Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024

Paul Holmes

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0344, written 27 Jun 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report27 Jun 2024
Reference2024-0344
DeceasedPaul Holmes
CoronerStephen Covell
Coroner areaCornwall and the Isles of Scilly
CategoryRoad (Highways Safety) related deaths
Organisation namedRoyal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust · Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses publishednone published

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Chief Medical Officers for CFT and RCHT 

c/o Royal Cornwall Hospital 

Truro 

Cornwall 

TR1 3LJ 

Tel: 

16th August 2024 

Mr Stephen Covell 

Assistant Coroner for Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly 
H.M Coroner’s Office 

Pydar House, Pydar Street 

Truro, Cornwall 

TR1 1XU 

Dear Mr Covell 

Re: Death of Paul Byron Holmes - R28 PFD Report and letter (ref: 10871060) 

We write in response to the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths, dated the 13th 
June  2024  and  received  on  the  27th of  June  2024,  by  both  the  Cornwall  Partnership  NHS 
Foundation  Trust  (CFT)  and the  Royal  Cornwall  Hospitals  NHS  Trust  (RCHT),  issued  as  a 
result  of  the  inquest  into  the  death  of  Mr  Paul  Byron  Holmes,  which  concluded  on  22nd of 
February 2024. 

We would like to take this opportunity to express our sincerest condolences to the family of Mr 
Holmes for their loss. 

During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. These 
are as follows: 

On Paul's transfer from The Royal Cornwall Hospital to Liskeard Community Hospital on 18 
April 2022 

1)  There was no clear, detailed and direct handover between doctors of the two hospitals. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2)  A treatment plan including the need to continue to treat Paul for dehydration and what 
to do in the event of deterioration was not agreed and recorded clearly between clinical 
staff of both hospitals. 

3)  Any handover which did take place was not properly recorded in Paul's medical notes. 

4)  An error in the writing out of a prescription for intravenous fluids at the Royal Cornwall 
meant that the administration of hydrating fluids at Liskeard Community Hospital was 
delayed. 

Please find below a response from the Trusts in relation to each concern you have raised: 

1)  There was no clear, detailed and direct handover between doctors of the two hospitals. 

Whilst in the Emergency Department at Treliske, there was a detailed management plan in 
place for Mr Holmes including the administration of intravenous fluids, oral antibiotics, regular 
laxatives and restarting his regular diabetic medication. A sputum sample was sent for cultures 
and a note made to review Mr Holmes’ pain relief. The advice was to continue with ongoing 
rehabilitation  inputs  and  monitor  electrolytes,  inflammatory  markers  and  renal  parameters. 
Further  to satisfactory  improvement,  the  Consultant  who  reviewed  Mr  Holmes  on  the  post- 
take ward round on the 18th of April 2022, deemed him appropriate to complete his recovery 
in  a  community  hospital,  after  stabilising  the  acute  medical  illness  that  Mr  Holmes  had 
presented with. The rationale for the transfer was acknowledged as clear at the inquest. 

There is no documentation of a handover from the discharging Consultant to the accepting 
team at Liskeard, however this is in-line with expected practice. 

The expected practice within CFT for admissions to community hospitals would not ordinarily 
include a doctor-to-doctor handover. Following the decision by the Consultant in RCHT that 
the  patient  was  appropriate  for  admission  to  a  community  hospital  and  once  a  bed  was 
identified, it is expected that a nurse-to-nurse handover would take place. In the case of Mr 
Holmes, this nurse-to-nurse handover did occur as expected and confirmed that Mr Holmes’ 
presentation and condition at the point of admission was appropriate to the capacity and remit 
of the ward. 

There  are  some  additional  safeguards  in  place  for  more  complex  presentations.  In  the 
scenario where a patient has needs which cannot safely be met by the nurse-led community 
hospital, an admission can be refused. There have also been cases, where the patient’s needs 
are complex, where a doctor-to-doctor handover does take place. 

Given that there is very limited medical cover available at CFT community hospitals, it is not 
feasible to change practice to insist on doctor-to-doctor handovers for all admissions to nurse- 
led wards. 

2)  A treatment plan including the need to continue to treat Paul for dehydration and what 
to do in the event of deterioration was not agreed and recorded clearly between clinical 
staff of both hospitals. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The handover from the frailty nurse at Treliske was that they did not feel Mr Holmes was septic 
or  had  an  infection  but  that  he  was  dehydrated.  Intravenous  fluids  were  prescribed.  The 
nursing documentation on the morning of transfer to Liskeard details an update to Mr Holmes’ 
son, an update on an attempt to administer medication to Mr Holmes and also that a sputum 
sample and CSU had been sent. 

There is no documentation of the detail of the handover from the discharging nurse at RCHT. 

The patient handover form was completed by the receiving nurse at CFT, however, this did 
not detail the need to continue to treat the patient for dehydration and what to do in the event 
of  a  deterioration.  Although  specific  actions  in  the  event  of  a  deterioration  were  not 
documented on the handover form, there was a Treatment Escalation Plan (TEP) dated 4th of 
April  2022  recorded  in  Mr  Holmes’  paper  notes,  which  did  detail  that  Mr  Holmes  was  for 
escalation back to the acute hospital in the event he deteriorated. The TEP was followed. 

The  response  to  concern  number  3,  below,  describes  that  a  nurse-to-nurse  handover  is 
expected practice and both Trusts propose some actions to strengthen this process. 

3)  Any handover which did take place was not properly recorded in Paul's medical notes. 

Within CFT, the verbal nurse-to-nurse handover is documented on a paper record, which is 
then added to the patient’s paper notes on arrival at the ward. Due to limited communication 
between the electronic patient records of both Trusts, it is not practicable to produce a shared 
handover which is apparent on both systems. 

Both  Trusts  acknowledge  that  this  poses  a  risk  of  there  not  being  a  shared  understanding 
about when to escalate the patient for further treatment. 

Both Trusts propose to review the inter-hospital transfer form used by both the discharging 
and  receiving  wards  to  ensure  an  escalation  plan  is  documented  and  to  ensure  that  the 
handover record in both Trusts is consistent. Any revisions to the handover documentation 
would need to include a prompt for the discharging and receiving nurse to share any relevant 
details from the medical management plan. 

Both Trusts commit to establishing a task and finish group to review the design of the inter- 
hospital transfer forms and take forward any developments. This group will be established by 
the start of October 2024. 

4) An error in the writing out of a prescription for intravenous fluids at the Royal 
Cornwall meant that the administration of hydrating fluids at Liskeard Community 
Hospital was delayed. 

It is recognised that there was a delay in administering IV fluids to Mr Holmes as a result of 
the prescription provided by RCHT having an invalid date. Because CFT and RCHT do not 
use the same electronic prescribing system, there are inherent challenges when trying to 
rectify a prescription which is invalid. As detailed in the statements to inquest, efforts were 
undertaken within CFT to seek a new prescription through the out of hours medical service, 
which is the only option for medical cover in evenings and weekends. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CFT recognise that an additional option in such circumstances would be for the receiving 
ward to return to the original prescriber to rectify any prescription issues. Upon review with 
ward managers, this course of action is routinely taken when prescription errors are detected 
in normal operating hours, however this is not a safeguard which would apply in the out-of- 
hours scenario which impacted Mr Holmes. 

RCHT recognise the human error made in the writing of the prescription. The science of 
human factors (and ergonomics) seeks to understand human interactions with systems of 
work to identify, prevent and where possible design-out the opportunity for error. In relation 
to medication incidents, the Trust continually explores how the electronic prescribing system 
can build-in prompts and highlight where there may be risks to safety such as allergies and 
drug interactions. We also have processes such as medicine reconciliation which ensure the 
medicines prescribed to a patient prior to admission are continued. However, errors do 
sometimes occur for a number of reasons, and we are using education to create a culture of 
learning, understand error types and ensure the appropriate corrective actions are taken to 
reduce risk. 

Whilst training regarding human factors and medication has previously been delivered on an 
ad hoc basis to all professional groups in the Trust, it is also now part of the revised LEAD 
programme aimed at all leaders, supervisors, and managers in RCHT. Specific reference to 
medication errors is made to ensure learning in personal awareness but also that the 
conditions we create for ourselves (and others) can contribute to slip and lapse errors which 
can be seen in tasks such as transcription and completing care related tasks. 

The LEAD programme went live in August 2024 and completion is monitored via electronic 
staff records. 

We hope that this letter provides both you and Mr Holmes’ family with assurance that both 

Trusts have taken seriously the matter of concerns you raised in your report. 

Yours Sincerely 

 and 

Chief Medical Officers 

CFT and RCHT 

4
Also filed under 2024-0344: Paul-Holmes-Prevention-of-future-deaths-report-2024-0344_Published.pdf
REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:   

1. Cornwall Partnership NHS Foundation Trust  

2. Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust  

CORONER 

1 

2 

3 

I am Stephen Covell one of the Assistant Coroners for Cornwall & the Isles of Scilly  

CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 14 June 2022 I commenced an investigation into the death of  Paul Byron Holmes who 
died on 29 May 2022 then aged 90. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest 
on 22 February 2024.  
The cause of death was lower respiratory tract infection following a period of terminal 
decline on a background of delirium, frailty of old age, ketoacidosis, poor oral 
intake/nutrition, type 2 diabetes mellitus, chronic kidney disease and fractured ribs and 
sternum.  
I recorded that Paul Byron Holmes was pronounced deceased at 0645 on 29 May 2022 at 
Arbour Cottage, Mount Hawke, Truro. Paul died as a result of complications including 
dementia and a chest infection arising from chest injuries sustained in a road traffic collision 
on 4 April 2022 and subsequent hospitalisation and loss of mobility against a background of 
frailty. I recorded a conclusion of road traffic collision.  

4  CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEATH 

i.   On 4 April 2022 Paul was a passenger in a vehicle involved in a road traffic collision 

as a result of which he sustained chest injuries comprising fractured ribs and a 
fractured sternum 

ii.  Paul was admitted to the emergency department of the Royal Cornwall Hospital 
Truro the same day for treatment of his injuries. Although Paul was initially lucid, 
over the subsequent few days he developed delirium which was probably due to a 
combination of the trauma, his age and frailty, the painkilling medication and 
disorientation being in a busy acute hospital.  

iii.  On the evening of the 16 April 2022 Paul was transferred from the Royal Cornwall 
Hospital to Liskeard Community Hospital. Paul's medical condition had stabilised 
and it was felt that a community hospital was the best location for rehabilitation and 
for his delirium to settle. The clinician with care of Paul felt that his prognosis was 
guarded although that was not communicated to Paul's family.  

iv.  Unfortunately Paul's condition deteriorated on 17 April 2022. The nursing staff had 

  
   
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 difficulty encouraging Paul to eat and hydrate, his heartrate and rate of breathing 
had increased. Those treating him felt that Paul was suffering from an infection. A 
decision was taken to transfer Paul back to the Royal Cornwall Hospital which took 
place in the early hours of 18 April 2022.  

v.  At the Royal Cornwall Hospital Paul was given Intravenous antibiotics and fluids. It 

was felt that Paul did not have an infection and that the principal issue was 
dehydration. By late morning on 18 April 2022 clinical staff considered that his 
condition had stabilised and he could be transferred back to Liskeard albeit that his 
dehydration had not resolved and intravenous fluids needed to be continued.  
vi.  Because of Paul's ongoing dehydration and overall frailty there needed to be a 

robust and detailed handover between treating doctors from the two hospitals as to 
the ongoing treatment plan and what to do in the event of Paul deteriorating. This did 
not take place. There was a nurse to nurse handover without sufficient details being 
exchanged or recorded, particularly with regard to the unresolved dehydration. 
There was also an error in the date of the prescription for the intravenous fluids 
which resulted in a delay to Paul receiving fluids.  

vii.  Paul's condition deteriorated again resulting in him being transferred back to the 
Royal Cornwall Hospital at 18.45 the same day where he received appropriate 
treatment for dehydration and a possible infection.  

viii.  Unfortunately whilst Paul's condition stabilised his delirium persisted and it was felt 

that he should  return home for palliative care. Paul returned home on 16 May where 
he died on 29 May 2022.  

ix.  The planning and handover for Paul's transfer between the Royal Cornwall Hospital 

and Liskeard Community Hospital at around midday on 18 April 2022 was 
inadequate and caused significant discomfort and distress to Paul and a delay to the 
treatment of the dehydration. It did not however cause or contribute to Paul's death 
over a month later.   

CORONER'S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  

 On Paul's transfer from The Royal Cornwall Hospital to Liskeard Community Hospital on 
18 April 2022 

(1) There was no clear, detailed and direct handover between doctors of the two hospitals   

5 

(2) A treatment plan including the need to continue to treat Paul for dehydration and what to 
do in the event of deterioration was not agreed and recorded clearly between clinical staff 
of both hospitals 

(3) Any handover which did take place was not properly recorded in Paul's medical notes  

(4) An error in the writing out of a prescription for intravenous fluids at the Royal Cornwall 
meant that the administration of hydrating fluids at Liskeard Community Hospital was 
delayed. 

  
 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

6 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the 
power to take such action. 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 22 August 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

7 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the 
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons 

8 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. 

,   

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. 
He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of 
interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, 
about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

27 June 2024 

9 

Signature 

Stephen Covell Assistant Coroner for

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