Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0318, written 13 Jun 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 13 Jun 2024 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2024-0318 |
| Deceased | Christopher Larsen |
| Coroner | Isobel Thistlethwaite |
| Coroner area | Rutland and North Leicestershire |
| Category | Suicide (from 2015) |
| Organisation named | Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS NOTE: This form is to be used after an inquest. REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: The Chief Executive, Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust via their legal representatives 1 CORONER I am Miss I THISTLETHWAITE, His Majesty's Assistant Coroner for the coroner area of Rutland and North Leicestershire. 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 17 January 2023 I commenced an investigation into the death of Christopher Henrik LARSEN aged 52. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on . The conclusion of the inquest was that: The cause of death was established as: I a Hanging by Ligature I b I c II 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Mr Larsen was a 52 year old white male who, on 6 January 2023, was found hanging at his home in Leicestershire. 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the investigation my inquiries revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 16/05/2023 Pre-amble Mr Larsen was a 52 year old male with no history of mental health problems until he presented to his GP in November 2022 to discuss a decline in his Mental Health. Mr Larsen reported going through a very difficult time, his business was being liquidated and he felt he had let his family and business associates down. Mr Larsen advised the GP that he had placed a bag over his head a few days before the consultation but stopped short of seeing his attempt to end his life through because he thought about his children who were a protective factor for him. Mr Larsen’s GP referred him to the CRISIS Home Resolution Treatment Team, part of the Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust, who accepted him for a period of treatment. Mr Larsen was seen regularly by the team and commenced on medication. Mr Larsen was discharged from the CRISIS Home Resolution Treatment Team on 3 December 2022. On 4 January 2023 Mr Larsen contacted the CRISIS Home Resolution Treatment Team and reported a return of suicidal thoughts, he said that he felt he needed medication, counselling and mental health support. Mr Larsen agreed to be contacted by a Mental Health Practitioner from the Mental Health Central Access Point for the purposes of carrying out a triage. On 5 January 2023, in the evening, a Nurse from the Mental Health Central Access Point contacted Mr Larsen to carry out a Safe and Well Call. During the call Mr Larsen confirmed that he was ok and agreed for the triage appointment to be carried out on 6 January 2023, confirming that he would be able to keep himself safe until then. It was accepted during the inquest by the Nurse who undertook this safe and well call that she had not read Mr Larsen’s medical records or his referral document before making the safe and well call and therefore she was not aware of the risks relating to Mr Larsen when she made the call. On 6 January 2023 Mr Larsen was found hanging at home by his wife, he died before the planned triage call could take place. Concerns 1. Multi-Disciplinary Team (“MDT”) Meetings I am concerned about the Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust MDT meetings and their functionality. Mr Larsen was discussed at three meetings, at two of the three meetings none of the attendees had met Mr Larsen. It was at an MDT meeting where Mr Larsen was deemed to be “low risk” (having initially been deemed to be high risk by the Central Access Point), it is not possible to understand why Mr Larsen’s risk was downgraded to low risk by the MDT meeting because the MDT meeting documentation does not contain that information. The issue of poor documentation relating to MDT meetings and their decision making is something which could have ramifications across the whole Trust and also for other bodies who come together to provide care for patients. The MDT meeting either misread or misunderstood Mr Larsen’s medical records. The notes document that Mr Larsen explained that he had previously placed a bag over his head and that this remained the way he would end his life, he advised that he could not give assurances that he would not try to do this again. The MDT documentation however states that Mr Larsen “wrapped plastic bag over his face but self-rescued, does not want to do it again”. This is incorrect. The MDT meeting therefore proceeded, and made decisions based upon, incorrect information. There were several requests made to MDT meetings for Mr Larsen to have a medic review, the MDT Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 16/05/2023 deemed this to be unnecessary but there is no documentation explaining the rationale of those decision. The Trust SI report states that “it is unfortunate that he was not reviewed by a medic.” At the second MDT meeting on 17th November the working diagnosis in relation to Mr Larsen was an acute stress reaction. This working diagnosis was not revisited at the third MDT on 22nd November. The Trust’s SI report states that by 17th November there was evidence of a severe depressive disorder, this potential diagnosis was not identified or explored by the MDT meeting. 2. Risk assessments At his initial triage (undertaken by the Central Access Point) Mr Larsen was deemed to be high risk. At a later MDT meeting Mr Larsen was deemed to be low risk. It is not possible to explore the rationale behind the downgrading of Mr Larsen’s risk to low because there is no documentation about the decision making. The Trust’s SI report identified the fact that several “red flag” risk factors which applied to Mr Larsen were not “robustly considered” when assessing Mr Larsen’s risk. The Trust’s SI report states that it was “unclear why it was felt the risks had subsided by the time of discharge on 3.12.2022”. 3. Discharge Mr Larsen was discharged from the care of LPT on 3 December 2022, there was no planned support for Mr Larsen post-discharge other than some counselling which was due to start three weeks later. The Trust’s SI report states that it is “unclear why it was felt the risks had subsided by the time of discharge on 3.12.2022” and that Mr Larsen had the “presence of ample markers for high risk of completed suicide” yet he was discharged back to the care of his GP and into a lacuna of care with no pre-arranged support other than counselling which would not commence for three weeks. 4. The Serious Investigation and Reporting Process at LPT I remain concerned about inadequacies in the Serious Incident Investigation and Reporting processes at Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust. The Serious Incident Investigation into Mr Larsen’s death did uncover and accepted some failings in relation to the care provided to Mr Larsen. However, it failed to uncover all the matters arising at inquest and, some of the matters that it did uncover do not have correlating items of work listed in the action plan. There was no exploration of the MDT meeting’s functionality or documentation as part of the SI investigation. Further, I have concerns about the implementation and embedding of the lessons learned which are identified by the SI Report. In this case the live witnesses who gave evidence during the course of the inquest did not demonstrate that learning had filtered down to the front-line staff. I am therefore concerned that the SI process at LPT does not support a robust and critical analysis and investigation of the care provided to patients, further, I have concerns about the ability of the Trust to embed changes and learning. This failure to properly explore matters and learn where possible inevitably leads to a delay, or failure altogether, to learn lessons which are vital to patient safety across the whole Trust. Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 16/05/2023 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you (and/or your organisation) have the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by August 08, 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise, you must explain why no action is proposed. COPIES and PUBLICATION 8 I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons The Larsen Family I have also sent it to The CQC who may find it useful or of interest. I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it. I may also send a copy of your response to any person who I believe may find it useful or of interest. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 Dated: 13/06/2024 Miss I THISTLETHWAITE His Majesty's Assistant Coroner for Rutland and North Leicestershire Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 16/05/2023
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Email:
Bridge Park Plaza
Bridge Park Road
Thurmaston
Leicester
LE4 8PQ
Tel:
www.leicspart.nhs.uk
Via email c/o
13th June 2024
Dear Miss Thistlethwaite
Christopher Henrik Larsen
Inquest date: 21st March 2023 & 10th May 2023
On behalf of the Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust (‘the Trust’), I am responding
to your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “your Report”) dated 30 April
2024 concerning the death of Christopher Henrik Larsen. In advance of responding
to the concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express my deepest
condolences to Mr Larsen’s family and loved ones. The Trust wishes to assure the
Larsen family and HM Coroner that the concerns raised about his care have been
listened to, reflected upon and action has been taken as a result.
I am very sorry that you were required to issue such a report before the completion
of the evidence in this Inquest, but I hope that this response will provide you with
assurance that changes have been implemented.
In your report, you have raised three Matters of Concern:
1.
Safe and Well call on the 5th January 2023
‘The Nurse who undertook the Safe and Well Call on Mr Larsen on 5 January 2023
did not read his medical records or his referral document before making the call. The
Nurse accepted that she was therefore not aware of the risks relating to Mr Larsen at
the time of making the call. She stated that if she had been aware of the risks, she
would have explored the events prior to the referral, including the suicide attempt,
and confirmed whether or not Mr Larsen was having suicidal thoughts and whether
Trust Headquarters: Bridge Park Plaza, Bridge Park Road, Thurmaston, Leicester. LE4 8PQ
he had intent to act on any thoughts he might have been having, during the Safe and
Well Call.’
Regular training, clinical supervision and reflection sessions take place routinely for
clinical staff, however following this feedback, additional training and reflection
sessions were undertaken with the nurse, and the line manager of the nurse to fully
understand the context in this case. A full investigation into the nurses’ practice is
underway internally; this will include consideration of the appropriateness of an NMC
referral in line with Trust processes. In the meantime, the nurse is restricted from
undertaking any nursing shifts within community services within the Trust or as a
practicing lone qualified member of staff in an inpatient setting until the investigation
concludes.
2.
Current practice around Safe and Well Calls.
‘The same Nurse advised at the first day of the inquest, which is currently part-heard,
that she still does not review a patient’s medical records before making a Safe and
Well Call. Further, the Nurse confirmed that she does not have the time to read the
whole of the referral document before making the Safe and Well Call, she only has
enough time to read part of it.’
We understand and recognise that this has occurred previously and as part of our
ongoing learning we are reviewing all causal factors whilst reminding clinicians of the
importance of reviewing medical records before taking any clinical decisions.
team regarding professional
Additional
responsibility for reading a clinical record before making calls and taking clinical
decisions.
training has been delivered
this
to
Training and team meetings are important vehicles for us in reminding people of the
importance of this, and we are also formalising this by updating the Central Access
Point Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to be explicit that it is the clinician’s
responsibility to manage their own allocated work for the shift, look through the
referrals having considered the patient record and prioritise the triage calls on risk,
urgency and patient availability.
3.
Access to risk documentation
‘Further, and as in the case of Mr Larsen, sometimes patients self-refer to the
service. On those occasions, the referral documents are populated containing only
what a patient tells the person completing the document. There may be pertinent and
important information contained within the medical records relating to risk that is not
disclosed by the patient, for whatever reason, and does not form part of the referral
document. In these cases, the failure to read a patient’s medical records can lead to
important information being missed and possibly important issues not being explored
by the person making the Safe and Well’.
As a learning point from the feedback provided, we are reviewing the layout of the
safe and well template to ensure that this is in a format which makes this as easy as
possible for call takers to review the information and assess risk and capture
information from the call. The new template will be co-produced with staff and will be
signed off by the Information Management and Technology (IM&T) Clinical Safety
and Improvement Group.
This will be available within the full electronic patient record (EPR) which the team
has access to.
Trust Headquarters: Bridge Park Plaza, Bridge Park Road, Thurmaston, Leicester. LE4 8PQ
I trust that the response outlined above provide assurances that the Leicestershire
Partnership NHS Trust has controls in place to minimise a recurrence of the
circumstances around Mr Larsen’s death.
Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and
please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Yours sincerely
Chief Executive
Trust Headquarters: Bridge Park Plaza, Bridge Park Road, Thurmaston, Leicester. LE4 8PQ
Chair: Crishni Waring Chief Executive: Angela Hillery
Room 100/110 Pen Lloyd
Building
County Hall
Leicester Road
Glenfield
Leicestershire
LE3 8RA
Tel:
www.leicspart.nhs.uk
Ref
8 August 2024
Dear Miss Thistlethwaite
Christopher Henrik Larsen
Inquest date: 21st March 2024, 10th May 2024, and 13th June 2024
On behalf of Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust (hereafter ‘the Trust’), I am
responding to your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “your Report”) dated
13th June 2024 concerning the death of Christopher Henrik Larsen. In advance of
responding to the concerns raised in your report, I would like to express my deepest
condolences to Mr Larsen’s family and loved ones. The Trust wishes to assure the
Larsen family and HM Assistant Coroner that the concerns raised about his care have
been listened to, reflected upon and actions have been taken as a result.
Concern 1: Multi-disciplinary Team (MDT) Meeting
“I am concerned about the Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust MDT meetings and
their functionality. Mr Larsen was discussed at three meetings, at two of the three
meetings none of the attendees had met Mr Larsen. It was at an MDT meeting where
Mr Larsen was deemed to be “low risk” (having initially been deemed to be high risk
by the Central Access Point), it is not possible to understand why Mr Larsen’s risk was
downgraded to low risk by the MDT meeting because the MDT meeting documentation
does not contain that information. The issue of poor documentation relating to MDT
meetings and their decision making is something which could have ramifications
across the whole Trust and also for other bodies who come together to provide care
for patients. The MDT meeting either misread or misunderstood Mr Larsen’s medical
records. The notes document that Mr Larsen explained that he had previously placed
a bag over his head and that this remained the way he would end his life, he advised
that he could not give assurances that he would not try to do this again. The MDT
documentation however states that Mr Larsen “wrapped plastic bag over his face but
self-rescued, does not want to do it again.” This is incorrect. The MDT meeting
therefore proceeded, and made decisions based upon, incorrect information. There
were several requests made to MDT meetings for Mr Larsen to have a medic review,
the MDT Regulation 28 – After Inquest Document Template Updated 16/05/2023
deemed this to be unnecessary but there is no documentation explaining the rationale
of those decision. The Trust SI report states that “it is unfortunate that he was not
reviewed by a medic.” At the second MDT meeting on 17th November the working
diagnosis in relation to Mr Larsen was an acute stress reaction. This working diagnosis
was not revisited at the third MDT on 22nd November. The Trust’s SI report states that
by 17th November there was evidence of a severe depressive disorder, this potential
diagnosis was not identified or explored by the MDT meeting.”
As part of immediate learning and action taken relating to the concerns you have
raised directly about the MDT meeting and documentation, we have reviewed and
made substantial changes to the MDT template to be used for MDT meetings
[Appendix 1]. In addition, after engagement with clinical staff and extended reflection
on the death of Christopher Larsen, we have also implemented a process to provide
further clarity on the reason for referral into the MDT meeting via pre-MDT sections to
be completed on the MDT template. This template will be completed by the clinician
who had the last clinical contact with the patient prior to the MDT meeting. The
information captured in this template and the reason for the referral into the MDT
meeting will be discussed with the patient at this clinical contact and will support the
information captured within the patient’s notes and risk assessment.
The MDT meeting attendance has also been reviewed to include a senior nurse
clinician to oversee the process along with medical colleagues and other members of
the crisis service. The MDT meeting will utilise the information within the pre-MDT
template and the most recent Core assessment, Risk assessment and the
contemporaneous clinical notes to inform the clinical discussions. The discussions
within the MDT will be captured in real-time in the MDT template and the outcomes,
decisions and actions agreed and documented; the MDT template forms part of the
patient notes and will be immediately available. The template also enables specific
actions and owners to be captured, this includes responsibility for contacting the
patient to inform them of the outcome as a follow-up to the clinical consultation which
prompted the referral; this also enables a further opportunity for the clinician to
understand if the clinical presentation has changed since the referral was made.
To provide assurance to the Directorate senior clinical team, audits will be undertaken
monthly to ensure the processes and documents are being completed fully and to the
standards expected. Feedback from the audits will be shared with the staff involved
via their weekly meeting to ensure they are aware of areas requiring improvement.
The outcomes of the audit will be reviewed within the Directorate Quality and Safety
Governance meeting, with evidence of learning shared; this will be monitored monthly.
In addition, the Chief Nurse and Medical Director will review the audits, sample of
decisions and outcomes of the new process in six months to provide additional
assurance and scrutiny.
The process was implemented on 08 July 2024 and the outcome of the first audit is
due to go to the Directorate Quality and Safety meeting on the 22 August 2024.
In addition to the above, there is an opportunity for key clinical discussions to be held
in daily team debriefs based on clinical need; the outcomes of which will be
documented in the patient notes and discussed with the patient if required.
The Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
[Appendix 2] has also been reviewed and amended to clearly explain all these
processes for our staff and includes specific guidance on how to identify when a
medical review should be considered/offered as this is not required for all patients.
The revised SOP was agreed on 24 July 2024 and was circulated to all staff via email
on 25 July 2024; it was also shared in team meetings which take place weekly. Staff
have been required to sign a confirmation that they have read and understand the
SOP and the new process.
Concern 2: Risk Assessment
“At his initial triage (undertaken by the Central Access Point) Mr Larsen was deemed
to be high risk. At a later MDT meeting Mr Larsen was deemed to be low risk. It is not
possible to explore the rationale behind the downgrading of Mr Larsen’s risk to low
because there is no documentation about the decision making. The Trust’s SI report
identified the fact that several “red flag” risk factors which applied to Mr Larsen were
not “robustly considered” when assessing Mr Larsen’s risk. The Trust’s SI report states
that it was “unclear why it was felt the risks had subsided by the time of discharge on
3.12.2022.”
Clinical risk assessment is a dynamic process undertaken by clinicians when they are
with the patient, considering all information relating to a patient with the view of
assessing the likelihood of the patient acting in a manner which may be harmful to
themselves and/or others. Part of a clinical risk assessment includes the consideration
of risk factors. Risk formulation as part of the risk assessment brings together an
understanding of personality, history, current mental state, environment, potential
causes and protective factors, or changes in any of these. If there are indicators which
would indicate the presence of increased risk factors, then these will be explored on a
case-by-case basis by the assessing clinician.
The risk assessment undertaken by the clinician presenting a case to the MDT, forms
part of the information considered by the MDT in accordance with NICE [NG225]
guidelines which state that decisions about care should not be made based on risk
assessment tools and should be based on clinical formulation. Additionally, they state
that the forementioned 'red flag' risk factors alone do not indicate the likelihood of self-
harm or suicide amongst the patients under crisis (who by the nature of their
presentation, would all be deemed at a higher level of risk than those in the general
population). The MDT considers the clinicians assessment of risk at the time of
assessment. When the outcome of the MDT is shared with the patient, it offers a
further opportunity for the clinician to assess whether the risk presentation has
changed from the previous assessment.
As the assessment of risk is a key component to the effectiveness of the clinicians
working within the Crisis team, the Trust is completing a review of our competency
framework and the audit tool to support the monitoring of robust documentation of risk
assessment/formulation. This review was completed on 02 August 2024. The
outcomes of the review will be presented to the Urgent Care Quality and Safety
Meeting on the 22 August 2024 to inform any required changes.
Concern 3: Discharge
“Mr Larsen was discharged from the care of LPT on 3 December 2022, there was no
planned support for Mr Larsen post-discharge other than some counselling which was
due to start three weeks later. The Trust’s SI report states that it is “unclear why it was
felt the risks had subsided by the time of discharge on 3.12.2022” and that Mr Larsen
had the “presence of ample markers for high risk of completed suicide” yet he was
discharged back to the care of his GP and into a lacuna of care with no pre-arranged
support other than counselling which would not commence for three weeks.”
The Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team is a short-term, needs-based
intervention service whose primary role is to mitigate the requirement for inpatient
admission to an acute mental health hospital setting. Patients are referred into the
service for intensive home treatment from a variety of different settings, including both
primary and secondary care. For a substantial number of patients who have received
care from the team, a referral into secondary care is not clinically appropriate or
indicated. Many patients are subsequently discharged back to primary care following
the formulation of a clear crisis and contingency plan which is formulated in
collaboration with the patient (and carers where applicable).
A crisis and contingency plan includes information about how, where and when a
patient can seek support for their mental health should the need arise, including the
identification of 24-hour access to mental health support via the Urgent Care Pathway
within LPT (set up in line with the requirements set out by NHS England Five Year
Forward View (2014), the NHS England Long Term Plan (2019) and the Crisis Care
Concordat (2014) which state that people with mental health problems should be able
to get help 24 hours per day before they get to crisis point.
At the point of discharge from the Crisis Team, the decision is discussed and explained
to the patient and a discharge letter is formulated which outlines the care a patient has
received, alongside any changes to their medication and a copy of their crisis and
contingency plan. Additionally, within the discharge meeting with the patient their risk
assessment is formally updated on their records to accurately capture any significant
changes to their risk profile and clinical formulation both whilst under the care of the
team and at the point of discharge.
The Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team’s SOP states that all patients will only
be discharged following an MDT discussion. Should a patient request early discharge
(earlier than planned) from the team, the case will be escalated to a CRHT consultant
and/or the Duty Team Lead. At this point, the patient’s care and clinical presentation
(including risk formulation) will be considered, and a decision about discharge (or
escalation of care) will be made and documented in the patient’s notes. It is important
to note that should it be felt following a clinical review of presentation that there is an
increased likelihood of a patient acting in a manner which may cause harm to
themselves and/or others if they were to be discharged early from the team, then care
would be escalated depending on urgency at this point. Examples of this may include
the consideration of a formal Mental Health Act Assessment or escalation to
emergency services for immediate risk concerns.
Concern 4: The Serious Investigation (SI) and Reporting Process at LPT
“I remain concerned about inadequacies in the Serious Incident Investigation and
Reporting processes at Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust. The Serious Incident
Investigation into Mr Larsen’s death did uncover and accepted some failings in relation
to the care provided to Mr Larsen. However, it failed to uncover all the matters arising
at inquest and, some of the matters that it did uncover do not have correlating items
of work listed in the action plan. There was no exploration of the MDT meeting’s
functionality or documentation as part of the SI investigation. Further, I have concerns
about the implementation and embedding of the lessons learned which are identified
by the SI Report. In this case the live witnesses who gave evidence during the course
of the inquest did not demonstrate that learning had filtered down to the front-line staff.
I am therefore concerned that the SI process at LPT does not support a robust and
critical analysis and investigation of the care provided to patients, further, I have
concerns about the ability of the Trust to embed changes and learning. This failure to
properly explore matters and learn where possible inevitably leads to a delay, or failure
altogether, to learn lessons which are vital to patient safety across the whole Trust.”
We take learning form serious incidents very seriously and have taken on board
feedback provided relating to the processes within the Trust. All serious incident
reports are reviewed by the Medical Director and Chief Nurse to ensure that they
provide a critical analysis and investigation of the care provided to patients. We also
recognise that the transition to the new National Patient Safety Incident Response
Framework (PSIRF) has taken time to embed. Feedback from the new PSIRF process
has been positive from families and clinicians. In order to make the process more
robust a rapid improvement programme is underway to utilise quality improvement
methodology to identify any improvements which can be made to the process.
In addition, the Director of Nursing and the Medical Director have initiated quality
summits that have focussed on safety, leadership, and governance within the crisis
pathway. The summits have been a collaborative space involving leaders and staff
within the service to ensure accountability and learning.
I trust that the proposed actions that we have described above do collectively provide
assurance that the Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust is taking a number of
immediate measures to respond to the concerns set out by HM Coroner in her Report.
Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please
do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Yours sincerely
Chief Executive
Enc
Appendix 1 MDT template
Appendix 2 The Crisis Resolution Home Treatment Team Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP)
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