities  as  the 

United Kingdom’s NSB;    

c.  BS 0: 2021 ‘A standard for standards – Principles of standardization’ (BS 0) 

6.  Article 1.2 of the MoU provides that BSI’s role as the NSB should be interpreted to 

include the management, co-ordination and understanding of: 

a)  “British Standards” and “other standardization products”;  

b)  participation  by  BSI  in  European  and  international  standards  bodies,  and 

other international activity undertaken in the interests of BSI as the United 

Kingdom’s NSB;  

c)  promotion, marketing, distribution and information activities concerned with 

British Standards, BSI’s other standardisation products, and standardisation 

generally;  

d)  support any corporate infrastructure activities intended, wholly or in part, 

to enable paragraph 9(a) to (c) above.  

The Director of Standards has the primary responsibility for the activities set out in 

paragraph 9(a) to (d). BSI’s present Director of Standards is Dr 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (his  full  title  is  ‘Director–General,  Standards’,  which  incorporates  the  role  of 

Director of Standards).  

7.  BSI  develops  and  distributes  standards  in  response  to  the  needs  of  UK 

stakeholders, which include UK Government and business. Standards are technical 

documents  representing  good  industry  practice.  They  are  voluntary  documents 

drafted by independent experts.  

IV. 

Standards committee structure  

8.  Each  individual  standard  is  the  responsibility  of  one  technical  committee.  A 

technical  committee  may  be  responsible  for  more  than  one  standard,  and  may 

establish subcommittees to deal with individual standards or other discreet areas 

of its work.  

9.  Technical  committees  and  sub-committees  consist  primarily  of  independent  (of 

BSI)  experts,  often  nominated  by  trade  associations,  professional  bodies, 

research/scientific institutions, government or other entities (see BS 0, para 7.2). 

They have an independent chair and BSI provides a committee manager and other 

support including an editorial project manager for each standard.  

10. The committees referred to in this letter are examples of such committees.  

V. 

Status of Standards  

11. The  defining  characteristic  of  standards  is  that  they  are  voluntary,  agreed  by 

industry  experts  and  users, 

including  manufacturers,  health  and  safety 

representatives, regulators and consumer groups.  They do not have the status of 

legislation  or  regulation  (unless  specifically  referred  to  in  a  statute  or  regulatory 

instrument, which is extremely rare though not unknown), although they may be 

used  as  one  means  of  demonstrating  compliance  in  appropriate  circumstances. 

They may also become privately enforceable between individual entities by being 

incorporated into a contract (see paras 4.14 and 9.2 of BS 0).   

12. BSI  is  therefore  not  in  a  position  to  draft  standards  which  would  be  binding  on 

owners and operators of commercial waste bins.  

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VI. 

BSI expert committee feedback 

13.  BSI considered two committees would have relevant expertise: 

a.  B/538/4 - Building hardware. This subcommittee has expertise in locks.  

b.  B/183 - Waste containers and associated lifting devices on refuse 

collection vehicles 

14. The subcommittee chair of B/538/4 has advised as follows. First, concerning the 

effectiveness of the locks on the bin in question. They are not ineffective at 

holding a lid closed in windy conditions or to keep animals out but they would be 

ineffective at keeping a motivated person out. However, the locks were never 

intended for that in the first place. Further, experts would describe them as 

‘latches’ rather than ‘locks’ because they are not robust in design and are not 

operated by a unique mechanical device (they operate using a triangular peg but 

could also be opened with a device such as a pair of pliers). 

15. To upgrade a bin to a security device would mean a significant upgrade of lock, 

probably one complying with BS 3621: 2017 Lock assemblies operated by key 

from both the inside and outside of the door, and would require a much more 

robust lid (most of them at the moment are made of flimsy plastic). In turn, this 

would make the bin itself much heavier and more costly. With heavier bins there 

might also be an increase in accidents whilst they were being emptied. 

16. The experts also looked at some examples of large, commercial bin locks and 

noted ‘On one of the bins you can latch and unlatch the device from the inside 

without the triangular key and is very easy to operate but on the other one you 

could not as it was enclosed but it would be impossible to lock yourself in that 

one as you can only operate from the outside. Neither of the bins lock as you 

close the lid so trapping yourself would have to be a conscious decision. If 

someone were to lock someone else in these type of bins, it would be easy to get 

out as the lids are plastic and flexible so the latch would “pop” once force was 

applied.’ 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17. Experts from B/183 were consulted and responded as follows:  

Requirements for lids for commercial bins to be lockable    

18. In the standards BS EN 840-2 (Dimensions and Design) and EN840-6 (Health and 

Safety) there is no stipulation that 4 wheeled containers are to be fitted with lid 

locks.  

19. A lot has been done regarding safety with lids, but more so with the topic of 

entrapment of heads in "roll top" containers or domed lids.  

Robustness of locks 

20. Some locks within the marketplace are very robust and we should not generalise 

the whole standard, regarding 4 wheeled containers, on the basis of one 

manufacturer’s lock design.  Lock come in a multitude of varieties and design. 

Some with padlocks, other slamlocks which have proven to withstand 

approximately 300Kgs of force and still not open. Some manufacturers have lid 

designs to fit 2 locks per lid closer to each corner to make even more secure. This 

is an attempt to prevent contamination of the wrong waste stream entering the 

incorrect container but even so, preventing entry will have the same effect as 

stopping an individual entering a container. 

21. The EN840 standard could not offer any advances in making locks more robust 

without introducing a whole new element of testing, and to cover off every single 

scenario dependant on manufacturers locks. The same lock is very difficult to 

work on every single container and lid design.  

22. A stronger lock would in fact make it more difficult for it to be broken i.e. from 

inside the skip. Also, the accessory cannot readily prevent access and also 

subsequently provide egress. 

23. In considering the waste skip as a confined space, by providing a means for 

escape (i.e. emergency secondary release panel, etc.) it should be noted that 

skips where there is either a compacted or heavy weight content, could in fact 

cause the escape panel to open inadvertently. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Are there any changes recommended to prevent similar incidents? 

24. The experts considered this a very difficult question. If a car thief wants to steal a 

particular car, he will steal it, any security devices are merely a deterrent. If 

someone wants to get into a container they will. This includes homeless people 

who live in cities. There are too many variables involved in preventing entry to 

the container. Has the bin crew accidentally left the container unlocked? Has the 

end user/shop owner left the container unlocked?  

25. Some manufacturers fit warning labels on the outside of the containers. In the 

same vein building owners fit signage to say “Warning fragile roof” therefore 

pushing the onus onto the individual who might climb upon it.  

26. Some manufacturers can supply clear acrylic or polycarbonate panels in order to 

see into the container to identify the waste stream and any contaminants. To the 

same effect, some use wire mesh panels which cannot become opaque over time. 

However, this can be problematic in other areas; it would not be as effective in 

preventing fires / odours / vermin etc.  

Any other standards that should be considered which need to be 

amended/updated? 

27. Is there a possibility of having a sensor device fitted to all refuse vehicles that 

can detect individuals inside containers, sensing heartbeat, temperature, thermal 

imaging etc? There would be cost implications for RCV manufacture and 

implement this to all trucks. There is already a lot of electronic technical 

hardware fitted so the vehicles potentially have the means of powering such 

device.  

Is the standard fit for purpose? 

28. In terms of what the EN840 is intended to achieve, which is to have a waste 

receptacle which will integrate safely and effectively with a recognised lifting 

device and carrying out a means of emptying, then it cannot be faulted. It has 

been there for decades and served manufacturers well throughout Europe and 

other parts of the world who adopt the same principles.  

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29. It is assumed that in many cases, the securing lock falls outside the scope of 

manufacture/supply of the skip, rather it is an aftermarket accessory provided by 

the refuse collection provider. Note the relevant standards for supply of Container 

skips are under BS EN 840-2. The Standard could include a section “Instructions 

for use” where many of the action points identified in the BIFFA research/ WISH 

guidance could be included. This would be a proactive way forward to assist the 

Coroner without fundamentally require a review of the design standard. 

30. The BIFFA research can be found at: 

https://www.biffa.co.uk/-/media/files/download-pdfs/biffa-people-sleeping-in-

waste-containers.ashx 

31. The research also makes reference to WISH guidance note 25: - WASTE-25-.pdf 

(wishforum.org.uk) and states that where practicable, bins should be located in a 

secure area.  

Concluding thoughts of committee members 

32. Clearly this is not an isolated case. It is however not accepted by the experts that 

the number of deaths could be reduced if stronger locks are fitted. Bin crews 

and/or end users might leave the container unlocked. If a refuse vehicle broke 

down and therefore did not empty that container when scheduled, and the bin 

then became overfilled, an individual could easily empty a few bags onto the floor 

and enter the container. The lock would have served no bearing in that scenario.  

33. The container in its entirety is a very simple device. It is a receptacle for 

collecting waste, it needs to remain simple. More robust locks are available 

(taking on board the point of entombment), but the lock is not the issue. The 

problem is the individual themselves, intoxicated or not. Might there be some 

means of electronically identifying individuals that are inside containers and 

means of the lifting device not carrying out that cycle by means of an electronic 

failsafe?  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders  

34. Finally, BSI reproduces verbatim the response from the Society of Motor 

Manufacturers, who are one of the nominating organizations represented on the 

B/183 committee: 

The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) offers our sincere 

condolences and sympathy to the family and friends of Corrie following 

this tragic case. Our understanding is that there were many unusual 

circumstances that contributed as factors into his death, and that in the 

coroner’s opinion action should be taken in order to prevent future deaths. 

Neither the SMMT, nor our members, are involved in the design or 

manufacture of waste bins for Refuse Collection Vehicles (RCVs) – 

including the large 1000 litre waste bin containers subject to this case - so 

we are not in a position to comment on what steps could now be taken to 

remove all entrapment risks; however, we feel the coroner’s suggestion of 

considering better locks is appropriate and therefore BSI standards for 

such bins should be reviewed to determine if such solutions are possible.  

With regards to the RCV itself we do not foresee any changes in design 

that could guarantee such an event could never happen again, but SMMT 

members continue to invest and refine their products to maximise safety. 

35.  BSI  will  raise  the  issue  once  again  when  the  committee  next  has  a  meeting  to 

discuss further if any changes to existing standards would be appropriate. 

 Attachments  

36. For completeness, BSI includes with this letter the following standards:  

a.  BS 3621:2017 (Lock assemblies operated by key from both the inside and 

outside of the door) 

b.  BS EN 840-2: 2020 (Mobile waste and recycling containers) 

c.  BS EN 840-6: 2020 (Mobile waste and recycling containers) 

37. These  standards  are  the  copyright  of  BSI  and  sold  commercially  by  BSI.  BSI 

therefore  requests  that  they  are  not  distributed  by  the  Coroner  further  than  is 

necessary for the purposes of the investigation. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38. BSI believes that this letter and attachments constitutes a full reply to the Coroner’s 

Request.  If,  however,  the  Coroner  has  any  further  questions  or  requires 

clarification, BSI would be pleased to assist.  

Yours sincerely  

Head of Standards Governance 

BSI, 389 Chiswick High Road, London, W4 4AL, UK 

bsigroup.com | Twitter | LinkedIn        

We support the UN Sustainable Development Goals, so please 
consider the environment before printing this email 

BSI Standards Limited is a member of BSI Group and is registered in England under number 7864997 with its registered address at 389 Chiswick 
High Road, London, W4 4AL, United Kingdom. 

9
Response from Biffa (PDF)
2 7 MAY  2022 

Mr.  Nigel Parsley,  Senior Coroner for Suffolk 
The Suffolk Coroner's Service 
Head  Office and Court 
Beacon  House 
White House Road 
Ipswich 
IP1  5PB 

25 May 2022 

Dear Mr.  Parsley, 

REGULATION  28  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS - INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF 
CORRIE McKEAGUE 

We write in  response to your Report dated 1st  April 2022. 

This letter sets out our response to  each of the matters of concern you  identify in your Report and 
adopts the same order and  numbering (identified in  bold  below). 

As a member of the Environmental Services Association,  Biffa has,  for many years,  been  part of the 
Waste Industry Safety and  Health forum (WISH), which  involves all  major waste companies in 
conjunction with the Health and  Safety Executive and  manufacturers.  Biffa is currently chairing the 
latest review of industry guidance on  best practice for dealing with the  risk of people in  and  around 
bins. 

Since your Report was issued, we have engaged with  some of the other recipients of the  Report to 
discuss bin  design and  locking,  bin  lifting  and weighing systems.  These discussions are ongoing. 

1. 

Ineffective bin  locks 

We believe that the existing locking mechanisms are effective when used  and fulfil  their 
purpose of securing waste inside the bin  and  preventing unauthorised access.  However, we 
have engaged with  bin  manufacturers on  the  locking options available and  our understanding 
is that they are considering alternative design options available to secure containers.  Whilst 
there are snap lock options available (being locks that 'lock' on  closure of the bin  lid  and then 
require  unlocking),  as you  heard during the Inquest, these do present an  entombing risk for 
any  person entering  the bin.  Options to overcome this risk are being explored by  the 
manufacturers. 

The effective use of any locking mechanism is reliant upon customers using the locks and  not 
overfilling the bin  so that the bin  lid can be closed and  the  locks used effectively.  We will be 
reminding our customers of the  importance of bins being secured and, where feasible,  being 
stored in  a secure location. 

 2. 

Ineffective search of the  bin 

The existing bin weighing systems fitted  to our vehicles record the weight of the bin  after the 
emptying cycle has  been  completed.  This involves the equipment recording the weight of the 
bin  before and after it is emptied to calculate the net weight of its contents.  We have engaged 
with the designer of our bin  weighing systems to  establish the feasibility of using historical bin 
weight data to recognize  if a bin  about to  be  emptied  is outside the usual range of historical 
weights recorded. They have confirmed that the existing weighing  system does not have this 
capability.  Any technology solution to achieve this will  require a significant redesign  of the 
weighing system and Biffa's systems that hold  the historical weighing data.  Whilst changing 
these systems is  not feasible  in  the  near term we are  keen  to  explore how improvements to 
this and other technology in  use or in  development could  help to  reduce the risk and will 
continue to work with equipment designers and suppliers. 

3.  Any driver not having the means to search the bin  thoroughly or safely 

In  our experience it is not always possible for our operatives to search the entire contents of a 
bin  safely.  The search of bins is typically  limited to the top  layer of the materials within a bin 
and this search  may include the  use of a push stick. As part of our commitment to  continuous 
improvement, we regularly  review our toolbox talks and any other training  on  the  requirements 
for checking  bins (which  may include the  use of a push stick where this is  appropriate to the 
size of bin to  be checked). Any updates and  changes to these would typically  be 
communicated by  internal awareness campaigns for our operatives on  the risks to  people in 
and around bins and our safety procedures for checking bins to  prevent injury. 

4.  Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on  the lorry. 

We have verified that the vehicle involved in  this case,  complies with the requirements of the 
European Safety standard  BS  EN  1501  (Refuse Collection Vehicles - General Requirements 
and  Safety Requirements).  This standard does not currently contain a requirement for side 
windows to be fitted. 

On the vehicle involved,  the side windows fitted are to allow operator vision  of the  discharge of 
the container contents relative to the compaction mechanism i.e.  the point at which  container/ 
mechanism physically approach  one another.  The window has therefore been  positioned  to 
facilitate viewing  of this operation,  i.e.  at eye line and/or above,  rather than to check the 
contents of the vehicle  hopper.  We note the comments in  your report,  and we are  reviewing 
our operating instructions to ensure there is  clarity on  how and when the  viewing window is to 
be used,  if one is  present. 

Where fitted  any windows on the various types of bin  lifting  mechanisms will continue to  be 
used for their designed purpose as stated by  the  manufacturer of the various types of bin  lift 
mechanism which are fitted across our fleet of collection vehicles. 

 Our operating  instructions will be reviewed to reflect that checking the vehicle hopper prior to 
compaction may not be possible on some configurations of collection vehicle such  as the one 
involved in this case. 

As a waste collector with  many customers, we take our responsibility to protect people affected  by  our 
business and  operations seriously.  Our deepest sympathies remain with  Corrie's family and friends in 
this tragic case.  This terrible incident highlights the wider problem of people  seeking  shelter in waste 
containers,  an issue we've been  actively campaigning on  for more than 10 years. 

We will continue our efforts to  reduce,  and raise awareness of,  the risks to people in  and  around  bins. 
We believe that our customers can  actively support the  management of the risk of people in  bins by 
reporting to us any instances of people suspected or found  taking  shelter within or around  bins at their 
premises before collections take  place.  Additionally, we are continuing to develop our relationships 
with  national charities who provide support to  rough  sleepers.  This will  build on the existing 
arrangements we have with  Streetlink, who we inform of any  incidents involving people in and around 
bins,  so they can  initiate their outreach  support services. 

We hope that our response addresses the concerns raised  in your Report. 

Yours sincerely 
For BIFFA WASTE SERVICES LIMITED 

Group Health and  Safety Director
Response from Container Handling Equipment Manufacturers (PDF)
2 3 MAY  2022 

CONTAINER HANDLING EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS 

CHEM  SECRETARY 

Three Tree Barn. Millhouse Lane. 
Croft. Warrington. 
WA37HA 

Mr Nigel Parsley 
The Suffolk Coroners Service 
Beacon House 
White House Road 
Ipswich 
IPI SPB 

Reference Corrie McKeague. 

16/05/2022. 

Dear Mr Parsley. 

Thauk you for your correspondence dated 01/04/2022. The contents of which we note. 
May we firstly introduce you to CHEM which was formed in the late 1960's, which is a non 
profit making organisation run by its members whose principal activity is to ensure certain 
standards of universal interfacing of equipment with the relevant vehicles & sharing of 
information by way of guidance, which all its members can adhere to. 

The membership mainly comprises of manufacturing companies covering the manufacture of 
Skiploaders, Hooklift demounts, Compactors &  certain containers, &  Refuse collection 
vehicles within the UK, all of which have separate Committees. 

Regarding the containers used & handled, CHEM have formed Technical Standards. which 
relates to Skiploader,  Hookloader, & Compaction containers only, to ensure that these are 
compatible for use with the UK spec vehicles. 

The design & build of Refuse Collection 11001 containers/bins are not covered under CHEM 
Technical Standards, we understand these are catered for under EN840. The number of these 
containers in use the UK run into the millions and CHEM believe they are fit for purpose and 
serve our industry needs well. 

The Refuse Collection Vehicles - RCV' s manufactures who are members have their own 
instruction & guidance manuals along with the appropriate warning signage. 

In addition, going forward,  CHEM share the concerns raised regarding the number of 
incidents of members of the public gaining entry inside these containers and the CHEM RCV 
members would welcome any suggestions for the insertion of additional warnings for the 
operator to cover this type of eventuality. 

 
 
 
 We hope the information contained within may be of some assistance with your enquiries 
Yours Faithfully
Response from Dennis Eagle (PDF)
1 8 MAY  2022 

Dennis Eagle ltd. 
Heathcote Way,  Heathcote Ind.  Estate 
Warwick,  Warwickshire,  CV34 6TE 
United  Kingdom 

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MfMSER  0, THS  R(WAl  rrnarnG  c,Roue 

Mr Nigel Parsley 
Senior Coroner for Suffolk 
The Suffolk Coroner's Service 
Head Office and Court 
Beacon  House 
White House Road 
Ipswich 
IPl 5PB 

16/05/2022 

Dear Mr Parsley 

REGULATION  28 REPORT TO  PREVENT FUTURE  DEATHS  response 

The  Directors of Dennis Eagle  Ltd.  would  like to extend our condolences to the family of Corrie 

McKeague. 

Please see  below our response to the CORONER'S  MATTERS OF  CONCERN  item number 4.  within the 
REGULATION  28  REPORT TO  PREVENT FUTURE  DEATHS  issued  1st April 2022: 

4.  Poor visibility through the Perspex viewing window on the lorry. 

Purpose/ Design intent of the side 'window' in  Dennis Eagle  refuse machines 

All  refuse collection bodies produced  by Dennis Eagle  Ltd  are designed to comply with the European 

Safety standard BS  EN  1501 (Refuse Collection Vehicles - General Requirements and Safety 

Requirements). This standard does not currently contain a requirement for side windows or camera's 

etc to enable viewing inside the tailgate for this configuration of machine. 

The side windows fitted to the OLYMPUS tailgate have been added to allow operator vision when 

required, of the discharge of the container contents relative to the compaction mechanism i.e. the 

point at which container/ mechanism physically approach one another. The window has therefore 

been positioned to facilitate viewing of this operation, i.e.  at eye line and/or above. 

This window is  not an  absolute requirement for the operation of the machine but has operator 

benefits in some scenarios and/or situations. For example, when larger containers (1100 Its and 

above) are discharged, situations can  occasionally occur when the container contents and/or the 

container need to be  monitored through the discharge cycle to 'aid' clean transfer into the tailgate. 

This can  be  required due to issues with container, container lid condition/position, container contents, 

how full the container is,  etc. 

Opacity of window 

Due to the position of this viewing aperture, it cannot be  an  open feature as  occasionally debris, dust, 

liquids etc., can  be dispersed because of the compaction process. The window is therefore made from 

Dennis  Eagle  Ltd. 
Registered  Office:  Heathcote Way,  Heathcote Ind.  Est,  Warwick,  Warwickshire CV34 6TE 
Registration  No,  03794455,  VAT No.  GB 729  846 779 

 
 
 
 polycarbonate to resist typical  impact scenarios. Over time mechanical scratches, the effect from UV 

light etc. will build  up affecting its transparency. The window is  therefore a serviceable part which can 
be replaced  as  necessary. 

Positioning of window 

The  minimum height/ size of the viewing window is determined by the kinematics of the compaction 
mechanism and discharge trajectory of refuse from containers of many types and sizes  i.e.  its 
positioned above areas potentially subject to wear and  likely impact. 

Operating instructions 

We do not have access to Biffa's Operating Instructions to make specific comments. 

Automatic compaction 

Today's RCV's  including the OLYMPUS  have evolved to support high efficiency collecting systems 
usually utilising automatic twin lifters (lifting smaller, typically 2401tr containers) and auto cycle start 
packing mechanism operation. Auto packing cycle start is a significant benefit to the operators in 

these instances. As  multiple smaller containers are loaded in an  ongoing random way into the tailgate 
the auto packing mechanism start function helps to prevent the tailgate from becoming overloaded 
and  removes the need for frequent operator intervention to achieve the same. 

When lifting larger containers or where refuse tends more towards what may be described as  'trade' 
waste i.e.  a little more unpredictable in  content, it is  possible to select manual compaction from the 

bin lift control station. With manual compaction selected the compaction  mechanism will only start by 
the operator pushing the compaction start button on side control station i.e.  it will not start 
automatically when the bin  lift is  operated. 

Overall summary 

The viewing window, as designed, is  to aid  in the container discharge operation of the machine and 
not to enable the viewing of the floor of the tailgate after the refuse  has  been discharged. 

Your sincerely 

Company Secretary

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