Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2019
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2019-0160, written 17 May 2019. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 17 May 2019 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2019-0160 |
| Deceased | Jaspal Singh Bahra |
| Coroner | Crispin Butler |
| Coroner area | Buckinghamshire |
| Category | Other related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
C.G.BUTLER SENIOR CORONER +» BUCKINGHAMSHIRE REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1. Civil Aviation Authority CORONER lam CRISPIN GILES BUTLER senior coroner, for the coroner area of Buckinghamshire CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS | make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. http://www. legislation.gov/uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 http://www. legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/pdfs/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 20" November 2017 | commenced an investigation into the deaths of Jaspal Singh BAHRA, Saavan Singh MUNDAE, Michael Leonard GREEN and Thanh Trung NGUYEN The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 2™ May 2019. The conclusion of the jury at inquest was that each man died from multiple injuries and each death was as a result of an accident. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATHS Mr Bahra and Mr Mundae were flying in a Cessna 152 light aircraft and Mr Green and Mr Nguyen were flying in a Guimbal Cabri G2 helicopter when the two collided over Wilderness Wood, near Waddesdon Manor in Buckinghamshire. This led to a rapid descent by both craft through trees, impacting with the ground in the woodland. All of the men died at the scene from the injuries they respectively sustained. CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. — (1) It was clear from the evidence of The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) and The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) that aircraft such as the two involved in this collision operate in unregulated Class G airspace such as exists in the area of this collision without the requirement to carry any inter-craft electronic proximity warning or collision avoidance devices and are primarily kept safe by operating under the “See and Avoid” procedure which remains the same today as it was on 17" November 2017 (when the Coroner’s Office, 29 Windsor End, Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire. HP9 2JJ Tel: (01494) 475 505 Fax: (01494) 673 760 E Mail: coroners@buckscc.gov.uk s D, or SFO OB, ET MON. C.G.BUTLER SENIOR CORONER - BUCKINGHAMSHIRE collision occurred). It appears this has also been the case for many years before that. This procedure is entirely reliant upon pilots seeing other craft and undertaking periodic clearing turns to try to bring craft into view which might be concealed by a blind spot particular to that craft. It was the view of the AAIB that the “See and Avoid” procedure was central to the cause of this collision. Although evidence was given by CAA about movement towards the introduction of electronic devices, it was clear that, without universal application, small craft would remain at risk and that timescales for implementation are unclear, leaving “See and Avoid” as the continuing process by which these types of craft avoid collisions. (2) Although it could not be demonstrated that exposure to Carbon Monoxide prior to or during flight played a part in the implementation of “See and Avoid” or the collision, evidence demonstrated that it is not mandatory for light aircraft such as were involved in this collision to carry any Carbon Monoxide monitors or warning devices, notwithstanding their potential availability. Given the regular service requirements for such craft and the possible limitations in identifying hairline cracks or hidden defects in aircraft exhaust and heating systems, there remains a risk that pilots and passengers may be exposed to Carbon Monoxide in such craft which might directly put them at risk of death or might put the craft at risk of collision or accident carrying with that the inherent risk of death. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and | believe you have the power to take such action. YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 13" July 2019. |, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. COPIES and PUBLICATION | have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: 1. The respective families of Messrs Bahra, Mundae, Green and Nguyen 2. AAIB 3. Airways Aero Associates and the insurers for the Cessna 152 4. 21 Ltd tla Helicopter Services and Heligroup Ltd and the insurers of the Guimbal Cabri G2 helicopter 5. European Aviation Safety Agency | am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. Coroner’s Office, 29 Windsor End, Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire. HP9 2JJ Tel: (01494) 475 505 Fax: (01494) 673 760 E Mail: coroners@buckscc.gov.uk S me, SEO Sp GM, ET MON C.G.BUTLER SENIOR CORONER « BUCKINGHAMSHIRE The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 17™ May 2019 Crispin Butler, Senior Coroner for Buckinghamshire Coroner’s Office, 29 Windsor End, Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire. HP9 2JJ Tel: (01494) 475 505 Fax: (01494) 673 760 E Mail: coroners@buckscc.gov.uk
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
C G BUTLER – SENIOR CORONER FOR BUCKINGHAMSHIRE
INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATHS OF JASPAL SINGH BAHRA, SAAVAN SINGH
MUNDAE, MICHAEL LEONARD GREEN & THANH TRUNG NGUYEN
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY RESPONSE TO A REPORT ON ACTION TO PREVENT
OTHER DEATHS PURSUANT TO REGULATION 29 OF THE CORONERS
(INVESTIGATIONS) REGULATIONS 2013
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has considered carefully the report of the Senior Coroner
to prevent future deaths and its response to the concerns raised is set out below:
A) ‘See & Avoid’
i)
Introduction
At present, there is no single alternative available that comprehensively
addresses the limitations inherent in the use of ‘see and avoid’ techniques.
The CAA anticipates that the further development and deployment of
universally-compatible electronic conspicuity devices will aid in mitigation the
risk of future mid-air collisions occurring in Class G (uncontrolled) airspace. As
such, this is an area in which the CAA has invested and will continue to invest
significant resources.
However, pending such further advancement and subsequent adoption, the
CAA continues to address the associated risk by ensuring that pilots are
cognisant of the limitations of ‘see and avoid’; reviewing reports of airprox
incidents identifying causal or contributory factors; collaborating with industry
stakeholders through the Mid-Air Collision Programme and recommending or
acting where appropriate to mitigate the risk of such incidents occurring.
ii)
Regulatory Framework
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was established as an agency
of the European Union (EU). In 2003, EASA assumed the responsibility for
certain International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) obligations on behalf of
EU Members States. These obligations include policies for personnel licensing,
rules of the air and operations. The EU Basic Regulation established EASA
competence in these areas and implementing rules have since been published
setting out the requirements. Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1178/2011
concerns the regulation of aircrew and provides certain requirements for the
training and licencing of pilots. Annex 1 to the EU Aircrew Regulations is
referred to Part-FCL. ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance’ (AMC) and ‘Guidance
Material’ are published to support each element of the regulations. AMC1 to
FCL.210 details the syllabus that instructors have to deliver, so that a student
pilot may build the necessary competence and skills in a structured and
achievable manner.
Student pilots are required to complete a training course at a Declared Training
Organisation or an Approved Training Organisation. The course includes
theoretical knowledge and flight instruction appropriate to the privileges applied
for. The standard format for a course is a series of exercises, starting from
basic principles, to allow the student pilot to achieve an initial solo standard.
The student is required to consolidate these skills before moving on to
navigation, landing at other aerodromes and introduction into radio navigation
and instrument flight. Effective look out technique training is incorporated from
a very early stage in pilot training. The Acceptable Means of Compliance to
FCL.210 states that ‘each of the exercises involves the need for the applicant
to be aware of the needs of good airmanship and look-out, which should be
emphasised at all times’.1
The importance of maintaining an effective visual lookout is reinforced through
CAA publications. In May 2019, the CAA published the second edition of the
‘Skyway Code’,2 which is intended to provide pilots involved in non-commercial
and flight training operations with practical guidance on the operational, safety
and regulatory issues relevant to their flying. Its primary focus is safe aircraft
operations and the safe use of airspace. It is oriented towards Visual Flight
Rules (VFR) flight and provides guidance on the rules for the prevention of
collisions; precautionary measures that pilots can take; techniques for effective
visual scanning; the limitations of ‘see and avoid’ and available means of
ensuring electronic or visual conspicuity. The CAA intends that the Skyway
Code will be reviewed annually to ensure it reflects the latest regulatory
requirements and best aviation practice.
iii)
UK AIRPROX Board
The United Kingdom Airprox Board (UKAB) is the UK’s focal point for
investigating and reporting the circumstances, causes and risk of collision for
all airprox occurrences3 in UK airspace. The UKAB conducts investigations into
airprox events, reporting directly to Chief Executive of the CAA and the Director
1 AMC1 FCL.210.A PPL(A) – Experience Requirements and Crediting.
2 CAP 1535, Skyway Code, Version 2 <http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/modalapplication.aspx?appid=11&mode=detail&id=7920>.
3 An ‘airprox’ is defined as a situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or air traffic services personnel, the distance between
aircraft as well as their relative positions and speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved may have been
compromised.
Military Aviation Authority (MAA) as a quasi-independent endeavour beyond
the day-to-day oversight activity of those entities.
The UKAB focuses on enhancing air safety. It provides a mechanism for
feedback and follow-up of airprox-related insights and recommendations
regarding the efficacy of airspace regulation and the factors that have
influenced the performance of pilots and controllers. The sole objective of the
UKAB is to assess occurrences in the interests of enhancing air safety; it does
not apportion blame or liability.
The UKAB website details specific airprox events together with ‘lessons
identified’ and actions flowing from UKAB Safety Recommendations. The Pilots
and controllers involved in the airprox event each receive their own copy of the
UKAB’s final report which sets out what happened and why. Safety
Recommendations are made where appropriate to reduce the risk of
recurrence.
The UKAB publishes an annual report, which includes an analysis of UK airprox
numbers, rates and trends, to raise awareness and understanding in the
aviation community. Airprox Reports are one method of monitoring instances
in which aviation safety may have been compromised. Together with
mandatory occurrence reports and voluntary reports made to the CAA, they
ensure that incidents or occurrences are reported and can be learned from.
iv)
Mid-Air Collision (MAC) Programme
Mitigating against the risk of a future mid-air collision is a complex and long-
term challenge. The CAA’s current MAC Programme aims to reduce by
regulatory action the risk of a mid-air collision. The programme pursues
improvements in systems, cultures, and operational processes.
The MAC programme stakeholders work with the UKAB, UK Flight Safety
Committee, CAA UAS Programme, Military Aviation Authority and industry
stakeholders to better understand and assess risk and identify effective and
collaborative mitigation. This coordinated effort in turn ensures that the UK
meets the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) requirement for Member
States to address the risk of mid-air collisions in their safety plans.
The current MAC Programme Board provides the CAA’s Safety & Airspace
Regulation Group (‘SARG’) with a data observatory function, where key
indicators, trend analysis data and causal factor information is received,
monitored and considered. Potential intervention actions are identified by the
Programme Board and tasked for action. This data and coordination function
will continue into the foreseeable future in compliance with EPAS requirements.
Among other measures, the MAC Programme will continue to:
a. manage data on MAC events and use this evidence to steer action and
mitigation strategies with industry collaboration;
b. encourage the further development and deployment of conspicuity
devices which are interoperable, practical and affordable; and
c. contribute to the update and accessibility of the recently published CAP
1535 The Skyway Code to act as a guide to airmanship.
v)
Conclusion
Pilots are trained to be proficient in, and to understand the limitations of, ‘see
and avoid’ techniques as part of their basic training requirements. In addition,
there are measures in place to ensure that accidents, incidents and ‘near
misses’ in uncontrolled airspace, are reported and dealt with appropriately.
Where appropriate, such occurrences may be investigated to determine
whether regulatory action may be required.
The Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths has provided an opportunity
to review the approach to ‘see and avoid’ techniques and to give consideration
as to how best to mitigate the risk of collisions in Class G airspace. The issue
is a complex and long-term challenge. The CAA will continue to analyse the
findings and recommendations of the UKAB, and utilise the outcomes
promoted by the MAC Programme to enhance safety in this area.
B) Carbon Monoxide Exposure
The potential for carbon monoxide contamination in small aircraft (fixed or rotary wing)
is addressed through regulations that concern the design, maintenance and operation
of such aircraft.
i)
Aircraft Design
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has oversight of the design of
the aircraft involved in this accident. EASA promulgates design requirements
(‘codes’) CS-23 for ‘Small Light Aeroplanes’ and CS-VLR for ‘Very Light
Rotorcraft’, which contain specific requirements on cockpit contamination
preventative measures. Any change to those requirements would need to be
brought about by EASA. The codes address the required levels of ventilation,
the maximum acceptable CO content in the cockpit and the design of heating
systems (notably exhaust-related heat exchangers) with a view to preventing
CO contamination in the cockpit. The codes do not require CO detectors to be
fitted as part of the design. Similar design requirements exist in the United
States, which is the primary source of general aviation aircraft types.
ii)
Maintenance
Maintenance (Continuing Airworthiness) requirements and recommendations
in the UK provide that aircraft exhaust systems are to be inspected in
accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, the requirements of which
may vary from physical inspection to physical inspection with partial dis-
assembly, internal inspection and pressure testing. In the UK, there are two
publications of specific relevance to this topic:
CAA Publication (CAP) 562 ‘Civil Aircraft Airworthiness Information and
Procedures’
This publication includes Leaflet B-190 ‘CO contamination’, which
provides generic expectations for the maintenance-related measures to
minimise the likelihood of such occurrences. It addresses the nature
and effects of carbon monoxide, the causes of contamination, the
importance of
for
contamination.
inspections and means of
routine
testing
CAA Publication CAP 747 ‘Mandatory Requirements for Airworthiness’
This publication contains a related Generic Requirement, ‘GR No. 11’,
covering potential CO contamination from combustion heaters, which
are only fitted to a relatively small number of light aircraft. GR No. 11
addresses servicing and overhaul requirements intended to detect CO
contamination
Also, as a result of specific in-service instances, some manufacturers have
issued type-specific information that has been mandated by the responsible
aviation authorities in the form of ‘Airworthiness Directives’.
The new pan-European light aircraft maintenance requirements that are being
proposed for adoption later this year (Part M Light) are expected to contain a
requirement in the Minimum Inspection Programme (MIP) to “[i]nspect Cabin
Heating Heat Exchanger for improper condition and function. For exhaust heat
exchanger check CO-Carbon monoxide concentration.”
iii)
Operation
In the UK, there are a series of pamphlets (‘Safety Sense’ leaflets) providing
guidance to aircraft owners/operators on a variety of subjects. The ‘Winter
Flying’ Safety Sense Leaflet contains information on the use of ‘spot-type’
passive indicators. Such devices are small, widely-available and relatively
inexpensive. They can be attached to a wall or panel in the cockpit and do not
need to be professionally installed.
There are a range of active CO detectors available that use audible, visible or
vibration warnings when pre-determined CO levels are exceeded. These have
the notable advantage of actively engaging the pilot’s attention and are
accordingly more likely to be more effective than the ‘spot-type indicators’.
CO detectors may be fitted to UK-registered aircraft as ‘standard changes’
under the provisions of CS-STAN (for EASA aircraft) and CAP 1419 (for non-
EASA aircraft). This removes the need for direct authority involvement, allowing
equipment to be installed without the associated time and costs.
CO detectors are not mandated for general aviation aircraft, as from an initial
design viewpoint, the requirements for the certification of the aircraft are such
that the system design should minimise the likelihood of CO contamination, but
the maintenance of sometimes notably highly-utilised airframes and/or their
ageing systems means that contamination can occasionally take place. The
more widespread use of CO detectors is thus currently down to the
pilot/owner’s discretion.
iv)
Conclusion
The Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths has provided an opportunity
to review available material on CO contamination avoidance. Notwithstanding
the measures already in place and those expected in the near future, the CAA
will consider the merits of an additional information on best practice CO
contamination avoidance, in a ‘Safety Notice’ publication. To this end, the CAA
will consult with members of the relevant stakeholder forum, the AOPA
Maintenance Working Group, in making this decision by the end of the third
quarter of 2019. If a decision be made to publish a Safety Notice, this is
expected to take place by the end of 2019.
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