Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2019

Mark Hinton

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2019-0142, written 30 Apr 2019. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report30 Apr 2019
Reference2019-0142
DeceasedMark Hinton
CoronerJohn Ellery
Coroner areaShropshire, Telford & Wrekin
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Organisation namedThe Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

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REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 
1.  Mr  Simon  Wright,  Chief  Executive,  Shrewsbury  and  Telford  NHS  Trust,  Royal 
Shrewsbury Hospital, Mytton Oak Road, Shrewsbury SY3 8XQ  

CORONER 

I am Mr John Penhale Ellery, Senior Coroner for the coroner area of Shropshire, Telford 
& Wrekin. 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On  15th  October  2018  I  commenced  an  investigation  into  the  death  of  Mark  Richard 
HINTON, 52  years of age, and opened an inquest on the 28th February 2019. 
The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on the 25th day of April 2019. The 
medical  cause  of  death  was  Ia)  Pulmonary  Embolus  due  to  Ib)  Deep  Vein  Thrombosis 
and II) Bleeding Duodenal Ulcer. 

The conclusion of the inquest was “Preventable Natural Cause” 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

On  Monday  8th  October  2018  at  16:37  hours  the  deceased  self-presented  in  A&E, 
Princess  Royal  Hospital,  Telford.  He  was  triaged  at  17:25  hours  with a  history  that  he 
had  been  walking  his  dog  last  Thursday  and  the  dog  ran  into  his  right  leg.  He  had 
increased pain to his right calf area radiating into his thigh. He had contacted 111 who 
advised  him  to  go  to  A&E  due  to  possible  ‘clot’.  He  was triaged,  seen  by  other  nurses 
and  a  doctor  and  was  discharged  home  at  22:10  hours.  A  D-Dimer  test  had  been 
requested  which  would  have  assisted  indicating  the  presence  or  not  of  a  DVT.  That 
request  had  not  been  documented  and  the  discharging  doctor  was not  aware  of  it  at 
the time of discharge. The result showed a markedly raised D-Dimer which if known at 
the  time  would  have  resulted in  the deceased’s  admission  to  hospital,  treatment  and 
probable survival. A series of failings and system errors led to the death. 

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CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. 
In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

Concerns were raised by SATH themselves in their Serious Incident Investigation Report 
and other arose during the course of the inquest. For completeness all concerns are set 
out here so a holistic approach can be taken.  

(1)  The information chain.  

a)  When  Mark  (as  the  family  wish  him  to  be  referred  to)  attended  A&E  he 
informed the triage nurse (nurse A) that he had contacted 111 who advised to 
go to A&E due to possible ‘clot’. That information was not recorded or passed 
on  to  others.  Recorded  examination  of  Mark  included  pain  and  obvious 
swelling to right calf.  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b)  The Staff Nurse (nurse B) who then carried out observations on Mark came to 
the  view  that  he  ‘could  probably  do  with  a  D-Dimer’.  That  nurse  states  she 
passed that information to the next (third) nurse (nurse C).  

c)  Nurse C states that information was not passed to her. She was unaware that 
Mark  had  pain  in  his  calf  and  therefore  had  no  reason  to  request  bloods, 
particularly a D-Dimer test, and had no knowledge of them being requested.  

d)  At or around 19:33 hours it appears that bloods, including a D-Dimer test were 
requested. However there is no record of these (8) test being recorded or who 
ordered them or why.  

e)  When the attending doctor first saw Mark at 21:06 hours he saw the results of 
7 blood tests none of which indicated to him the presence of a possible DVT. 
The 8th blood test (i.e. the D-Dimer test) was not shown and as there was no 
record of it having been requested he did not know it was outstanding and nor 
in  his  opinion,  was  it  required.  Upon  the  information  before  that  doctor  he 
medically  discharged  Mark  from  hospital.  Following  Marks’  discharge  from 
hospital the result of the D-Dimer test became available which would have led 
to Mark being admitted with treatment which probably would have saved his 
life.  

(2)  System failures. 

a)  The system did not require or mandate the person who requested blood tests, 
specifically in this case a D-Dimer test, to record that request or the reason for 
it.  There  was  no  alert  system  which  would  have  alerted  the  final  decision 
maker  of  that  request.  At  that  time  a  health  care  assistant,  staff  nurse  or 
doctor could have requested the tests. Only a doctor may do so now.  

b)  The  evidence  indicated  that  agency  nurses  and  locum  doctors  did  not  have 
access to the hospital systems in particular the “review” system for requesting 
and  reporting  on  tests.  It  appears  to  have  been  common  practice  for  those 
who  could  not  do  so  to  log  on  using  a  permanent  member  of  staff’s  pin 
number or access code, with or without their permission.The blood tests had 
been requested on nurse C’s ‘review’ account who denied doing so.  

c) 

If  none  of  the  witnesses  who  gave  evidence  requested  the  D-Dimer  test  it 
meant  that  another  person  did  and  could  do  so  without  any  entry  or  note 
made in the A&E records.  

(3)  Other matters arising.  

a)  A  second  set  of  observations  should  have  been  made  before  Mark  was 

discharged. This did not happen. 

b)  The  D-Dimer  test  result  was  delayed  due  to  a  systems  error  with  the  CS2500 
machine. It is stated that this may happen intermittently and is then corrected. 
Had  the  system error  not  occurred  it  is  likely  that  the (8th)  result  would  have 
been available on screen for the discharging doctor to review.  

c)  Telephone  results  are  not  made  if  the  patient  is  an  in-patient  in  A&E.  The 
Standing Operation Procedure (SOP) in Pathology states “D-Dimer greater than 
500ug/l  telephone  to  GP,  out-patients  and  outlying  hospitals  (excludes  SATH 
in-patients)”.  Is  a  patient  waiting  assessment  in  A&E  an  out-patient  or  in-
patient or some other category? 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 d)  Differential  diagnosis.  Had  all  the  information  to  the  discharging  doctor  a 

differential diagnosis of DVT may have been made and recorded.  

e)  A body map had not been completed at any time.  

f)  Oramorph was recorded as having been given but not checked. Also it may the 

mask symptoms of pain.  

g)  Whilst  D-Dimer  tests  were  becoming  routine  rather  than  clinically  required, 
Mark  had  come  in  with  a  possible  ‘clot’  whether  his  earlier  symptoms  had 
improved or not. 

h)  The  absence  of  documentation  made  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  resolve 

factual discrepancies between members of staff.  

i) 

The impression given by witnesses was that they were under pressure (racing 
against the clock) to meet the 4 hour deadline in A&E. 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In  my  opinion  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  future  deaths  and  I  believe  your 
organisation has the power to take such action. 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 25th June 2019. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I  have  sent  a  copy  of  my  report  to  the  Chief  Coroner  and  to  the  following  Interested 
Persons, 

 mother of Mark, 

 sister of Mark.  

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. 

The  Chief  Coroner  may  publish  either  or  both  in  a  complete  or  redacted  or  summary 
form.  He  may  send  a  copy  of  this  report  to  any  person  who  he  believes  may  find  it 
useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of 
your  response,  about  the  release  or  the  publication  of  your  response  by  the  Chief 
Coroner. 

Mr John Penhale Ellery 
Senior Coroner 
Shropshire, Telford & Wrekin 

30th April 2019 

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Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from The Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust (PDF)
INHS

The Shrewsbury and

21 SUN 2019 Telford Hospital
NHS Trust

Trust Headquarters

Royal Shrewsbury Hospital
Mytton Oak Road

Mr J P Ellery Shrewsbury
Senior Coroner for Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin A tr
The Shirehall

Abbey Foregate Our Ref: SW.djp
Shrewsbury Tel: 01743 261001
Shropshire Website: www.sath.nhs.uk
SY2 6ND E-mail:

Twitter: @SaTH_CEO

Date: 18 June 2019
Dear Mr Ellery

Re: Regulation 28 Report - Mark Richard Hinton (deceased)

| write in response to the Regulation 28 Report issued on 30 April, 2019. For ease of
reference, | will respond to the Coroner's concerns following the numbering pattern within the
Regulation 28 Report.

1. The Information Chain

a. When Mark (as the family wish him to be referred to) attended A&E he informed the triage
nurse (nurse A) that he had contacted 111 who advised to go to A&E due to possible ‘clot’.
That information was not recorded or passed on to others. Recorded examination of Mark
included pain and obvious swelling to right calf.

There is nothing in the Trust documentation that the information provided to
111 was subsequently provided to the Trust.

b. The Staff Nurse (nurse B) who then carried out observations on Mark came to the view that he
‘could probably do with a D-Dimer’. That nurse states she passed that information to the next
(third) nurse (nurse C).

This is agreed as contained within the statement of Nurse B.

c. Nurse C states that information was not passed to her. She was unaware that Mark had
pain in his calf and therefore had no reason to request bloods, particularly a D-Dimer test,
and had no knowledge of them being requested.

Nurse C states that the information was not passed to her, and therein lies a
discrepancy in evidence.

d. At or around 19:33 hours it appears that bloods, including a D-Dimer test were requested.
However there is no record of these (8) test being recorded or who ordered them or why.

When a patient presents to ED, the reason for admission would determine
which blood tests are carried out. There is no record of the D-Dimer test
being requested on the ED card, however, the results are on the Review
system. The Review system does not show which tests are requested, only the
results. Interrogation of the pathology systems confirmed that the D-Dimer
test was requested under the computer log-in of Nurse C.

Proud To Care & Make It Happen & We Value Respect & Together We Achieve

EEE eel ti(‘i‘

e. When the attending doctor first saw Mark at 21:06 hours he saw the results of 7 blood tests
none of which indicated to him the presence of a possible DVT. The 8th blood test (i.e. the
D-Dimer test) was not shown and as there was no record of it having been requested he
did not know it was outstanding and nor in his opinion, was it required. Upon the
information before that doctor he medically discharged Mark from hospital. Following Marks’
discharge from hospital the result of the D-Dimer test became available which would have led
to Mark being admitted with treatment which probably would have saved his life.

The treating Doctor reviewed Mark at 2155 hours and wrote in the records
at that time. The ED system shows that Mark was discharged at 2210 hours.
The Review system shows that the D-Dimer results were available at 2205
hours, 5 minutes before Mark was discharged. However, as the treating
Doctor did not know that the D-Dimer test had been requested, he had no
reason to go back and re-review the blood tests. The records show that
Mark was keen to go home even without medication.

2. System Failures

a. The system did not require or mandate the person who requested blood tests, specifically in
this case a D-Dimer test, to record that request or the reason for it. There was no alert
system which would have alerted the final decision maker of that request. At that time a
health care assistant, staff nurse or doctor could have requested the tests. Only a doctor
may do so now.

There is a facility to alert clinical staff to tests that have been requested
[Appendix 1, CAS card, page 2]. This section of the CAS card was not
completed, due to human factors, not a system failure.

In relation to who can request a blood test, the current system is that any
trained clinical professional may request a D-Dimer test once it is authorised by
a doctor.

The electronic system does not indicate how many tests have been requested,
but will only report on the outcome of the tests.

b. The evidence indicated that agency nurses and locum doctors did not have access to the
hospital systems in particular the “review” system for requesting and reporting on tests.
It appears to have been common practice for those who could not do so to log on using a
permanent member of staffs pin number or access code, with or without their permission.
The blood tests had been requested on nurse C’s ‘review’ account who denied doing so.

The Trust IT policy (Information Governance guidance) stipulates that personal
PIN numbers/log-ins must not be shared and individuals sign to adhere to this
policy. It is an individual's responsibility to log out once immediate work is
completed.

To reinforce information security, in ED there is a "lock out" after five minutes on
a personal log-in.

Locum staff and agency staff do not have a generic PIN as that offers a
compromise to information security.

Proud To Care <& Make It Happen & We Value Respect & Together We Achieve

c. If none of the witnesses who gave evidence requested the D-Dimer test it meant that another
person did and could do so without any entry or note made in the A&E records.

Accepted. There is no definitive explanation as to what happened. However, it is
possible that another person used Nurse C's log-in before it locked out.

3. Other Matters Arising

a. A second set of observations should have been made before Mark was discharged.
This did not happen.

This is accepted. A second set of observations should have been taken which
is good practice. This has been a learning point for the individual doctor.

b. The D-Dimer test result was delayed due to a systems error with the CS2500 machine. It is
stated that this may happen intermittently and is then corrected. Had the system error not
occurred it is likely that the (8th) result would have been available on screen for the
discharging doctor to review.

Yes, this is accepted and a full explanation was provided in the evidence by
Dr E.

c. Telephone results are not made if the patient is an in-patient in A&E. The Standing
Operation Procedure (SOP) in Pathology states “D-Dimer greater than 500ug/I telephone to
GP, out-patients and outlying hospitals (excludes SATH in-patients)”. Is a patient waiting
assessment in A&E an out-patient or in-patient or some other category?

A patient in ED is an "in-patient", therefore the protocol is that the
Pathology Department do not telephone through the results as they will be
available on the system. The onus is on the requester to check the results. The
normal standard within Pathology is that the Pathology Department rings up to
three times for some abnormal test results, for example, Hb, low potassium.
Thereafter it defaults to the requester to check the system.

There are no national guidelines in relation to D-Dimer tests, it is up to the
individual Trust to determine. There are no guidelines from the Royal College
of Pathologists which is what we take other ranges from to action.

d. Differential diagnosis. Had all the information been available to the discharging doctor a
differential diagnosis of DVT may have been made and recorded.

Accepted.

e. A body map had not been completed at any time.
Mark was classified as a "minors" patient. A body map is used for
significant skin disorders, for example, pressure sores, lacerations, bruising.

Patients who are classified as "majors" would by definition have a body map
completed. ;

f. Oramorph was recorded as having been given but not checked. Also it may mask
symptoms of pain.

Proud To Care 4 Make It Happen < We Value Respect < Together We Achieve

There was no documentation as to why Oramorph was prescribed, however,
there was a pain score of 10/10 which would justify a painkiller like Oramorph.
There is no pharmaceutical requirement for Oramorph to be double-checked.

g. Whilst D-Dimer tests were becoming routine rather than clinically required, Mark had come in
with a possible ‘clot’ whether his earlier symptoms had improved or not.

The Trust did not know about the suspicion of a clot which we understand,
with hindsight, to have been suggested when Mark sought primary care
advice (1a). Mark's presenting complaint was a painful leg which was not
necessarily indicative of a clot.

h. The absence of documentation made it difficult if not impossible to resolve factual
discrepancies between members of staff.

Agreed. The Trust relies on the integrity of individuals to maintain professional
standards of completing documentation. There are clear guidelines issued by
both the NMC and the GMC which should be adhered to. An action from the
RCA was to audit whether the ED staff were compliant in completing
documentation. The initial audit results showed poor compliance and the plan
is for the audit to be repeated monthly. The results have been discussed by
the senior ED management team who are tasked with bringing improvement.

i. The impression given by witnesses was that they were under pressure (racing against the
clock) to meet the 4 hour deadline in A&E.

The ED was routinely busy. On 8 October, 2018, the data shows that the
"majors" side of ED was very. busy, and these patients have clinical priority.
Therefore patients within "minors" tend to have a longer wait. The "four hour
deadline" refers the time the patient is seen and discharged home, seen and
the decision is taken to admit. In Mark's case, he arrived at 1637 hours, he was
triaged at 1725 hours, ECG at 1752 hours, Oramorph given at 1930 hours,
bloods at 1933 hours, seen by the doctor at 2106 hours, and discharged at
2210 hours.

Patient safety overrides any national targets imposed.
| hope that the above provides assurance that the Trust has taken action to implement the

lessons learned from this sad case. If you require any further explanation, particularly
i atio ie systems or processes within ED or Pathology please do let me know.

Chief Executive

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