Matthew Wood

Date of report	4 Jan 2016
Reference	2016-0001
Deceased	Matthew Wood
Coroner	Andrew Harris
Coroner area	London Inner (South)
Category	Other related deaths
Source	judiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published	2

The report

Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1. Rt. Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP, Secretary of State for Transport,
Department for Transport, Great Minster House, 33 Horseferry Road, London,
SWI1P 4DR

2. Mr Andrew Haines, Chief Executive, Civil Aviation Authority, CAA House, 45-
59 Kingsway, London, WC2B 6TE

3. Po Manager, London Heliport, Lombard Road, Battersea,
London, SW11 3BE

CORONER

Iam Andrew Harris, Senior Coroner, London Inner South

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act
2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations
2013.

INQUEST
Re Peter Barnes (0149-13) and Matthew Wood (0150-13) (died 16.01.13) (JB)

On 8" December 2015 I concluded a joint inquest into the above two deaths
outside HE Wandsworth Road, South Lambeth, before a jury. The
conclusion of the jury as to the deaths of the pilot, Mr Barnes, and pedestrian, Mr
Wood, was Accident.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

The helicopter crashed into a crane at 693 ft altitude on St George’s Wharf and
the pilot suffered non survivable injuries. Debris fell on the pedestrian and spilt
fuel ignited and caused non survivable burns to the pedestrian.

The circumstances recorded included that the pilot should not have attempted the
flight, considering the poor weather. His decision to divert to Battersea Heliport
and his decision not to abort the landing were neither safe nor appropriate, but he
was likely to have felt under pressure to land at Battersea. His erratic flight path
and altitude shifts suggested that Mr Barnes was working hard to steer cleat of
cloud. Impact was likely a result of loss of situational awareness due to poor

visibility.

CORONER’S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed that

1. London Tall Buildings Policy, implemented after planning permission for St
George’s Wharf was approved, required reporting of any buildings over 1000 ft,
which is the appropriate consideration for Heathrow and City Airport flight paths.
In a previous application to development on the site the CAA responded that
575ft would not impact on integrated airspace management and advised
consultation with the Heliport. There is no equivalent policy of reporting
considering the flight paths to the Heliport.

2. The Head of Safety at Department of Transport advised that aerodrome licence
holders should conduct an in depth consultation with local planning authorities
about any proposed developments that may affect the safety of air services. No in
depth consultation did take place between the Heliport and planning authority
about the construction of St George’s Tower, to which was attached the crane.

A retired official from the Civil Aviation Authority had expressed the view that the
London Heliport should be a safeguarded aerodrome. The Head of Safety in
Department of Transport advised that in an official safeguarding regime one can
be sure that such consultation takes place, which one cannot in an unofficial
process, where it depends on the local system and players.

3. The Heliport manager was concerned that the erection of St George’s Wharf
would affect passing air traffic on helicopter route H4. He stated that there was an
apparent conflict between maintaining en route standard altitudes and complying
with Rule 5, especially in reduced cloud base. He had some informal discussions
with the CAA, but the local planning authority did not respond to his concerns.
He did not take the matter further as the proposed building was just outside the
area designated in the map of his local plan. It is not clear whether this local plan
or the local process is adequate to assure safety. He temained of the view that the
tall building created a risk as it was more difficult to operate helicopters in poor
visibility.

4. Captain who was called as an independent expert pilot, gave an opinion
that establishing a minimum altitude would assist pilots and promote safety and
that the H4 route required review, to make it safer, to reduce future deaths.
Other pilots testified to the challenges of flying along the Thames with the
proliferation of tall buildings in less good weather.

5. The Air Accident Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB)
made a Safety Recommendation 2014-30 in August 2014. It read:

It is recommended that the Department of Transport implement measures that enable the
Civil Aviation Authority to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential
implications of new en route obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures.

The Senior Inspector of Air Accidents (Operations) AAIB said that if this
recommendation was not implemented lives would be put at risk. The Head of
Airspace, Air Traffic Management and Aerodromes at the CAA supported this
recommendation, saying it would be a safety back up. The Department of
Transport has not implemented this recommendation, and reported in December
2014 that it was consulting, which was still the position a year later. This was
explained by the Head of Aviation Safety Policy at the Department of Transport as
initially due to lack of resources. He said that there was not an intention to
implement this recommendation, in particular noting that it may be contrary to
government proposals for the planning process.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN ate as follows. -

Despite a good safety record, it would seem that the relevant bodies in relation to
aviation safety along the Thames need to expedite a specific review of H4 and
consider any need to alter flying rules, to assure the public of on going safety given
the current concerns of pilots about the difficulties of flying along the Thames. It
is not clear that helicopter aviation considerations for the Heliport or more widely
for flights along the Thames are adequately considered in the planning processes
for tall buildings. It appears that little or no progress has been made in considering
the need to safeguard the heliport or implement AAIB Recommendation 2014-30,
which the court heard would potentially save future lives.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe that
the Department of Transport and Civil Aviation Authority and London Heliport
have the power and expertise to address and reduce the risks of future deaths.

YOUR RESPONSE

You ate under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this
report, namely by Monday 29" of February 2016. 1, the coroner, may extend the
period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken,
setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is
proposed.

If you require any further information about the case, please contact the case
ofc, i 1 cure farther
information about the process of responding to this report my cleri {i

to whom your response should be
sent.

:

COPIES and PUBLICATION

I have sent a copy of my report to the following Interested Persons:

Counsel for Ey idow of Peter

Barnes.

BE Counset and Solicitor of Bdb-law.co.uk for I
HR (brother) and (mother) of Matthew Wood,
po

Counsel of Fountain Chambers for Helicopter insurers and

BES Counsel of TG Chambers for Civil Aviation Authority,
Counsel of Temple Garden Chambers for Air Accident

Investigation Branch,
a Solicitor of Freeths Solicitors for Air Traffic Controller and

NATS (En Route) PLC,
Solicitor of DWF LLP for Brookfield Multiplex,

EE Counsel and I of DAC Beachcroft for
Berkeley Group,

of Government Legal for Department of Transport,
BEE Solicitor of BCL Burton Copeland Solicitors ‘or

HE S 0 licitor of King & Spalding Solicitors for Battersea Heliport.

Tam also sending a copy to Captain . Senior Manager of

Planning Team for Lambeth Council and I Head of Development
Permission, Wandsworth Council, The Town Hall, Wandsworth High Street,
London SW18 2PU

Tam also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or
summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes
may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the
coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your
response by the Chief Coroner.

[DATE] [SIGNEP BY CORONER]

Sent 4" January 2016

Responses

2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Respondent Not Named (PDF)

Office of the General Counsel

Civil Aviation
Authority

Clerk to Senior Coroner |
Inner South District of Greater London /
The Coroner's Court i
1 Tennis Street

London SE1 1YD |

24 February 2016 |
|

Dear Sir

IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUEST TOUCHING THE DEATHS OF PETER BARNES AND |
MATTHEW WOOD (DIED 16.01.13) :
(BATTERSEA HELICOPTER CRASH JOINT INQUEST) |

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY RESPONSE TO REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT
FUTURE DEATHS

Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 4 January 2016 relating |
to the Joint Inquest into the deaths of Peter Barnes and Matthew Wood. The Civil Aviation i
Authority (“CAA”) has carefully considered the matters of concern raised therein and | have been
asked by Andrew Haines, Chief Executive, to respond on behalf of the CAA. Details of the actions
to be taken by the CAA in order to help address your concerns are set out below.

11 The first matter of concern that you raise is the need to expedite a specific review of H4
including consideration of any need to alter the flight rules, in order to assure the public of :
on-going safety.

1.2 As you know, the London airspace is highly regulated and has a good safety record.
Nevertheless the CAA routinely conducts on-going regulatory oversight and, as part of this |
role, the Flight Operations team (“Flight Ops’) is in the process of conducting a review of :
the safety of onshore helicopter operations in the UK this year. This follows the recent
review of offshore helicopter operations. The review will include a post implementation
review of the Standardised European Rules of the Air (“SERA”) which came into force in
the UK on 4 December 2014.

1.3 The CAA will work with e,.helic lt sid
any recommendations or industry best practice that could be incorporat 2. re
or regulatory guidance material, in order to enhance the safety of the airspace. An
initial meeting was held on Wednesday, 20" January 2016. Helicopter pilots represented

Civil Aviation Authority
CAA House KS 45-59 Kingsway London WC2B6TE www.caa.co.uk
Telephone 020 7453 6160 Fax 02074536175 kate.staples@caa.co.uk

“1.4

1.6

1.8

by the British Helicopter Association’ were invited to raise any areas of concern and to
propose operational improvements.

The review will consider the safety of the London airspace, including H4, in order

specifically to address your concerns. It is appropriate for H4 | and the flight rules. to be, .

assessed of this wider review for fhe following reasons.

besteasuaatints

(a) the flight rules apply to the UK airspace as a whole, they are not specific to H4 or
the London airspace;

(b) jow level Visual Flight Rule ("VFR") helicopter flights that take place in the vicinity of
tall structures are not unique to London;

(c) within the London airspace, the low level VFR obstacle environment, situated below
the extensive Instrument Flight Rule commercial air traffic for London Heathrow
and London City airports, is not unique to H4 or indeed the heliroutes: most
helicopters transiting the London Control Zones. are now twin-engine and do not fly
on the heliroutes; and

(d) H4 is only one of a number of VFR helicopter routes within the London Control
Zones which are subject to detailed requirements and operating provisions.

Consequently, any potential changes to the use of H4 or the applicable flight rules are
likely to. have wider applicability and/or implications and must be considered both in the
context of the wider UK and the other portions of the London airspace.

In sum, the review will enable the CAA to identify and assess whether there are (i) any
high-level safety issues common to all onshore UK helicopters and (ii) any more. specific
safety issues affecting the London airspace, including, but not limited to, H4.

In considering whether to implement any changes as a result of this review, the CAA must
act in accordance with its statutory duties. Whilst the CAA’s primary duty in relation to its
air navigation functions is to maintain a high standard of safety in the provision of air traffic
services, it must also have regard to the following duties (amongst others)”:

(a) securing the most efficient use of airspace consistent with the safe operation of
aircraft and the expeditious flow of air traffic;

(b) satisfying the requirements of operators and owners of all classes of aircraft; and

(c) taking account of the interests of any person (other than an operator or owner of an
aircraft) in relation to the use of any particular airspace or the use of airspace

generally.

Compliance with these statutory duties requires the careful exercise of judgment to strike a
balance between potentially competing interests. Thus, by way of example, in relation to
the suggestion that it would enhance safety if a higher minimum altitude (above 500ft)
across London were implemented, the CAA must carefully assess the fact that this could
generate a new safety hazard by compressing VFR traffic into a narrower vertical band of
available airspace below the controlled airspace above, potentially increasing the likelihood
of VER conflictions. Furthermore, the CAA is obliged to be mindful of the fact that this
could significantly restrict helicopter operations over London since it would reduce the

1 The British Helicopter Association is a non-profit trade organisation that represents the UK's civil helicopter industry.
2 See Section 70 of the Transport Act 2000

available airspace below the Instrument Flight Rules traffic routing in and out of London
Heathrow and London City airports. This could adversely impact helicopter operations in
general and could restrict access to the London Heliport.

Planning

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

The second matter of concern that you have identified is as follows:

“it is not clear that helicopter aviation considerations for the Heliport or more widely for
flights along the Thames are adequately considered in the planning processes for tall
buildings. {t appears that little or no progress has been made in considering the need to
safeguard the heliport or implement AAIB Recommendation 2014-30...”

The CAA supports the London Heliport’s application to the Department for Transport
(“DET”) to become officially safeguarded. The CAA is currently providing support to the
DfT in order to assist with the preparation of an official safeguarding map for the Heliport.

We note that in relation to this accident, the Heliport would not have been consulted even if
it had been officially safeguarded as St George Wharf is not situated in the relevant area: it
is too far away from the London Heliport.

Consequently, as the CAA explained in the course of evidence, it agrees that
implementing the AAIB’s Recommendation 2014-030 would enhance safety. As you will
recall, the CAA actively encouraged the AAIB to include a recommendation of this kind in
its report. Recommendation 2014-030 states as follows:

“It is recommended that the Department for Transport implement measures that enable the
Civil Aviation Authority to assess, before planning permission is granted, the potential
implications of new en-route obstacles for airspace arrangements and procedures.”

Obstacles such as St George Wharf that are located outside of safeguarded areas are
known as “en-route obstacles". If this Recommendation is implemented it will mean that
the impact of all obstacles (i.e. any building or works extending 300ft or above) on airspace
arrangements will be assessed either by an aerodrome operator or by the CAA at the pre-
planning stage.

We understand that the DfT is also keen for ‘implementation of Recommendation 2014-030

progressed. An initial ‘meelinig took place on 8" February 2016 between the DfT and’
Department for Communities and Local Government (“DCLG”) to this end. The CAA
will actively engage with and support the DfT and DCLG in this regard.

The CAA will keep under review, both when implementing the outcome of
Recommendation 2014-030 and when considering, on a case by case basis, pre-planning
applications and as part of the on-going review of onshore UK helicopter operations,
whether it becomes necessary to implement an equivalent to the London Tall Buildings
Policy in order to maintain safe access routes for helicopters approaching London
aerodromes and for those transiting the London (City) and London (Heathrow) Control
Zones.

Safety Culture

3.1

The CAA is mindful of all the findings of your jury, including the conclusions that Mr Barnes
should not have attempted the flight, lost situational awareness and was likely to have felt
under pressure to land at Battersea. In addition to conducting the review discussed above,

the CAA is planning to hold a seminar later this year on safety culture for the commercial

|
|

helicopter industry. This subject is also being addressed by the Corporate Aviation Safety
Executive through its onshore helicopter section.

We trust that the above is of assistance. Please do not hesitate to contact either myself
(Kate. Staples@caa.co.uk) or Serena Lim (Serena.Lim@caa.co.uk) should you have any queries.

Yours faithfully

Kote Stages

Kate Staples
General Counsel and Secretary to the Civil Aviation Authority

Response from 2 (PDF)

Wi siport
Helipor
23"4 February 2016

Clerk to Senior Coroner

Inner South District of Greater London
The Coroner's Court

1 Tennis Street

London SE1 1YD

For the attention of Andrew Harris, Senior Coroner, London Inner South

Response to Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths
— Peter Barnes & Matthew Wood 16/01/13

Since the inquest the London Heliport has continued its correspondence with both CAA and DfT in
order to provide information to progress consideration of official safeguarding of the London
Heliport and assist them with implementation of AAIB report recommendation 2014-30,

On 4" January 2016 Abimbola Alli from DfT responded to my email of 10" November 2015, which
formed part of the inquest documents | was asked to comment on during my witness testimony, by
stating that the email, originally sent by way of providing information to support the London
Heliport enquiry concerning consideration for an application, would in fact be treated as a formal
application for official safeguarding whilst asking for further documentary evidence to support the
application.

The DfT for their part of the assessment have set out the current guidance for official safeguarding
of aerodromes and also the general arrangements for safeguarding whether official or not and also
stated that they will need to understand the existing consultation/communication process between
the London Heliport and the relevant local planning authorities. They would also consult the CAA
and the Department for Communities and Local Government (the department with lead
responsibility on planning policy) to determine what other measures, if any, are available to ensure
that local planning authorities give due regard to safeguarding concerns from the London Heliport
when granting planning permission.

At a meeting on 29" January with the London Heliport designated CAA Aerodrome Principal
Inspector and in subsequent correspondence | have set out current requirements and guidance for
notification to the London Heliport of planning applications, This process consists of an annotated
map and accompanying guidance letter sent to all planning departments of the Local Government
authorities which fall within the London Heliport safeguarded area in 2009. A pre-planning
consultation arrangement i is in place with the Port of London Authority for any works or
development in the River Thames within 250 metres of the London Heliport landing platform which
extends on concrete piling from the river wall over the tidal waters.

| have also provided to CAA information on the level of pre-planning consultation made by
developers under current arrangements and the number actual planning applications upon which
the London Heliport has been required to make comment or raise objections since the local
authorities were advised in 2009. There have been 10 major projects during this time, including tall
buildings, large-site projects with multiple buildings of mixed height, river piers and a modification to
the Cremone railway bridge involving a cantilevered foot-bridge addition. All of these projects have
been concentrated in the vicinity of the heliport and its air traffic circuit which extends
approximately 1 kilometre in either direction along the River Thames from the London Heliport.

The London Heliport Ltd, Bridges Court, Battersea, London, $W11 38E
Registered Office: 4'* Floor Millbank Tower, 21-24 Millbank, London SW1P 4QP
Registered in England & Wales: 04546128

The Lond

Helipor
The most in depth work to date began in 2015 on a development (now approved) at 12-14 Lombard
Road of a 90 metre tall building around 300 metres from the heliport located on the southern
riverside, Due to its size and proximity to the heliport and its approach and climb-out areas along the
river objection to the project involved insistence on in depth wind-tunnel, reflected glare and
technical (including building lighting and impairment of radio communications) assessments at the
additional expense of the developer since the planning application included only desk-based
assessments. Due to the unofficial safeguarding status of the London Heliport there was no
mechanism for referral of the planning application and heliport objection to the CAA who were also
therefore unable to make comment. Following an extended consultation process the development
was approved by the planning authority and the London Heliport made final comment that this
building and others of similar height would have a cumulative effect on the operation due to the
obscuration of line of sight between aircraft in the air and the heliport. Consultation on the
obstruction lighting scheme is underway and yet to be completed.

There have also been adhoc consultations on schemes for obstruction lighting on tall-building
projects mostly in the Vauxhall/ Nine Elms area as well as notifications of cranes across a wide area
of London about once a week since early 2013 following the 16 January Vauxhall crash.

| have also discussed with CAA how the safeguarded area, currently centred on the London Heliport
Air Traffic Zone with the main focus on the immediate approaches and climb-out area along the river
front within the heliport “circuit”, might be developed to reflect better the important routes where
heliport traffic approaches and departs the London Heliport Air Traffic Zone. This could involve
extending the coverage to include not only to the east and west along the heli-route structure where
it coincides with the course of River Thames through London including the increasingly high-rise
Vauxhall/ Nine Elms area but also away from the river directly to the north and south of the heliport.
As part of this process | have also asked National Air Traffic Services to provide radar-plotted
information which could assist with highlighting current traffic patterns and also asked to speak to
the responsible department within National Air Traffic Services for safeguarding low-level air traffic
over London.

| understand there may be a concern registered by the DCLG that if the safeguarded area for the
London Heliport becomes too extensive it may view this as too onerous a responsibility in terms of
notification and consideration. Whilst | understand this concern | would suggest there must also be a
wider responsibility to protect users of the airspace other than London Heliport customers who use
the same routes, | have stated our view that whilst the London Heliport itself does not wish to take
on an excessively onerous safeguarding burden it is seeking to find a suitable balance in order to
work with CAA, DfT, NATS and DCLG to find a solution.

In addition to liaising with CAA on the subject | have also set out in recent email correspondence
with DfT at their request consideration with regard to the London Heliport application for official
safeguarding in relation to current guidance.

Areas covered included:

1, Strategic Importance

« for routine government, diplomatic, military and Police and Air Ambulance use

¢ use in case of major emergencies (e.g. London bombings 2007, Marchioness Disaster)
for Air Ambulance, Police, Military Security Services

* asa forward operating base for Police Air Support when Central London is a venue for
state visits, ceremonial and public events which entail additional security or restrictions
on use of airspace.

The London Heliport Ltd, Bridges Court, Battersea, London, SW11 38E

Registered Office: 4" Floor Millbank Tower, 21-24 Millbank, Landon SW1P 4QP
Registered in England & Wales: 04546128

AA Lond
f leliport
2. Technical safeguarding

As a landing site in inner London the London Heliport has the capability if required for
technical support to the wider aviation community as an essential local link to National Air
Traffic Services radar coverage for the local management of low-level helicopter air traffic in
London, At the same time the London Heliport is also currently considering options for
upgrade of its meteorological reporting capability under a Meteorological Office project to
provide semi-automated online meteorological data available not only to aircrew of low-

level air traffic across London (not currently available) but also as part of the same project to
assist with London-wide fog forecasting for London Heathrow (and City) airports.

3. Physical Safeguarding

Given its key location in Central London the main areas for safeguarding London Heliport

should cover:

¢ much of the Central London heli-route structure including areas at or beyond the limits
of the London Heliport ATZ (e.g. Nine Elms/ Vauxhall), keeping in mind the tall-buildings
zoning policies for any of the inner and central London boroughs including City of
London Corporation especially where their boundary is river-facing since there are
many tail riverfront (or near riverfront) buildings either consented or under
construction in Central London (e.g.“No1 Blackfriars” on south side of Blackfriars Bridge) i

¢ the London Heliport Local Flying Area (LFA) which operates as an autonomous (from
NATS) extension to the south of the heliport ATZ.

¢ azone of similar dimensions to the LFA but running to the north which although
currently overseen by combined NATS and RAF Northolt radar services could also
become a second semi-autonomous LFA. To this end we are currently under discussions
with NATS to put in place contingencies in case of failure of the NATS radar service
which have in the past either closed the London Heliport or severely limited its freedom
to operate. |

Whilst | would not argue that the London Heliport becomes solely responsible for the
onerous task of safeguarding such a large area, | believe it would be a logical area within
which CAA/NATS and London Heliport could work together with the DLGC to protect
London-wide low-level helicopter and other fixed wing air traffic (since not all of it uses
London Heliport). The focus for the London Heliport would be the area within and
immediately adjacent to its ATZ, with a wider “on-route” and “off-route” responsibility
passing increasingly to NATS and CAA further away from the London Heliport ATZ.

4. Current List of officially safeguarded aerodromes
This list includes many privately-owned important regional airports, including one which is
currently closed and unlikely to ever re-open (Plymouth) and others such as Blackpool and
Coventry which have come close to closure. Another, Carlisle currently has no commercial
air transport operators. Also listed is Penzance which is now closed having been the only
dedicated heliport facility on the list; it served the Scilly Isles until closure and transferral of
the scheduled helicopter service to Lands’ End Airport before this ceased to operate. There
is a precedent therefore for safeguarding of a heliport in the public interest for commercial
air transport operations (albeit not scheduled services) rather major aerodromes.

5. Future safeguarding arrangements under European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
A form of official safeguarding will happen through the statutory provision of aerodrome
data which is part of the increasing scope of EASA law concerning all airports of a certain size
and complexity which in time may also include heliports within its scope (this currently only

The London Heliport Ltd, Bridges Court, Battersea, London, SW11 3BE
Registered Office: 4" Floor Millbank Tower, 21-24 Millbank, London SW1P 4QP
Registered in England & Wales: 04546128

The Lond
Heliport

applies to aerodromes with a certain level of passenger throughput, runway length which
also use radar). Given the pace of development of Central London and the number of tall
buildings either under development or at the planning stage it seems expedient to not wait
for this to become law in order to secure the future of the heliport facility and meet the
recommendations of the coroner report into prevention of future deaths following the
inquest into the Vauxhail helicopter crash on 16th January 2013.

6. Aunique facility
The London Heliport is the only licensed Heliport in London. It was the foresight of Westland
Aviation (now part of Finmeccanica-Agusta Westland), who as custodians of the post Second
World War helicopter manufacturing industry, founded the London Heliport in 1959 to
prove the viability of an urban business heliport. Thanks to its unique design combined with
the flexibility of operation of helicopters and their continuing technical and safety
developments, including new designs and technologies, the London Heliport remains a
relevant, viable operation after 55 years of operation.

7. Review of current official safeguarding arrangements
Although the official safeguarding system may have been established after the Second
World War when certain aerodromes were identified as being important for the national
transport system, the process has now been extended to other sites, such as City Airport so
it cannot be right to treat London Heliport differently and be excluded. The London Heliport
has similarities in strategic importance with other aerodromes albeit in some case for
slightly different reasons due to its specialisation as a facility for helicopters.

In conclusion the London Heliport remains committed to pursuing an officially safeguarded status
and working with the aviation regulator (CAA/ EASA), local government (DCLG) and the on-route air
traffic service provider (NATS) for the safeguarding of the London Heliport and the wider network of
routes in the London area used by helicopter air traffic. The London Heliport is currently awaiting a
response from the DfT to the case made above for official safeguarding.

Yours sincerely

Simon Hutchins
Heliport (Accountable) Manager

The London Heliport Ltd, Bridges Court, Battersea, London, SW11 3BE
Registered Office: 4‘* Floor Millbank Tower, 21-24 Millbank, London SW1P 4QP
Registered in England & Wales: 04546128

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