Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2018

John Armstrong

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2018-0008, written 12 Jan 2018. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report12 Jan 2018
Reference2018-0008
DeceasedJohn Armstrong
CoronerDianne Hocking
Coroner areaLeicester (City & South)
CategoryOther related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

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Mrs D Hocking
Assistant Coroner for Leicester (City and South)

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: Mr Andrew Haines, Chief Executive, Civil Aviation
Authority.

1

CORONER

am Mrs D Hocking, Assistant Coroner for Leicester (City and South)

2

CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS

make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and

regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

3

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On 05/12/2016 I commenced an investigation into the death of John Christopher Armstrong,
aged 70. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 03 January 2018.
The conclusion of the jury was Accidental Death. The jury's Box 3 read as follows:- "Mr
Armstrong, a 70 year old healthy male and an experienced glider pilot conducted a flight in a
glider from Husbands Bosworth Airfield on 4th December 2016. The weather conditions were
good, with visibility reasonable but reduced when flying towards the low sun. During the flight Mr
Armstrong conducted a 270 degree turn, then approximately 28 seconds later was involved in a
mid-air collision with a Cessna aircraft that was on a training navigation flight. The collision
occurred at approximately 12.30pm. Although the Cessna took suitable evasive action, the
collision resulted in the wing of the Cessna hitting the left wing of the glider, severely damaging it
and causing the glider to nosedive to the ground at approximately 12.30pm. There was no
evidence of evasive action from Mr Armstrong's glider. Air ambulance was shortly dispatched
and arrived, at 12.49pm. Unfortunately Mr Armstrong suffered severe injuries as a result of the
impact with the ground and was pronounced dead at the scene, at Laughton Road, Laughton,
Leicestershire on 4th December 2016. From the evidence provided neither aircraft saw one
another on enough time to avoid the collision."

The cause of death was: - "Head, spine and chest injuries."

4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
As above from the jury's conclusion. The Air Accident Investigation Board conducted an
investigation and concluded that "The accident occurred because the pilots did not see each
other's aircraft in sufficient time to take effective avoiding action. Collision avoidance was by
lookout and visual detection, which has limitations and the low sun would have reduced the
likelihood of the pilot of G-CLJK (the glider) seeing G-CSFC (the Cessna) in time. G-CLJK was
fitted with FLARM but G-CSFC was not fitted with such a system. Therefore, there was no
electronic means to increase the ability to detect other aircraft in the vicinity to allow for effective
collision avoidance. The CAA have since issued CAP 1391 and are part of CWG which
. promotes the installation of EC (Electronic Conspicuity) devices in aircraft"

5

CORONER'S CONCERNS

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my
opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it
ism statutor  dut  to re  ort to  ou.

Town Hall Square, Leicester, L~1 9BG
I'ax 0116 225 2537
Tel 0116 4541030  ~ 

 The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. —

(1) A'see and avoid' principle. of avoiding collisions is subject to limitations of the human eye and
may be a significant problem in certain weather conditions (as in this case, a low sun).

2) There is no effective way of one aircraft ascertaining another aircraft's position in flight or have
any warning of an impending collision. Some aircraft have alarms and/or anti-collision devices
but (a) they are not necessarily compatible with other systems that are used and (b) they are not
mandatory;

(2) There was no Air Traffic control over Husbands Bosworth airfield even though there is a
gliding club at the airfield and therefore, one would assume, a higher usage of airspace and
likelihood of a collision. There were seven aircraft in the vicinity at the time of the accident
(including the two aircraft involved in the accident) but no-one controlling the position of the
aircraft.

6

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

I n my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I  believe you have the power
to take such action.

7

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by
09 March 2018. I, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.

8

COPIES and PUBLICATION

have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons;

 (Wife)

 (Brother in Law)

 (AAIB)

 (Lawyer representing Go Fly Oxford)

 (Aviva Insurance)

 (Solicitor representing Insurers of Coventry Gliding Club)

am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He
may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest.
You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the
release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.

9

Dated 12th January 2018

Signature

Assistant Coroner for Leicester (Ci 

nd South)

Town Hall Square, Leicester, L~1 9BG
Tel 0116 4541030  ~  Fax 0116 225 2537

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Caa (PDF)
Chief Executive's Office

HM Coroner
For Leicester City and South Leicestershire
The Town Hall
Town Hall Square
Leicester
LE1 9BG

23 February 2018

Civil Aviation
Authority

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Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths —John Christopher Armstrong

refer to your letter dated 12 January 2018 regarding the mid-air collision between a
glider and a Cessna aircraft over Husbands Bosworth Airfield on 4 December 2016
which led to the regrettable death of Mr Armstrong.

2. 

In your letter, you highlight 3 areas of concern:

a.  The limitations of the see and avoid principle.
b.  The lack of an effective method to ascertain another aircraft's position in

flight.

c.  The lack of Air Traffic Control Provision over Husband's Bosworth airfield.

would like to address each of these issues in turn.

See and Avoid
3. 

In the absence of a full and comprehensive ground surveillance picture, where all
airborne are `electronically conspicuous' and subject to either monitoring or control by air
traffic services, the use of see and avoid has been an effective, if not infallible, method of
avoiding collision for many decades. But, as you quite rightly mention, it does have its
limitations.  Limitations of the `see and avoid' principle include: the difficulty of the human
eye in detecting other aircraft on a steady bearing (which would indicate a collision is
likely); blind spots within the aircraft (much as there is in a car behind the a-pillars);
visual conspicuity of small, often white objects against the sky (such as gliders); and as
in this tragic case, the position of the sun in the sky relative to each aircraft.  In addition,
whilst air traffic control is valid and effective within controlled airspace, the UK structure
enables large swathes of `open, uncontrolled' airspace where users are entitled to
operate with little or no electronic equipment or air traffic assistance.

4. 

The Mid-Air Collision (MAC) Working Group, chaired by the CAA and including
representation from across the flying spectrum, has examined the issue of visual
conspicuity over many years. There are things than can be done to improve conspicuity,
including different paint schemes and high intensity strobe lighting.  Gliders though are
painted predominantly white due to issues surrounding heat absorption and structural
integrity; patently against the majority of meteorological background conditions, this is far
from ideal. Some work has been done to raise the visual profile of gliders, including the

Civil Aviation Authority
K5, CAA House, 45-59 Kingsway, London, WC2B 6TE www.caa.co.uk
Telephone 020 7453 6003

 use of stripes and bands of colour, but the key contributor to visual acuity is the use of
strobe lighting and, due to weight and power consumption constraints, this has not
proven to be a realistic solution. Some modern, high-end gliders are fitted with powerful
batteries and in some cases even, a small engine to help sustain flight, but this is in a
very small section of the gliding community.

Effective Method to Ascertain another Aircraft's position.
5. 

There are other facilities and items of equipment that can provide cues for `see and
avoid'; these include: making radio calls when passing an aerodrome, participation in an
Air Traffic Control (ATC) service, (an action which is not mandatory in the type of
airspace within which this event occurred), and the carriage and use of Electronic
Conspicuity equipment. The position of other aircraft can be ascertained by those
aircraft carrying interoperable electronic signal emitting transponders and, in some
cases, conflicts can be resolved by using collision avoidance technology. This is an
enhancement of the `see and be seen' principle known as `see, be seen and avoid'.

6.  As highlighted in your report, glider GCLJK was fitted with a system known as FLARM, a

lightweight collision avoidance solution particularly popular amongst the gliding
community as it is light weight and with minimal power requirements. FLARM is also in
use by some pilots in the General Aviation (GA) community but it is by no means
ubiquitous; FLARM operates on a different frequency to more capable electronic
transponders as favoured by the majority of larger aircraft around the world. FLARM has
great utility in dense traffic situations such as would exist with groups of gliders soaring
around a thermal but is largely incompatible with the equipment in different types of
aircraft.  Any form of electronic conspicuity equipment relies on all those in the vicinity
carrying compatible systems. Had- Glider GCLJK been fitted with a newer version of this
equipment PowerFLARM hops://flarm.com/products/powerflarm/ Mr Armstrong might
have been able to pick up emissions from Cessna GCSFC if it were carrying and
operating such a system, and thereby been given indication as to the presence of this
aircraft.

7.  You also mention in your letter that the CAA has published CAP1391. This document is
the result of many years of work of the Electronic Conspicuity Working Group (ECWG),
that has striven to overcome the challenges of the need for low power consumption,
portability and affordability to encourage the wider use of electronic conspicuity devices.
The CAA, alongside the ECWG, has provided specifications to industry for such devices
and is actively encouraging the licensing and equipage of such equipment, to minimise
the incidents of mid-air conflict. There are several trials currently being run in the UK
airspace to examine the efficacy of this equipment.

8. 

Indeed, some of this work has already born fruit with at least 4 different devices being
declared as meeting the CAP1391 requirements and available for purchase for a few
hundred pounds. http://www.caa.co.uk/General-aviation/Aircraft-ownership-and-
maintenance/Electronic-Conspicuity-devices/ There is an intention that there will be
gradual convergence of technology and greater compatibility between systems as
technology advances and greater gains are made in miniaturisation.

Air Traffic Control Provision
9. 

As is with the case of the fitment of electronic conspicuity, the participation in an air
traffic control service is also not mandatory in this type of airspace. The gliding
community generally reserve their radio transmissions for club communications and
deconfliction with other gliders, whereas GA aircraft on a navigation exercise would
normally speak with ATC or air to Ground stations along their route, although this is not
mandatory unless they are planning to penetrate an air traffic control zone.

Civil Aviation Authority
K5, CAA House, 45-59 Kingsway, London, WC2B 6TE www.caa,co.uk
Telephone 020 7453 6003

 10.  Large parts of the airspace in the south of the UK are facilitated by the provision of a

Lower Airspace Radar Service (CARS) mainly provided by military units. However,
coverage is sparse in some areas. This service is provided through the long standing
joint and integrated approach to airspace regulation in the UK, which corrals the
capabilities of both civil and military facilities to the benefit of all airspace users. The
service is however entirely voluntary: there is no requirement to provide nor utilise the
service. It is understood from the AAIB report that the Cessna GCSFC was in
communication with Leicester Airport, but that aerodrome does not have a radar facility.
The provision of radar facilities at an aerodrome is a decision for the operator of the
airfield, although it does have a role to play at busier airports where commercial air
transport operates and where the CAA may require the operator to provide radar service
provision as part of the airport's safety management system. This is not the situation in
the case of Leicester aerodrome due to the small scale of their operation and the
absence of public transport flights.

1 1.  Whilst an air traffic service is a good cue to assist `see and avoid', it does depend on the
capabilities of the service provider (are they equipped with radar?), the ability of the
radar to detect aircraft made from composite non-radar reflective materials, and that all
aircraft in the same area are receiving a service from the same provider (i.e. on the
same frequency). The nature of gliding operations is such that preference is given to
remaining on a `gliding frequency'. Accordingly, the CAA and the various working
groups looking at these issues over the years, have concluded that proactively enabling
the development and manufacture of lightweight, low cost electronic conspicuity devices
and encouraging wider carriage of compatible electronic conspicuity devices is the best
option to mitigate the risks of mid-air conflict and the prevention of collision. It should be
noted however, that in a busy visual air traffic circuit, the utility of electronic conspicuity
devices is reduced, as pilots do not have the time to look into the cockpit to track other
aircraft -they must be predominantly "heads out" as this is the safest way of operating
with other aircraft that are using the circuit at the same time. Pilot education in the
dangers associated with circuit operations is currently the most effective tool.

Conclusion
12.  The CAA will continue to drive forward the plan to ensure operators are `electronically
conspicuous' which will help to reduce the incidence of such events as those at
Husbands Bosworth and others more recently.  The risk of mid-air collision is a
complex and long-term challenge and as such the CAA's MAC programme aims to
reduce the risk of mid-air collision by pursuing targeted and continuous improvements in
systems, cultures, processes and capability. The MAC programme works closely and
collaboratively with the UK Airprox Board, UK Flight Safety Committee, Military Aviation
Authority and industry stakeholders to understand and assess risk and identify effective
and collaborative mitigations. This programme also meets the European Plan for
Aviation Safety (EPAS) requirement for Member States to address MAC in their safety
plans.

Yours sincerely

Andrew Haines
CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Civil Aviation Authority
K5, CAA House, 45-59 Kingsway, London, WC2B 6TE www.caa.co.uk
Telephone 020 7453 6003

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