Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2020

Karen Bingham

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2020-0081, written 30 Mar 2020. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report30 Mar 2020
Reference2020-0081
DeceasedKaren Bingham
CoronerCaroline Topping
Coroner areaSurrey
CategoryMental Health related deaths · Other related deaths · Emergency services related deaths (2019 onwards)
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published2

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

IN THE SURREY CORONER’S COURT 

IN THE MATTER OF: KAREN JANE BINGHAM 

__________________________________________________________ 

The Inquest Touching the Death of KAREN JANE BINGHAM  

A Regulation 28 Report – Action to Prevent Future Deaths 

__________________________________________________________ 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

  Philip Astle Chief Executive South East Coast Ambulance Service  
  The Chief Constable Surrey County Constabulary  

1 

CORONER 

Caroline Topping HM Assistant Coroner, for the County of Surrey 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

The inquest was opened on the 28th November 2017 and resumed before a Coroner 
with jury on the 4th February 2020. It concluded on the 18th February 2020 and the jury 
returned a narrative conclusion as follows: 

Karen first came in to contact with the Mental Health Services on 13/10/2014, when 
referred to Waverley CMHRS after an overdose.  In March 2015 she was diagnosed with 
Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder. The personality disorder is characterised by 
a highly unpredictable, rapidly changing emotional state, suicidal ideation with risk of self 
harm.  In Karen's case this was exacerbated by alcohol. 

Karen's mental disorder was also exacerbated by being the defendant in harassment 
proceedings and by her perception of being let down by the Criminal Justice System. On 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 occasion, contact with the Police and Criminal Justice System triggered self injurious 
behaviours. 

Karen had made a perjury allegation, and the CIO Officer investigating this allegation 
was aware of the above triggers. 

On 09/10/2017, Karen called police saying she was going to hang herself. Police officers 
attended her home within 20 minutes and cut her down from a noose.  Karen had been 
drinking and going through her legal paperwork and was found standing on a bannister, 
with a noose around her neck.  Karen spoke to the attending police constable about her 
legal investigations including the perjury allegation. 

The attending police constable raised concerns that Karen was at high risk of suicide, 
especially if the on going legal investigations did not give her the result she had hoped 
for. The PC attempted to escalate this concern using a 39:24, an LOI marker, and an 
email addressed to the CID Detective Sergeant, the Detective Constable investigating 
the perjury allegation, and the Surrey Police Professional Standards Department. 

The CIO Investigating Officer and Detective Sergeant did not follow Surrey Police 
Protocol which required them to involve partner organisations (SABP) when dealing with 
Karen. They did however decide that news about the perjury investigation should be 
conveyed in person. 

On 18th November 2017, the CIO Investigating Officer accompanied by a colleague 
attended Karen's address, 
also be present. Karen was informed that her perjury allegation was being filed due to 
lack of evidence. The officers left Karen with her friend. Both officers felt that Karen was 
ok and had taken the news better than expected. Karen's friend also felt she was ok and 
left her alone around 15.15. 

 Farnham, having arranged for Karen's friend to 

During the afternoon of 18/11/17, after her friend left, Karen consumed some alcohol 
and sent an email at 16.05 to the CID Investigating officer discussing her legal case and 
thanking the officer for her investigation.  It is unclear when this email was drafted. It was 
entitled 'Final Statement' and closed with the words 'none of it matters anymore. This is 
what she wanted'. Karen's intent in sending this email is unclear and it was not read by 
the officer until much later. 

At 16.15, Karen called the police on 101 and told the switchboard that she had been 
trying to hang herself and had broken her hand. The police contact centre called her 
back and although Karen assured the call handler that she was ok and did not require 
assistance, the call handler felt that an emergency ambulance and police response was 
required. 

At 17.43 the ambulance crew arrived and were let in to the property by Karen's friend 
who had just arrived. Karen's friend entered the house with the ambulance crew and 
Karen was found hanging from the loft hatch. Her knees were bent with her feet trailing 
on the floor behind her. 

The paramedics attempted to resuscitate Karen, however she was asystolic, cyanosed 
and could not be revived. The Critical Care Paramedic called ROLE (Recognition of Life 
Extinct) at 17.59 on 18th November 2017. 

Matters the jury finds are probably causative: 
In respect of the safeguarding plan put in place when telling Karen about the outcome of 
the perjury investigation on 18th November 2017: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.Sufficient information was not obtained to inform safeguarding plan. 
2.There was a failure to invite SABP to contribute to the plan. 
3. There was a failure  to put Karen's lay supporter on notice of the purpose of the visit 
on 18th November 2017, the concerns about Karen's reaction, and to discuss any role 
that person was expected to play in the safeguarding plan. 
4. There was a failure to put in place an adequate multi-agency safeguarding plan. 

Matters the jury finds are possibly causative, not found established on the balance of 
probabilities: 
1. There was a lack of knowledge among police officers involved with Karen regarding 
how and when to add an update Location of Interest and warning markers on NICHE, 
PNC and ICAD. 
2. The failure to add recent sufficient information to these markers possibly 
compromised the ability of the Police Contact Centre and Force Control Room to make 
an informed decision on 18/11/17. 
3. It is possible that, had accurate up to date information been recorded, a Grade 1 
police response might have been dispatched, despite Karen's assurances to the police 
call handler that she was now ok. 
4. Had  a Grade 1 police response been dispatched it could possibly have materially 
affected the outcome. 

The jury concludes Karen met her death by accident. 

The cause of death was  

1a Hanging  

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

These are fully set out in the narrative conclusion see above.  

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

The evidence showed that: 

1.  Police training in respect of mental health does not provide information as to the 

type of behaviours associated with common mental health conditions.  
2.  Those responsible for the dispatch of emergency services in the police and 

ambulance services do not have a sufficient understanding of the triaging and 
dispatching processes used by each other’s service nor their response times. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe your 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 organisation has the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 25th May 2020. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons; 

Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Trust  

Surrey County Council Adult Social Care  

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary 
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful 
or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your 
response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

Signed: 

Caroline Topping 

Dated this 30th March 2020.

Responses

2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Chief Constable of Surrey Police (PDF)
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE  

Regulation 28: Report to 
Prevent Future Deaths – Karen 
Jane Bingham  

Document details  

Authorising Officer  

Author  

T/Assistant Chief Constable 

Completed: 12/5/2020 

Distribution  

HM Assistant Coroner Caroline Topping 

Executive Summary:  

This report has been written in response to actions outlined within section 5 of HM Assistant Coroner’s 
regulation 28 report following the investigation and inquest into the death touching Karen Jane Bingham.  

HM Assistant Coroner’s request for response to key areas of concern as follows: 

1.  Police training in respect of mental health does not provide information as to the type of 

behaviours associated with common mental health conditions. 

2.  Those responsible for the dispatch of emergency services in the police and ambulance services do 
not have a sufficient understanding of the triaging and dispatching processes used by each other’s 
service nor their response times. 

Surrey Police response  

(In respect of the order in which the points appear above): 

1.  Guidance is currently available via an APP on all officers’ Mobile Data Terminals entitled “Mental 

Health Guide”. This will be updated to ensure the comprehensive section on signs and indicators of 
mental health conditions is at the top of the page and the first thing available for officers to refer 
to. This will be closely followed with contact details for further assistance and advice which includes 
out of hours service available for all officers when faced with a potential mental health situation. 
The guidance also includes initial engagement advice, flowcharts detailing process and advice for 
officers who are considering sectioning an individual.  

  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 The Force is also publishing further details in relation to the roll out of mental health first aiders via 
the Occupational Health Unit which will give a clear list of support available to officers to help them 
identify and deal with mental health issues both with their own staff and when dealing with the 
public. Line managers are also to be delivered training on recognising mental health conditions 
which they will cascade to their own teams.  

The Contact Centre (where all 101 and 99 calls into Force are received) are including a one day 
training session for all of their staff on common mental health conditions later in 2020 to help those 
dealing with the public over the telephone recognise signs and symptoms.  

There is a revised online Mental Health training package which is to be mandated for all officers 
and staff to refresh their knowledge and skills in this area, including recognising common 
behaviours in those with mental health conditions. This will feature an input from SECambs Clinical 
Operations Manager on NHS Pathways and response times.  This will also be supplemented by 
training input at officers’ annual officer safety refresher training during the autumn. 

2. 

In the summer and autumn of 2018 (since Karen’s death) all staff from the Contact Centre and 
Force Control Room (resource dispatch) received training from South East Coast Ambulance 
(SECambs). This included input on NHS Pathways (as described during the inquest), Ambulance 
Response Programme (categories of response and associated time frames) and their Operational 
Business Plan Surge (which protects calls with the highest clinical need where there is excess 
demand). 

To supplement the training a number of staff “exchanges” between Surrey Police and SECambs to 
gain a better understanding of the roles of their respective contact and dispatch functions.  

A quarterly meeting is held between the senior managers of Surrey Police’s Force Control Room, 
and SECambs Emergency Operations Centre to discuss any matters which may impact respective 
services including any themes from incident reviews (albeit these meetings have been postponed 
during the current Covid-19 pandemic). 

A new Decision Support Flowchart, to help police officers and Contact Centre staff identify the 
appropriate NHS Pathway when dealing with members of the public (e.g. 999, 111, GP etc), has 
been agreed across Surrey, Sussex and Kent with a planned implementation date of October 2020.
Response from Secamb (PDF)
South East Coast Ambulance 
Service NHS Foundation Trust 
Nexus House 
Gatwick Road 
Crawley 
RH10 9BG 

0300 123 0999 

Ms Caroline Topping 
HM Assistant Coroner for Surrey 

By email only 

11 May 2020 

Dear Madam 

Karen Bingham deceased 

I write in response to the Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths Report that you issued 
in this case on 30 March 2020.  I was very sorry to hear of Ms Bingham’s passing and I 
would like to pass my personal condolences to Ms Bingham’s family. 

I am not able to respond to the first matter of concern raised in your report as this concerns 
Surrey  Police  alone.  I  therefore  confine  my  response  to  the  second  matter  of  concern, 
namely: 

“Those responsible for the dispatch of emergency services in the police and ambulance 
services do not have a sufficient understanding of the triaging and dispatching processes 
used by each other’s service nor their response times”. 

I would like to break your concern down into two areas: 

1.  SECAmb’s dispatch staff’s knowledge of police dispatch procedures 

  and 

I understand that evidence was given to the inquest by two of my senior managers, 
  as  to  how  SECAmb’s  Emergency  Operations  Centre 
(“EOC”)  functions  so  I  do not  intend to  repeat  that here.  From  that  evidence,  the 
Court is aware that a national triage system called NHS Pathways (“NHSP”) is used 
in our EOC to triage and categorise calls.  NHSP arrives at a “disposition” – a call 
categorisation. Our Resource Dispatcher will see the incident immediately when the 
area of the incident becomes apparent and can assign a resource either immediately 
for  a  Category  One  (“C1”)  call  or  after  or  during  triage  for  other  categories.  This 
visibility allows the dispatcher to start planning a suitable resource to send to the 
patient during triage. The dispatcher will assign an ambulance resource when  an 
appropriate  vehicle  becomes  available  in  a  reasonable  vicinity  of  the  incident.  
Resources  are  primarily  assigned firstly  according  to  urgency  (C1  calls first,  then 
category 2 etc) and secondly, within a category, on the length of time the call has 

  Chairman: David Astley 

                   Chief Executive Officer: Philip Astle 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 been waiting (the oldest C2 call will be assigned a resource before the second oldest 
etc).  There are limited circumstances in which a call can be elevated to a higher 
priority than its place in the queue of outstanding calls.  Dispatchers are supported 
by  nurse  and  paramedic  Clinical  Supervisors,  coordinated  by  a  Clinical  Safety 
Navigator,  who  are  assigned  to  oversee  ‘Clinical  Prioritisation’  of  all  incidents 
awaiting  resource  allocation.  Clinical  Prioritisation  includes  undertaking  clinical 
reviews of individual incidents, undertaking welfare checks, calling back cases for 
enhanced  triage,  upgrading/downgrading  and  prioritising  individual  cases  within 
their existing categorisation.  Furthermore, dispatchers have a route of escalation 
through  a  Dispatch  Team  Leader  (DTL)  and  Clinical  Supervisor  to  highlight  any 
individual incidents where they have reason for concern. 

Whether another emergency service is attending an incident and in what timeframe 
are not factors that would normally influence a dispatcher’s decision making. There 
are a very limited number of scenarios in which knowledge of the type and number 
of co-responders from other services being assigned may be of use, for example: 

• 

If multiple police resources were attending a patient experiencing a mental 
health illness and were needing to restrain them, we might consider Acute 
Behavioural Disturbance and think about sending a Critical Care Paramedic. 
•  An  incident  involving  multiple fire appliances  would  be  a  consideration for 

Hazardous Area Response Team allocation. 

Our  dispatchers  are  not  specifically  trained  in  police  triaging  or  dispatching 
processes  because  such  knowledge  would  so  rarely  factor  into  their  dispatching 
decisions, which are based on clinical need. 

As  mentioned  above,  calls  awaiting  assignment  of  an  ambulance  resource  are 
under  constant  review  by  a  clinician,  who  does  have  the  ability  to  alter  the 
categorisation or priority of a call.  The decisions of the clinician are made on clinical 
grounds; factors such as history, environment, load on our system are also taken 
into  account.  Knowledge  of  estimated  arrival  times  of  other  emergency  services 
would not influence these clinical decisions in the vast majority of cases. 

Where there is concern between agencies, the issue can be raised at an operational 
or  tactical  management  level  where  the  principles  of  JESIP  will  be  applied.  Put 
simply, the Police Operational Commander can, and does, talk to the EOC Manager 
or Clinician Supervisor to discuss the incident. 

In  light  of  the  above,  I  consider  that  the  knowledge  of  my  EOC  staff  of  police 
dispatching  processes  is  sufficient  at  present  to  enable  them  to  carry  out  their 
functions safely and appropriately. 

2.  Police dispatch staff’s knowledge of SECAmb’s dispatch procedures 

 gave evidence to the inquest of the actions taken by SECAmb to ensure 
that  our  police  colleagues  are  aware  of  our  call  categorisations  and  response 
targets.  At  the  time  the  Ambulance  Response  Programme  was  rolled  out  in 
SECAmb (on 22 November 2017) a comprehensive document was prepared for our 
partner organisations and distributed to them. This includes the three police forces 

Chairman: Sir Peter Dixon 

   Acting Chief Executive: Geraint Davies 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 with  whom  we  principally  work:  Surrey,  Sussex  and  Kent.  We  created  and 
disseminated  a  further  document  for  our  partner  agencies  explaining  our  Surge 
Management  Plan,  including  information  on  how  we  triage/prioritise  calls,  ARP 
response targets, SMP triggers and our actions. We also have in place a system for 
notifying  Police  Force  Control  Rooms  by  email  when  we  reach  the  levels  of  our 
Surge Management Plan whereby there is a substantial risk that we will struggle to 
reach our target response times. 

SECAmb rely on our police partners to disseminate internally the information that 
we provide.  It is for each force to ensure that all relevant materials are cascaded to 
all those who need to know of their contents. 

Notwithstanding  the  efforts  we  have  previously  made  to  ensure  our  police 
colleagues are aware of our processes, we have considered, in light of this case, 
  and  the  EOC  Operating  Unit  Manager 
whether  we  could  go  further. 
responsible for dispatch 
 are in the early stages of a review of our Surge 
Management  Plan.  We  consider  that  it  would  be  constructive  to  involve  all  three 
police forces in our area as part of that review to discuss possible joint actions that 
could be taken when certain levels of stress on our system are reached.  There are 
many options that we consider worth joint discussion, some of which could lead to 
closer working of our respective control rooms. 
 will  work 
with  our  Blue  Light  Collaboration  Manager  to  liaise  with  our  police  colleagues  to 
explore  opportunities  for  closer  collaborative  working. Whilst  I  do  not  have  a  firm 
timescale for this review, particularly in current circumstances, I would very much 
hope that it will be concluded and implemented before the end of this year. 

If I can assist you further in relation to any of the above, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. 

Yours sincerely 

Philip Astle 
Chief Executive Officer 
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust 

Chairman: Sir Peter Dixon 

   Acting Chief Executive: Geraint Davies

Related reports

Other reports by Caroline Topping

See all →

More reports categorised “Mental Health related deaths”

See all →

Track Mental Health related deaths

See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching Mental Health related deaths, and how often a new one appears.

What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text

Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.

These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.