Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0186, written 5 Apr 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 5 Apr 2024 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2024-0186 |
| Deceased | Tracey Farndon |
| Coroner | Louise Hunt |
| Coroner area | Birmingham and Solihull |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths |
| Organisation named | University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
1 2 3 4 REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1. Secretary of state for Health 2. University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust CORONER I am Louise Hunt, Senior Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 9 November 2023 I commenced an investigation into the death of Tracey Ann FARNDON. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest . The conclusion of the inquest was; Natural causes contributed to by a delay in diagnosis and treatment of sepsis. Her death was contributed to by neglect. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Tracey was admitted to the emergency department at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital at 02.17 on 25/04/23 with a 3 day history of diarrhoea and vomiting and severe lower back pain radiating down the buttock and right leg. Initial assessment was undertaken however her blood pressure could not be recorded due to it being very low and no NEWS2 score was calculated. It was not appreciated that Tracey likely had sepsis and no sepsis screen or treatment was given. Tracey was provided with pain relief but no further assessment or observations were undertaken until 07.20 when she was found to have a low blood pressure and a NEWS2 score of 6. She was moved to majors after 08.00 when she was noted to be very unwell. She was not reviewed by a doctor until 08.30 who suspected she was suffering from dehydration due to the diarrhoea and vomiting and fluids were administered but no sepsis screen was undertaken and no sepsis treatment was provided. She deteriorated rapidly with blood gases showing a severe metabolic acidosis. She went into cardiac arrest at 10.30 and sadly could not be saved. Post mortem showed evidence of severe pneumonia and a septic spleen. On balance she was likely suffering from severe sepsis when she was admitted to hospital and there were delays in diagnosing and treating this condition. The emergency department was overwhelmed with patients at the time of Tracey's presentation which impacted on the care provided to her. Following a post mortem the medical cause of death was determined to be: 1a Septic shock 1b Sepsis secondary to community acquired pneumonia 1c II CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. – 5 1. The inquest heard how the emergency department was, and continues to be, overwhelmed with patients with insufficient staff to care for, monitor and manage those patients. There is continued regular use of agency staff. This directly impacts patients' safety and is a risk of future deaths. 2. The inquest heard how staff failed to consider a diagnosis of sepsis throughout Ms Farndon's admission. There is a concern that staff do not fully understand the variable signs and symptoms of sepsis and there is a risk of future deaths. 3. Ms Farndon’s BP was not recordable when she first presented at the emergency department. It was likely to be very low. This was not considered by the staff concerned and no further attempts were made to assess Ms Farndon’s BP. There is a concern staff do not understand the implication of a low BP, the importance of continued observations when a key parameter cannot be recorded and that this may indicate the patient is seriously unwell. This raises a concern of future deaths. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 6 In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the power to take such action. YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 31 May 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 7 Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: Ms Farndon’s family 8 I have also sent it to the Medical Examiner, ICS, NHS England, CQC, who may find it useful or of interest. I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 5 April 2024 9 Signature: Louise Hunt Senior Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
From Maria Caulfield MP
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Mental Health and Women's Health Strategy
Department of Health and Social Care
39 Victoria Street
London
SW1H 0EU
Louise Hunt
HM Senior Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull,
The Birmingham and Solihull Coroner’s Court,
Steelhouse Lane,
Birmingham,
B4 6BJ
13 May 2024
Dear Mrs Louise Hunt,
Thank you for your Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths dated 05/04/2024 on the
death of Tracey Ann Farndon. I am replying as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
(Minister for Mental Health and Women’s Health Strategy).
I was saddened to read of the circumstances of Tracey’s death, and I offer my sincere
condolences to her family and loved ones. The circumstances your report describes are very
concerning and I am grateful to you for bringing these matters to my attention.
Your report raises concerns over a failure to identify and treat sepsis within the emergency
department at Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Birmingham, and highlights the following matters
of concern:
1. The Emergency Department (ED) was, and continues to be, overwhelmed with patients
with insufficient staff to care for, monitor and manage those patients. There is also
continued regular use of agency staff.
2. Staff failed to consider a diagnosis of sepsis throughout Ms Farndon’s admission. This
raises the concern that staff do not fully understand the variable signs and symptoms of
sepsis.
3. Ms Farndon’s blood pressure (BP) was not recordable when she first presented at the
emergency department. It was likely to be very low. This was not considered by the staff
and no further attempts were made to assess Ms Farndon’s BP. This raises concern that
staff do not understand the implication of a low BP, the importance of continued
observations when a key parameter cannot be recorded and that this may indicate the
patient is seriously unwell.
In preparing this response, DHSC officials have made enquiries with NHS England. NHS
England also consulted with University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Trust on local actions
taken. The following response addresses each of your matters of concern in turn.
Sepsis can be a devastating condition and patients rightly expect the NHS to be able to
recognise and diagnose it early and provide the highest quality treatment and care. We must
do all we can to learn from tragic incidents such as Ms Farndon’s death to ensure the safety
of health services and prevent future deaths.
Your report raised concerns about the demand and capacity in Queen Elizabeth Hospital’s
Emergency Department. I recognise the significant pressure the urgent and emergency care
system is facing. That is why we published our ‘Delivery plan for recovering urgent and
emergency care services’, which aims to deliver sustained improvements in waiting times.
Our ambitions include improving the Accident and Emergency (A&E) Department waiting
times and reduce overcrowding, so that, by March 2025, 78% of patients are admitted,
transferred, or discharged from A&E within four hours. A&E waiting times have improved this
year following the delivery plan’s publication, with national A&E 4-hour performance
improving from 71.5% in March 2023 to 74.2% in March 2024.
A key part of the plan has been to increase hospital capacity to reduce overcrowding in A&E.
We have delivered 5,000 more staffed, permanent beds this year compared to 2022-23. A
whole-system approach is needed to ensure people get the emergency care they need. This
is why £1.6 billion of funding has been made available over two years to support the NHS
and local authorities to ensure timely and effective discharge from hospital, helping to free up
beds and reduce long waits for admission from A&E.
The commitment to improving patient safety is highlighted in the first NHS Patient Safety
Strategy. This spring, NHS England will launch a deterioration toolkit called ‘PIER’ which
stands for Prevention, Identification, Escalation and Response. This suite of resources will
be accompanied by improvement support delivered by Patient Safety Collaboratives and
targeted at Integrated Care Systems to improve deterioration pathways. This programme of
work will also incorporate the implementation of ‘Martha’s Rule’, which will be rolled out to at
least 100 acute NHS trusts in 2024-25. ‘Martha’s Rule’ will allow inpatients and families to
request a rapid review 24 hours a day when a patient’s physiological condition is thought to
be deteriorating.
We aim for all acute trusts in England to use PIER to create and implement deterioration
improvement plans, alongside Matha’s Rule. This will help staff to ensure an individual’s vital
sign baseline (including blood pressure) is understood and that a range of risk assessment
tools and methods are used to identify, monitor and mitigate their risk of deterioration.
We must ensure clinicians, and other NHS staff, can recognise unwell and deteriorating
patients. The National Early Warning Score (NEWS2) is a system for scoring the
physiological measurements that are routinely recorded at the patient's bedside to support
clinicians in identifying acutely unwell patients, including those with suspected sepsis. Since
2018, NEWS2 has been implemented across 98.4% of acute trusts and 100% of ambulance
trusts in England.
Despite the widespread use of NEWS2, some patients who deteriorate with sepsis are still
not diagnosed quickly enough. To address that, ‘Recording of NEWS2 score, escalation and
response time for unplanned critical care admissions’ was identified as a clinical priority area
for the NHS over 2023/2024. It was included in the Commissioning for Quality and
Innovation (CQUIN) scheme in 2023/2024, which aimed to incentivise the use of NEWS2 to
improve care by ensuring appropriate steps are taken to record and respond to deterioration.
Sepsis requires early recognition and prompt treatment with antibiotics. In May 2022, the
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges published a position statement on the initial
antimicrobial treatment of sepsis. Subsequently, in March 2024, the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) updated Guideline 51 on suspected sepsis. It is critical
that updates to national sepsis guidance are disseminated and well recognised amongst a
wide range of healthcare professionals who may encounter sepsis and acute deterioration.
NHS England has developed several sepsis training and education resources, including e-
learning, sector specific toolkits, and the ‘sepsis educational digital game,’ an accessible
introduction to sepsis for clinical and non-clinical staff. We will continue to work with NHS
England to understand what resources are needed ensure that healthcare professionals
recognise and respond appropriately when patients deteriorate.
Furthermore, there is a commitment to drive evidence generation in this area. In 2022, the
National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) awarded £3.2m of funding to the
Sepsis Trials In Critical Care study (SepTIC), which will look to answer critical questions on
sepsis diagnostics and treatment. NIHR continues to fund many ongoing studies into sepsis
and welcomes applications for further research in this area.
Your report also raised concerns regarding the assessment of Ms Farndon’s low blood
pressure. I note you have shared your report and concerns with University Hospitals
Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, to respond directly to your matters of concern. I have
included below some of the local actions that the Trust has committed to in response to the
concerns in your report.
Firstly, the trust has acknowledged the need for further clinical skills training for nursing staff,
which includes being competent and confident in taking manual blood pressure readings.
Queen Elizabeth Hospital’s A&E department has also recognised that an alternative method
of assessing perfusion, such as checking the radial pulse, is needed in addition to manual
blood pressure. The Trust have agreed to include this in its induction programme along with
an educational update to increase awareness and compliance. The A&E standard operating
procedure will be updated to reflect that any observations that are incompletely documented
must be handed over to the patient's nurse, with the need to repeat the observations being
clearly documented.
In addition, feedback has been given to all staff involved in Ms Farndon’s care. The Trust has
recognised that further education is required by clinical staff to be able to identify patients
with possible sepsis having back pain, gastrointestinal symptoms and/or being afebrile. This
learning will be shared at Morbidity and Mortality meetings, through local training and via the
ED Safety Newsletter. The Trust has also acknowledged the need for a review of both the
“Role & Responsibility Action Cards” for staff leads on shift, and the escalation procedures
within ED.
I hope this response is helpful. Thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention.
Best Wishes,
MARIA CAULFIELD
Executive Office of the Chair & Chief Executive
28th May 2024
Mrs Louise Hunt
HM Senior Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull
Dear Mrs Hunt
Inquest touching the death of Tracey Ann Farndon
Response to Regulation 28 Report to prevent future deaths
I am writing in response to the Regulation 28 notice issued following the conclusion of the
inquest on 5th April 2024, into the sad death of Tracey Ann Farndon on April 25th, 2023, at
Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (part of University Hospitals Birmingham NHS
Foundation Trust (UHB)). I extend my sincere condolences to Mrs Farndon’s family.
I note your narrative conclusion as “Natural causes contributed to by a delay in diagnosis and
treatment of sepsis. Her death was contributed to by neglect.” I further note your concerns
regarding risks of future deaths, which have been addressed in turn below. The focus of the
actions has been at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB), but the learning
identified in this response has been shared with each of the responsible Hospital Medical
Directors and Directors of Nursing covering QEHB, Heartlands Hospital and Good Hope
Hospital, respectively, for implementation.
Concern 1:
The inquest heard how the Emergency Department at QEHB was, and continues to be,
overwhelmed with patients with insufficient staff to care for, monitor and manage those
patients. There is continued regular use of agency staff. This directly impacts patients'
safety and is a risk of future deaths.
It is recognised that Emergency Department (ED) crowding, where the demands on the
department exceed the capacity, can have a negative impact on patient outcomes and staff
(Royal College of Emergency Medicine: The Management of Emergency Department
Crowding, January 2024). Solutions require whole systems interventions. Causes and
interventions to minimise the risk of crowding can be considered in terms of:
1) Output – The inability of patients to leave the ED once their care is completed.
UHB has Trust wide Standard Operation Procedures for Trust Capacity Escalation, and
for circumstances where the Emergency Departments reach full capacity. These are
followed in conjunction with the operational policy for managing ambulance offload delays.
At each site, there are bed meetings held throughout the day to identify beds for patients
requiring admission to ward areas. A member of the site team is present in each of the
UHB Emergency Departments between the formal bed meetings to liaise with the nurse in
charge and Consultant and ensure patients are transferred to the allocated beds as soon
as they become available. There are dedicated escalation processes in place with
Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Foundation Trust and Birmingham and Solihull
Integrated Care Board to ensure that patients with mental health issues requiring
admission are transferred from the ED as soon as possible.
At QEHB, for patients awaiting medical review who are likely to be able to be discharged
following appropriate investigation and management, we have increased the number of
patients referred to the acute medicine Same Day Emergency Care (SDEC) area, and
created a frailty SDEC in November 2023, where frailer patients can receive the
appropriate medical and therapy input. Through reconfiguration of the QEHB ED, we have
reintroduced an Emergency Observation Unit (EOU) for patients that do not require
admission but may require additional monitoring or investigation prior to discharge from
the ED. The QEHB EOU was opened March 2024.
2) Throughput – processes within the ED
a) ED staffing
i. Nursing
A staffing matrix is used as a forward look to ensure sufficient staffing for each level of
seniority on every shift, with an escalation process for predicted shortfalls. ED staff
utilise shift logs and quality and safety checklists to ensure patients receive the
appropriate care, monitoring, and management.
There has been an improvement in nursing recruitment, with a significant reduction in
the use of agency staff in ED at QEHB. In May 2023, over 600 shifts per month were
filled with external registered staff. This has reduced to 164 shifts in April 2024, with a
projection to withdraw external agency requests at the end of June 2024.
ii. Medical
Due to under-recruitment, medical middle grade rosters (Specialist Registrar level or
equivalent) in QEHB ED remain reliant on locum staff, but the majority of shifts are
filled by doctors who work regular shifts in the department and are therefore familiar
with hospital processes.
Since May 2023, at QEHB there has been an additional dedicated Consultant in the
ED Ambulatory Area (EDAA) until midnight, with the aim of improving flow.
b) Reconfiguration of the department
We have recognised that the current layout of the ED at QEHB causes significant
challenges to operational performance. The EDAA area was initially created to
mitigate the physical distancing demands of the Covid pandemic, but its layout and
location away from the main department poses risks to patients clinically and staff
logistically. We will therefore be reducing the size of the EDAA to treat minor injuries
and referrals to the on-site urgent care GP led service only. This will occur from June
2024, and will allow us to focus staff to provide care within the main ED footprint.
c) Rapid Assessment and Triage and eTriage
In conjunction with the physical reconfiguration of the department, we will be
introducing eTriage to help identify the high acuity patients earlier on in their arrival
before the full triage, and to help prioritise sicker patients in a busy ED. This system
utilises the Manchester Triage System and is expected to be implemented at QEHB
ED in June 2024. Introduction of eTriage will follow at our other Emergency
Departments as soon as possible.
A Rapid Assessment and Triage (RAT) process is being re-established for
ambulance and walk in patients. This will ensure that all patients will be reviewed by
a senior decision maker and senior nurse soon after arrival, with an initial
investigation and management plan instigated. RAT will be in place at QEHB by early
June 2024, and will increase the safety of walk-in patients and patients in the waiting
room. The effectiveness of current assessment and triage pathways at Heartlands
and Good Hope Hospitals is also under review and the feasibility and utility of
introducing RAT in these EDs is being considered.
3) Input – influences before the patient arrives at the ED
We have worked with system partners to introduce measures to try and reduce the number
of patients presenting to each of our EDs.
At QEHB, this includes:
a) Reintroducing direct GP referrals to the Same Day Emergency Care area run by Acute
Medicine – this was implemented in January 2024, and has seen a marked increase
in the number of GP referrals to SDEC.
b) In December 2023, a “Call before you convey” process was introduced across the
West Midlands region. This facilitates ambulance clinicians to access acute and
community teams for a joint clinical discussion to support the right care for patients
aged over 60 years.
c) UHB works closely with West Midlands Ambulance Service and the ED has an agreed
Standard Operating Procedure for managing Ambulance Offloads.
Concern 2:
The inquest heard how staff failed to consider a diagnosis of sepsis throughout Ms
Farndon's admission. There is a concern that staff do not fully understand the variable
signs and symptoms of sepsis and there is a risk of future deaths.
There is a dedicated Trust Sepsis Group which proactively audits compliance with sepsis
pathways across the organization. The emergency department at QEHB routinely identifies
and successfully manages a large number of patients with sepsis. Between January and April
2024, the department identified 900 patients with sepsis, 847 (94%) of whom received
antibiotics intravenously within an hour of their diagnosis.
In response to events surrounding Ms Farndon’s death, the ED department at QEHB has
initiated a programme of sepsis training. This includes:
Identifying sepsis champions at all grades of staff
•
• Utilising Trust and Sepsis UK resources for educational events, with focussed sepsis
events planned for May and June 2024. Pre and post education assessments will
evaluate whether training improves knowledge.
• Displaying sepsis specific information on safety boards
A rolling audit programme of completion of the Sepsis 6 Bundle has been established, and
sepsis training is included in the induction programme for all new staff and in regular
educational training updates. Sepsis is part of the educational and training programmes for all
junior medical staff.
The Trust utilises sepsis screening using NEWS2, which is automatically calculated from the
physiological observations recorded in the electronic medical records’ system. Alerts to
consider sepsis are generated automatically when the NEWS2 is equal to or greater than 5.
However, a significant focus of training is “call for concern” where a patient may have sepsis,
but the NEWS2 score is less than 5.
Sepsis screening will be embedded in the Rapid Assessment and Triage process, and the
early involvement of senior clinicians in the review process for walk in and ambulance patients
will facilitate recognition of sepsis across the spectrum of presentation.
Concern 3:
Ms Farndon’s BP was not recordable when she first presented at the emergency
department. It was likely to have been be very low. This was not considered by the staff
concerned and no further attempts were made to assess Ms Farndon’s BP. There is a
concern staff do not understand the implication of a low BP, the importance of
continued observations when a key parameter cannot be recorded and that this may
indicate the patient is seriously unwell. This raises a concern of future deaths.
A programme of manual blood pressure training and competence was commenced for all
Emergency Department staff at QEHB in March 2024. This includes education regarding the
limitations of electronic blood pressure measurement, for example the unreliability when
patients have atrial fibrillation, and the escalation process for situations when blood pressure
cannot be recorded. All band 6 and band 7 staff who are not on extended leave have
completed this training, with all band 5 staff expected to have completed training by the end
of May 2024. There is always a dedicated senior emergency doctor in all areas to escalate to
for urgent review if the blood pressure is unable to be recorded through automatic or manual
means. Training also includes education regarding additional means of assessing perfusion
such as palpation of radial pulse and capillary refill time. The Trust Clinical Guidelines for
taking a Non-Invasive Blood Pressure Measurement in adult patients have been disseminated
to all staff. The Rapid Assessment and Triage process will ensure that there is a senior nurse
and senior decision maker on initial review.
Mindful of the relevance of this concern to UHB ward areas, a Moodle educational package
has been created for all UHB staff which covers fundamental observations including how to
complete a manual blood pressure. The clinical skills team will be running drop-in sessions for
staff to refresh their knowledge in this skill.
I would like to assure you that the concerns raised within the Regulation 28 Report have been
taken extremely seriously, which I hope is demonstrated in the steps we have taken in
reviewing and strengthening our systems, processes and training provision to our teams.
Yours sincerely
Chief Executive
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