Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2020
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2020-0081, written 30 Mar 2020. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 30 Mar 2020 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2020-0081 |
| Deceased | Karen Bingham |
| Coroner | Caroline Topping |
| Coroner area | Surrey |
| Category | Mental Health related deaths · Other related deaths · Emergency services related deaths (2019 onwards) |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
IN THE SURREY CORONER’S COURT IN THE MATTER OF: KAREN JANE BINGHAM __________________________________________________________ The Inquest Touching the Death of KAREN JANE BINGHAM A Regulation 28 Report – Action to Prevent Future Deaths __________________________________________________________ THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: Philip Astle Chief Executive South East Coast Ambulance Service The Chief Constable Surrey County Constabulary 1 CORONER Caroline Topping HM Assistant Coroner, for the County of Surrey 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 3 INVESTIGATION and INQUEST The inquest was opened on the 28th November 2017 and resumed before a Coroner with jury on the 4th February 2020. It concluded on the 18th February 2020 and the jury returned a narrative conclusion as follows: Karen first came in to contact with the Mental Health Services on 13/10/2014, when referred to Waverley CMHRS after an overdose. In March 2015 she was diagnosed with Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder. The personality disorder is characterised by a highly unpredictable, rapidly changing emotional state, suicidal ideation with risk of self harm. In Karen's case this was exacerbated by alcohol. Karen's mental disorder was also exacerbated by being the defendant in harassment proceedings and by her perception of being let down by the Criminal Justice System. On occasion, contact with the Police and Criminal Justice System triggered self injurious behaviours. Karen had made a perjury allegation, and the CIO Officer investigating this allegation was aware of the above triggers. On 09/10/2017, Karen called police saying she was going to hang herself. Police officers attended her home within 20 minutes and cut her down from a noose. Karen had been drinking and going through her legal paperwork and was found standing on a bannister, with a noose around her neck. Karen spoke to the attending police constable about her legal investigations including the perjury allegation. The attending police constable raised concerns that Karen was at high risk of suicide, especially if the on going legal investigations did not give her the result she had hoped for. The PC attempted to escalate this concern using a 39:24, an LOI marker, and an email addressed to the CID Detective Sergeant, the Detective Constable investigating the perjury allegation, and the Surrey Police Professional Standards Department. The CIO Investigating Officer and Detective Sergeant did not follow Surrey Police Protocol which required them to involve partner organisations (SABP) when dealing with Karen. They did however decide that news about the perjury investigation should be conveyed in person. On 18th November 2017, the CIO Investigating Officer accompanied by a colleague attended Karen's address, also be present. Karen was informed that her perjury allegation was being filed due to lack of evidence. The officers left Karen with her friend. Both officers felt that Karen was ok and had taken the news better than expected. Karen's friend also felt she was ok and left her alone around 15.15. Farnham, having arranged for Karen's friend to During the afternoon of 18/11/17, after her friend left, Karen consumed some alcohol and sent an email at 16.05 to the CID Investigating officer discussing her legal case and thanking the officer for her investigation. It is unclear when this email was drafted. It was entitled 'Final Statement' and closed with the words 'none of it matters anymore. This is what she wanted'. Karen's intent in sending this email is unclear and it was not read by the officer until much later. At 16.15, Karen called the police on 101 and told the switchboard that she had been trying to hang herself and had broken her hand. The police contact centre called her back and although Karen assured the call handler that she was ok and did not require assistance, the call handler felt that an emergency ambulance and police response was required. At 17.43 the ambulance crew arrived and were let in to the property by Karen's friend who had just arrived. Karen's friend entered the house with the ambulance crew and Karen was found hanging from the loft hatch. Her knees were bent with her feet trailing on the floor behind her. The paramedics attempted to resuscitate Karen, however she was asystolic, cyanosed and could not be revived. The Critical Care Paramedic called ROLE (Recognition of Life Extinct) at 17.59 on 18th November 2017. Matters the jury finds are probably causative: In respect of the safeguarding plan put in place when telling Karen about the outcome of the perjury investigation on 18th November 2017: 1.Sufficient information was not obtained to inform safeguarding plan. 2.There was a failure to invite SABP to contribute to the plan. 3. There was a failure to put Karen's lay supporter on notice of the purpose of the visit on 18th November 2017, the concerns about Karen's reaction, and to discuss any role that person was expected to play in the safeguarding plan. 4. There was a failure to put in place an adequate multi-agency safeguarding plan. Matters the jury finds are possibly causative, not found established on the balance of probabilities: 1. There was a lack of knowledge among police officers involved with Karen regarding how and when to add an update Location of Interest and warning markers on NICHE, PNC and ICAD. 2. The failure to add recent sufficient information to these markers possibly compromised the ability of the Police Contact Centre and Force Control Room to make an informed decision on 18/11/17. 3. It is possible that, had accurate up to date information been recorded, a Grade 1 police response might have been dispatched, despite Karen's assurances to the police call handler that she was now ok. 4. Had a Grade 1 police response been dispatched it could possibly have materially affected the outcome. The jury concludes Karen met her death by accident. The cause of death was 1a Hanging CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH These are fully set out in the narrative conclusion see above. 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. – The evidence showed that: 1. Police training in respect of mental health does not provide information as to the type of behaviours associated with common mental health conditions. 2. Those responsible for the dispatch of emergency services in the police and ambulance services do not have a sufficient understanding of the triaging and dispatching processes used by each other’s service nor their response times. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe your organisation has the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 25th May 2020. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons; Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Trust Surrey County Council Adult Social Care I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 Signed: Caroline Topping Dated this 30th March 2020.
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Karen Jane Bingham Document details Authorising Officer Author T/Assistant Chief Constable Completed: 12/5/2020 Distribution HM Assistant Coroner Caroline Topping Executive Summary: This report has been written in response to actions outlined within section 5 of HM Assistant Coroner’s regulation 28 report following the investigation and inquest into the death touching Karen Jane Bingham. HM Assistant Coroner’s request for response to key areas of concern as follows: 1. Police training in respect of mental health does not provide information as to the type of behaviours associated with common mental health conditions. 2. Those responsible for the dispatch of emergency services in the police and ambulance services do not have a sufficient understanding of the triaging and dispatching processes used by each other’s service nor their response times. Surrey Police response (In respect of the order in which the points appear above): 1. Guidance is currently available via an APP on all officers’ Mobile Data Terminals entitled “Mental Health Guide”. This will be updated to ensure the comprehensive section on signs and indicators of mental health conditions is at the top of the page and the first thing available for officers to refer to. This will be closely followed with contact details for further assistance and advice which includes out of hours service available for all officers when faced with a potential mental health situation. The guidance also includes initial engagement advice, flowcharts detailing process and advice for officers who are considering sectioning an individual. The Force is also publishing further details in relation to the roll out of mental health first aiders via the Occupational Health Unit which will give a clear list of support available to officers to help them identify and deal with mental health issues both with their own staff and when dealing with the public. Line managers are also to be delivered training on recognising mental health conditions which they will cascade to their own teams. The Contact Centre (where all 101 and 99 calls into Force are received) are including a one day training session for all of their staff on common mental health conditions later in 2020 to help those dealing with the public over the telephone recognise signs and symptoms. There is a revised online Mental Health training package which is to be mandated for all officers and staff to refresh their knowledge and skills in this area, including recognising common behaviours in those with mental health conditions. This will feature an input from SECambs Clinical Operations Manager on NHS Pathways and response times. This will also be supplemented by training input at officers’ annual officer safety refresher training during the autumn. 2. In the summer and autumn of 2018 (since Karen’s death) all staff from the Contact Centre and Force Control Room (resource dispatch) received training from South East Coast Ambulance (SECambs). This included input on NHS Pathways (as described during the inquest), Ambulance Response Programme (categories of response and associated time frames) and their Operational Business Plan Surge (which protects calls with the highest clinical need where there is excess demand). To supplement the training a number of staff “exchanges” between Surrey Police and SECambs to gain a better understanding of the roles of their respective contact and dispatch functions. A quarterly meeting is held between the senior managers of Surrey Police’s Force Control Room, and SECambs Emergency Operations Centre to discuss any matters which may impact respective services including any themes from incident reviews (albeit these meetings have been postponed during the current Covid-19 pandemic). A new Decision Support Flowchart, to help police officers and Contact Centre staff identify the appropriate NHS Pathway when dealing with members of the public (e.g. 999, 111, GP etc), has been agreed across Surrey, Sussex and Kent with a planned implementation date of October 2020.
South East Coast Ambulance
Service NHS Foundation Trust
Nexus House
Gatwick Road
Crawley
RH10 9BG
0300 123 0999
Ms Caroline Topping
HM Assistant Coroner for Surrey
By email only
11 May 2020
Dear Madam
Karen Bingham deceased
I write in response to the Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths Report that you issued
in this case on 30 March 2020. I was very sorry to hear of Ms Bingham’s passing and I
would like to pass my personal condolences to Ms Bingham’s family.
I am not able to respond to the first matter of concern raised in your report as this concerns
Surrey Police alone. I therefore confine my response to the second matter of concern,
namely:
“Those responsible for the dispatch of emergency services in the police and ambulance
services do not have a sufficient understanding of the triaging and dispatching processes
used by each other’s service nor their response times”.
I would like to break your concern down into two areas:
1. SECAmb’s dispatch staff’s knowledge of police dispatch procedures
and
I understand that evidence was given to the inquest by two of my senior managers,
as to how SECAmb’s Emergency Operations Centre
(“EOC”) functions so I do not intend to repeat that here. From that evidence, the
Court is aware that a national triage system called NHS Pathways (“NHSP”) is used
in our EOC to triage and categorise calls. NHSP arrives at a “disposition” – a call
categorisation. Our Resource Dispatcher will see the incident immediately when the
area of the incident becomes apparent and can assign a resource either immediately
for a Category One (“C1”) call or after or during triage for other categories. This
visibility allows the dispatcher to start planning a suitable resource to send to the
patient during triage. The dispatcher will assign an ambulance resource when an
appropriate vehicle becomes available in a reasonable vicinity of the incident.
Resources are primarily assigned firstly according to urgency (C1 calls first, then
category 2 etc) and secondly, within a category, on the length of time the call has
Chairman: David Astley
Chief Executive Officer: Philip Astle
been waiting (the oldest C2 call will be assigned a resource before the second oldest
etc). There are limited circumstances in which a call can be elevated to a higher
priority than its place in the queue of outstanding calls. Dispatchers are supported
by nurse and paramedic Clinical Supervisors, coordinated by a Clinical Safety
Navigator, who are assigned to oversee ‘Clinical Prioritisation’ of all incidents
awaiting resource allocation. Clinical Prioritisation includes undertaking clinical
reviews of individual incidents, undertaking welfare checks, calling back cases for
enhanced triage, upgrading/downgrading and prioritising individual cases within
their existing categorisation. Furthermore, dispatchers have a route of escalation
through a Dispatch Team Leader (DTL) and Clinical Supervisor to highlight any
individual incidents where they have reason for concern.
Whether another emergency service is attending an incident and in what timeframe
are not factors that would normally influence a dispatcher’s decision making. There
are a very limited number of scenarios in which knowledge of the type and number
of co-responders from other services being assigned may be of use, for example:
•
If multiple police resources were attending a patient experiencing a mental
health illness and were needing to restrain them, we might consider Acute
Behavioural Disturbance and think about sending a Critical Care Paramedic.
• An incident involving multiple fire appliances would be a consideration for
Hazardous Area Response Team allocation.
Our dispatchers are not specifically trained in police triaging or dispatching
processes because such knowledge would so rarely factor into their dispatching
decisions, which are based on clinical need.
As mentioned above, calls awaiting assignment of an ambulance resource are
under constant review by a clinician, who does have the ability to alter the
categorisation or priority of a call. The decisions of the clinician are made on clinical
grounds; factors such as history, environment, load on our system are also taken
into account. Knowledge of estimated arrival times of other emergency services
would not influence these clinical decisions in the vast majority of cases.
Where there is concern between agencies, the issue can be raised at an operational
or tactical management level where the principles of JESIP will be applied. Put
simply, the Police Operational Commander can, and does, talk to the EOC Manager
or Clinician Supervisor to discuss the incident.
In light of the above, I consider that the knowledge of my EOC staff of police
dispatching processes is sufficient at present to enable them to carry out their
functions safely and appropriately.
2. Police dispatch staff’s knowledge of SECAmb’s dispatch procedures
gave evidence to the inquest of the actions taken by SECAmb to ensure
that our police colleagues are aware of our call categorisations and response
targets. At the time the Ambulance Response Programme was rolled out in
SECAmb (on 22 November 2017) a comprehensive document was prepared for our
partner organisations and distributed to them. This includes the three police forces
Chairman: Sir Peter Dixon
Acting Chief Executive: Geraint Davies
with whom we principally work: Surrey, Sussex and Kent. We created and
disseminated a further document for our partner agencies explaining our Surge
Management Plan, including information on how we triage/prioritise calls, ARP
response targets, SMP triggers and our actions. We also have in place a system for
notifying Police Force Control Rooms by email when we reach the levels of our
Surge Management Plan whereby there is a substantial risk that we will struggle to
reach our target response times.
SECAmb rely on our police partners to disseminate internally the information that
we provide. It is for each force to ensure that all relevant materials are cascaded to
all those who need to know of their contents.
Notwithstanding the efforts we have previously made to ensure our police
colleagues are aware of our processes, we have considered, in light of this case,
and the EOC Operating Unit Manager
whether we could go further.
responsible for dispatch
are in the early stages of a review of our Surge
Management Plan. We consider that it would be constructive to involve all three
police forces in our area as part of that review to discuss possible joint actions that
could be taken when certain levels of stress on our system are reached. There are
many options that we consider worth joint discussion, some of which could lead to
closer working of our respective control rooms.
will work
with our Blue Light Collaboration Manager to liaise with our police colleagues to
explore opportunities for closer collaborative working. Whilst I do not have a firm
timescale for this review, particularly in current circumstances, I would very much
hope that it will be concluded and implemented before the end of this year.
If I can assist you further in relation to any of the above, please do not hesitate to contact
me.
Yours sincerely
Philip Astle
Chief Executive Officer
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust
Chairman: Sir Peter Dixon
Acting Chief Executive: Geraint Davies
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