Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023

Michael Bray

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0238, written 22 May 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report22 May 2023
Reference2024-0238
DeceasedMichael Bray
CoronerPeter Taheri
Coroner areaSuffolk
CategoryEmergency services related deaths (2019 onwards) · Suicide (from 2015)
Organisation namedEast of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published2

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

1) The Right Honourable Steve Barclay MP 
Secretary of State for Health and Social Care 

2) [The East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust] 

1 

CORONER 

I am Peter Taheri, Assistant Coroner, for the coroner area of Suffolk. 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 15th October 2021 an investigation was commenced into the death of Michael 
James Francis Bray. 

The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 16th February 2023. 

The Jury’s narrative conclusion of the inquest was that: 

Michael Bray died by way of misadventure. 

Points that possibly contributed to Michael’s death include: 

• The Fast Action Response Plan, and whether it should have been updated to 
include risks arising from the near-miss on 23 September 2021 and PC Cook’s 
view by 4th October 2021 that the risks of suicide / misadventure had risen to 
high. 

• Whether the Police should have deployed resources upon learning, at about 
2.02am on 10th October 2021, that Michael was no longer on the telephone to 
the mental health professionals together with the knowledge that an ambulance 
could take up to 120 minutes to arrive. 

• Whether the Ambulance Service should have asked Police to deploy a 
resource because of delays in sourcing an available ambulance. 

• The Ambulance Service omission to bring the Police declining to attend, at 
about 3.18am, to the attention of the Ambulance dispatcher, leading to a one-
hour delay in the dispatcher becoming aware that Police would not attend. 

• The appropriateness of the ambulance crew’s dynamic risk assessment on 
arrival at Michael’s home address and their decision not to approach his house 
and check his door and check welfare. 

• The period of time taken for the ambulance crew to chase for the whereabouts 
of Police attendance. 

• The timing of any escalation of the Ambulance Service request for Police 
attendance. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • Shortcomings in software and communication systems, amongst agencies 

• Poor interpretation, misunderstanding and poor analysis of the information 
available to agencies concerned. The sharing and agreement of actions, at 
times lacked urgency. 

• The police failing to complete a welfare check after an initial call from the 
Crisis Team. 

The medical cause of death was confirmed as: 

1(a) Hanging 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

The Jury’s answer to how, when, where and in what circumstances the deceased 
came by his death was: 

Michael Bray was at home on 9th and 10th October 2021 
He had been drinking alcohol and called the Crisis Helpline stating 

resulting in his death sometime between 1:55-5:53, 10th October 2021 

 considering hanging himself. After the call, he proceeded, 

After the conclusion of the evidence, I ruled that on the evidence the Jury could not 
safely make any finding of fact on the balance of probabilities on the precise time of 
death other than that death occurred between about 1.50am and 5.53am on 10th 
October 2021. The Jury were directed to, and did, answer the question of when the 
deceased died accordingly. 

A notable feature of this case was a lack of availability or provision of an ambulance 
to respond in a timely manner to the deceased’s Category 2 call, which contributed to 
a considerable delay. 

On the evidence, the national ambulance target response time for a Category 2 call is 
an average of 18 minutes, with 90% of calls to be responded to within 40 minutes. In 
this case, the ambulance response took a period of time in the hours, considerably 
greater than the target response time. 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. 
In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In 
the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: –  

Although it could not be safely said when the deceased died, and therefore it could 
not safely be said that the delay in the ambulance response probably contributed to 
the death, the concern is that long delays in ambulance response to Category 2 calls 
create a risk that other deaths will occur in the future. 

Bearing in mind the national ambulance target response time for a Category 2 call of 
an average of 18 minutes, with 90% of calls to be responded to within 40 minutes: 

The average Category 2 response time for the East of England Ambulance Service 
NHS Trust (‘EEAST’) in October 2021, the month of this death, was 56 minutes and 2 
seconds. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The same average time for January 2023, the most recent month for which data was 
available, was 49 minutes and 3 seconds. 

Every month since the deceased’s death, EEAST’s Category 2 response time has 
been above the 90th centile time of 40 minutes. 

The average EEAST Category 2 response time for a given month in the period from 
October 2021 to January 2023 is over 1 hour, with a standard deviation of about 20 
minutes. 

Therefore, EEAST’s Category 2 response time remains persistently and consistently 
far off target. 

Although I accept on the evidence that action is being taken, on both local and 
national levels, to prevent future deaths as a result of this issue, the evidence of the 
results of such actions to date is that these actions have been demonstrably 
ineffective and have not resulted in a Category 2 average response time for EEAST 
that is even close to the target time. 

The evidence received was that this issue, and the causes for it and the action 
required, are not just local in nature, but also national. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe each of 
you and / or your organisations have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 17th July 2023. I, the Coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting 
out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons: 

-  The Bray Family (in particular 

, the deceased’s son, and 

, the deceased’s wife) 

- 
-  The Chief Constable of Suffolk Constabulary 
-  Norfolk & Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust 

I am under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary 
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it 
useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the Coroner, at the time of 
your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief 
Coroner. 

9 

22nd May 2023                                        Peter Taheri

Responses

2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Department of Health and Social Care (PDF)
From Helen Whately MP 
Minister of State for Care 

39 Victoria Street 
London 
SW1H 0EU 

Peter Taheri 
Assistant Coroner for the coroner area of Suffolk 
BMSDC 
Endeavour House 
Ipswich IP1 2BX 

12 April 2024 

Dear Mr Taheri,   

Thank you for your letter of 25 May 2023 about the death of Michael Bray. I am replying as 
Minister  with  responsibility  for  Urgent  and  Emergency  Care.  Please  accept  my  sincere 
apologies for the significant delay in responding to this matter. I would like to assure you that 
the  department  is  mindful  of  the  statutory  responsibilities  in  relation  to  prevention  of  future 
deaths reports and we are prioritising responses as a matter of urgency.  

Firstly, I would like to say how saddened I was to read of the circumstances of Mr Bray’s death 
and I  offer  my  sincere  condolences to  their  family  and loved  ones.  I  am grateful  to  you for 
bringing these matters to my attention.  

Your  report  raises  concerns  about  the  ambulance  response  times  by  East  of  England 
Ambulance  Service  NHS  Trust  (EEAST).   You  have  raised  these  concerns  directly  with 
EEAST which is best placed to respond on the specific action being taken locally to improve 
response times. In preparing this response, Departmental officials have made enquiries with 
the Care Quality Commission who have also met EEAST to discuss the circumstances around 
Mr Bray’s death and local action being taken. 

I recognise the significant pressure services are facing.  That is why we published our Delivery 
plan  for  recovering  urgent  and  emergency  care  services’  which  aims  to  deliver  sustained 
improvements in waiting times, including to reduce Category 2 response times to 30 minutes 
on  average 
is  available  at  https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2023/01/B2034-delivery-plan-for-recovering-urgent-and-emergency-care-
services.pdf  

this  year.  The  plan 

A  primary  aim  of  our  delivery  plan  is  to  boost  ambulance  capacity.  Ambulance  services 
received  £200  million  of  additional  funding  in  2023/24  to  expand  capacity  and  improve 
response times, and we are maintaining this additional capacity in 2024/25. This is alongside 
the delivery of new ambulances and specialist mental health vehicles. With more ambulances 
on the road, patients will receive the treatment they need more swiftly.     

I recognise that ambulance trusts work within a health and care system and issues such as 
delayed patient handovers to hospitals can impact on capacity and response times. That is 
why a  key  part  of the  delivery  plan  is  about  improving  patient  flow  and bed capacity  within 
hospitals.  We  achieved  our  2023/24  ambition  of  delivering  5,000  more  staffed,  permanent 
hospital beds this year compared to 2022-23 plans, backed by £1 billion of dedicated funding, 
and we will maintain this capacity uplift in 2024/25. Further, we also achieved our target of 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
   
 scaling up virtual ward bed capacity to over 10,000 ahead of winter 2023/24, and there are 
now  over  11,000  beds  available  nationally.   We  also  have  made  £1.6  billion  of  funding 
available over two years to support the NHS and local authorities to ensure timely and effective 
discharge  from  hospital,  helping  to  free  up  beds  and reduce  long  waits  for  admission  from 
A&E, reducing delays in ambulances handing over patients so they can swiftly get back on 
the roads.  

At a national level, we have seen significant improvements in performance this year compared 
to last year. In winter 2023-24, average Category 2 ambulance response times (including for 
serious conditions such as heart attacks and strokes) were over 12 minutes faster compared 
to  the  same  period  last  year,  a  24%  reduction.  For  EEAST,  in  winter  2023-24,  average 
Category 2 response times were almost 23 minutes faster compared to the same time period 
last year, a 32% reduction.  However, I recognise there is still more to do to reduce response 
times down further and back towards pre-pandemic levels – reducing waiting times is a priority 
for this Government. 

Thank you once again for bringing these concerns to my attention.   

Yours,  

HELEN WHATELY 

2
Response from East of England Ambulance Service (PDF)
HM Coroner Peter Taheri 
Assistant Coroner for Suffolk 
By Email 

18 July 2023 

Dear Mr Taheri, 

East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust 
Headquarters 
Whiting Way 
Melbourn 
Cambridgeshire 
SG8 6NA 

I  am  writing  further  to  the  inquest  into  the  death  of  Michael  James  Francis  Bray,  which  concluded  on  16 
February 2023. I understand that you heard from a number of Trust witnesses during the inquest and the 
Legal Services Team provided you with additional information post-inquest in relation to the actions the Trust 
is taking to respond to Category 2 calls. Following this you made a Regulation 28 Preventing Future Death 
report and this is the Trust’s response to your concerns.  

You acknowledge that action is being taken on both local and national levels in relation to the C2 response 
times (as this is not an issue specific to this Trust) however you have stated that the evidence from these 
actions is that these have been ineffective to date. 

The  Trust  has  an  Organisational  Performance  and  Improvement  Plan  (OPIP)  where  the  main  aim  is  to 
improve  the  Trust’s  response  to  patients  demonstrated  in  national  performance  benchmarking  and  to 
increase  the  work-effective  workforce.  The  plan  is  incredibly  detailed  and  identifies  actions  on  a  granular 
level, however the attached presentation has been produced to provide a visual update on where we are with 
this work. I believe this demonstrates the Trust’s commitment to improve our response times and the key 
areas of focus.  

Meeting the C2 response time has been a challenge for all ambulance services. Modelling by NHS England 
(NHSE) demonstrates there is a strong relationship between hospital handover delays and the ambulance 
C2 performance. NHSE’s regression model indicated that based on previous performance, in order to reach 
an average response time of 30 minutes for C2 patients, a maximum of 1,500 lost hours per week should not 
be exceeded (see graph below). Equally if more than 1,500 hours are lost per week, the C2 response time is 
unachievable.  

The  Regional  NHSE  oversight  meetings  have  been  formed  to  support  this  important  maximum  standard. 
Currently levels exceed this significantly and in Q1 weekly lost hours exceeded 2,700 hours per week.   

www.eastamb.nhs.uk 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 We  are  continuing  to  work  with  NHSE  and  our  other  healthcare  partners  to  improve  our  response  times, 
particularly in relation to Category 2 calls. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require any further 
information.  

Yours sincerely, 

Chief Executive Officer 

www.eastamb.nhs.uk

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