Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2024

Kevin Woods

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2024-0531, written 3 Oct 2024. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report3 Oct 2024
Reference2024-0531
DeceasedKevin Woods
CoronerGuy Davies
Coroner areaCornwall and Isles of Scilly
CategoryEmergency services related deaths (2019 onwards)
Organisation namedRoyal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Information Classification: PUBLIC 

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS  

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUEST  

TOUCHING THE DEATH OF KEVIN GEORGE WOODS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

, Secretary of State for Health and Social care 

1 

CORONER 

I am Guy Davies, His Majesty’s Assistant Coroner for Cornwall & the Isles of Scilly. 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 19 January 2024 I commenced an investigation into the death of 64-year-old Kevin 
Woods. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 30 September 2024.  

The medical cause of death was found as follows:  

1a. Hypertensive heart disease 

The four questions - who, when, where and how – were answered as follows: 

Kevin George WOODS died on 17 January 2024 at 

 from complications of an undiagnosed heart condition following an 
ambulance delay which denied Kevin the opportunity of potentially lifesaving 
treatment.   
Kevin’s family made a 999-call requesting an ambulance at 22:24 hours on 16 
January 2024, at which time Kevin was exhibiting clear symptoms of a heart 
attack.   The ambulance service allocated Kevin a category 2 priority but there 
were no ambulances available on that category. 
Kevin went into cardiac arrest at 02:33 hours on 17 January 2024 and 
subsequently became unresponsive.  The ambulance service re-categorised the 
call as category 1 and despatched an ambulance.   
A Paramedic Support Vehicle arrived at 02:44 hrs on 17 January 2024 whilst the 
family were giving Kevin CPR.  The paramedics continued CPR but were unable to 
save Kevin’s life.  Kevin was pronounced deceased at the scene at 03:31 hrs that 
day. 
There was a response delay of 4 hours and 16 minutes from the original category 
2 priority decision to the arrival of the paramedic support vehicle. 

1

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Information Classification: PUBLIC 

Kevin’s heart condition was possibly treatable, and the ambulance delay denied 
him the opportunity of potentially lifesaving treatment.  The ambulance delay was 
attributable to a systemic failure related to the whole system of health and social 
care. 

The narrative conclusion of the Inquest was as follows: 

Kevin died from an undiagnosed and possibly treatable heart condition, following 
an ambulance delay attributable to a systemic failure related to the whole system 
of health and social care. The ambulance delay was possibly causative of death in 
that it denied Kevin potentially lifesaving treatment. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

1.  The findings of fact on how Kevin died are set out above in the answers to the four 

statutory questions. 

Systemic failure and Kevin’s death  

2.  The court made findings of fact upon the wider circumstances, namely the 

systemic failure that was possibly causative of Kevin’s death. 

3.  On the day the ambulance call was made there were considerable ambulance 
delays. Whilst Kevin’s priority remained category 2, during the period from the 
original 999 call to the onset of cardiac arrest (over four hours) there were no 
ambulances available for Kevin. 

4.  The national target set by the Department of Health is to attend Category 2 
incidents within 40 minutes on at least 90% of occasions, with an average 
response of 18 minutes.  Kevin waited over four hours and the reason the 
ambulance then attended was because Kevin’s case was re-prioritised to Category 
1 following the cardiac arrest. 

5.  Data provided to the court suggested that on the 16th January 2024 some Category 

2 calls were having to wait 6 hours for an ambulance. 

6.  At approximately the time the ambulance call was made, 23:00 hours, there were 
33 incidents awaiting allocation in Cornwall, including 20 that were Category 2. At 
this time South West Ambulance Service Trust (SWAST) reported that all 
ambulance resources were either responding to calls or delayed at hospitals (in the 
patient handover process). At the two main receiving hospitals for Cornwall, there 
were 12 ambulances delayed at Plymouth hospital and 22 ambulances delayed at 
Truro Royal Cornwall Hospital (RCHT).  At this time SWAST was 123% resourced 
for anticipated demand in Cornwall, with a total of 45 ambulances available. This 
means approximately half of the allocated ambulances for Cornwall were delayed 
at RCHT. 

7.  The court found that the hospital has regularly failed to meet the 4-hour target for 
moving patients out of the Emergency Department (ED) during 2024. It was noted 
that there is a recent major study which shows that the standardised mortality rate 
starts to rise from 5 hours after the patient’s time of arrival at the ED and they 
concluded that after 6–8 hours, there is one extra death for every 82 patients 
delayed. 

8.  The court found insufficient bed availability on acute wards was attributable to  

an increase in patients with no reason to reside (NCTR), these being patients who  
are medically optimised but cannot be discharged due to lack of onward care  
support. 

9.  Approximately 80% of NCTR patients at RCHT are of that status for external 

reasons beyond the control of RCHT. The main causes of external NCTR numbers 
were found to be as follows: 

•  Social care provision (whether commissioned by social services or NHS) 
namely packages of care in the community, beds in nursing homes or 
residential care homes 

•  NHS primary healthcare support for discharge (in the home) 
•  NHS community hospital provision 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Information Classification: PUBLIC 

10.  The court found significant correlation between delayed discharges, handover 

delays and delays in ambulance response times. On this basis, the court found 
there was a direct connection between the ambulance delay and inadequate social 
care provision, community hospital provision and primary healthcare support. 
11.  The connection between delayed discharges and ambulance delays and the 
associated risks has been referred to in reports from Southwest Ambulance 
Service Trust (SWAST) and the Health Services Safety Investigations Body 
(HSSIB). The court found that the state knew or ought to know of the risks. 

Current circumstances of systemic failure 

12.  The findings of fact upon current circumstances in relation to the systemic failure 

were as follows.  

13.  There was found to be a direct connection between current ambulance delays and 

inadequate social care provision, community hospital provision and primary 
healthcare support on discharge. This is because inadequacies in those services 
lead to delayed discharges from hospital which lead to shortages of acute beds, 
impeded patient flow, crowding in ED and the inability of ambulances to handover 
patients to ED.  

14.  Significant average handover delays at RCHT were recorded for every month of 

2024. This is a picture reflected across the SW and indeed nationally.  

15.  The average handover delays conceal spikes such as that which led to the long 

delay in this case. Such long delays increase the risk of mortality.  

16.  There are continuing delays of patients from ED which is evidenced by the ongoing 
failure to regularly meet the 4-hour standard. These delays increase the risk of 
mortality.  

17.  Over the last year up to 16% of patients in RCHT have been of external NCTR 

status, patients who meet the criteria for discharge but cannot be discharged for 
reasons external to RCHT.  

18.  The court found that if the external NCTR numbers could be reduced, this would 
significantly address current issues of ambulance delays, ED crowding, and the 
shortage of acute beds.  

19.  The main drivers of external NCTR patients are inadequate social care provision, 
community hospital provision and primary healthcare support on discharge. 

20.   The court noted the SWAST systems report which found… 

‘’….there is a direct link between patients waiting in the hospital for 
discharge to social care and patients being cared for inside ambulances 
and Emergency Departments.’’ 

21.   Approximately 10% of social care posts in Cornwall are currently vacant 

notwithstanding Cornwall Council securing the agreement of social care providers 
to pay the living wage. This reflects the national picture of 165,000 vacant social 
care posts.   

22.  The extent of the obligation on local authorities is set out in the Care Act s5  

A local authority must promote the efficient and effective operation of a 
market in services for meeting care and support needs with a view to 
ensuring [inter alia] …. a variety of high quality services to choose from…  

23.  The NHS does not carry responsibility for the recruitment and retention of social 

care staff or any broad obligation to promote the social care market.  
24.  The organisations immediately required to deal with ambulance delays are 

ambulance trusts and acute hospitals, In Cornwall that is SWAST and RCHT. 
These organisations do not have control over the services primarily responsible for 
ambulance delays, namely social care provision, primary healthcare provision and 
community hospital provision. They are unable to influence the whole-system and 
therefore carry risks that they cannot wholly mitigate or manage.  

25.  The court noted the HSSIB report which states that delayed discharges (and 

consequent ambulance delays) are a national issue which is attributed to a whole 
system failure of health and social care. The court noted the HSSIB investigation’s 
first safety recommendation is an urgent ‘whole system’ response to reduce patient 
harm. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 Information Classification: PUBLIC 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

1)  Continuing average handover delays (and therefore response delays) which 
create a risk of future deaths. The averages conceal spikes of delayed handover 
and ambulance response times which increase the risk of mortality. 

2)  There is a direct connection between the risk of ambulance delays and 

inadequate social care provision, community hospital provision and primary 
healthcare support for discharges in Cornwall. This is because the 
inadequacies in these services lead to delayed discharges causing crowding in 
ED, shortage of beds in acute wards, and handover delays. This creates a risk of 
future systemic failures causing ambulance delays.  

3)  There is no single organisation with responsibility to ensure that the 

provision of social care is sufficient to avoid delayed discharges leading to 
ambulance delays. The obligation upon local authorities such as Cornwall Council 
is limited to a requirement to promote the market.  

4)  There is an absence of any overarching organisation with responsibility for 
patient safety risk from ambulance delays. The organisations immediately 
required to deal with ambulance delays do not have control over the services 
primarily responsible for the delays. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you [AND/OR 
your organisation] have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 28 November 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the 
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons: Kevin’s family and SWAST. I have also sent it to other bereaved families who 
have experienced ambulance delays who may find it useful or of interest. 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. 
He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of 
interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, 
about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

3 October 2024                                            Guy Davies 

4

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Dhsc (PDF)
Minister of State for Health (Secondary Care) 

39 Victoria Street 
London 
SW1H 0EU 

28 November 2024 

Our ref: 

HM Coroner Guy Davies 
Cornwall Coroner’s Service, 
Pydar House, Pydar Street,  
Truro, Cornwall  
TR1 1XU 

By email: 

Dear Mr Davies,  

Thank you for the Regulation 28 report of 3 October 2024 sent to the Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Care about the death of Kevin Woods. I am replying as the Minister with 
responsibility for urgent and emergency care.      

Firstly, I would like to say how saddened I was to read of the circumstances of Mr Woods’ 
death, and I offer my sincere condolences to his family and loved ones. The circumstances 
your report describes are concerning and I am grateful to you for bringing these matters to 
my attention. 

The report raises concerns regarding delayed transfers of care to hospital by ambulances 
and poor emergency department performance due to patient flow and discharge issues at 
Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust (RCHT). I recognise the concerns raised with health 
and  care  delivery  in  the  region,  which  align  with  representations  from  local  members  of 
parliament. 

In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England to ensure 
we adequately address your concerns. 

I understand that RCHT is implementing urgent changes to improve patient flow and care 
through the emergency department. Priority actions include: 

•  making space for a Clinical Decision Unit model, for patients who need more clinical 

care but don’t need to be admitted to hospital.  

•  converting  the  Same  Day  Medical  Assessment  Unit  (SDMA)  to  a  Same  Day 
Emergency  Care  (SDEC)  and  having  a  triage  process  to  ensure  only  patients 
considered as same day go to the SDEC.  

•  supporting the move of acute medical resource from the emergency department to 
Acute Medical Unit with the intention of improving short stay performance at the Acute 
Medical Unit.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 The overall urgent care position in the region is supported by ongoing actions, including a 
system clinical leaders’ event in August which focussed on clinically led plans to maximise 
community alternatives and update models to improve the urgent care access standards for 
Cornwall.  The  Chief  Operating  Officer  at  RCHT  reports  weekly  on  improvement  actions 
being taken.   

At a national level, this government is committed to returning to the safe operational waiting 
time  standards  set  out  in  the  NHS  Constitution.  In  doing  so  we  will  be  honest  about  the 
challenges facing the health service and serious about tackling them. The Health Secretary 
ordered an independent investigation of NHS performance to provide an assessment of the 
issues and challenges it faces. This reported on 12th September 2024 and the investigation’s 
findings will feed into the government’s work on a 10-year plan to radically reform the NHS 
and build a health service that is fit for the future.  

In the short-term, a range of action is being taken by the NHS this year to improve urgent 
and emergency care performance, including by maintaining capacity gains in acute hospital 
beds and ambulance hours on the road achieved in 2023-24, increasing the productivity of 
acute  and  non-acute  services  across  bedded  and  non-bedded  capacity,  and  directing 
patients to more appropriate services in the community where these can better meet their 
needs.   

This  government  is  working  to  improve  hospital  flow  to  make  sure  people  do  not  spend 
longer than necessary in hospital and reduce delayed discharges. We will tackle delayed 
discharges by developing local partnership working between the NHS and social care and 
making sure people get the right support from health and social care services to return home 
as soon as possible.   

We have also ensured that every acute hospital has access to a care transfer hub. These 
hubs bring together professionals from the NHS and social care to manage discharges for 
people with more complex needs who need extra support.  In the integrated care systems 
that face the most discharge delays, the Department is working directly with partners across 
health and social care to drive improvements.    

Turning to your concern regarding organisational responsibilities, health and care systems 
and  providers  should  work  together  to  ensure  that  efforts  to  discharge  individuals  from 
hospital into social care are joined up and make best use of available resources, in line with 
the duty to cooperate set out in Section 82 of the NHS Act 2006. 

The responsibility for identifying and mitigating risks within healthcare services sits with the 
provider  of  those  services.  Each  provider  of  NHS  services  will  have  their  own  internal 
processes and structures for the identification, examination, management and improvement 
of patient safety risks. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) is responsible for monitoring 
the  quality  and  safety  of  the  care  provided  by  NHS  Trusts  through  the  regulation  of  the 
Trust’s regulated activities. The CQC carries out inspections and produces reports setting 
out their findings. 

I hope this response is helpful. Thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention.   

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yours sincerely, 

MINISTER OF STATE FOR HEALTH

Related reports

Other reports by Guy Davies

See all →

More reports categorised “Emergency services related deaths (2019 onwards)”

See all →

Track Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust

See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching Royal Cornwall Hospitals NHS Trust, and how often a new one appears.

What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text

Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.

These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.